Operation Helpem Fren: A Personal Perspective
Abstract
This article is based on a presentation to the Rowell Profession of Arms Seminar, held at the Telstra Theatre, Australian War Memorial, on 23 June 2005. It is a personal reflection on the evolution and context of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), by the man who planned and deployed Australia’s contribution to that operation. A truly international and interagency effort, RAMSI is often viewed as a template for promoting security and governance in Australia’s volatile neighbourhood.
Introduction
Operation Helpem Fren was the codename given to the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). My involvement in the mission began with initial planning in the weeks before the first waves of police and military deployed to Solomon Islands on 24 July 2003. Subsequently, I served in Solomon Islands in the dual roles of Commander of the Participating Police Force (PPF) and as Deputy Commissioner of the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) until 1 August 2004. This experience was a great honour and privilege and, after living in Solomon Islands for a little over a year, I developed a deep affection for the country and its people. Before going any further, I should also acknowledge the loyalty and great respect I feel towards the many dedicated and committed police officers who remain in the RSIP and who persevered in their duties through years of neglect and intimidation before RAMSI.
RAMSI has had a profound impact upon the people of Solomon Islands by literally changing the course of their nation’s history. While this discussion will consider the success of the mission up until mid-2005, I would also like to preface these remarks by noting that there is still a great deal of work to be done in Solomon Islands. The job remains a difficult and, at times, a very dangerous one. In the past eight months there have been two assassination attempts on RAMSI personnel and, in May 2004, at Manakwai village on Malu’u, North Malaita, shots were exchanged between RAMSI military forces and a criminal element. The second assassination attempt against RAMSI personnel (which, like the first in October 2004, was a cowardly ambush of a PPF patrol in Honiara) resulted in the shooting death of Australian Federal Police (AFP) officer Adam Dunning on 22 December 2004. While the mission has been incredibly successful, it is also necessary to remember the fragility of the peace created by RAMSI. There remains a critical need to address the complex causes of the underlying ethnic tensions that led to the breakdown of civil society in Solomon Islands during the mid- to late- 1990s. Before proceeding, it is important to develop some context by describing the country and some of the recent history that led to the political, economic and social crisis for which RAMSI was the response.
Solomon Islands - Geography, Climate and Historical Background
Solomon Islands is located in the south-west Pacific. The Shortland Islands form the country’s northern border, which is adjacent to the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. The islands of Choiseul, Santa Isabel and Malaita make up the remainder of the northern part of the Solomon chain, while New Georgia, Guadalcanal and Makira form the southern part, with the Santa Cruz Islands further to the east. In total, however, almost a thousand separate islands comprise the Solomon group, with the six major islands and many smaller ones forming a double chain that stretches for 1500 kilometres in a south-easterly direction from the Shortland group. The national capital, Honiara, is located on the island of Guadalcanal, which is about three and a half hours flying time from Brisbane. Guadalcanal is perhaps best known to most Australians as the focal point of the many sea and land battles fought during the Second World War, primarily between Japanese and American forces for the possession of the strategically located Henderson airfield.
Just a few degrees south of the equator, Solomon Islands has a tropical climate, with rugged mountain ranges and heavy jungle forming the major terrain features across most of the islands. Due to the geography of Solomon Islands, many of the communities are extremely remote—a factor that makes the delivery of services very difficult. The primary means of transport is by boat, with motor vehicle traffic mainly being confined to the major centres of Honiara, Auki and Gizo. The population of the islands is about 500 000 and growing at a rate around 3.5 per cent per annum. The rate of population increase is high and of increasing concern because of the pressure it places on both natural resources and the demands for services. Melanesians make up the majority of the population; however, there are also pockets of Polynesians and Gilbertese, particularly on some of the outer islands. Religion plays a significant role in the life of the people. More than ninety-five per cent of the population is Christian, with the remainder following customary beliefs. In some places Christianity is practised alongside traditional beliefs of magic and ancestor worship. Over eighty languages are spoken in the country. On numerous occasions, particularly on the rugged island of Malaita, a five minute helicopter flight from one village to the next would mean that RAMSI personnel needed a different interpreter.
