Humint-Centric Operations: The Way Forward for Australian Land Forces in Complex Environments

Abstract

This article discusses Human Intelligence (HUMINT) as a potential solution to the problem of gathering intelligence on highly agile and adaptive threat networks in complex environments. The article examines why HUMINT is effective in supporting the new forms of small team, semi-autonomous operations proposed by the Australian Army in the future as well as the cultural and historical qualities of its soldiers. The author proposes the adoption of a HUMINT-centric approach to land force operations based on a more holistic view of the HUMINT capability than is currently the case.

The evolution to a future network-centric, knowledge-based force will require the pursuit of pervasive and persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to improve the protection and survivability of future lighter and mobile platforms and engage enemies at the earliest opportunity in complex operational terrains, e.g., urban operations.

- Daniel Chia, 2005¹

Introduction

Diverse, adaptive and agile networks of non-state actors are now pursuing a long-term strategy of asymmetrical attacks against coalition forces in Iraq and elsewhere as part of a global insurgency in the name of fundamentalist Islam. Western conventional militaries have been much slower to adapt to this conflict environment as a result of constraints imposed by unwieldy structures and bureaucracies; ethical concerns; and budgetary, legal and political processes. The very nature of these threat networks, and the complex environments they operate in, have made them difficult to detect and deal with. But why is this the case given the technological advantage Western militaries possess in the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) domain?

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) provides one such solution to the problem of gathering intelligence on highly agile and adaptive threats, and does so by focusing more on the human-centric nature of this new and complex environment. But is HUMINT the panacea that it has been heralded as? Answering this question is particularly important for the Australian Army, which has identified in its Future Land Operating Concept Complex Warfighting that land forces will need to operate in complex and highly lethal areas where they may not be capable of detecting the threat before they are attacked.

The HUMINT Spectrum

HUMINT, or the gaining of intelligence from human sources, lays at the very heart of all intelligence activities. Outside of natural phenomena, a human is behind every activity or decision in a conflict. HUMINT encompasses a spectrum of activities designed to maximise the information gained from human sources. This includes the basic framework activities of a deployed force such as passive low-level information gained through face-to-face interaction between soldiers and the population, as well as tactical questioning of selected individuals. It also includes information gained from debriefing and interviewing activities with consensual participants as well as non-consensual participants—interrogation. Finally there are source operations—where a specifically cultivated individual, or group of individuals, is tasked with gaining specific information—run by trained HUMINT operators.

Why is HUMINT Effective in Complex Environments?

Complex Warfighting identifies that many operations occur below the ISTAR discrimination threshold in complex environments where land force must still be prepared to fight. This threshold is currently based upon the limitations of current ISTAR technologies and capabilities available to the force. The majority of these legacy sensor technologies have been designed for conventional symmetrical warfare in open terrain and adapted, where possible, to suit the new complex environments in which they now find themselves employed. Recognising this shortcoming, investment is now being placed into new ISTAR technologies which will continue to push the threshold down.

To operate effectively in any environment, a force strives to achieve information superiority, and by doing so it can shape the battlespace to best achieve the desired effects. This is the central aim of network-centric warfare (NCW). But achieving information superiority in such a densely built and diversely populated environment will be difficult due to the sheer volume of information that needs to be collected and analysed.² For ISTAR sensors to be effective and persistent in such an environment, they need to be ‘cued’ by a pervasive capability to ‘burrow’ into complex terrain. Otherwise, searching for the threat would be like looking for a needle in a haystack. Reducing complexity in these environments means developing a detailed understanding of the terrain and identifying where, when, how and against who ISTAR is to target its effort. Any proposed solution needs to remain cognisant of the fact that all threats still originate from a human source.

HUMINT by its very nature is designed for penetrating threat networks in the complex terrain of urban operations. By establishing its own networks it adapts to the threat’s method of operations. It provides critical targeting information that can be used to cripple a network at the key nodes rather than a more conventional decapitation which will allow networks to regenerate and reorganise. When supported by effective processing or analysis, HUMINT has achieved significant results. The capture of Saddam Hussein was based on a link-pattern analysis of information gained from human sources with linkages to the former Iraqi leader and those helping to harbour him.³

HUMINT is a pervasive ISTAR capability. It can burrow into complex terrain and penetrate threat networks. Once inside, HUMINT can continue to exploit information from that network, in combination with other sensors, to provide more persistent coverage and precision awareness of a potential target. It is this burrowing function that makes it extremely useful in complex environments where other sources are initially limited.

