Helping a Friend: An Australian Military Commander’s Perspective on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands

For Australia, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was the first effects-based or ‘whole of government’ response to restoring law and order in a failed state in the South Pacific. RAMSI collected and destroyed some 2627 weapons and 6561 munitions while the mission’s military support component enabled the police to undertake thirteen successful arrest operations. The rebuilding of the Royal Solomon Islands Police force has commenced, and there has been a reduction of the military component of RAMSI, with only a small element remaining in order to provide a coordinating headquarters and an in-theatre response force.

The success of the mission since July 2003 has led many observers to comment that RAMSI should provide the template for future ‘permissive interventions’ in the South Pacific. Nevertheless, there remain a number of issues in relation to the conduct of operations that need to be carefully considered in planning for future inter-agency operations. The author commanded the third rotation of Combined Joint Task Force 635 (CJTF 635) that deployed to the Solomon Islands from March to August 2004. This article seeks, from a military commander’s perspective, to highlight some of the critical lessons that need to be learnt from the Solomon Islands operation in order to permit the Army to adapt and be ready for the next RAMSI-style mission.

The Conduct of Operations in the Solomon Islands, March - August 2004

The underlying theme that ran through the planning and conduct of operations in the Solomon Islands was the reality that CJTF 635 was to provide support for the civil and police forces restoring law and order. The Task Force’s official mission was ‘to provide military, security and logistic support to the Participating Police Forces (PPF) within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)–led mission to restore order as part of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands’.

The aim of RAMSI was to ensure that PPF elements dominated, with the mission’s military personnel remaining in the background. At no time did the military forces involved in RAMSI act independently in order to arrest suspected criminals or to restore law and order. The bulk of the Task Force’s military activities in the Solomon Islands consisted of protection and security duties, the provision of logistic support and transport to various civilian agencies, and the maintenance of an in-theatre quick-reaction force (QRF) composed of a rifle platoon. An examination of the way in which these diverse tasks were performed by CJTF 635 reveals the need to absorb a number of lessons that will help to ensure the Australian Army’s readiness for any subsequent inter-agency operation within the Asia-Pacific region.

Planning Issues in Inter-Agency Operations

A number of the military activities conducted in support of the PPF in the Solomon Islands mission demonstrated that significant differences existed in the planning methodologies and descriptive language that each agency employed. For instance, while the Australian Defence Force (ADF) possesses a proactive planning culture, the PPF were largely reactive in character and had little appreciation of the response timings that might be required to conduct actions on foreign soil. Simply, the PPF did not fully grasp the concept of an operation with multiple tasks as part of a wider campaign plan. As a result, the police approach led to many short-notice requests for military support, an inability to prioritise tasks (and assets) to achieve a particular outcome and a tendency to take inadequate force protection measures. The police approach was characterised by compartmentalised activity—an approach that was further exacerbated by the existence of different threat assessment methodologies.

The PPF’s lack of an overall campaign plan made it difficult to ensure that military activities supported the civil authority in an efficient manner—for instance, during the process of making arrests of suspected criminals. During the planning of military support in which a platoon of troops was involved in assisting the PPF to apprehend a particularly high-profile criminal, there was a distinct lack of shared information between the police and the military. Lack of information resulted in insufficient time for briefing, rehearsals, and the preparation of police and soldiers for a potentially dangerous inter-agency operation.

This situation could be improved by arranging a system of military secondments to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in order to provide that organisation with a basic understanding of ADF planning methodologies and military culture. Given the current threat environment from terrorism, both the ADF and the AFP need to develop intelligence and operational procedures that ensure the evolution of what might be described as a common operating picture. The production of an inter-agency handbook based on the RAMSI experience (and modelled to an extent on the ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook)¹ would provide a useful document for joint doctrine development. Doctrine should be designed to facilitate common procedures in inter-agency planning, command and control, intelligence assessment, and the conduct of operations. Doctrine should also assist in the assessment of the requirements for logistical support.

