Of Mars and Mammon
In late December 2004, a suicide bomber entered the mess hall of the US Army’s Forward Operating Base Marez, near the city of Mosul. The resulting explosion killed twenty-two people and wounded sixty-nine others. The Marez incident, similar to thousands of other attacks in Iraq, soon passed from the world’s media headlines. However, the reasons why this particular attack was so lethal are worthy of further consideration. The large death toll was due to the lucrative target offered by the base’s huge centralised dining facility. The facility was run by contractors and, despite being located in an operational area, was managed on the basis of commercial values—efficiency and profit—instead of the usual military tenets of dispersion and security.
Commerce and war share a long history. Mercenaries from Sir John Hawkwood through Munzio Sforza to Mike Hoare and his Wild Geese have been a persistent feature of warfare. Similarly, merchant contractors offering a range of services have had an equally long history in the annals of armed conflict. In the 20th century, the necessity of two World Wars and the global nuclear stalemate of the Cold War compelled governments to take control of almost every aspect of warfare. Since the end of the Cold War, however, large-scale cuts to many Western defence budgets have caused the rapid growth of private corporations that offer an array of services to armed forces. During the 1991 Gulf War, the use of private companies to provide niche logistics to Coalition forces was thought unusual enough to be newsworthy. A decade and a half later, there are now a number of large corporations that offer a wide range of military services and capabilities. In an age of globalisation, security has not been exempt from the march of private capital propelled by electronic networks.
Contractors and large corporations have become a significant feature in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the post-Saddam Iraqi state. Observers have estimated that there are more than seventy such companies in Iraq, resulting in a ratio of military to civilian personnel of around one to seven. In contrast, during the 1991 Gulf War the military–civilian ratio was about one to one hundred. Today, reduced budgets and the requirements of military pragmatism mean that commercial contractors have become a permanent feature in zones of armed conflict. Yet it is important that both the mass media and Western electorates continue to recognise the vital distinctions between private and public entities in operational areas. Such distinctions are, unfortunately, no longer easy to make. For example, many contractors now bear arms, and the military’s monopoly over the use of force has been eroded. However, one singular difference remains between contractor and soldier: that of liability. Ultimately, a commercial contractor’s primary responsibility is financial in character. There can be no comparison between a contractual obligation to provide services for profit and a sworn obligation to serve a nation in the profession of arms.
The distinguished Australian-born British soldier, General Sir John Hackett, memorably described the essential basis of the military life as ‘the ordered application of violence under an unlimited liability’. The key clause of unlimited liability—that is, the willingness to die in defence of civilised values—is the special, unwritten contract that exists between the soldier and society. This contract has not changed in the 21st century. Soldiers serve Mars, not Mammon; the profession of arms continues to be based on public duty and private excellence. As a consequence, the wellbeing and personal security of professional soldiers should never be compromised for reasons of commercial expediency.
The wide range of topics covered by the articles in the Autumn 2005 issue of the Australian Army Journal (AAJ) reflects the eclectic interests of practitioners and students of the profession of arms both in Australia and overseas. In our Point Blank section we present an informative interview with retired US Army General, Tommy Franks. General Franks, the former Commander of the US-led Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, discusses the problems of coalition warfare and highlights several aspects of Australia’s involvement in recent campaigns. In the main body of the journal, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, sets the scene in the Ideas and Issues section with an article that outlines his vision for land–air manoeuvre. The Chief of Army highlights the need for a seamless integration of air and land forces in operations in the future battlespace.
Aspects of two current operations are covered in important articles by Barak Salmoni and by Lieutenant Colonel John Hutcheson of the US and Australian armies respectively. In the first part of a two-part article, Major Salmoni outlines the development of Iraq’s new security forces. Lieutenant Colonel Hutcheson’s article provides an Australian commander’s perspective on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). In the AAJ’s section on joint operations, Wing Commander Chris Mills of the RAAF presents the case for developing a multi-mission ship capability for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The AAJ’s analysis of contemporary tactics embraces three interesting articles by Australian Army officers. Colonel Michael Krause analyses the potential for adopting minimum-mass tactics in the Australian Army, and Captain Ian Langford considers the problems of suppression and manoeuvre for the modern infantry platoon. In the third article, Lieutenant Colonel John Simeoni discusses some of the lessons learnt from recent US Marine Corps urban combined-arms operations in Iraq.
