Volume 19 Number 2

Chief of Army Foreword – Littoral Manoeuvre

On the morning of 4 September 1943, soldiers from the 9^th Australian Division disembarked from landing craft and waded ashore on marshy landing sites some 15 kilometres east of the town of Lae in occupied New Guinea.

Screened by five destroyers whose naval gunfire hammered away at the tree line ahead of the assaulting Australians, the 9^th Division’s landing near Lae was a relatively bloodless action that had the distinction of being the first major amphibious landing conducted by Australians since Gallipoli.

The 7^th Australian Division air-landed at nearby Nadzab airfield, and through dense jungle, assaulted Lae from the west. The two Australian divisions then raced each other to Lae, their rapid overland advance delayed by rivers swollen with monsoonal rain and a determined enemy.

The application of decisive joint operations on the ground and in close quarters fighting saw Lae fall to the Australians on 15 September – marking the start of a series of successful operations that extended along the north coast of New Guinea.

Perhaps what is most remarkable about the capture of Lae was not its role in the liberation of occupied New Guinea, but the speed and effectiveness of the 9^th Division’s transformation to meet the circumstances of the day.

For most of 1941 and 1942, the 9^th Division had been in North Africa, fighting major engagements at Benghazi, Tobruk and El Alamein against the forces of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps. Then at the start of 1943, it was recalled to Australia and rapidly adapted for amphibious operations and jungle warfare in the Pacific littorals against the forces of Imperial Japan. Lae was its first major action in the new theatre – and it was a resounding success.

This volume of The Australian Army Journal coincides with the 80^th Anniversary of the joint forcible entry operations at Lae. Operation Postern, as it was known, serves as a timely reminder that our Army has always adapted to our nation’s changing strategic circumstances, and indeed the changing character of war.

An understanding of our history helps to prepare our Army for the challenges of the future. We can learn a great deal from the hard won experience of those whom have gone before us. Our history can inspire confidence in uncertain times.

Today, our Army is transforming – optimising for littoral manoeuvre operations by the sea, land and air as part of the integrated force. We must continue to adapt, drawing upon what we have learned from our history of conducting littoral manoeuvre in our region and beyond.

This issue brings together and applies the focus of distinguished historians on Australian operations in the littorals of German New Guinea (1914), Gallipoli (1915), Lae (1943), Borneo (1945) and East Timor (1999) – among others. Common to all is the challenge of achieving balance between war’s enduring nature and its ever-changing character.

Our Army must harness the capacity of its intellect and innovative nature. The Australian Army Journal is an important way in which you can engage in contest of ideas and the professional discourse on the future of our Army, a national institution, a profession and fighting force.

Reflecting on our past ensures that we continue to learn from the service and the sacrifice of those who came before us – and all that they created, for our Army and our nation.

LTGEN Simon Stuart, AO DSC

CHIEF OF ARMY

Written by: John Nash

This Australian Army Journal (AAJ) article started life as a themed collection of papers concerned with the topic of littoral manoeuvre. This is a priority research area for The Australian Army Research Centre after the release of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR). It is for this reason that two papers in this edition are written by AAJ Board members (Peter Dean and Rhys Crawley). This change from an edited collection of papers to an AAJ represents a return to the AAJ as a biannual publication in the post-Covid era. The Australian Army Journal was first published in 1948. This represents 75 years of intellectual engagement on issues of vital interest to Army and the practice and profession of land power. There is now no more pressing a topic to the modern Australian Army as that of littoral manoeuvre.

Since the release of the 2023 DSR, the new area of focus for the Australian Army has been on all things littoral, including the concept of ‘littoral manoeuvre’. While the concept is not new, the context of the DSR and attendant reduced warning time for Australia has given discussions around littoral operations and littoral manoeuvre new and more urgent life. The DSR also recognises that Australia’s defence lies in the collective security of the Indo-Pacific region, Australia’s core ‘strategic geographical framework’ since the 2013 Defence White Paper.[1] While the importance of a maritime approach to Australia’s defence strategy has been emphasised for years, the DSR specifically directs that ‘Army must be optimised for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime spaces and provide a long-range strike capability.’[2] It refocuses the discussion on the conduct of operations in the near region, which is predominately littoral in nature. Naturally, the concept of ‘littoral manoeuvre’ has become prominent in conceptualising Army’s future operations as part of an integrated Australian Defence Force (ADF). The idea of littoral manoeuvre – its history, modern understanding, and future – is the focus of this Australian Army Journal edition.