HUMINT is designed for determining the intent side of the threat equation. It may not always produce actionable intelligence immediately, but given time will give a unique insight into the human mind that most technologies will never be able to achieve. HUMINT is an ideal capability for the determination, prediction and analysis of both the secondary and tertiary effects of military operations due to the level of intimacy it achieves with the local population. Its grounding in understanding cultural and social networks helps to determine the motivations and aims of threat networks. It can also expose potential fault-lines or conflicts within an organisation for further exploitation through information operations and viral targeting such as that proposed by Swanson in his article on countering improvised explosive device (IED) networks.⁴ When coupled with the ability to map out the complex interactions and relationships that exist in threat networks, HUMINT allows for the identification of key nodes for monitoring, further exploitation or targeting. This is an area where the Australian Army has already demonstrated operational success:

Appreciating the human dimension of the Iraqi battlespace, by placing a priority on HUMINT rather than technological assets, has been of advantage to OBG-W [Overwatch Battlegroup – West] when dealing with complex adaptive human systems.⁵

The versatility of HUMINT also means that, for example, if the threat adapts to ISTAR operations by moving into the cyber domain to escape detection, a HUMINT source can then be given an email account and access to the Internet to maintain coverage. HUMINT is geared for the anonymity that cyberspace provides and is not geographically tied to a theatre of operations. Providing the right level of local situational awareness is achieved, threat networks can be penetrated from anywhere on the globe. By posing as an insurgent or terrorist in an Internet chat room, a gifted individual could monitor and infiltrate the outer layers of an organisation. Such access would give a unique insight into the individuals involved, their methods, recruitment, organisation and motivations. Importantly, once trusted this individual could then exploit other sources within the network and assist in the critical determination of intent. This merging of technical intelligence gathering and HUMINT is an excellent adaptation to changing societal trends and means of communication and will also help set the foundations for future prevention of cyber-terrorism and cyber-attacks.

HUMINT also plays to the cultural and historical strengths of the Australian Army’s soldiers. Australian soldiers are well known for being culturally attuned, inquisitive and having an ability to gain the empathy of the population they are trying to support in complex conflicts. Ample evidence of this exists from Australia’s campaigns in the Pacific during the Second World War right through to recent operations in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. This empathy is engendered by continually making personal contact with the population through patrols and humanitarian assistance projects. This not only enables Australian forces to move freely amongst the population but also creates an environment where soldiers can establish a mutual trust. This provides soldiers with the ability to observe their surroundings, give insights into local attitudes and emotions, and ask questions to establish further information. By talking to locals about how many people are normally present at a mosque or market on any given day, soldiers may provide an indicator that, if a significant number of locals are avoiding the market on that day, an incident may be likely. It is their ability to contextualise and pass on this information that will make each soldier a critical node in a seamless network of sensors and shooters.

HUMINT has a significant advantage over other more technical sources of intelligence in that it does not have a huge reliance on technology to operate. It is therefore not as vulnerable to power outages, communications difficulties, network outages and cyber-attacks. The provision of HUMINT, however, can be enhanced in the future through the provision of GPS devices, mobile phones, digital cameras, and the provision of email accounts to its sources.

By achieving the penetration of a threat network, a HUMINT source will also be capable of leaving tracking devices and other miniaturised, remotely-operated sensors behind in the target’s location to maintain persistent coverage. The continued development of automatic language translators will also make HUMINT more accessible to normal soldiers who do not have interpreters or sufficient language skills to communicate and gain information from the population. Identifying the right people with which to initiate contact may also become easier with biometric recognition systems. General Sir Rupert Smith, in his book The Utility of Force, reinforces the value of technology in support of HUMINT-centric operations:

Our enemies have now gone amongst the people to negate the advantages that advanced sensor technologies bring. Yet these enemies still need to be engaged amongst the people. So in these circumstances, technological advantage can only be achieved when technology is in direct support of those engaged in collecting information amongst the people.⁶

A Potential Solution for Australian Land Forces?

If Australian land forces are to capitalise on the potential benefits of adopting a HUMINT-centric approach to operations in complex environments, then a more holistic view of the HUMINT capability needs to be considered than is currently the case. A holistic view of HUMINT capability would encompass all deployed elements contributing to the establishment of a clear, complete and coherent picture of the human environment in which they are operating. Currently the approach is for specialists only to conduct HUMINT at the tactical level. This approach potentially limits the amount of information available to a commander and also fails to utilise the potential of the soldiers to observe, contextualise and report on their operating environment.

Complex Warfighting has already argued the case for devolved situational awareness through the provision of ISTAR capabilities right down to the battlegroup and combat team level.⁷ HUMINT, through its basic framework activities, needs to follow this trend as well. Having only a finite amount of HUMINT teams held at higher levels will mean a great deal of valuable information available at battlegroup level and below will not be made available to the entire force until a HUMINT team is available.