Solomon Islands was a British protectorate from 1893 until 7 July 1978, just over twenty-five years ago, when the nation achieved independence. Since that time, for a variety of reasons, standards of living have deteriorated to the extent that social indicators are among the lowest in the Pacific. Unemployment remains very high, with approximately ninety per cent of the population following a rural subsistence lifestyle. Almost all export earnings are derived from primary products, particularly timber, fish, palm oil, copra and cocoa. Over recent years, Solomon Islands’ economy became dependent on the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and a succession of budget deficits. There was very little capital investment, few development projects or employment generation schemes, and basic infrastructure such as roads and electricity supply were eroded.
Ethnic Tensions
Urban drift to the national capital, Honiara, throughout the 1990s exacerbated unemployment and other social problems, further heightening tensions between various ethnic groups. In particular, friction between the inhabitants of Guadalcanal and Malaita over issues such as land, internal migration and compensation claims led to numerous outbreaks of violence and criminality. At the height of this conflict some 20 000 Malaitans were forced, through fear and intimidation, to flee their homes in Guadalcanal and return to Malaita. Young, dispossessed and aggrieved youths took up arms and clashes between rival groups became commonplace.
Prior to RAMSI, Solomon Islands was a troubled nation in a steady state of decline that met all the indicators of a ‘failing state’. Honiara was under the sway of armed criminal elements. In more remote areas there was a state of virtual civil war, in which self-proclaimed warlords and thugs with guns created no-go zones where they committed horrific crimes at will.
These groups were largely unopposed by an almost totally ineffective police force that was riddled with corruption and which frequently exacerbated the situation by forming alliances with opposing groups based on wantok loyalties.1 In some cases, the police provided arms and ammunition to militants directly from the RSIP armoury. The national government, paralysed by fear, and deeply compromised by its own connections and dependence upon some of the armed groups, was reduced to rubber stamping outrageous demands for ‘compensation’ from parties claiming to have been wronged. Police officers were also often involved in exacting huge sums of cash at gunpoint from a beleaguered national Treasury. Money destined for provincial development programs and normal services such as hospitals and schools was squandered by the thieves and thugs who were virtually ruling Honiara. At village level, people found themselves without even the most basic of services. The spiral of economic decline was directly related to law and order problems. The normal social welfare responsibilities of government, particularly in the areas of health and education, were almost entirely reliant on aid funds from the international donor community and church groups. By mid-2003, the situation had deteriorated to the point where the Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, Sir Allan Kemakeza, heading a weak and divided government that was also essentially bankrupt, wrote to the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, asking for assistance.
The RAMSI Concept of Operations
Planning Assumptions
Planning for the mission was based upon several underlying assumptions that developed out of the initial government-to-government discussions between Australia and Solomon Islands. These ideas were further refined through three high-level scoping visits that were undertaken to Solomon Islands prior to the formal arrival of RAMSI personnel on 24 July 2003. It was these early planning assumptions that have proved to be the key ingredients for the success of the mission in its first two years.
It is important to recall that the RAMSI deployment followed a request for assistance by the Government of Solomon Islands. Moreover, the majority of its citizens wholeheartedly supported the request for assistance. These two key factors, along with careful management, have ensured that the mission began with, and has maintained, the overwhelming support of the population. Evidence of this support could be seen in the incredible reception at Honiara International Airport on 24 July 2003 when thousands of cheering Solomon Islanders greeted the constant stream of C-130s and charter aircraft bringing in the police, soldiers and civilian specialists. Soldiers on the first planes had disembarked in defensive postures, but quickly sensed the mood of the population and shouldered weapons in order to wave to elated crowds. Even before the arrival of RAMSI personnel, the first illegal firearms had been handed in and stolen cars suddenly appeared in their owners’ yards overnight.
