Contribute

Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies

Journal Edition
Volume 6, Number 1

Abstract

Today’s operations represent complex, uncertain battles against enemies concealed among a population whose support is critical to victory. This article examines the importance of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capabilities in the Australian Army, demonstrating its potentially vital role in the range of ADF operations. The author articulates the benefits that can accrue to ADF commanders when a properly integrated and coordinated CIMIC effort is undertaken. The author calls for the official establishment of a dedicated CIMIC sub-unit in 2 Division, and identifies the ways in which CIMIC units, and the ADF more broadly, stand to benefit from the recent establishment of the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence.

Introduction

Civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) has become a vital component in the success of Australian Defence Force (ADF) disaster relief, urban, counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations. Military activities in countries affected by complex emergencies that also necessitates a response from other government agencies and non-government organisations (NGOs) requires, at the very least, some form of communication between the military and civilian elements. The ADF views CIMIC as ‘enabling military operations to make a more coherent contribution to the achievement of national and international objectives’.1 CIMIC capability and CIMIC doctrine in the ADF are, however, still developing.

Admiral Chris Barrie, former Chief of the Defence Force, said in 1999 that the ADF had a dual role: ‘we must actively work for peace, as well as prepare for war’.2 CIMIC activities help rebuild civil infrastructure, protect the civilian population from the negative impacts of warfare, ensure the ADF approach an operation with the greatest possible chance of success, and work holistically for international peace and security—all in accordance with our international obligations and the commander’s intent. As such, this article will explore the necessity of the CIMIC capability in disaster relief, humanitarian intervention, urban operations, counterinsurgency and peace support operations, and critically discuss some key issues of contention for CIMIC.

Defining the Terms and the Actors

The ADF defines CIMIC as:3

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities as well as international, national and non government organisations and agencies.4

The inclusion of ‘in support of the mission’ is what differentiates CIMIC from the term civil–military coordination (CMCoord), used by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which maintains a humanitarian imperative. CMCoord is defined as:

The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.5

CIMIC may offer support to the civil community. However, this will generally only take place where and when it is necessary to create the conditions for a successful mission, or because civilian capabilities are unable to carry out the activity. It is important to note that, due to the connection with the civil community, any CIMIC activity that is poorly planned or mismanaged will potentially have severe, negative effects on the mission, the commander and the Task Force, and may seriously degrade relationships with the civilian community.

CIMIC allows the ADF to effectively interact with civil elements within the area of operations (AO). In so doing, ‘CIMIC provides the interface for cooperation, coordination, mutual support, joint planning and information exchange at all levels’.6 To achieve this, CIMIC operators and CIMIC specialists are currently deployed on all major ADF operations. The CIMIC element of the Australian Army is based in Brisbane, at Headquarters 1 Division. The CIMIC element of 2 Division currently consists of a squadron based in Sydney at 21 Construction Regiment. This squadron is still awaiting official unit establishment.

Civil actors in an AO may include: international organisations such as organs of the UN; the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; the Red Cross; national and international NGOs such as Oxfam, Care and Plan International; local and foreign government organisations; and local community organisations such as cooperatives and unions.7 NGOs may have short-term emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction goals, a longer term development outlook, or a combination thereof, each with a different approach. The value of the diversity of these approaches should be a key consideration of CIMIC.

Many current ADF operations resemble the ‘three block war’ as outlined by General Krulak, former Commandant of the US Marine Corps, whereby forces provide assistance to the civil population, carry out peacekeeping tasks, and combat operations concurrently.8 This is reflective of other descriptions of the complexities of the modern battlespace, explaining that many of the tasks outlined here will overlap.

This ‘three block war’ most often occurs in complex emergencies. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee defines a complex emergency as a humanitarian crisis

where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.9

Complex emergencies or impending complex emergencies consist of the threat of humanitarian crisis, violent conflict and political instability. An effective response to a complex emergency must address each of these components. In an era of increased recognition of human security, CIMIC adds depth of both knowledge and capability to planning and operations in the complex emergencies in which the ADF operates.

The term humanitarian crisis refers to a lack of basic human needs including food, water and shelter in any given area. Due to the fundamental nature of these needs, humanitarian organisations deliver aid on an impartial basis, with positive discrimination toward those in the greatest need; they operate independently from any political policy, and some are neutral parties in any conflict. So long as these principles are evident to protagonists, this offers humanitarian organisations a unique practical protection in the field as well as legal protection under international law. Military action is driven by political will. Therefore, it is very rarely textbook humanitarian action. As a result, any ADF action in support of the civilian dimension must not be referred to as humanitarian unless it expresses all recognised traits of humanitarian assistance.

In the 1990s, Rony Brauman, president of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), coined the term ‘espace humanitaire’, or humanitarian space. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states that relief ‘shall not be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts’, and that the parties to the conflict ‘shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment, and personnel’.10 Humanitarian space is now a term used commonly by humanitarian organisations to describe a space in which they ‘are free to evaluate needs, free to monitor the distribution and use of relief goods, and free to have a dialogue with the people’11—and this often conflicts with boundaries of a military AO.

Disaster Relief

In a purely disaster relief operation the military can respond with unmatched speed, deploying a mobile, skilled workforce trained to work in extremely arduous conditions with minimal notice. Such skills and ability amount to a wealth of resources. The impact that a disaster has on a population is affected by the level of risk reduction mechanisms that are in place within a community. In a conflict zone, the infrastructure and community resources that can be used to recover from a disaster will be greatly depleted.

A disaster will erode what very little a community has, and make them more vulnerable against future disasters and increasingly vulnerable to poverty and the consequences of conflict. As a result, the humanitarian community has indicated that disaster relief must include an element of risk reduction against future disasters. Any rebuilding must be completed to a standard able to withstand future disasters, actively reducing the vulnerability of victims and reducing potentially greater resources needed in response to a future disaster.

