Saddam’s Last Gulf War and the Modern Media: Implications for the Military
Abstract
Working with the media is an essential element of strategic planning for the military of today. This article examines the various roles of the media and the understanding required for today’s forces to become a media-savvy military. While the media may act as both collaborator and traitor, it is the military that requires a new way of thinking to consciously factor in the newest player in the battlespace: the embedded journalist.
While every war is different, there is a constancy about many of the elements of conflict. The media first went to war with Billy Russell, who covered the Crimean War for The Times newspaper. His graphic accounts proved a powerful tool and ultimately led to significant improvement in the horrific conditions British soldiers endured as a result of poor logistics. Yet the media can also significantly damage a military campaign: witness the CBS reports of the infantry landings in Korea,1 or the television crews with lights filming the arrival of US forces on the beaches of Somalia.2 The embedded journalists in the recent Iraqi conflict were probably closer to their military units than their contemporaries in recent conflicts. An undeniable result of this proximity is the commensurate increase in the speed of understanding of the war for those watching outside the conflict. The effect of this increased understanding can be either overwhelmingly positive or critically negative. The power of the media is such that it is consistently capable of enormous influence on the success of the military effort.
Media as Traitor
Generations of military commanders must have pondered the question of how much information the enemy derives from the media both before and during a campaign. Given widespread use of the Internet, newspaper commentary speculating on the strategy and tactics of a forthcoming conflict can be downloaded and distributed for discussion just as quickly in enemy headquarters as they can by friendly forces. Many commentators employed by Western media outlets are informed, perceptive and are brilliant tacticians in their own right—some with considerable backgrounds in strategic studies, politics and military planning. The very nature of the liberal democracy for which we fight demands that they remain uncensored. How, then, should the coalition military manage a graphically illustrated, well-written account of how it might attack Iraq broadly disseminated throughout the world’s media?
Perhaps one possibility is for the military to simply supply the media with sufficient competing strategies to confuse the enemy with a multiplicity of possibilities. No force can prepare for all eventualities. The media can also be used to undermine a military campaign by sowing misinformation in the minds of its own people. Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, for example, kept up a constant stream of deception on behalf of his government. Neat as ever in his rimless spectacles, green Ba’ath Party uniform and black beret, the man who was Saddam Hussein’s mouthpiece continued to spin loyally for his elusive master even as US troops entered Baghdad: ‘The infidels are committing suicide by the hundreds at the gates of Baghdad,’ he said at a rooftop news conference amid sirens and clouds and only a few hundred metres from US tank positions on the other side of the Tigris River. ‘They say they brought 65 tanks into the centre of the city. I say to you this talk is not true. This is part of their sick mind. There is no presence of American infidels in the city of Baghdad.’ Mr Sahaf became an unlikely media star, combining defiant and abusive language with a subtle awareness of the power of television propaganda. He was a master of plain-speaking, Ba’athist style, and appears to have had few doubts about his own credibility, despite mounting evidence that much of what he said was untrue.
The actions of the so-called ‘Minister for Information’ were both overt and subtle. The misinformation sowed doubt in some viewers’ minds as to Coalition success, comforted and heartened Iraq’s fighters, and thus continued the war, while also providing ammunition for political dissent within the West. This last point is a telling one. The Information Minister spoke the language of protestors who have remained a thorn in the side of the leaders of Britain, America and Australia throughout the Iraq War. He used phrases such as ‘the international gang of outlaws’, ‘crooks’, ‘mercenaries’, ‘stooges’ and ‘racists’—all elements of dogma that could be captured and magnified by domestic political opposition. The Iraqi government was well aware of the political pressure on the West’s leaders, and capitalised on that pressure, using it as a weapon that proved more effective than the tactics of its piecemeal army.
