Editorial
Welcome to the 2022 edition of the Australian Army Journal (AAJ). This edition examines foundations of professional mastery and doctrine, and reinforces the proposition that how we think inevitably affects how we perform.
Like so many activities over the last two years, the COVID-19 pandemic constrained AAJ publication and the written output of prospective authors. As we emerge from pandemic conditions, the Journal is fortunate to have experienced a strong resurgence of interest. We look forward to resuming a regular pattern of AAJ publications in the New Year.
The AAJ has always been a forum for ideas and debate about land power. Reinforcing the value of informed debate and intellectual interchange, this edition introduces a new approach. Some papers are accompanied by commentary by subject matter experts within Army discussing the arguments and recommendations presented. This approach will be applied more widely in future editions enabling readers to see how ideas are received and absorbed by Army stakeholders who have a direct professional interest in the topics discussed.
Journal Articles
With a focus on joint integration, Mark Gilchrist asks: “Is the Australian Defence Force Joint Enough?” Gilchrist proposes that changes in Australia’s geostrategic environment risk outpacing the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) joint capabilities. In order to ensure the ADF is able to fully realise the benefits of organisational change for enhanced multi-domain effect, Gilchrist argues that the joint force must be underpinned by a joint culture that balances traditional service equities to achieve maximum warfighting advantage. He considers the design and implementation of joint warfighting concepts and command-and-control systems necessary to prepare for potential high-threat contingencies. This piece is accompanied by an Army commentary by Major General Chris Field highlighting the important link between thoughtful critique and continuous improvement in any organisation.
Mark Mankowski contributes further to the debate on how the ADF can maximise the effectiveness of contemporary joint operations. Drawing on the historical example of air-land integration during the Burma campaign of the Second World War, Mankowski presents three factors essential to effective joint operations. Firstly, he explains the vital role of cross-domain professionalisation within the ADF; secondly, he highlights the critical importance of the ongoing identification of issues that impede operational efficiency and unity of command during joint operations; and thirdly, he illustrates the importance of tactical commanders building strong relationships and being receptive to guidance that will drive joint integration. The lessons drawn from this historical example are distilled into succinct recommendations that are as relevant to contemporary joint operations as they were in July 1944.
Reflecting this edition’s theme of adaptation to changing strategic circumstances, Nick Bosio emphasises the importance of agile and creative military decision-making. While technological advantage is important, Bosio contends that modernisation of equipment must be matched by commensurate growth in military thinking. He argues that a culture of deliberate professional gaming can enhance Army’s intellectual performance in military planning, decision-making, and concepts for competition, conflict and war. Bosio outlines how humans think, and how games can help build new ways of thinking for professional creativity. He also offers suggestions for how professional gaming may be incorporated into military education.
Nicholas Mahr explores the concept of adaptation, arguing for clarification of Army’s understanding of the ‘adaptation cycle’. Mahr rejects simplistic notions that success in war comes from quick adaptation. Instead, he contends that rates of adaptation are relative, and that superior adaptation is the critical aspect. The employment of measures to slow the enemy’s rate of adaptation is outlined through a discussion of ‘decisive events’ and ‘emerging decisive events’. Using the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as an historical example, Mahr demonstrates how an enemy’s decision-making cycle can be slowed through the orchestration of concurrent dilemmas. This piece is accompanied by commentary from Major General Michael Krause.
Continuing a focus on clarifying military thinking, Mark Sargent invites the reader to consider what ‘defeat’ really means to battlefield success. Skilfully weaving historical examples to illustrate his arguments, Sargent explores Army’s doctrinal emphasis on shattering an enemy’s moral and physical cohesion as a prelude to their defeat, while drawing attention to a lack of explanation of how one may lead to the other, or of what each actually looks like. Sargent proposes a meaningful definition of defeat, offers a framework of defeat mechanisms, and exhorts Army to more effectively link planning actions to defeat of the enemy.
Drawing on his experiences and surveys of 3rd Brigade personnel, James Casey argues that the Australian Army’s current planning processes place insufficient emphasis on the principles of surprise and deception. Citing doctrinal deficiencies, Casey reasons that a ‘plan that is not founded upon the achievement of surprise delivers the enemy a course of action he has already war-gamed’. Over the course of the paper, Casey marshals evidence to support his contention, challenging Army to improve the way it plans for and implements surprise and deception in operational design, supporting this process by providing his own recommendations as to how these concepts can be improved.
In his timely paper, Leo Purdy provides a brief history of armoured vehicle-borne infantry. Through an assessment of the various ways in which such forces have been employed as part of larger battle groups, several vehicle platforms are discussed and placed within the context of their respective operating concepts. Amidst popular comment from the Russo-Ukraine war around the continued relevance of such capabilities and platforms, Purdy’s paper offers insights into the ongoing utility of armoured vehicle-borne infantry to the joint force. Purdy’s paper is accompanied by a commentary from Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Howard that emphasises the importance of a replacement infantry fighting vehicle for the M113 as part of the ADF’s modern and effective combined arms fighting system.
Book Reviews
The three book reviews in this edition provide insights into both the past and the future. Peter Dean’s review of Semut: the Untold Story of a Secret Australian Operation in WWII Borneo reveals a well-balanced history that provides an immersive and detailed exploration of the Semut II and III operations in Borneo in 1945. The Services Reconnaissance Department’s (special forces) operatives and operations, the local Dayak people, and Japanese forces are skilfully interwoven to provide a meticulous account yet, Dean laments, lacks detailed analysis of the strategic and operational objectives. Sonya Russell and Atonio Nagauna review the classic 1948 publication, The History of the Fiji Military Forces 1939–1945. Providing a narrative
history that outlines Fijian forces’ war preparations from the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1939 to Japan’s surrender in 1945, the work is considered by the reviewers to be essential reading for those wishing to engage the Republic of Fiji Military Forces. As Army enhances its regional relationships within an increasingly contested South Pacific, this book offers insights for those keen to understand the genesis of Fiji’s modern forces and its historical coalition relationships.
In contrast to the historical focus of the previous books, Albert Palazzo assesses the usefulness of 2034: a Novel of the Next World in outlining a possible future scenario where great power rivalry has tipped over into conflict. The value of this novel is not, Palazzo advises, the tactics and weapons employed, but rather how the authors have highlighted how human values underpin the ‘understanding and waging of war’. The exploration of these concepts, and the deep need to understand the culture of one’s enemy, make this a title that Palazzo argues would be a valuable addition to the professional library of junior leaders.
Future Editions
As the editorial team look toward planning multiple editions for 2023, we extend an invitation to regular and casual AAJ readers to recommend themes. We welcome constructive comment on the journal’s content, frequency of editions, balance of papers, book reviews, or any other issues that may improve the readership experience. Further, the AAJ encourages submissions from all ranks within Army and from across the wider Defence community. Please see the Call for Submissions on page 144.
Finally, the AARC and the AAJ Board wish to thank Brigadier Ian Langford (former Acting Head Land Capability) and Colonel David Beaumont (former Director, Australian Army Research Centre) for their stewardship and support for the AAJ, and for their steadfast encouragement of Army’s collective cognitive development. Both officers have left a legacy of intellectual vigour that places Army in a stronger position to identify, debate and engage issues relevant to the profession of arms and the interests of its people. As the long history of the AAJ records, and as the themes of this edition remind us, land power professionals must persist in overcoming physical, moral, informational and intellectual barriers in order to prepare for the challenges of future land warfare.