One of the greatest challenges for the mission will be to continue to maintain the high level of support of the majority of the Solomon’s population. One obvious barometer of the ongoing level of public support for RAMSI is the monitoring of newspaper editorials and comments from the man in the street and the woman in the village. The friendly smiles and waves of school children walking to reopened schools at the sight of a passing RAMSI vehicle is another less scientific, but equally demonstrable, sign of continued support. I recall saying on many occasions that when the kids stop waving to us, we need to reassess what we are doing and how we are doing it.
The second factor contributing to the mission’s success was the possession of a strong mandate. The passing of the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 by the Parliament of Solomon Islands, prior to the arrival of the mission, enabled almost 2000 soldiers and 300 police to arrive legally empowered to commence the immediate restoration of security and law and order. During the planning phase, there was some debate about how large and visible the military presence needed to be in order to fulfil its dual roles of protection of the PPF and logistical support to the mission. One can now say that arriving with the support of a significant military force has enhanced the success of the mission in a number of ways. The earlier experience of the International Peace Monitoring Team, an international effort in the Solomons from November 2000 to June 2002, had demonstrated the futility of a peace mission without ‘teeth’. On that occasion, police had been limited to monitoring and reporting incidents, and were not empowered to act against crimes being perpetrated in front of them. It was interesting to see numbers of AFP and New Zealand police officers who had served with the International Peace Monitoring Team returning to Solomon Islands with RAMSI to address what they described as ‘unfinished business’. Empowering an intervention force with a strong mandate often draws criticism over a range of sovereignty issues but, for the villager at the grass roots level, the notion of sovereignty takes a distant second place to daily survival. There is also an argument that in such cases sovereignty is not taken from but actually restored to the host nation.
A third critical factor in the mission’s success has involved the multinational and multidisciplinary character of the mission. Operationally, RAMSI is a police-led mission, a feature that is something of a novelty in itself. The mission brought together a mix of police, military and civilian expertise that was not only able to deliver security and law and order, but also simultaneously to provide significant peace dividends such as development and nation-building. The role played by Nick Warner, a seasoned diplomat from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as the mission’s civilian Special Coordinator, greatly enhanced the human face of the mission and ensured its success.
The Importance of Regional Partners
In addition to being multidisciplinary, RAMSI includes personnel from 10 regional partners: Fiji, Samoa, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, New Zealand and Australia. This diversity, along with the support of the Pacific Islands Forum, has strengthened the legitimacy of the mission by demonstrating the high level of regional commitment to its success. While some nations have contributed only limited resources, their efforts on the ground show that the commitment is not just about numbers or symbolism. RAMSI is about doing something to help a neighbour and it was a great source of pleasure for me to nominate the pidgin words ‘Helpem Fren’ as the mission’s operational title.
Operation Phases
The planning phase of the mission made use of the excellent facilities at the AFP’s Wangaralli Nurrumbai Centre at Majura in the Australian Capital Territory. The centre now houses the AFP’s International Deployment Group, but in mid-2003 it was used to bring together planners from the main agencies involved in the mission—Defence, the AFP, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and AusAID. The aim of these sessions was to come up with a consolidated view of where we were going and what we were trying to achieve. There were some interesting meetings and a great deal was learnt about various organisational cultures and the differences in such basics as the language and terminology used by Canberra’s various bureaucracies. A good example of these differences involved priority setting and the understanding of the duration of the mission. Some members on the whole-of-government planning team were thinking that the mission would only be ‘in country’ a matter of days prior to its withdrawal. Others were planning in months and years for achievement of specific goals, while those focused on aspects such as nation-building rightly argued that success could not be judged until Solomon Islands could stand on its own feet, which would probably take decades to achieve.