‘The first casualty when war comes is truth,’ reputedly remarked California Senator Hiram Johnson in 1917. This axiom is even more relevant today. Often, the military’s best tactic in the media battlespace is simply to provide as much information and as truthful an account of the battle as possible. Even withholding information is better than deception, simply because a free and aggressive press will usually find the truth anyway. And the media thrives on bad news—witness how quickly the siege of Basra by British forces was relegated to the background during campaign coverage simply because it was progressing steadily and to plan. By contrast, a negative story took centre stage and proved the undeniable power of the media. The shooting of an insurgent in the Battle for Fallujah in 2004 saw a US Marine ‘withdrawn’ from the battlefield because a media team saw him shoot a wounded enemy combatant. Journalistic ‘witnesses’ decried the fact that ‘... the man who was killed didn’t appear to be armed or threatening in any way, with no weapons visible in the mosque. The slain man was among a group of men wounded in fighting a day earlier at the mosque and left there.’3 There was little consideration of the fact that the Marine may well have been acting in self-defence as there were reportedly a number of incidents of wounded Iraqis faking death and then firing on US soldiers.4
What is interesting is the instant analysis of this incident in the media: the national newspaper The Australian used the word ‘murdered’ in its front page headline and The Age also leapt to conclusions in its banner ‘Video captures marine killing unarmed fighter’.5 What these journalists apparently did not appreciate is the military perspective: that wounded fighters remain extremely dangerous. Many veteran accounts from previous conflicts indicate that some battle killing of wounded enemy is seen as a necessary precaution. Sergeant Audie Murphy, the most decorated World War II American soldier, spoke of shooting enemy wounded after taking a position: ‘I step around him and examine other foxholes. Each contains a body or two. One stirs, and I give it a burst as a precaution.’6 There is a lesson in this for any military force: if the media is allowed to see the true face of battle at close quarters, then the military had better have its own explanations for the dreadful actions that tactical combat necessitates.
Negative Domestic Media
A hostile domestic media requires a deliberate strategy of damage control. Even now, it remains difficult to judge whether the media as a whole supported or opposed the war in Iraq. Some newspapers were perhaps jingoistic in their approach: witness The Daily Telegraph’s predilection for reporting the war almost always in positive tones, as opposed to The Sydney Morning Herald’s often negative coverage. Commentator Gerard Henderson reflects these obvious divisions in his suggestion that ‘... most (but not all) members of the Canberra press gallery privately disagreed with the Howard government’s decision to deploy, and subsequently commit, the ADF to war.’7 Henderson used this particular piece to document various examples of media hostility. He cited ABC television’s The 7. 30 Report on 13 March, 18 March and 31 March, and Catherine McGrath on ABC radio’s AM on 24 January and 30 January as evidence of this hostility. He referred to ‘the bad language expressed by some veteran media commentators’, naming Alan Ramsey, Phillip Adams, and Terry Lane.
To negate the effects of a hostile media, the military needs to go on the offensive with its own outspoken supporters. For every Phillip Adams, there needs to be a Tim Blair. For every article condemning the use of war as a political weapon, there needs to be one pointing out the fallacy of not using state-controlled violence. For every individual who advocates not using a war machine to protect freedom and democracy, there needs to be another to point out how armoured divisions can be peacemakers.
Media as a Weapon
While acknowledging that the media can be used as a weapon by an enemy, the military has to admit that the media is an effective tool to further its own cause. In just the same way as the Iraqi Information Minister bolstered his troops’ morale with news of Iraqi victories and American losses (albeit false), so too can the Coalition military use the media to further its cause. The widespread promotion of the tactics of ‘shock and awe’ that preceded the onset of the invasion certainly led some Iraqis to believe that they would be helpless before an allied onslaught. Such propaganda may have worked to convince Iraqi fighters to run, or fight less aggressively than they might have otherwise. This is, however, dependent on enemy access to this message. The military has to ensure that its enemies are bombarded with these morale-damaging messages. US forces certainly exploited this tactic, using Humvee-mounted loudspeakers along the road to Baghdad to broadcast the insult—in Arabic—that Iraqi men are impotent.8 This had the effect of causing Fedayeen, the fierce Iraqi irregulars, to come out fighting—to be attacked by the invading troops without the protection of their human shields. It is fairly safe to surmise that this piece of news was not broadcast on Iraqi television.