It would not have surprised many observers that the DSR once again acknowledges what other Defence reviews of the past have, that Australia is an island nation requiring a maritime strategy for its effective defence. However, the DSR has re-emphasised ‘National Defence’ as the primary focus, achieved through a strategy of ‘deterrence through denial’.[3] It is here that Army needs to prepare for littoral operations in the north, to deny attempts to coerce Australia or to attack its interests, which are often far from the nation’s shores. This is not just material preparation, but cultural, organisational, and technological. Australia is reliant on its Sea Lines of Communication, and these lines all pass through the Indo-Pacific region. In the language of the DSR, the ADF requires ‘all-domain, maritime capabilities for sea denial operations and localised sea control’.[4] The key concept to highlight is ‘all-domain’. Sea denial and sea control are no longer concepts for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) alone: Army must be positioned to contribute to such operations in the future.

Definitions are important and the logical starting point for any discussion of complex military ideas. Many terms are thrown around when discussing littoral – including by the papers in this collection. This can be as simple as adding any number of different words to ‘amphibious’ – assault, operation, withdrawal, raid. Other terms are more esoteric, such as ‘manoeuvre operations in the littoral environment (MOLE)’, which although now obsolete doctrinally, often still sits in the back of discussions. Littoral and littoral manoeuvre are, quite naturally, established terms in Australian Doctrine. For instance, Australian Maritime Doctrine defines the terms as:[5]

littoral

The areas to seaward of the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the sea.

            and:

littoral manoeuvre

The use of the littoral as an operational manoeuvre space from which a sea-based joint amphibious force can threaten, or apply and sustain, force ashore.

These are fine starting points, but are just that: a beginning. As technology changes and influences doctrine, so too must definitions adapt or modify to new realities. For instance, the ranges and capabilities of modern sensors and weapons systems mean that ships and shore-based units have a hitherto unknown ability to influence events inland or far to sea, thereby theoretically extending ‘littoral’ space further inland than has traditionally been the case. Arguably, new and emerging technology has blurred the land/maritime divide.

A historical example from the opening of the 21^st century helps illustrates why updating definitions is important. In October 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the US and UK struck Al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan with Tomahawk cruise missiles and carrier airstrikes from the north Arabian Sea off the coast of Pakistan. On 25 November, the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) launched six CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters for an assault to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at an abandoned airfield in Helmand Province, known as FOB Rhino. Launching from USS Peleliu and USS Bataan, the helicopters received inflight refuelling as they travelled 371 nautical miles (688 kms) from the Arabian Sea to Rhino.[6] Just over a week later, Australia would join the fight by deploying two Troops of 1 Squadron Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), who flew into FOB Rhino and commenced operations in southern Afghanistan.[7] Coalition forces soon after moved into Kandahar, a further 190 km to the northeast, while aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea provided close air support and strike. The point of this example is that despite what was effectively an amphibious assault and the provision of combat air power from the sea, few people would probably consider Afghanistan as a ‘littoral’ environment, even considering the decisive influence and support provided from the sea to the land. Clearly, continued discussion is required on what is and is not littoral, if such rigid distinctions can even be made. Like many strategic constructs, it will often change due to specific circumstances, and there is no one definition or solution. Perhaps it is better to think of an Australian specific definition of littoral operations. This volume seeks to be a starting point for such conversations.

