US Marine Urban Combined-arms Operations in Iraq: Some Observations

This article discusses US Marine Corps combined-arms tactics in Operation Iraqi Freedom in March and April 2003 by examining the way in which live force-experimentation was converted into actual combat effectiveness. Live force-experimentation conducted by Project Metropolis at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory proved to be a useful indication of real combat conditions. As a result, an analysis of Marine experimentation and its relationship with operational experience holds valuable lessons for the Australian Army as it embarks on the Hardening and Networking the Army (HNA) initiative.

Fighting in the Urban Littorals: The US Marine Corps Focus

Improved urban combat capabilities became an integral part of Marine Corps operational thinking during the tenure of General Charles Krulak as Commandant in the mid-1990s, and a Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory was developed during 1995. General Krulak’s personal interest in preparing for urban combat was clear from his frequent use of the phrase ‘three-block war’ as a means of capturing the complexity of military operations. An experimentation program named Urban Warrior was initiated by the Marines and was aimed at improving warfighting capabilities in cities. The program identified a number of key technologies for urban warfare, including intra-squad radios, thermal sights and mechanical breaching equipment. In addition, live force-experimentation quickly identified deficiencies in individual and collective training skills. Despite the advantages of advanced technology, specific techniques and tactics were required for urban combat.

Project Metropolis

As a result of lessons drawn from the Urban Warrior program, the Marine Corps established Project Metropolis in 1999. The primary aim of this project was the development of a ‘base line’ training package aimed at increasing individual and unit proficiency in urban operations. The project’s hypothesis was that a properly trained and equipped Marine Air and Ground Task Force (MAGTF) could succeed in urban combat and sustain acceptable casualties. The development of such a training package was aimed at a general-purpose force employing combined-arms teams in an urban environment. A distinction of this nature was important because current close-quarter battle techniques—used by more specialised elements such as special operations forces and force reconnaissance units—were unsuitable for high-intensity urban warfare.

Basic Urban Skills Training

Over a period of six years, Project Metropolis developed a Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) syllabus designed to provide Marine infantry with urban combat skills. Employing mainly live force-experimentation, the BUST syllabus provided training for Marines in individual and collective skills within fire teams composed of four men and within squads consisting of thirteen men. Subsequently, the BUST syllabus was expanded to embrace a wider range of formations and tactics. These formations and tactics included platoons employing heavy weapons and snipers in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), and battalion-size landing teams operating as part of a MAGTF.

Marine divisions became willing to provide forces to the Warfighting Laboratory and Project Metropolis for the following reasons. First, the BUST syllabus was regarded as a valuable initiative. Second, the Warfighting Laboratory provided the latest training equipment that was often not readily available through normal service channels. Third, the use of ammunition from a Special Effects Small Marking system (SESAM) in the experimentation process proved to be an invaluable training tool in preparing for urban combat. The use of SESAM ammunition permitted a degree of realism in the fire experimentation since at ranges of 75 m or less the effects could be painful. Moreover, the use of SESAM ammunition demonstrated that concealment did not equal cover. Through experimentation, Marines soon learnt that taking cover behind a plaster wall inside a house was unsafe and could result in quick casualties. The final advantage of the SESAM system was its employment of coloured ammunition that allowed participants to quickly see the results of exchanges of fire and to take appropriate measures in order to avoid fratricide. Through the above measures, the Project Metropolis team developed a training package whose value was soon understood within the Marine Corps.

Bust and Combined Arms Experimentation

The final step in the development of the BUST program was the conduct of an experiment requiring the full integration of combined arms teams in forcible-entry operations. During the summer of 2002, Project Metropolis personnel conducted an experiment aimed at testing battalion-landing teams that would transition from warfighting to peace enforcement tasks in an intense and dangerous operational environment. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7) became the designated experimental force. Attachments to the battalion included an M1 tank, armoured amphibious vehicle (AAV), and light-armoured vehicle (LAV) platoons. Other force elements assigned to the experimentation force included combat engineers and reconnaissance-and-combat service support troops.

Initially the entire battalion-landing team was trained in BUST techniques. Such an approach was important because it recognised the fact that all participating forces in urban combat, regardless of their tasks, must be trained to be familiar with the complexities of urban operations.¹ BUST training for the experimental force was based on a three-week training schedule split into four five-day phases. The first five-day phase involved general training in urban operations for all participant elements, including infantry, armour, artillery and combat support troops. The second five-day training period was more specific in character and focused especially on close combat. A third five-day period involved platoon-level training concentrated on understanding vehicle capabilities and on the limitations of integrating combined arms in close combat. The final five days in the program involved company-level combined-arms teams training that was conducted within a battalion group command-and-control structure.