In the area of military technology, Lieutenant Colonels Michael Ryan and David Schmidtchen provide two interesting perspectives on network-centric warfare. These articles are followed by a consideration by Brigadier General Philip Coker from the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command of military transformation under the impact of high operational tempo. Brigadier General Coker’s essay is followed by Major Lynda Liddy’s analysis of the idea of the ‘strategic corporal’. She seeks to identify some of the training and educational requirements that might be necessary in order to develop ‘strategic corporals’ in the Australian land force.
Two further articles are devoted to problems of civil–military relations and of military law and ethics. Officer Cadet Iain Henry of the Australian Defence Force Academy offers an analysis of the prospects for democracy in Indonesia as the involvement of the armed forces in politics is progressively reduced. Colonel David Kelly then discusses the legal factors in the planning of coalition warfare and interoperability, and their implications for the ADF. On the subject of terrorism, the AAJ offers both local and overseas perspectives. Peta Tarlinton of the Department of Defence examines the work of the Egyptian theologian, Sayyid Qutb, in an attempt to provide an insight into the roots of radical Islam. A second article by the leading American scholar of the Middle East, Dr Daniel Pipes, considers the West’s need to reconceptualise the War on Terror as an ideological struggle.
The AAJ’s section on terrorism is followed by sections on the media and on military history. In a topical article, the Sandhurst scholar, Stephen Badsey, examines the interactions between the media, strategy and military culture. In terms of military history, the AAJ offers three articles. Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland reflects on the role of signals intelligence in Australian military operations from World War II to Vietnam. Journalist and former Army Reserve cavalry officer, Nicholas Stuart, ponders the elusiveness of victory against Western military practice and Major Paul Rosenzweig discusses the concept of mission command in the context of the ANZAC landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915. In the Insights section of the AAJ, we present two contrasting articles. First, we publish a first-hand analysis of conditions in the Darfur region of Sudan by aid worker, Andjela Jurisic. Jurisic offers a disturbing account of the armed conflict in the Sudan and of the challenges that aid workers must confront in a zone of crisis. Second, the AAJ provides an analysis of the psychological dimensions of military uniforms by Recruit Sean Kikkert from South Australia.
In the Retrospect section, the AAJ once again draws on Australia’s first military journal, the Commonwealth Military Journal, and reprints Colonel James Whiteside Mackay’s incisive 1911 article, ‘The True Principles of Australian Defence’. Mackay’s meditation on Australian defence is as relevant today, nearly a century later, as it was in the years leading up to World War I. In the Milestones section, the AAJ publishes the obituaries of five distinguished soldiers: Major General Duncan Francis, Major General William Watson, Brigadier Noel ‘Chic’ Charlesworth, Brigadier O. D. Jackson and Colonel Charles Stuart. Vale!
The review essays for this issue of the journal are by Lieutenant Colonel Graeme Sligo and Michael Evans. Sligo considers Sir Arnold T. Wilson’s book, Mesopotamia 1917–1920: A Clash of Loyalties—A Personal and Historical Record. He explores the British experience in Mesopotamia during the period between 1917 and 1920 with a view to improving our understanding of contemporary operations in Iraq. In the second essay, Evans reviews the current state of urban military operations and their significance for future armed conflict.
Three book reviews follow; they are by Captain Lachlan Mead, Colonel Terry McCullagh and Russell Parkin. The Autumn issue of the journal concludes with letters and commentary, and diary notices. Finally, the editorial staff of the AAJ trust that the diverse content of this volume will find a wide readership within the Australian profession of arms and its supporters.