The Journal begins with an article written by Professor Peter Dean, Co-Lead of the 2023 DSR Secretariat as senior advisor and principal author for the independent lead. His paper thus represents invaluable insight into Australia’s land power and its utility in the Indo-Pacific region. It looks back at Australia’s history of littoral operations in the region – a common theme of the articles in this Journal – and also looks forward on the lessons we should take away from this history and the context of the DSR. Following this, Matthew Scott’s ‘Tenets for Littoral Manoeuvre’ provides a valuable way of conceptualising littoral operations as laying on a spectrum between discrete land operations and discrete ‘blue water’ naval operations. Importantly, he helped define what makes ‘amphibious’ a subset of littoral, namely, the ship-to-shore component of such operations. As several other papers highlight, Army will be expected to conduct operations in the littoral that do not have such a component, especially if they are to operate in a manner similar to the USMC Stand-in Forces, prepositioned in-theatre.

The historical studies in this volume explore various operations throughout time and space, dating back hundreds of years. We can, however, go back further in time; as far as the Peloponnesian War of the 5th Century BCE.[8] While appeals to classical history for authority are often shallow and sometimes ill-conceived, in this case we can learn lessons in the effectiveness of maritime power projection.[9] In the first half of the Peloponnesian War, Athens used its superior sea power to protect its vital sea lines of communication while outmanoeuvring the Spartans, isolating their territory and raiding with virtual impunity. Far from being nuisance raids, Athenian operations on the Peloponnesian littoral stretched Spartan resources and raised the possibility of revolt against them. After all, the Spartan army existed primarily to repress its slave population, the helots, who provided the workforce that allowed Spartans to concentrate on nothing else but being soldiers. The worst possible eventuality for Sparta was a helot revolt, and Athenian operations around the Peloponnese raised that spectre. This came to a head in 425 BCE when the Athenians landed a force at Pylos, the modern day Bay of Navarino, an area in the heart of helot territory and so ripe for stoking insurrection. This forced the Spartans into a land and sea confrontation. The Spartans landed a force of their elite hoplites on the island of Sphacteria at the entrance to the bay. The Athenian fleet soon after crushed the Spartan fleet and gained sea control over the area, isolating the Spartans on an island a mere 300 metres from the mainland at its closest point. The Athenians then landed on the island where they easily defeated the tired and supply-less Spartans, taking most of them prisoner and thus changing the course of the war. This is not hyperbole since afterwards, in an attempt to have their soldiers returned home, the Spartans granted numerous concessions, including handing over the rest of their warships and ending their raids into Athenian territory that had disrupted supply lines and damaged some Athenian agricultural land. Moreover, The Spartans asked for a formal peace treaty to end the war, an offer unwisely rejected by the buoyant Athenian democracy.

The point of this example is to highlight enduring lessons in littoral operations. The fact that it is literally an ancient example is also part of the point. There is no comparable technology to the modern age, yet the core principles of warfare are readily apparent. First and foremost is the importance of conducting operations that support a clear strategy. Athenian strategy was to wear Sparta down with a concentrated campaign of maritime operations, from trade interdiction through to raids and the potential stoking of rebellion within Sparta’s home territory. This involved avoiding confrontation with the full Spartan army while simultaneously protecting vital sea lines of communication. The Pylos operation in 425 BCE was in full accordance with this strategy and led to a situation whereby they could have secured a favourable peace: the way in which they achieved the desired end state for their strategy. The second and most obvious lesson is that a land force operating in the littoral has little chance of surviving let alone succeeding in any mission without local sea control or effective sea denial. The natural corollary of this is that logistics is critical. Simply put, the Athenians could resupply their force, located on a hostile shore hundreds of nautical miles from their support bases, while simultaneously denying the Spartans the ability to resupply their forces, only several hundred metres from friendly shores. Noteworthy is that the closest Athenian support bases had been established after the outbreak of war. This reflects the operational level effect: continued campaigning established forward bases from which they could launch their attacks on the Peloponnesian littoral. This resulted in Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria and the offer of a peace treaty from Sparta that would have ended the war in Athens’ favour, achieving their main war goal.