On completion of build-up training, preparation of an urban warfare scenario commenced, in which the Marine Corps used role players and an opposing force. This sequence of training involved a battalion-landing team initiating an entry operation into the ‘city’. As the scenario unfolded, the battalion-landing team underwent a transition through the ‘three-block’ sequence—in particular from the Block III high-end fight to Block II operations involving peace enforcement. The experiment revealed a number of valuable lessons. First, the urban facility required in simulating an operation involving a battalion-landing team must be large—indeed, substantially larger than any urban training facility currently available to the US Marine Corps. In the 2002 experiment, the Marines made use of a former US Air Force facility, George Air Base in Victorville, California. Nearly 400 buildings, ranging from single to four stories in height, were made available from a former married quarter. This type of building complex is probably the minimum requirement for any realistic battalion-level activity in urban warfare. A second important lesson was the realisation by the US Marine Corps that the transition in operations from Block III to Block II modes is a true test of a military organisation’s adaptability and skills. Possessing military personnel that are capable of dealing with humanitarian issues while simultaneously fighting a highly trained enemy is a valuable capability for any unit in the field.

Project Metropolis produced a valuable training package that spanned all levels of activity for Marine battalion landing teams. The Third Battalion came away from the experimentation program with a level of experience whose full benefit would not be apparent until deployment as part of the 1st Marine Division to Iraq in 2003.

Preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom

Operation Iraqi Freedom presented numerous challenges to the 1st Marine Division, most notably in the area of distributed command and control. Despite significant advances in information collection at the operational level, the advance to Baghdad in April 2003 was largely based on information that Marine battalions had collected. Before D-Day, Coalition planning concentrated on the ‘opening gambit’ or the initial push into Iraq. Military activity aimed at seizing the Iraqi gas–oil separation plants before these were damaged—an action that operational planners saw as critical to the achievement of the Coalition’s strategy. The Commanding General 1st Marine Division, Major General James Mattis, gave clear and succinct guidance to all Marines down to unit level while in holding areas in Kuwait.

General Mattis’s clear exposition of the mission proved to be crucial once communications became difficult during operations. There were numerous instances in which battalion commanders were required to make decisions based on minimum information from higher sources. Commanders relied on two primary means of information: that provided by organic manoeuvre elements and that provided by personal communication with higher commanders.

Communications

Communications technology had advanced significantly since the Division’s previous operations in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Based primarily on very high frequency (VHF) communications, battalion-level command and control during Iraqi Freedom was often overstretched. Battalion forward elements often found themselves attempting to communicate with a headquarters situated 20 km in their rear. At the same time, the headquarters would, in turn, be trying to direct logistic elements another 20 km further back. Because VHF communications were often inadequate, satellite communications proved to be invaluable. Particular systems such as Blue Force Tracker provided enhanced situation awareness, while individual commanders could communicate with each other using satellite phones.

Communications at small-unit level were, however, greatly assisted by new VHF and UHF communication systems. Of particular importance was the employment of the UHF personal role radios (PRR) at the individual and small-team levels and the VHF/UHF Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) at the squad and platoon levels. These two radio systems permitted increased situational awareness within the urban combat environment of Iraq. Personal role and multi-band team radios allowed squad leaders to manoeuvre their fire teams in accordance with their platoon commander’s directions. In addition, multi-band team radios allowed squad leaders to direct critical close air-support from both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The ability of ground forces to bring air support to bear was vital because in urban combat conditions in Iraq, traditional forward air-controllers were often unable to view targets. Personal role radios allowed Marines at the team level (four Marines) to communicate with their squad leader at ranges of between 100 and 500 m. This ability was valuable during convoy operations, when vehicle commanders were able to pass fire directions to Marines operating missiles and heavy guns from the turrets of vehicles.

Earlier, Marine Corps experimentation in tank and infantry cooperation had demonstrated that use of a tank telephone would be important in integrating infantry–tank efforts in urban combat. As a result, shortly before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps Abrams tanks were retrofitted with the VIC 3 tank telephone. This communications device proved critical during combat, particularly for tank crewmen who were unable to discriminate between military and civilian targets in urban areas. The telephone provided an additional ‘eye’ for tank crews and increased their ability to engage targets with confidence and precision.

