On 24 August this year, the Prime Minister announced another expansion of the size of the Australian Army. This increase, in addition to that announced earlier in the context of the Hardened and Networked Army initiative, will ultimately raise the strength of the Australian Regular Army to around 30 000 members.
Speaking on 26 September, the Prime Minister explained his Government’s rationale for this decision:
The expansion of the Army will enable our troops to better sustain operations and to rotate forces so as to be better prepared for future requirements. It will ensure our soldiers are better supported and, when they get home, better rested and prepared to meet future challenges. This increase in the size of the Army is in addition to the enhanced land force capability announced last year as part of the Hardened and Networked Army initiative. It reflects this Government’s fundamental reassertion of the strategic importance of the Army—and indeed of the individual soldier—in Australia’s strategic culture.
As welcome as the expansion of the Army is, its implementation will present significant challenges. In his Order of the Day, in response to the Prime Minister’s announcement, the Chief of the Army declared: ‘The most significant challenge will be recruitment and retention.’ This not a novel problem.
Examination of the records of the Military Board deliberations from the 1960s, particularly on the eve of the Vietnam War, reveals that throughout its history, the modern Australian Regular Army has constantly struggled to attract and retain quality soldiers. This has been especially so during periods of low unemployment and prosperity. Nonetheless, the recent increased Government investment in the land force is unambiguously good news for the Army. It represents a significant expression of trust in the Army, based on the exemplary efforts of our soldiers on operations in recent years.
Moreover, it vindicates painstaking intellectual efforts by Army strategic thinkers over the past two decades to convince policy makers of the enduring relevance of the Army to Australian strategic policy. It is now beyond dispute that the Government endorses Army’s portrayal of the complex security environment in which tailored, multi-agency task forces may be required to operate in pursuit of Australia’s national interests.
That environment is lethal, and characterised by unprecedented human and physical complexity. Only land forces proficient in the mastery of close combat through the employment of balanced combined-arms teams will be able to survive in this environment, let alone persuade, protect and reassure populations. To this end, Army is hardening and networking in order to deploy modular, combined-arms battle groups.
While the Government has grasped this reality, many commentators have not. Their wilful ignorance of the modern battle-space—shaped by the proliferation of non-state actors, radically enhanced individual lethality, and densely populated cities—has been most glaringly manifested in their hysterical campaign against the purchase of the M1A1 Abrams tank. This facile, disingenuous campaign shows no sign of abating.
For this reason, we have re-published two articles from the March 1970 edition of the Australian Army Journal, which debated the proposition that the tank had become extinct. They are timely in that they demonstrate that the polarities of the current debate over the tank are not new. In addition, we are also publishing an article by a former Regular Army officer, David Kilcullen, which debunks many of the myths and misconceptions about the role and ongoing relevance of tanks. It is a comprehensive rejoinder to critics of the Abrams acquisition.
We are also delighted to publish a paper by Brigadier General (Retd) Huba Wass de Czege, one of the intellectual architects of the modern United States Army and the founder and first Director of the US Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies. In this article of panoramic breadth, he examines the importance of intellectual honesty and rigour in the process of aligning doctrine to the evolving nature of war and the battle-space. Although he traces the development of the seminal doctrinal publication FM 100-5 from the period immediately following the end of the Vietnam War, his reflections are of contemporary relevance.
In particular, readers will note the profound influence of a small coterie of officers with advanced education in military art and history on this vital process of intellectual renewal. Readers may be struck by the parallels between the intellectual and doctrinal ferment within the United States Army as it simultaneously sought to absorb lessons from a recent war while undertaking radical organisational and doctrinal transformation, and the current challenges facing the Australian Army.
Notwithstanding differences in degree, our Army is confronting challenges of a similar nature. It is essential that we bring the same spirit of intellectual honesty to bear upon them.
In that regard, we continue to be delighted at the number of high quality articles being submitted by serving members for publication in the Journal. The current edition traverses the gamut of issues from grand strategy to tactics. In particular, the thoughtful reflections of a number of officers, who have recently returned from operations in the Middle East, is evidence of a vibrant culture within the Army.
In commending the current edition to you, we wish all members, especially those deployed on operations, and their families, a happy, safe Christmas and New Year.
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APOLOGY TO PROFESSOR PAUL DIBB
On page 244 of the Winter 2006 Edition of the Australian Army Journal, Colonel John Blaxland, in an article titled ‘Defence of Australia and Forward Defence: Reconciling the Dialectic of Australian Defence Strategies’ attributed certain views to Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. The author went on to assert ‘This view surely borders on disloyalty.’
The Australian Army Journal accepts that this imputation of disloyalty to Professor Dibb caused him serious distress and had the capacity to harm his reputation. The Australian Army Journal unreservedly retracts this statement and apologises to Professor Dibb for the hurt this caused. He has served the nation in numerous senior positions within the Defence and Intelligence communities. His long and distinguished service is evidence of considerable loyalty to the nation. The Australian Army Journal unconditionally withdraws any inference to the contrary.
Malcolm McGregor
Lieutenant Colonel
Publisher, AAJ
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