The end product of these deliberations was a plan encompassing three phases: commencement, consolidation and final. The commencement phase focused on immediate tactical and operational issues such as establishing a presence in the country, winning back the streets of Honiara from the criminal elements, commencing investigations, neutralising the self-proclaimed warlords and collecting illegal firearms. The second phase was aimed at addressing the issue of consolidation of rule of law in the country, so as to enable the essential nation-building work to get underway. The final phase, as the name implies, was about ensuring the sustainability and self-reliance of Solomon Islands and paving the way for a return to normal bilateral relationships. Given the importance of the commencement phase in terms of establishing credibility and acceptance of the mission in the eyes of the people of Solomon Islands, much of the remainder of this chapter will focus on key events in those early days.
Prior to leaving Canberra for Townsville, the jump-off point for the operation, a number of ‘desk-top’ exercises were conducted. These exercises involved a series of ‘what if’ scenarios that included all the government agencies, but particularly the small group of RAMSI Principals—the leaders of the police, military and development teams—coordinated by Nick Warner. The aim of the exercises was to determine what we would like to achieve on each day of the mission’s first week. For example, on the day of our arrival, one of the objectives included initiating joint unarmed PPF and RSIP foot patrols on the streets of Honiara. This move was necessary to demonstrate that a viable police presence was henceforth going to be in place to ensure the safety of citizens. The foot patrols were also symbolically important to show that the PPF was in the country to support and work with the RSIP and not as a totally separate entity. Of course, to have unarmed police showing the friendly face of policing in Honiara meant that simultaneously there was a need to provide mobile patrols of armed police to act as backup. Indeed, because of the types of weapons available to the militant gangs that had controlled the streets before the arrival of the mission, it was also necessary to have a robust military response at close call. Detailed planning and cooperation were required to get these arrangements up and working so quickly.
As a result of these exercises, it was possible to launch the first joint RSIP/PPF foot patrol within 100 minutes of arrival ‘in country’. I went to the Central police station in Honiara to look for an RSIP officer to take part in a foot patrol of the town’s main marketplace. As the station’s front desk was unmanned, I went to where the watch house and prisoner cells were located. There I found a person, wearing a singlet and blue trousers, hosing blood out of the cells. I told him who I was and asked if he had a police uniform shirt. He scurried away and re-emerged a couple of minutes later with a sergeant’s shirt which he hurriedly buttoned on as I introduced him to the AFP officer who was to accompany him on the foot patrol. This simple act, while obviously a form of beat policing which the particular RSIP officer had not done for some time, was important both practically and symbolically in order to demonstrate to the people of Solomon Islands that the status quo was changing. Gratifyingly, images of the RSIP officer and his AFP counterpart walking around the markets together on the day of our arrival were subsequently beamed around the world.
Protective Security
Another important activity on that first day, conducted prior to mounting the joint police patrols, was a visit to the office of the Prime Minister to discuss his Close Personal Protection (CPP). Following very brief consultation, those thugs engaged in providing physical protection for Sir Allan Kemakeza were replaced by uniformed police officers trained in CPP tasks. Also replaced, by members of the AFP Protective Services, was the ragtag assortment of RSIP and their wantoks who guarded the Prime Minister’s residence and office. These actions were vital because, in the lead up to the arrival of RAMSI, there was considerable resistance from both groups and individuals who saw that their corrupt practices would probably end. Resistance to the coming of RAMSI took the form of threats and intimidation aimed at the Prime Minister. Fearing that the Prime Minister might be killed, the RSIP Commissioner decided to conceal him until the mission arrived. When I spoke to the Prime Minister on 25 July 2003, one day after his new CPP team had taken up duty, he beamed from ear to ear, saying that he had just had the best night’s sleep in years.
Extending the Influence of the Mission Beyond Honiara
The main presence of RAMSI was established at a site known as the Guadalcanal Beach Resort, which in reality was anything but a resort. Even as the mission consolidated itself at this location, there were already plans to establish additional police posts beyond Honiara. While it was crucial to secure a presence in known hotspots such as the Weathercoast and Malaita, where most of the fighting had occurred, there was also a keen sense that all Solomon Islanders across the country’s nine provinces needed to feel that RAMSI was there for everyone. Many people in the outer provinces had suffered incredible hardships throughout the years of the ethnic tensions. In numerous places, no goods or services had ever reached the villages; in other instances, villages had been subjected to raids by marauding gangs.
