The war in Afghanistan is now the longest to be waged by Australians and continues to demand a great sacrifice from the Australian Defence Force, especially among our land forces. It should also not be forgotten that the Army continues to sustain significant commitments in Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands and a range of smaller operations elsewhere. For more than a decade Army has been working hard; since the East Timor intervention in 1999 it has been on operations without respite, representing for a small force an intense tempo of activity as well as an important and proud addition to its history.
While the waging of the current fight deserves our full attention, an army must also consider its obligations to the future. This is one of the most difficult challenges a military organisation can face as it strives to find the balance between present and future requirements. In recent years the Army has worked hard to manage this balance. It has raised, trained and sustained the forces needed for its current tasks while overseeing the introduction of new capabilities that have eliminated some of the deficiencies revealed by the East Timor intervention. New equipment currently in the pipeline will further enhance the force’s capabilities and allow it to meet the government’s strategic requirements as outlined in the 2009 Defence White Paper.
Continuous modernisation and adaptation are two of the hallmarks of an effective and professional military, whether it finds itself at war or at peace. Although Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan will continue in the near term, it is timely to consider the future of the Army after Afghanistan in the mid-term. There is a need to reset the force for the next challenge. There are two areas in which this process of consideration is most pressing. These are the examination of the changing character of war and its applicability to the future of the Australian way of war, and the development of an amphibious capability suitable for the ADF’s primary operational environment.
It appears increasingly likely that in the mid-term view, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the Israeli experience in Lebanon in 2006 represent a transitional shift in the character of war. While conventional state-on-state conflict remains a danger, the risk of its occurrence is becoming less likely as a result of globalisation, rising wealth and the ongoing threat of nuclear weapons. Instead, we live in an age in which irregular and non-state based combatants have proliferated. Guerrilla war is by no means an innovation, but today’s practitioners have access to highly lethal weaponry which they combine with an ability to hide among the people. These opponents also exploit the reach afforded by globalised communications to disseminate their narratives. The state no longer has a monopoly on military power and the capacity to exert influence, if it ever did.
The second major requirement facing Army is to relearn how to conduct amphibious operations within its primary operational environment. This is a mission that the Army has not conducted since the end of the Second World War. Whatever skill sets Army once possessed have long atrophied, although the history of these operations is still relevant and instructive. The new Landing Helicopter Docks should not be seen as ‘water taxis’ but as warships designed to project military power in accordance with a government-directed maritime strategy. Amphibious operations are highly specialised, and the Army as well as the RAN and RAAF have much to learn before this capability achieves the needed effectiveness.
In responding to the changing character of future war and in developing its amphibious capability, all members of the Army have a part to play. At its core it is not the kit that enables a capability. Rather it is the knowledge the force possesses, translated into concepts and doctrine, that shapes how an army fights and thus determines the difference between success and failure. The Journal has always played a part in this process through its role in advancing debate on the profession of arms. In this issue the Journal balances the need to develop a force to wage the current fight with the requirement to adapt and anticipate the next fight. In ‘Living in the Twilight Zone: Advising the Afghan National Army at the Corps Level’, Lieutenant Colonel Gavin Keating discusses his experience as an advisor in the current, highlighting both successes and pitfalls. In contributing to the development of the Army’s future capability Major Michael Scott provides an engineer’s perspective in ‘Engineering from the Sea: Establishing how Australian Army Engineers fit into Australia’s Amphibious Capabilities’. The Journal will continue to publish articles that reflect the entire range of the force’s experience but it does call upon the Army’s members to think hard upon these themes and contribute to their debate in future issues.
This edition also represents a transition in the management of the Journal. Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm McGregor, its long-serving publisher, has moved to other duties in Army. Under his mentorship the Journal reached maturity in its contribution to the discussion of the profession of arms, both within Australia and abroad. The staff of the Land Warfare Studies Centre wish Lieutenant Colonel McGregor continued success in his future endeavours.
Sadly, as is the custom in this editorial, it is necessary to acknowledge those who have paid the supreme sacrifice in the service of their nation. We extend our condolences to the families of Captain Bryce Duffy, Corporal Ashley Birt, Lance Corporal Luke Gavin and Private Matthew Lambert who died on active service on Operation SLIPPER, and Craftsman Beau Pridue who died on active service on Operation ASTUTE. Lest we forget.