The Commander's Presence

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine commanders often placed themselves well forward during close fighting. It was not uncommon for a divisional commander to be physically present at a battalion action while coordinating manoeuvre elsewhere by use of a satellite telephone. Similarly, battalion commanders often moved forward with rifle companies to those locations that they considered to be at ‘the point of most friction’. While these command techniques were often successful, it was also risky since the history of warfare is replete with exposed commanders killed by sniper fire. Fortunately, in Iraq there were few encounters with trained snipers and, as a result, most unit commanders felt comfortable moving forward during combat engagements.

Combined Arms Operations

It was evident from the author’s discussions with individual Marines that the enemy, although fierce when encountered in pockets of resistance, was not coordinated at any high level in Iraq. Indeed, there were some instances in Iraq in which dispersed enemy groups would ambush a Marine armoured column, only to fire on each other because of their lack of tactical coordination. Ultimately, many Marines felt that there was no opposition in Iraq that could not be overcome by well-trained and well-equipped combined-arms teams, ranging from rifle companies to battalion-level units. Marine battalions fighting as landing-team entry forces and employing combined arms possessed significant warfighting capability. A battalion-level team fighting as part of a MAGTF could also call on rotary- and fixed-wing air-support.

Combat in Iraq and Battalion Landing Teams

During Iraqi Freedom, assaults by Marine Corps battalion-landing teams were often spearheaded by M1AI Abrams tanks. The tanks would penetrate urban areas, seeking to secure any high-speed routes for follow-on logistic elements. Tank and mechanised units also would secure specific advantage points near built-up areas in order to allow combined arms teams to begin penetrating urban areas. If contact was made with the enemy, the Abrams tanks would seek to identify the source of the hostile fire. If the armour could not identify the source of enemy activity, then mechanised infantry teams would deploy and ‘talk on’ the tanks until they located and destroyed the enemy positions. The mechanised infantry team employing heavy machine-guns, grenade launchers and other weapons systems would seek to mark the path towards targets for the Abrams tanks. Under these conditions, the choice of munitions was critical. For instance, the SABOT round usually proved unsuitable in the urban environment because of its powerful capability to penetrate multiple buildings. In its place, the multipurpose antitank (MPAT) round with variable fuze settings proved to be far more effective for urban combat.

Close Air-Attack and Fire Support in Iraq

In Iraq, the type of close air-support employed by the four US services—the Marines, the US Air Force, the US Navy and the Army—was based on three tactical levels determined by a risk assessment of collateral damage occurring. Type one of close air-support required forward air-controllers to synchronise attacking aircraft and the designated target using visual means. This tactic was important in situations where carefully coordinated control of air attack was necessary due to the proximity of friendly troops or innocent civilians.

Type two of close air-support was employed whenever a forward air-controller could not see the target, but might still be able to vector the aircraft attack onto its objective based on a ‘talk on’ from a forward observer. This tactic was useful at night, or in adverse weather conditions. Finally, type three of close air-support attack was used when the level of risk to friendly forces and civilian noncombatants was low. When in contact with aircraft, forward air-controllers would normally announce the close air-support type that was to be employed. The most common close air-support types used in Operation Iraqi Freedom were types two and three.

Other methods of fire support involved combat elements that were formed into combined anti-armour teams. Such teams—equipped with grenade launchers, heavy machine guns and tube-launched optically tracked wire-guided (TOW) missiles—supported Marine infantry fighting through the urban centers or deployed to the flanks of towns in order to interdict the reinforcement or withdrawal of enemy forces. The combined anti-armour teams provided accurate suppressive fire, with TOW missiles being used to strike at point targets in the upper stories of buildings. These teams could also undertake snap engagements with TOW missiles since the weapons system could also be used as a general weapon of suppression.

The tactics that the Iraqis employed often involved fighting from entrenchments situated at the base of buildings or under palm trees in order to avoid aerial observation. The Iraqis assumed that attempting to engage American forces from within buildings would quickly lead to targeting by US aircraft and cut off any chance of withdrawal and escape. As a result, enemy units would often wait until the lead elements of mechanised and armoured teams were within 100 m of their positions and then open fire with a volley of rocket-propelled grenades. Upon coming under fire, Marine tanks and mechanised elements would break into small groups in which armour would cooperate with infantry squads. The infantry would direct armoured firepower onto enemy positions, with tank telephones providing communications between the two fighting elements.

