This edition of the Australian Army Journal appears at a critical juncture in the history of Australian Army. It is now nearly ten years since the first Australian Special Forces troops deployed to Afghanistan in 2001. Throughout much of the ensuing decade the Army has borne the brunt of the Australian Defence Force’s commitment to the coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were undertaken in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.
We are constantly reminded of the high price that this sustained commitment to the so-called ‘long war’ is exacting from the Army with the announcement of each battle death or wounding. Since the crisis in East Timor in 1999 the Australian Defence Force has been deployed on operations without respite. None of the operations that we have conducted since were envisaged by those developing strategic guidance in the 1990s.
This demonstrates the folly both of those who proclaimed the End of History in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and those who believe that the ADF force structure should be predicated on a single scenario. There has been no peace dividend. Indeed, the end of the bipolar world unleashed the fissiparous forces of globalisation, which have shaped the character of the wars we have been fighting throughout this century.
Today the Australian Defence Force, especially the Army, is engaged in the full spectrum of operations from peacekeeping to warfighting. Our troops are performing very well in all theatres from the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste through to Afghanistan, conducting operations that embrace the full spectrum of armed conflict.
Their success is the product of the intellectual and technological transformation of the Army over the course of the past decade. The strategic shock of the East Timor crisis exposed the serious deficiencies in our land forces. While our people performed superbly in 1999, it was clear that the Army required substantial enhancement to engage in the types of operations demanded by the Australian government in the complex security environment of the twenty-first century.
That process of modernisation continues. Much has been achieved in the past decade but there is more to be done. The Army has displayed great professionalism and flexibility in sustaining operations across the spectrum of conflict in diverse theatres, while simultaneously implementing a major re-equipment program and reforming its organisation. This has placed great demands on our people.
Throughout this period Army has benefitted from strong and visionary leadership. Since the then Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling presciently decided that Army needed to recover its capacity to project power and operate away from its bases, successive Chiefs of Army have restored Army’s ability to survive and win on the contemporary battlefield. Likewise successive governments have provided the funding and strategic guidance to enable Army to maintain its core proficiency in combined arms warfighting as well as able to deploy forces for operations offshore.
Since July 2008, this has occurred under the able stewardship of Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie who, as Chief of Army, has implemented an ambitious reform agenda. He will be remembered for his overhaul of Army’s functional commands under the rubric of the Adaptive Army. This involved one of the most significant internal reforms of the Army since the end of the Vietnam War. Moreover, Lieutenant General Gillespie sought to inculcate a more adaptive culture and mindset within Army in order to rapidly assimilate lessons from operations into our force generation processes.
As this edition goes to press Lieutenant General Gillespie enters civilian life after forty-three years of unstinting service to the nation. The Australian Army Journal wishes to record its gratitude and best wishes to him and his family, Carmel and Moira, on his retirement. He leaves the Army in excellent shape.
His successor Lieutenant General David Morrison takes command of an Army engaged in fighting the longest war in its history. Like all his predecessors since 2001 he will face the simultaneous challenges of supporting operations while implementing pervasive structural and cultural change. Army is in the early stages of a major re-equipment program and is moving to standardise its brigade structures. This latter measure is a vital reform that will significantly enhance Army’s ability to generate ready, relevant land forces and sustain them on protracted, complex operations.
These important improvements must be achieved in the context of an increasingly tight fiscal climate. The development of the highly capable joint force of 2030 is only achievable within the framework of savings and investments prescribed under the Strategic Reform Program (SRP). As recent cuts to the capabilities of all three services in the United Kingdom demonstrate, military establishments are not immune to budgetary cuts even in the midst of a war.
The message to Army is that SRP provides us with an opportunity to master our destiny rather than having efficiency measures imposed on us. Managing the tension between sustaining current operations while investing in expensive capability improvements will be the most significant challenge the new Chief of Army faces over the next three years. His success in this endeavour will shape the development of the Australian Army well into the next decade. Nor are pressures on the Commonwealth budget the only threats to Army’s successful modernisation.