Day 14 of the mission saw the first police post outside of Honiara opened at Avu Avu on the Weathercoast. Three days later another police post opened at Auki, in Malaita and, by day 28, there were six more posts established in three provinces. By day 100 of the operation, there were 16 police posts across all nine provinces of Solomon Islands. Just prior to the first anniversary of RAMSI a seventeenth police post was opened at Lofung on the border with Papua New Guinea. The creation of these posts in such a short period of time was an incredible achievement, particularly when each post establishment needed to be preceded by significant negotiations with local chiefs and elders, political representatives and rival militia commanders. In addition, this task presented a logistical nightmare, especially when it required the building of police stations in incredibly remote areas of dense jungle with little local infrastructure and under very adverse climatic conditions.
Great credit must be given to the military component of the mission for running the logistic support in such a difficult environment. At the newly constructed police post in Maluu I spoke with exhausted Army engineers who had constructed a complete building, including office facilities and living quarters, in just 12 days. To achieve this result, they had not only worked 18-hour days, but also managed to build up a great relationship with the local people. Initially, Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen, the commander of the military contingent, had agreed with me to establish nine police posts across the country. He managed to retain his sense of humour when told after only a few weeks on the ground that there had been a miscalculation and the requirement was 17 posts. The success of the mission is deeply indebted to the military for such excellent support in this aspect of the operation.
As a final word on the posts, it is worth noting that, of the 17 posts established, seven were what came to be called ‘accompanied’ posts. This term meant that a risk assessment had determined that it was too dangerous to send police into an area without also having a full-time military presence. This was another requirement that drew heavily on the resources of the Army, because an ‘accompanied’ post consisted of two PPF officers and over a platoon of soldiers. In these locations there was the added ability for the police and a team of soldiers to trek through the jungle to isolated villages and deliver policing services. The police posts became critical, not only in terms of delivering these policing services, but also by acting as a network for the delivery of RAMSI’s public relations strategies. The posts became a focal point for interaction between local people and the police and military personnel attached to that area. They provided such an excellent conduit for getting consistent messages out across the country that police posts have now become a central gathering place for people to meet and discuss problems. The posts also coordinate sporting and community events and provide a place where villagers can go to read the Solomon Star newspaper which, at the time of the operation, was usually full of information about RAMSI operations and where the mission was heading.
Engagement with the Key Militant Groups
The police posts also provided RAMSI with a base in the stronghold areas of the key militant groups from which it was possible to progressively negotiate with the various factions in order to get them to lay down their arms. Major factions included the Guadalcanal Liberation Front (GLF) and the Isatabu Freedom Movement, both of which were running military style campaigns against each other on the Weathercoast. Another was the Central Neutral Force, which occupied tracts of land in central Guadalcanal and was headed by Stanley Kaoni who also used the alias of ‘Satan’. Another major group was the Malaitan Eagle Force, with strongholds located in Auki and Maluu on Malaita and strong affiliations with rogue police. The Malaitan Eagle Force was responsible for much of the criminality being committed in and around Honiara.
The engagements with the militant groups on the Weathercoast were of particular importance, as there had been a virtual civil war raging there for some time. The task of securing the Weathercoast and disarming the rival warlords there was among the highest priorities to ensure the success of RAMSI. The three RAMSI principals travelled to the Weathercoast probably no less than 60 times during the first year of the mission, talking with hundreds of villagers, chiefs and elders and bringing the RAMSI messages to the people at the grass roots level. During these visits, we also attended numerous traditional reconciliation ceremonies facilitated through the police posts. In these ceremonies, opposing villages brokered tentative peace agreements and exchanged custom gifts. One of the most sensitive issues in Solomon Islands that still requires careful management involves reconciling traditional custom law with the criminal justice system administered by the central government.