Some Lessons from Close Combat in Iraq

One of the most important factors in the ultimate success of the Marines in urban close combat involved the ability of the Abrams tank to survive multiple hits from a variety of anti-armoured weapons and thus remain in close support of the assault infantry. Both Marine infantry and tank crews developed an intimate knowledge of each other’s capabilities and limitations. Without such knowledge and cooperation each combat arm was vulnerable in urban operations. Significantly, those Marine units with training experience in combined arms warfare conducted prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom enjoyed early operational success.

Another useful lesson from urban operations in Iraq was the need to equip the infantry with suitable organic firepower for close-range fighting at both below street level and in elevated buildings. A weapons system that requires ‘powering up’ and optical target acquisition is unsuitable in an urban combat environment. Marine infantry discovered that there was a critical requirement that all elements of the combined arms team possess a detailed knowledge of the effects of their various weapons in close combat. This knowledge is critical when employing air–ground weapons systems in close proximity to friendly troops or civilians. Thus, the Marines expressed preferences for MPAT over SABOT, for using direct and indirect weapons in close fighting and for precision artillery.

The Marine Corps also discovered that individual fire from the M-16 rifle at close range was not always effective in bringing enemy combatants down quickly, especially if those combatants were fighting under the apparent influence of narcotics. Moreover, grenades thrown in close combat would be tossed back at friendly forces if the latter did not allow them to ‘cook off’ initially. The Marines also discovered that thermobaric weapons, employed at the infantry squad level, had limited effect if personnel armed with them lacked live firing practice. Many Marines reported that it was only when troops mastered the correct techniques that thermobaric weapons proved devastating in urban combat.

Some Complications in the Urban Battlespace

There were several complicating factors experienced by Marine forces operating in Iraq that are worth noting. A unique feature of the fighting throughout Iraqi urban areas was the constant presence of civilians. Regardless of the intensity of a battle and the power and range of the weapons being employed, Iraqi residents usually remained at home and in some cases watched the fighting closely. Many Marines found this behaviour to be somewhat unusual, until they realised that the Iraqis had endured decades of dictatorship and that the presence of military forces and weapons on the streets was not foreign to a majority of them.

Most Marines believed that the persistent presence of civilians in a warfighting zone is an operational aspect that needs to be incorporated into future urban combat training. In addition, the intermixing of Iraqi civilians with Iraqi combatants created complications for the Marines. For instance, despite configuring battalion-landing teams for warfighting, the Marines found that some elements had to be dedicated to humanitarian activities. There also appeared to be little or no time between the end of a close-combat engagement and the appearance of civilians on the streets. Many Marines were amazed by this phenomenon. Local people and vehicles moving immediately into close proximity of the Marines often compromised the safety buffer that followed completion of a successful fire-fight. Under these conditions, operational security, especially the risk of an attack by suicide bombers, became a real problem.

In conditions of urban warfare, the Marines also found that friendly, noncombatant and enemy casualties often required medical treatment simultaneously. On a number of occasions the Marine medical system was overwhelmed by a large number of noncombatant casualties. Yet another lesson was that language barriers were not confined to the spoken word. Marines on the streets discovered that the common Western hand signal for halt was, in Iraq, regarded as a sign to continue approaching. Given the threat of suicide bombers in vehicles, the problem of a misunderstanding by noncombatants approaching military checkpoints became another difficult problem for the Marines to control. Finally, it is useful to note that the use of non-lethal weapons by the Marine Corps in Iraq was largely ineffective. The majority of the Iraqi people had never seen a baton gun, beanbag or CS canister fired before. As a result, crowds could not discriminate between weapons. As a result, the brandishing of non-lethal munitions could result in a violent response from Iraqi crowds and escalate an incident. Accordingly, to avoid confusion and escalation of a crisis, the 1st Marine Division decided not to employ non-lethal weapons.

Conclusion

From the mid-1990s onwards, the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory began to prepare for urban warfare through concept development and experimentation. The aim was to uncover improved methods to fight, survive and win in built-up urban areas. The development of the BUST package allowed the Marine Corps to develop a combined arms team approach to urban combat that was, and is, probably the best in the world. The Marine Corps’ long preparation for urban warfare was vindicated by the fighting during Operation Iraqi Freedom and by its insurgent aftermath. As the Australian Army embarks on the HNA initiative and seeks to develop a combined arms capability in the land force, two important lessons can be drawn from the US Marine experience. The first of these lessons is the vital need for any military force to use concept development as a prelude to urban combat. The second lesson is that there is no substitute for live force-experimentation when a professional military force trains for urban combat.

Endnote

1  Experimentation had shown that all combat elements that enter the urban environment must be capable of fighting in that environment regardless of specialty.