Already there are calls from some commentators to reduce the size and combat weight of the Army when operations in Afghanistan cease. The end of the war in Afghanistan, we are confidently assured, will end the era of Australian military involvement offshore. That appears to be wishful thinking. Even during the so-called ‘long peace’ that followed the Vietnam War, the Army was engaged in operations in Rhodesia, Namibia, the Middle East, Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda and Bougainville. Moreover, the twenty-first century security challenges of climate change, food security and state failure are all present in our immediate region. All of these require balanced deployable joint forces capable of assisting allies and neighbours as well as defending Australia in its immediate land, sea and air approaches.
The recent edition of the journal Security Challenges published a selection of articles on the future of the Australian Army after Afghanistan. Some of the contributors queried the relevance of the Army to national security in the wake of Afghanistan.
In his inaugural message to the Army, Lieutenant General Morrison referred specifically to the diverse range of views as to the utility of land forces in this publication. He invited Army to respond to this intellectual challenge. Indeed, it is clear that there are still serious misconceptions as to the contribution that land forces can make in the full range of contingencies that may confront Australia in an era of uncertainty and heightened strategic competition in our region.
To some extent this is our own fault. Army needs to meet the intellectual challenge entailed in explaining its versatility to policy-makers. The Australian Army Journal must provide a forum for our soldiers and officers to engage in this debate. In particular we welcome responses to the views expressed in Security Challenges.
As the Army approaches the Force Structure Review of 2013 and the development of the next White Paper we will need to be rigorous in explaining the enduring relevance of land power to the defence of Australia and its regional and global interests. Over the past decade Army has developed a coherent narrative to describe the changing character of war. Ultimately, that narrative has been accepted by policy-makers who have authorised significant enhancements to the Army to enable it to deliver combined arms effects against credible opponents.
Our extant strategic guidance corroborates that requirement for robust, deployable land forces capable of operations from humanitarian support through to fighting credible state and non-state actors. This view has been endorsed repeatedly by the Australian government since the deployment of INTERFET. It is not contingent on the outcome of operations in Afghanistan. Rather, it is the only satisfactory response to the confluence of political complexity, globalisation and technological change that has manifested in an exponential increase in the lethality of individual weapons.
The lives of our soldiers depend on our maintaining public and political support for the development and introduction of capabilities that reflect these real world conditions.
This edition of the Australian Army Journal carries articles across a broad range of topics. We continue to focus on the war in Afghanistan. Of particular interest are the reflections of Colonel Peter Connolly on the operations of the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force in Uruzgan Province. This is a valuable contribution by an officer with recent experience of command in that theatre. Another perspective on counterinsurgency operations in a different part of the country is provided by a Canadian officer Major Mark Popov. We are especially delighted to publish the works of an officer from an allied army.
Major Ross Cable has written a challenging article that questions the effectiveness of the Australian Defence Force Academy. Since the so-called ‘Skype scandal’ at ADFA, many—including a former Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy—have questioned the relevance of ADFA. This contribution was indeed written before that scandal became public. Nonetheless, it is a provocative contribution that we are sure will stimulate debate.
Readers may also note that for the second successive edition we are publishing an article by Colonel Rupert Hoskin. Due to human error by the editor of the Journal an incorrect version of this article was published in the Summer 2011 edition of the Journal. We have apologised to Colonel Hoskin for this serious error. In order to ensure that his valuable work reaches the widest possible audience we have decided to publish the version originally approved by the Army Journal Board in February. We commend it along with all the contents of this edition to our readers.
Finally, as is customary in this editorial, we pay tribute to our fellow soldiers who have paid the supreme sacrifice since the last edition of the Journal. We extend our respectful condolences and sympathy to the families of these men: Lieutenant Marcus Case, Sergeant Brett Wood, Sergeant Todd Langley, Lance Corporal Andrew Jones and Sapper Rowan Robinson. Lest we forget.