Day 21 of the Mission - The Arrest of Harold Keke
When asked to nominate the most significant day in the first year of Operation Helpem Fren, RAMSI Special Coordinator Nick Warner is quick to reply Day 21, 13 August 2003. This was the day on which Harold Keke, self-proclaimed warlord and head of the GLF, surrendered and was formally arrested aboard HMAS Manoora. Keke’s arrest, arguably the most significant made during the operation, was also the first arrest made by the PPF. Harold Keke had gained a well-earned reputation throughout Solomon Islands as a vicious and cold-blooded killer who had established a no-go zone across a large area of the Weathercoast and refused to negotiate with the government. Rumours and stories added to the hysteria created by the horrific deeds allegedly committed by Keke and, to many people, he was seen as a demon.
I wrote my first letter to Harold Keke before leaving Canberra. In the letter I introduced myself and spoke about the mandate of RAMSI and requested a face-to-face meeting. In the following weeks there was frequent correspondence between us, the letters being collected by a member of the GLF who travelled from the Weathercoast to Honiara by small boat. At one point, just a few days after the arrival of RAMSI, this ‘courier’ was identified in Honiara by anti-GLF thugs who chased him and beat him up. He managed to escape from the thugs only to be arrested by the RSI Police and locked up. This affair then developed into a bit of a ‘Keystone Kops’ exercise when it became necessary to employ PPF members to negotiate the release of the courier from RSIP so he could deliver the next letter to Keke. After this experience, the courier refused to return to Honiara and from then on he was met at a location in the jungle on the outskirts of the town.
On the Weathercoast, Harold Keke’s influence was as profound as his methods were brutal. In one raid he destroyed a village. The 400 residents of the village were held at gunpoint, while Keke took two young boys, stripped them naked and beat them to death in front of the villagers. Their bodies were then tied to the hands of the local priest. Finally, Keke and his followers burnt down all the houses in the village. Only the little chapel was left standing because Keke was quite religious. Harold Keke eventually agreed to a face-to-face meeting with the three RAMSI Principals—Special Coordinator Nick Warner, Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen and myself. After a few of these meetings, which took place in a small church at Mbiti village, a place of Keke’s choosing, he finally surrendered and laid down his arms on the morning of 13 August 2003. As he said his good-byes to hundreds of his followers on the beach at Mbiti, many of them were in tears and visibly distressed. Many of these people had seen Keke as their protector and believed that his surrender would see them fall prey to other warlords who had been terrorising the Weathercoast. Indeed, Keke’s authority was such that, once in detention at a temporary remand facility built at the Guadalcanal Beach resort, the PPF were able to use him to write letters to other GLF members on the Weathercoast who were accused of serious criminal acts. In this way, it was possible to effect many dozens of what I call ‘arrests by appointment’ of suspects who would otherwise probably still be at large in the jungles of Guadalcanal.
I am convinced that if Harold Keke had not peacefully surrendered, it would have been necessary to insert significant military resources into the Weathercoast region in order to capture him. The great difficulty associated with that option was that Keke knew every inch of the incredibly difficult terrain and had a large number of well-armed supporters. It is almost certain that RAMSI would have suffered casualties if it had become necessary to arrest Keke by force. On the day of Keke’s arrest, his second-in-command Ronnie Cawa and a number of other key GLF personnel were also taken into custody. Some weeks later, after further investigations in which witness and confessional statements had been obtained, we realised the value of the other men who had been detained when Keke was arrested. Finally, on the day that Keke was arrested, as agreed in the negotiations, there was a formal ceremony at Mbiti in which members of the GLF surrendered to RAMSI 40 high-powered firearms, 28 of which were military style weapons. These weapons were destroyed on site in front of villagers and those GLF members in attendance.