This article is not advocating the case for a vast increase in the number of HUMINT teams within the Australian Army. A HUMINT-centric approach at the combat team level and below does not involve complex source handling operations but places a greater emphasis on language and cultural training and awareness to assist in soldiers’ capacity to observe, interact and report all low-level information around them. Essentially this is about achieving the vision of making ‘every soldier a sensor’.

Such an approach would also require a small, select group of soldiers in each combat team to be trained in the basics of conducting interviews and patrol debriefs as well as the initial tactical questioning of detainees. They should also have a basic understanding of the overall intelligence cycle. This will enable them to process the information coming in from HUMINT framework activities—as well as an increasingly vast array of other sources—and to provide actionable intelligence for the decision-maker at that level. Essentially this requires the formation of small intelligence cells within existing combat teams. The benefits to the combat team commander in having such a cell at this level are significant. It will afford him with a significantly enhanced degree of situational awareness and thus facilitate a more considered, decisive and rapid response. This is an approach the United States Marine Corps is already considering following feedback from recent operations:

Few would argue that having a Marine able to speak the language of the indigenous population and enemy (or both should they differ) is highly desirable. The benefits in obtaining valuable, highly perishable intelligence through field interviews of enemy prisoners or indigenous civilian population are readily apparent.⁸

A modest expansion in the specialist capability to conduct interrogation and other source operations at the tactical level is also required as part of this holistic capability solution. While the core of this capability already exists within the Australian Army, the exigencies of the complex operating environment will place an even greater burden on the capability to provide HUMINT resources than ever before. A significantly enhanced processing element also needs to be established at all levels to support intelligence staffs in fusing the HUMINT products into the common relevant operating picture (CROP). This enhancement requires both personnel and software to support the analytical methods undertaken.

At the operational level, as part of the holistic HUMINT capability solution, the requirement to undertake source operations against high profile, difficult to access or technically sophisticated targets exists. There is also the requirement to process and provide an overview of entire adversary networks operating against Australian land forces—with a view to determining key nodes and vulnerabilities for targeting. The ability for such an organisation to extend military operations into the domain of cyberspace will also exist in the future. Such an organisation would leverage heavily off other Defence intelligence agencies and be capable of inter-agency and multinational operations. Individuals in this organisation would require extremely specialised training and would possess a select set of skills which may inhibit their wider employability. Currently no such organisation exists.

The costs of a holistic HUMINT capability solution are significant but not insurmountable. Most of the investment would be required in the areas of recruitment and training, incorporating foreign languages and culture. But compared to the level of investment that is currently placed in the Defence Capability Plan for ISTAR projects, this investment is minimal. As Ralph Peters argues, for a tenth of the cost spent on developing an advanced technical intelligence collection system, the United States could ‘buy off most of the enemies our satellites cannot find’.⁹ If decision-makers are serious about addressing the threat posed by operating in complex environments, then the investment would be a sensible and sound one.

To enhance the HUMINT capability there is no significant requirement to trade-off any other capabilities with the exception of personnel. The establishment of new organisations will require the re-allocation of personnel from other areas of the ADF unless an approval in personnel numbers is gained. This may involve commanders giving up line infantry personnel to undergo basic intelligence, interviewing, language and cultural training to provide a new and enhanced capability to operate and manoeuvre in a more informed manner amongst target populations. This type of organisational change is likely to meet significant cultural resistance within the Australian Army but is fundamental to changing to a more intelligence-focused approach to operations in complex environments.

Technology-based ISTAR sensors will still be needed to maintain support to high intensity warfighting tasks, however unlikely this scenario might be. ISTAR sensors are still capable of being adapted to support operations in complex environments and by doing so offer persistent coverage once a pervasive asset has uncovered the threat. They can be used to confirm single source intelligence feeds, as well as the classification and identification of potential targets, before destruction by fires. This will assist to avoid collateral damage or accusations of improper targeting.

HUMINT is not without its limitations. It takes time to establish a source network in any environment. Sources may not provide useful information until a certain level of trust exists. Those that do provide information immediately generally have some motivation for doing so and as a result that individual and their information needs to be rigorously confirmed before it is acted upon. Sources require assurances of significant protection or they will not divulge their information. Driving into an insurgent stronghold in an Australian Army Bushmaster vehicle to pick up a source in broad daylight will vastly reduce the source’s life expectancy. As a result, new methods of discrete operations need to be developed to allow HUMINT to operate freely in highly lethal, non-permissive environments. Commanders also need to be educated fully about the capability to employ it effectively and without unnecessary restrictions in support of their operation.