The military must increase the use of positive images to promote its efforts. Images and their captions, such as those available on the Department of Defence’s Media Room web pages, paint a positive picture of military deployment and action, providing clear evidence that the right images and the right words can do much to further the military cause. For example, many of these images portray soldiers and civilians interacting in relaxed and welcoming poses. Troops, with weapons slung and floppy hats (not helmets), are greeted by smiling Iraqis or jubilant East Timorese. These images may not be spontaneous and could be easily staged. Similarly, photographs of soldiers engaging in civil reconstruction or disaster relief are prominent, sending the message that the military is not present as an occupier but as a helping friend willing to pitch in. Often, such images ‘sell’ the message of helpful benevolence to the domestic constituency, a recognition of the importance of maintaining support at home.
The Media as Collaborator and the Role of the Embedded Journalist
While journalists have seen front-line action as war correspondents in the past, the use of embedded journalists in the war in Iraq placed photographers and commentators in closer proximity to the troops they accompanied than ever before. Undoubtedly, the concept of the ‘embedded journalist’ was initially greeted with ambivalence by the military. After all, their fears that the media presence would compromise the force’s safety or place undue demands on soldiers may have been well grounded.
Yet, the effect of such proximity to the front-line soldier could also mean that many of the embedded journalists reported on the military in a universally positive way. The tone of the following report, which was widely circulated during the early days of the conflict, is notable for the positive reinforcement it gives the Coalition forces.
Journalists on the front lines took a very different view of the need for operational security. We did not even complain when we were ordered to turn off our satellite phones because the Iraqi guns seemed to be able to zero on their transmissions, or when we were asked not to report something ... Of course it was alright. Forget journalistic objectivity. There were armed men across the road trying to kill me, and my protection depended on these British troops, many of whom I knew by their first names. There was no question which side I was on.
In the same way, those of us in the field knew that those gloomy armchair pundit accounts from London and Washington of setbacks and ‘pauses’ were missing the point. We learned to understand the painstaking way the British were gathering intelligence in Basra and steadily separating the Saddam loyalists from the bulk of the population—so the place finally fell like a house of cards.
Air Marshal Brian Burridge, the British commander, suggests that the hundreds of journalists who have learned a new understanding of the military could change the way the media covers war. It is about time.9
Many observers believe that the media experiment in embedding journalists was so successful that it has become a blueprint for the future.10 ADF Brigadier Mike Hannan, who briefed the media for much of the war, agrees: ‘It would be very hard for any country to walk away from embedding now.’ He noted, however, in an opinion shared by others, that embedded media see a very confined view of the war.11
The increasing likelihood of embedded journalists on the future battlefield implies that warriors may well have to factor in the presence of a camera, tape recorder or intrepid questioner beside them as they fight, even more so than before. The testy response to the classic ‘How do you feel?’ may well find itself broadcast around the world with negative results. Hopefully, the ‘Stockholm syndrome’ which, as the above account suggests affects a good proportion of journalists, would increase media empathy for the soldier on the ground.
The Media and the Maintenance of Morale
For the soldier in the field, the maintenance of morale is a crucial factor and, indeed, one of the principles of war, taught to young officers in military academies worldwide. Napoleon regarded morale as a force multiplier of the order of three to one; in other words, an army of 30 000 with high morale—all other factors including training, equipment and position on the ground being equal—will defeat an army of 50 000 with low morale.
What Napoleon neglected to consider, however, was the morale of the general public, sitting at home following the war through the media lens. While the lack of communication technology meant that Napoleon could blissfully ignore the influence of family on his troops, today’s soldier in the field has much more contact with family and friends through an efficient mail service and, in some cases, the use of email. If a military campaign is receiving negative publicity at home, this may be communicated to those fighting the war, with a resultant plunge in morale—although soldiers’ families are typically more likely to offer unconditional support. If those at home perceive that the campaign is lost, then this may affect the morale of the fighting troops, with potentially dire consequences for the campaign.