This reinforces some universal principles of war. That operations need to be tied to strategy seems like a simple lesson but it needs to be constantly reinforced. Amongst wider considerations, sea control and sea denial are also integral parts of the logistics issue, so critical to littoral operations. In their papers, Rhys Crawley and Tom Richardson both highlight the absolute necessity of good logistics for success in the littoral. Their papers highlight how the requirements and challenges of building and maintaining a logistics train are different in the littoral environment. William Westerman’s examination of Australian operations in Timor-Leste in 2006 demonstrate that even in a relatively permissive environment, the challenges can be many and are always varied. These papers highlight the requirement for reliable inter-theatre sea lift, but also the capacity for intra-theatre mobility. It may be that much of the ‘manoeuvre’ involved in future Army operations in the littoral environment is in support of dispersed operations, partially or entirely within a contested zone.

The question then becomes what missions will an Army littoral force be required to accomplish. Essentially, there are two core mission sets that can be envisaged for Army as a littoral manoeuvre force. The first is more akin to the amphibious operations that are discussed in this volume. That is, there may be territory in the littoral that needs to be taken off an adversary, or denied to an adversary landing force. In this sense, the manoeuvre aspect is using the littoral to position a force for offensive operations. This is unlikely to involve storming a beach ala Normandy or Tarawa, but could conceivably involve a heavy fight around a beachhead, more like Anzio or Balikpapan. Such an operation would no doubt occur in a heavily contested and non-permissive sea and air environment. This represents a high intensity scenario, conceivable but unlikely, perhaps even in danger of becoming a straw man construction. This is not to say there will not be scenarios involving elements of this role. It is easy to imagine a landing under some sort of fire, or having to penetrate a robust sea and air cordon to reach a desired landing zone, or that a landing force will have to engage in high intensity combat to expand or protect their landing. However, it seems unlikely that the Army will be called upon for such a drastic course of action in the near future, not least because it seems strategically difficult to imagine. After all, the DSR has called for deterrence by denial, so while this certainly does not rule out offensive action, it stretches the imagination to conceive of high intensity amphibious operations against a contested shore in a non-permissive air and sea environment. Nevertheless, this sort of role is one that often comes to mind when thinking of amphibious operations, so it is mentioned here in the context of the least realistic scenario for a littoral focused Australian Army.

This does not, however, simplify the littoral problem down to defaulting to the second possibility, using the littorals as an operational manoeuvre space rather than as a route from point ‘a’ to point ‘b’ as per an amphibious assault-type operation discussed above. This role is many faceted, hazardous, and as reliant on an integrated ADF as the ‘storming the beach’ possibility. As David Kilcullen highlights in this volume, Army will need to determine whether it will already be operating in an Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) zone, or if it will be required to penetrate such a zone to get to the necessary littoral operating area. The Australian Army Research Centre has recently published research by Andrew Carr and Stephan Frühling on the idea of forward presence for the Australian Army.[10] Within, they discuss how Army might position forward in the region, both as a means of reassurance to allies and deterrence against a potential adversary, and the basis of a presence that could be expanded in time of heightened tension or conflict. This would follow a model similar to what Kilcullen highlighted as the USMC’s approach. At the same time, a forward presence should not be assumed. Such a presence could be outside of the operational area required and so Army would be left contemplating entry into an A2/AD zone as per the working assumption of the Royal Marines.

There are subsets of missions within this operational manoeuvre focused role, with different scales of operations and requiring different skill and equipment sets. Less about moving Army from one place to another, there is a heavy focus on the ability to conduct inter- and intra-theatre lift. For the sake of discussion, four possible missions could include sea control/sea denial operations, long-range strike, provision of Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), and area denial. All of these fit within the scope of the DSR’s deterrence by denial strategy. Long-range strike is clearly articulated as a role for Army in the littoral environment, potentially as part of an A2/AD scenario. The acquisition of Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) for the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) will add an anti-ship capability to this system. Ash Zimmerlie explores some of the ways this might contribute to an Australian A2/AD system. The DSR also highlighted the need for ‘an enhanced, all-domain, integrated air and missile defence capability’ (IAMD).[11] Again, this will be a core component of area denial operations, in conjunction with the RAAF and RAN, with Army utilising the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) for this role. The base capability of NASMAS as well as the IAMD role are both a step-change up from legacy short-range systems (Rapier and RBS 70) employed for local air defence operations. In all scenarios it may be necessary for Army to contribute to the ISR picture, using land forces to establish outposts to create ISR ‘bubbles’ that would feed into a common operating picture. Finally, it may be that Army needs to conduct area denial by occupying vital territory that an adversary might want to occupy itself. Such a scenario might see an Army littoral force facing down an enemy landing, the defensive side of the coin to the ‘storming the beach’ scenario.