The Need for Inter-Agencuy Working Groups

The RAMSI approach was designed along single-agency lines, with civil, police and military planning staffs not situated together or even capable of using a common Local Area Network. The resulting ‘stovepiping’ of information and activity created significant interoperability issues that were only alleviated by the efforts of key military personnel in building effective inter-agency working relations. This personal approach was supported by the collocation of military staff in PPF (but not DFAT) functional areas. RAMSI created several working groups in order to ensure unity of effort. These groups included a Joint Operational Planning Group (to ensure that all operations were properly integrated); a Transitional Oversight Steering Group (to handle arrangements for resources to be transferred to contracted services); and the Technical User Group (to manage information efficiently within RAMSI). These groups succeeded in forming the basis for a collaborative effort between the various agencies involved in RAMSI and should be the model for future inter-agency missions. A working group approach could be improved by better cooperation between ADF, AFP and DFAT officers in terms of such initiatives as inter-agency scenario-based planning and attendance at various training courses in order to develop improved understanding and mutual confidence.

Creating an Inter-Agency Operational Culture

A critical factor in the success of RAMSI was the fact that PPF and CJTF personnel were able to work together at the tactical level in order to maximise their respective capabilities. There were, however, cultural distinctions between the PPF and CJTF that created a number of psychological barriers. A major difference between police and military culture resides in the former’s eight-hour shift mentality and the latter’s ‘24/7’ (twenty-four hours, seven days a week) focus. This cultural difference was broken down over time as policemilitary cooperation deepened, personal relations developed and an inter-agency awareness was gradually created. The conduct of a number of in-theatre training sessions, designed to build civil–military familiarity and to ensure that the PPF employed military personnel and resources effectively, also improved the situation.

In most cases the security provided by CJTF 635 consisted of a military presence (no less than a section) at designated PPF outposts and various patrols that were designed to deny freedom of movement to any potential adversary. The various patrols sought to communicate with outlying communities and to gather information in order to improve RAMSI’s situational awareness. The aim was to disrupt criminal activity by restricting access to provisions and secure hideouts while countering any intimidation tactics that might be used by dissidents to try to win control over the local population.

The use of military patrols in the Solomon Islands would have been greatly assisted by the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The latter would have aided the Task Force in building its situational awareness in village geography (including entry and exit points) while providing visual deterrence. The employment of UAVs would have been effective in a country where the majority of the population live in outlying rural villages and have a high opinion of the power of technology. UAVs should be considered as essential assets in future RAMSI-style missions.

Military commanders supporting the PPF received guidance to the effect that each police patrol should contain two radio-equipped soldiers as a minimum requirement. These soldiers were essential for the provision of protection and communications. If a police patrol was considered likely to encounter a person of interest (POI) who might be armed, then the Task Force regarded a four-man fire-team including a medic as the minimum-security requirement. This operational guidance was designed to reduce the risk of the military being unilaterally involved in the arrest of any POI without a police presence. This approach, coupled with various presence patrols, ensured that the military appeared ubiquitous whilst actual force numbers were being slowly reduced in preparation for repositioning. Ultimately, the PPF and/or members of the RSIP conducted most arrests and the success attributed to those organisations reassured the local population that normalcy had returned to the Solomon Islands.

Shaping an Inter-Agency Information Environment

The information environment in the Solomon Islands was controlled through the Office of the Special Coordinator of RAMSI. DFAT personnel had to approve all media contact from RAMSI, but there was no requirement for information operations to be conducted in order to support a campaign plan. From a military planning perspective, more work needs to be done to educate other government agencies about the benefits of developing a campaign plan that is supported by a communications strategy. The benefit of a communications strategy is that it can contribute to the task of influencing the perceptions of the population in the theatre of operations and, also, of the general public in Australia.

Combined Military Forces in Inter-Agency Operations

In the rotation to the Solomon Islands that occurred between March to August 2004, military forces from Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga were deployed. These countries usually contributed as a minimum a rifle platoon each alongside a national command element. As with the activities of any combined military force, there are differences between the various contingents in terms of perceptions about the character of the mission, levels of acceptable risk, and attitudes towards the local population that any Australian commander must consider.

As a result, there were a number of situations that highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of each national contingent. For example, the skill and ease with which personnel from Pacific Island countries were able to establish a good rapport with the local population was noticeable. In particular, the ability to speak and understand Pidgin greatly assisted patrols conducted by Papua New Guinea troops, who were able to gather relevant and timely information. In contrast, personnel from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and ADF personnel never achieved a rapport with the local people beyond the level of a smile and a greeting. However, operations by Pacific island military contingents were often hampered by differing types of doctrine, by a lack of operational experience and by diverse standards of training. These weaknesses were partly alleviated by the conduct of in-theatre training packages designed to build a collective capability in order to conduct subunit operations and reinforced force preparation training schemes already conducted in Australia. The next step must be the instigation of a regional initiative—beyond the largely bilateral objectives of the Defence Cooperation Program—to develop doctrine and standardisation of training across the South Pacific in order to support the rapid deployment of a combined military force anywhere in the region.