The maintenance of the morale of the fighting force thus has implications in terms of media control. As far as realistically possible, military forces would be well advised to supply the domestic media with good news and images, while the bad news and negative images are downplayed. The flow of information from the military to the public must be controlled and guarded. This is not to say that misinformation should occur or that ‘only good news’ should be supplied. Today’s media and the public in general are educated and questioning, and they will quickly become suspicious of anything that resembles the Iraqi Information Ministry’s ‘good news in any event’ tactic:
As Iraq’s Information Minister, Mohammed Said al-Sahhaf, defiantly denied the US advance, American soldiers were walking through the vast and lavish palace and appearing relaxed in their compound gardens.12
The Media as Targets
The Iraq conflict, like others before it, saw journalists listed among the casualties. At least twelve journalists died during the fighting and in the insurgency campaign that followed. Some of these were deliberate enemy targets. Paul Moran, working for Australia’s ABC at the time, was killed by a suicide bomber who drove a car packed with explosives alongside him and then detonated it. Another journalist stepped on a land-mine. Possibly the most appalling attack on the media, however, occurred on 8 April when US forces fired at the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad and at the Al-Jazeera television network. Three journalists were killed and several wounded in the two attacks.13
The controversy over these attacks concerned not simply the fact that journalists were killed, but that, according to some witnesses, the attacks were unprovoked—in the case of the Palestine Hotel—and deliberate—in the Al-Jazeera case. The US Army denied this: ‘... we don’t target journalists deliberately—not now, not ever,’ said Central Command spokesman Brigadier General Vince Brooks at his daily briefing. However, it is indicative of the unpredictability of the media-military relationship at time of war. For the military, it was an additional reminder that the media presence on the battlefield must always be tracked and managed.
Conclusion
The role of the embedded journalist in the war in Iraq is tangible proof that modern militaries are now forced to factor in the role of the media in any future operation. Military forces must realise that their cause is best served by accommodating and protecting the media in the battlespace and providing journalists a wealth of information heavily promoting the positive. The role of the media as collaborator must not be overlooked and, in fact, must be exploited to further the military cause.
Conversely, the role of the media as traitor—be it intentional or otherwise—must be managed skilfully lest it have a destructive effect on the force’s morale. The military must protect itself from the insidious influence of a hostile or unscrupulous media. Given today’s pervasive media presence, every member of a military force must be regarded as a possible spokesperson for the military cause.
Endnotes
1 See ‘War on Television’: ‘In August 1950, a CBS television news announcer reported an infantry landing as it was in progress, and the controversy caused by this possible security breach shaped a conflict that would long continue between military authorities waging war and television reporters covering that warfare.’ <http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/W/htmlW/warontelevi/warontelevi.htm>, 15 May 2003.
2 Southern Newspaper Publishers Association bulletin: ‘In December 1992, when Marines landed on the beaches of Mogadishu, Somalia, the only hostile groups they encountered were camera crews with blinding lights. The photographers were on the beachhead long before the Marines.’ <http://www.snpa.org/ebulletin/09. 20.01.htm>, 15 May 2003.
3 See ‘My Way’: ‘U.S. Military Investigating Marine Shooting’ at <http://apnews.myway.com/article/20041116/D86D337G0.html>, 16 November 2004.
4 The Canberra Times, ‘Marine filmed killing Iraqi’, 17 November 2004.
5 <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/11/16/1100574465379.html>. 17 November 2004, p. 2.
6 Audie Murphy, To Hell and Back, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1949, p. 175.
7 Gerard Henderson, ‘Rallying around the flag is no jingoism’, 8 April 2003, at: <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/04/07/1049567625596.html>.
8 Newsweek, ‘The Secret War’, 22 April 2003, p. 29.
9 Martin Walker, ‘Commentary: How the media changed.’ <http://www.upi.com/print.cfm?StoryID=20030408-071952-7876r>, 8 April 2003.
10 Sally Jackson, ‘Journalists the first casualties in reporting the truth of war’, The Australian (media section), 17 April 2003, p. 7.
11 Sally Jackson, ‘Too close to the action?’, The Australian (media section), 17 April 2003, p. 7.
12 ABC News website, ‘US troops spend first night in Baghdad palace’, 8 April 2003: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s826537.htm>
13 CNN website, ‘U.S. attacks kill three journalists’, 8 April 2003: <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/08/sprj.irq.hotel/index.html>