In all cases, Army’s littoral manoeuvre will be linked inextricably to naval and air operations. As Richard Dunley explores in his naval-focused piece, the littoral is a complex and potentially deadly zone for warships, with a multiplicity of threat vectors and hazards, both natural and military. This is important not just for how Army can support the Navy, but also how Army can capitalise on this operating environment to effectively combat a naval adversary. Army may find itself in a scenario where it needs to do both: deny enemy access while also aiding RAN operating space and the shelter of a friendly shore. It will also need the RAN and RAAF to help protect supply lines to and from forward deployed personnel.

Throughout the papers in this volume, history has been a guide of lessons learned and not learned, or in some cases overlooked. Importantly, the lessons of history are open to all and are being examined in great detail by a number of militaries. Of particular interest are the campaigns in the Pacific during World War 2, common case studies in various Western war colleges. The Chinese military has also studied these operations deeply, and for many years. They have taken many lessons from the different battles, especially key moments at Midway, Guadalcanal, and Okinawa.[12] Unsurprisingly, many of the lessons they have taken away accord with the thinking in this volume on what matters most in littoral operations; from the criticality of logistics through to the importance of a joint force operating together.[13] History also serves as an important baseline from which change over time can be measured. Perhaps most importantly, it does not necessarily mean that the operations of the Pacific War are the most important for the Australian Army to study. While the geography is practically the same, the geopolitics is not, nor is the technology. One might argue the highly contested air and sea environment of the Mediterranean in late 1942/early 1943 is more representative of the future contested operating environment in the Indo-Pacific than the landings in Borneo in 1945.

Army has perhaps the clearest strategic direction it has had in a decade, since the withdrawal from Afghanistan and closing out of the ‘Global War on Terror’. The Army will become a littoral-focused force, capable of manoeuvre operations in the Indo-Pacific region. This will require new capabilities and a new mindset. From new vessels through to long-range strike capabilities, air defence, and more prolific and persistent ISR platforms, Army will need to combine these with more ‘traditional’ platforms such as Protected Mobility Vehicles (PMV), Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), and Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRV) to maintain a robust combined arms fighting system. Nevertheless, this system will need to adapt to a new operating environment, more dispersed and more independent than has been the case. In the words of the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart:

To be truly future ready, we must continually adapt. There are changes in what our government expects of its Army and what the Integrated Force, and our Allies and partners need of us… There will also be changes to the scale and scope of our capabilities. The sequence and pace of delivery, how we’re organised, how we train, and the resources that will be available to us. Things will be different, and along with the opportunities, there will be challenges.[14]

Nothing in this volume is prescriptive. It does not set down any one way of doing ‘littoral’, rather, it is an exploration of the many facets of what is essentially an old concept practiced throughout history. Like all military-strategic terms, ‘littoral’ is a construct, the meaning of which is debatable. What this series of papers aims to do is continue that debate, and to inform the discussion in Australia on what lessons can be learned from the past and what we might do in the future. The Army has an excellent opportunity to move past ideas such as the, not unfairly maligned, ‘air-sea gap’ and finally embrace the sea as a manoeuvre space. As part of an integrated Australian Defence Force, Army can manoeuvre for advantage using the vast littorals of the Indo-Pacific, and position itself for area denial and long-range strike operations. Working as part of the Integrated Force to achieve a truly all-domain effect, Army can be a strong arm of maritime power projection and a core asset in a deterrence strategy.

Endnotes