The Weapon Amnesty
The destruction of the GLF’s weapons at Mbiti was part of a process conducted across the country to collect weapons from the various factions and the public. The eradication of weapons, either seized or handed in voluntarily, was important to the success of RAMSI. A central strategy in disarming the groups was the declaration of a 21-day amnesty. During this period, people could surrender weapons to RAMSI or to the RSIP without being prosecuted for possession of those firearms. Another element of the strategy involved destroying the weapons in front of the people who had surrendered them. This action ensured that it would not be necessary to guard those storage facilities vulnerable to attack. It was also a means of building trust with those who laid down their arms, as the destruction of weapons frequently occurred at large public events that took on the character of ceremonial occasions.
Those who surrendered weapons gained a deal of attention and respect from fellow Solomon Islanders and were assured that no ballistics examination would be conducted of any firearm surrendered during the amnesty period. Incentives to surrender weapons were also complemented by a significant disincentive for those who might seek to retain them. This disincentive took the form of some very tough legislation that would be applied to any person found in possession of a firearm after the 21-day amnesty period. The legislation, which was passed swiftly, included penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment and/or a fine of $25 000 for anyone caught with an illegal weapon. As a result of these measures, a total of 3730 weapons were collected during the first year of the operation, with all but five of these being surrendered during the amnesty period. In addition to the weapons, over 300 000 rounds of ammunition were also collected.
The amnesty did not succeed in collecting all the guns. The death of AFP Officer Adam Dunning and other shooting incidents prove that at least some weapons were cached. Certain individuals had made a choice to cache weapons in the hope that RAMSI would eventually leave the country. However, it is very likely that many of those same people who buried guns have been unable to access them due to their own subsequent incarceration in Rove prison. There are, however, two indicators that permit some confidence to be drawn from the large numbers of firearms collected during the amnesty that firearms are certainly not as readily available as they once were. One of these factors is that two assessments of the number of guns in circulation, conducted prior to our arrival in the country, both came up with total figures that were lower than the numbers of weapons actually collected. The second factor is that, other than the incidents discussed above, since the end of the amnesty, firearms have not been a feature of crimes committed in Solomon Islands. This is an extraordinary achievement when you consider the countless acts of murder, robbery and intimidation committed with guns in the four or five years prior to the arrival of RAMSI on 24 July 2003.
Investigations
The apprehending of Harold Keke and his key henchmen was followed by a series of arrests of key militants and their followers. In the first 12 months of Operation Helpem Fren, a total of 3390 arrests were made and 4900 criminal charges laid. While some of these charges related to minor crimes and street offences that were laid as part of restoring basic law and order to Solomon Islands, the most prevalent charge preferred by the major crime investigation teams was murder, closely followed by abduction. One of the most massive investigations in the South Pacific is still ongoing, involving over 50 bodies already exhumed from numerous gravesites on the Weathercoast of Guadalcanal. A significant number of criminal trials are also underway. The most significant arrests had to be timed in order to ensure that RAMSI was not seen to be favouring any particular group—from time to time claims of this nature had been made against the mission. Considerable time was also spent studying and discussing the flow-on effects, especially any possible political implications from these arrests. The wave of arrests, like the criminality itself, has had an impact across the whole of Solomon Islands society. To date, these high profile arrests have included all of the self-proclaimed warlords (and enough of their respective hierarchies to render the groups largely ineffective), the ombudsman, a magistrate, lawyers, numerous police, public servants, corrections officers and even two serving government ministers. From the outset, there was significant pressure on RAMSI to show that the mission was not a pawn of the government of Solomon Islands. There were, and still are, numerous calls to arrest the so-called ‘big fish’ whom the population at large believe to be guilty of official corruption, amongst other things. Many hours were spent explaining, on Solomon Islands national radio and at public meetings, the practical realities of gathering evidence to substantiate corruption allegations.