Adopting a HUMINT-centric approach to operations involves a degree of cultural change in the way in which commanders conduct operations in complex environments. Many commanders are now becoming aware of the capabilities of HUMINT and the disproportionate value it provides in terms of situational awareness and the associated safety and security of the force. Appropriately they are now designing their operations to support HUMINT and enhance activities. Further education and exposure to the capabilities will continue to drive this change.

HUMINT is but one source of intelligence. The dangers of acting on single source intelligence have been well documented throughout history. HUMINT has often been referred to as the least reliable form of intelligence. HUMINT operatives therefore carefully cultivate human information sources and seek to obtain verification of the information they provide. Effective actionable intelligence should always be confirmed by multiple sources before it is acted upon. Significant vetting of any locally employed civilians who act as interpreters will also take time and significant effort.

All of which amounts to HUMINT not being a panacea but nor is any other form of intelligence—especially in complex environments. But adopting a HUMINT-centric approach to operations provides a means of efficiently and effectively harnessing other available ISTAR sensor technologies to negate the advantages agile and adaptive adversaries gain by operating in complex terrain.

Conclusion

A full spectrum HUMINT capability provides an affordable solution to the Australian Army that is designed for supporting operations in complex land environments. It is a pervasive ISTAR capability which can also burrow into complex terrain and penetrate threat networks to gain vital information regarding intent and capabilities. HUMINT’s predominantly human-oriented focus ensures the Army able to comprehend the complex human interactions and responses which can assist to predict and detect the effects of military operations. It is a capability perfectly suited to the cultural and historical strengths of the Australian Army’s soldiers, allowing them to truly become part of the network of sensors in an NCW force.

A holistic HUMINT capability, able to support land force operations down to the lowest tactical level, is required to meet the evolving response to operations in complex environments. Here it can act as a combat multiplier by significantly enhancing situational awareness and enabling manoeuvres amongst the population. The costs involved in developing such a capability are significant—particularly in terms of personnel and training—but not when compared to the capital being invested in high-technology ISTAR projects.

HUMINT is not without its limitations, particularly in highly lethal, non-permissive environments. It takes time to establish source networks in any environment and the information provided is often unreliable until a mutual trust has been gained. Effective actionable intelligence should never be formulated on the basis of a single source of information and thus all ISTAR capabilities should contribute to its production.

So while not a panacea, HUMINT is the ISTAR capability most suited to achieving pervasiveness beneath the technology-driven threshold by penetrating threat networks in complex environments. It then allows for the harnessing of the traditional ISTAR sensors to maintain a more persistent coverage of the threat. HUMINT, if correctly resourced and coordinated, is also best suited to supporting the new forms of small team, semi-autonomous operations proposed by the Australian Army in the future as well as the cultural and historical qualities of its soldiers. The fact remains that to combat a problem of predominantly human complexity, you require a predominantly human solution.

Endnotes

1    D Chia, Future Communications in a Network-Centric Paradigm, Defence Science and Technology Agency - Singapore, Singapore, 2005, <http://www.dsta.gov.sg/DSTA_horizons/2005/04.htm&gt; accessed 10 May 2007.

2    J Medby and R Glenn, Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations, RAND, Arroyo Centre, Santa Monica, 2002, p. 5.

3    L Grau, ‘Guerrilla, Terrorists, and Intelligence: Something Old, Something New’, Military Review, Vol. LXXXIV, No. 5, July–August 2004, pp. 44–45.

4    Social Network Viral Targeting is an augmentation to current counter-IED ‘defeat the network’ activities and aims to disrupt the human element of insurgent groups with minimal civil impacts. See S Swanson, ‘Viral Targeting of the IED Social Network System’, Small Wars Journal, Vol. 8, May 2007.

5    G Reynolds, ‘Embracing Complexity: An Adaptive Effects Approach to the Conflict in Iraq’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. III, No. 3, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2006, p. 138.

6    R Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin Group, London, 2005, p. 400.

7    Director General Future Land Warfare, Future Land Operating Concept: Complex Warfighting, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2004.

8    R Glenn, J Medby, S Gerwehr, F Gellert and A O’Donnell, Honing the Keys to the City: Refining the United States Marine Corps Reconnaissance Force for Urban Ground Combat Operations, RAND, Arroyo Centre, Santa Monica, 2003, p. 75.

9    R Peters, ‘The Case for Human Intelligence: Our Addiction to Technology is Our Greatest Weakness’, Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 142, No. 12, p. 24.