Social Policies in Inter-Agency Operations

Another lesson that can be drawn from the experience of RAMSI is that the morale of soldiers in an inter-agency operation is as important as it is in any standard military deployment. There was conflict between the PPF and military personnel with regard to social policies, including alcohol consumption, standards of accommodation and the perception that the PPF somehow ‘looked down’ on soldiers. In order to deal with these issues, RAMSI took measures to encourage PPF and CJTF joint activities, including a Friday night ‘happy hour’ and a combined sports afternoon each Saturday. Such initiatives assisted in building better personal relations between members of the police and the military.

Another social area that may require attention is the monotonous character of much of the daily activity during RAMSI-style operations. There is a need for clearly defined policies on rest and relief, on participation in local civic projects, on sporting activities and a need for frequent briefings in order to pass on information. In low-threat environments social activity requires regulation lest police and soldiers forget that they are in an operational zone.

Reserve Forces in Inter-Agency Operations

The Army reserve personnel who deployed to the Solomon Islands performed to a high standard and demonstrated once again that there was little difference in quality between them and their full-time counterparts. Most reservists were employed in logistical support tasks such as driving, store control and contract management, and they were often able to use aspects of civilian experience. In the context of RAMSI, it was particularly advantageous to have a number of reserve personnel who were civilian police officers. Such reserve personnel proved invaluable in developing better military understanding of the PPF’s operating culture. In the future, the ADF should seriously consider expanding military career management to include the creation of a database that highlights the skills and competencies of reserve soldiers available for deployment. The Army should be in a position to approach a reservist for assistance in critical skill areas such as contract management and police liaison rather than issuing a request for any available person—reserve or regular—to take up relevant positions.

Military Aid to the Civil Power and Inter-Agency Operations

A final lesson from the Solomon Islands mission was the constant need to reinforce to soldiers that the military was operating in support of the police. In the Solomon Islands this situation meant that the PPF dictated the tempo and type of operations conducted—which for some soldiers was initially difficult to accept. For example, from the outset of RAMSI there was a clear need to develop an extensive military patrolling program in order to provide a secure environment. The adoption of an immediate patrolling regime was the initial advice given by senior military officers to their PPF counterparts. However, a patrol system is not how the PPF wished to conduct initial operations. In such a situation the best that a military commander can do is to advise, perhaps remonstrate, and then try to influence decisions that have an impact on the welfare and safety of his deployed troops. In future RAMSI-style missions, it will be important in force preparation courses and in-theatre reception packages to ensure that the conditions military personnel are likely to meet in an inter-agency operation are clearly outlined from the outset. This is vital in order to pre-empt any surprise, disappointment or frustration that might develop concerning each agency’s different techniques. There remains, as always, a need for soldiers to be constantly aware of the character of any mission involving civilian agencies.

Conclusion

It is possible that, in the near future, Australia will face another RAMSI-style operation in the South Pacific that will involve the Army. Because of the ADF’s capabilities in providing logistical support, there is always likely to be military involvement in any civilian-led offshore operation in the South Pacific. However, it is highly likely that, in most circumstances, there will be a need for a military quick-reaction force—either in-theatre or on reduced notice in Australia—in order to guarantee the type of secure environment that allows other agencies to achieve their goals in support of the Government’s objectives.

There is a requirement to ensure that work is now undertaken to develop inter-agency doctrine for command and control, intelligence assessment, the conduct of combined operations and for the delivery of logistical support. In particular, persuading civilian agencies to adopt a suitable variant of the Joint Military Appreciation Process as a methodology for inter-agency planning would be a positive step. In inter-agency operations the key aim must be to find a commonality of procedure that permits the achievement of political goals. Developing a common appreciation system needs to be accompanied by review aimed at devising an inter-agency campaign plan. Any campaign plan also requires two key facets: a communications strategy that seeks to shape the information environment and the development of in-theatre training packages to build familiarity and confidence-building measures between the various civil–military agencies deployed. Finally, the ADF might explore the feasibility of a regional initiative to develop common doctrine and standardise training regimes across South Pacific militaries and paramilitaries. The aim should be to facilitate the rapid deployment of a regional military force in order to deal with any crisis in the South Pacific.

Endnote

1 ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook, The American–British–Canadian–Australian Armies, Program Primary Standardization Office, Arlington, VA, 11 May 1999.