Rebuilding the Police Service
One area where RAMSI demonstrated that no one was above the law was in the very vigorous and very public cleansing of the RSIP. The RSIP had lost the trust, respect and confidence of the people and there was a need to demonstrate to the public that serious steps were being taken to clean it up. In the first year of Operation Helpem Fren, over 400 officers were removed from the RSIP. In some cases individual officers made the choice to leave the police service themselves, perhaps anticipating or witnessing what was happening around them. A number of other officers had the decision to separate from the force made for them and they were dismissed from the service. A total of 74 serving officers were arrested and charged with serious criminal offences and several are now serving lengthy prison sentences. These arrests included officers from all ranks, up to and including the two RSIP Deputy Commissioners.
Rebuilding a police service, however, is not merely about locking up or sacking corrupt officers: it is also about rebuilding the organisational culture and philosophy of the service. This task involves extensive community consultation about the values a community expects from the police and what services it wants the police to deliver. It is also a process that requires the identification of the true champions of the police service and the cultivation of those members in leadership positions that will take the force into the future.
To achieve this goal, a strategic review of the RSIP was established based on 15 terms of reference. In reality, every aspect of policing conducted by the RSIP was placed under the microscope and working groups of experts came up with a range of recommendations, many of which were rapidly implemented. The recommendations of the strategic review included revised recruitment standards for the RSIP and a new training regime that requires all new recruits to undertake tertiary studies as part of their training. New relationships have been established with institutions such as the Australian Federal Police College, the New Zealand Police Academy and the Australian Institute of Police Management. Shortly before I left Solomon Islands, I had the pleasure of addressing the first wave of new RSIP recruits brought in under the new regime. Of the 30 latest recruits, 16 are female and the new officers represent all nine provinces of Solomon Islands. This statistic is a far cry from the recruitment practices of earlier years that saw the ethnic representation of the RSIP, particularly at higher ranks, become dominated by a single minority group.
While my discussion has focused primarily on the police service, significant work was also being undertaken to rebuild other public and private sector institutions in Solomon Islands. However, this account has demonstrated that the establishment of the rule of law is central to the rebuilding of a shattered country and shows how important an effective and trusted police service is to the rule of law. In a little over a year, Solomon Islands experienced a remarkable change in its destiny. Rampant criminality was checked after some 3000 arrests and the seizure of thousands of illegally-held weapons. The important work of eliminating corruption and graft from the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force was well advanced, and the RSIP was set on the road to regaining the trust and confidence of the citizens of Solomon Islands.
Conclusion
Successes in security and law enforcement paved the way for the critical task of nation-building to occur. The return of the rule of law resulted in travel warnings for overseas visitors being dropped. The placement of foreign in-line advisors in Treasury and the Finance Department has seen financial procedures regularised and a degree of accountability restored. For the first time in years, a responsible budget was brought down by the government of Solomon Islands and provincial premiers received grants to enable them to address local priorities. In addition, public servants across the country were able to receive their pay on time. As a result of these reforms, international financial institutions re-engaged with Solomon Islands, arrears to the World Bank were met and evidence of reconstruction and return of foreign investment were visible. With positive economic indicators, development donors are now able to move freely around the almost 1000 islands of the Solomon group to deliver development aid to those most in need.
RAMSI is unique in many ways. Throughout the first year of the mission, Solomon Islands was visited by academics and strategists from around the world who were curious about the factors that produced such a success.
The formula employed in RAMSI was right for the mission at a particular point in time. The same formula will not necessarily yield the same success anywhere else at some other point in time. The road to recovery is a long one but, as the saying goes, ‘if you want peace, work for justice’. There is still much to be done and there will be spills and hurdles but, so long as RAMSI continues to listen and learn from the wonderful people of Solomon Islands, both parties will forever be richer for the experience.
Endnotes
1 The wantok system is a complex web of reciprocal obligations based mostly on ethnic identity and language (hence the name ‘wantok’, which is pisin or pidgin English for the same language). In Solomon Islands, the interaction of traditional Melanesian systems of social organisation (such as wantok), the country’s colonial history and the post-independence decline of the national government, promoted vertical linkages of patronage that reinforced the negative effects of the wantok system.