The ADF’s ability to respond to a disaster was exemplified by the disaster relief efforts in the aftermath of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunamis under Operation SUMATRA ASSIST. To ensure the effective and efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance, the commander combined the Joint Task Force (JTF) with the civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) mission. The key theme of the operation was delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance. To engage the approximately 400 NGOs working in the area, the ADF established a CIMIC centre in Aceh. The centre acted as liaison between foreign military, Indonesian military and civil agencies offering disaster relief. Over 1300 tonnes of aid was delivered by air, aeromedical evacuations were carried out, medical treatment and air transport were provided, 4.7 million litres of water was purified, and 9 cubic kilometres of debris was cleared.12 Furthermore, CIMIC staff gained information and provided advice at specialist working groups, and provided key information to JTF and UN agencies on camps for internally displaced people (IDP).13

Humanitarian Intervention

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established to find some solutions to the contentious issues surrounding humanitarian intervention. The ICISS Report, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), proposed that when a population is suffering serious harm and their government is unable or unwilling to avert the situation, the international responsibility to protect overrides the international legal principle of non-intervention. Humanitarian intervention is conditional on the right intentions: it must be a last resort, must be proportional, and must have a reasonable chance of success. Intervention when conducted then entails three responsibilities, the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild.

Despite the fact that each of these responsibilities has a civil component, the responsibilities fall on the intervening government or the intervening defence force to implement. It is the reasonable chance of success and the responsibility to rebuild which affects CIMIC activity. The ICISS Report is not a legally binding document; however, many organisations support the principles outlined in the document. Oxfam Australia has requested that all Australian peacekeeping operations should be framed by the principles of R2P because they provide a ‘humane and practical policy framework ... and ... take into account non-security and post-conflict aspects of the mission which are critical in complex conflict environments’.14 R2P requires that the international community is asked to intervene in a conflict by the UN Security Council. This was the case for the NATO intervention in Kosovo.15 If the international community is not asked to intervene by the UN Security Council, but does so anyway, as occurred in Iraq,16 there is no quietus on the responsibilities to the civilian population.

R2P amplifies the necessity for military forces to be able to undertake mandated protection tasks. There have been seven UN operations since 1999 where protection of civilians is an explicitly mandated task.17 Protection requires military and police forces to operate in conjunction with humanitarians to enhance the safety of civilians. The responsibility to protect non-combatants from conflict is enshrined in the Geneva Conventions, yet no guidance exists for how this is to be done.

Furthermore, Australia’s responsibility to ‘maintain peace and security’ is articulated in the UN Charter; and the Fourth Geneva Convention states that an invading army has the responsibility to restore basic services prior to withdrawal, rebuild damaged infrastructure, and has a number of other responsibilities to the civilian population ‘under occupation’.

Urban Warfare

A recent study sponsored by the United States Joint Forces Command noted that the modern battlespace is a complex urban environment which is fundamentally human and is shared by various civilian actors. The resulting report observed that successful urban operations require a clear understanding of the conflict, the enemy, the battlefield, the local population and their culture. It also stated that friendly forces must shape the strategic environment, local population and physical environment; effectively engage the hostile force; consolidate and protect what has been gained; and carry out an effective transition to civilian control.18 ‘Shaping campaigns should incorporate the capabilities of entire commands in support of civil affairs and related efforts to win the indigenous population’s trust and confidence.’19 CIMIC staff provide the critical coordination mechanism on the ground that is fundamental to the commander’s ability to understand and shape the conflict, the battlespace and the local population.

The hardship of conflict can push individuals and communities to turn to strategies that perpetuate conflict and instability, such as joining a militia or insurgency group, growing opium poppies or trading weapons. Local community groups and NGOs are likely to have been working to combat these negative livelihood strategies and address the root causes of conflict for decades. As a result, they have a great insight into the local needs and grievances of the communities inside an AO, and, with a correct approach, provide a good potential source of information to CIMIC, the commander and the ADF. They work to reduce the negative political, economic, social, ideological and cross-cutting factors which cause frustration in the civilian population that can be considered the precursors to and perpetuators of conflict. Often NGOs also work to counteract the negative effects of conflict in local populations. Such activities are vital to the achievement of sustainable peace and security.

Counterinsurgencies

‘Contemporary insurgencies flow from systemic failures in political, economic and social realms.’20 For a successful counterinsurgency operation, there must be a simultaneous reduction in the causes of frustration that swell the ranks of insurgent or terrorist groups, and a successful engagement of the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland describes the best approach to counterinsurgency as one that ‘is culturally attuned, responsive to local nuances that motivate insurgents and terrorists, and designed to generate lasting effects’.21 CIMIC is crucial in achieving this.

Increasingly, today’s strategic environment involves a convergence of military and civilian tasks. While the Reconstruction Task Force (RTF) in Afghanistan is equipped with specific heavy military equipment, modern military technology and combat troops, they are tasked with the reconstruction of infrastructure including schools, hospitals, bridges, and the improvement of community based projects to achieve a safe and sustainable future for Afghanis.

In the international context, insurgents may be rebelling out of ideological, economic, political or social frustrations, or most likely a combination thereof.22 Causes of conflict are cross-cutting; effective peace building measures must therefore be equally multi-faceted. Frustration at their economic situation may be brought on by the unfulfilled promises of structural adjustment policies, neglect from the benefits of national or international economic growth, or exclusion from market opportunities. Their political situation may infuriate them because they are excluded from or under-represented in governance, an existing government may be corrupt, they may be seeking meaningful autonomy or independence for cultural or other reasons, they may be exploited by already warring factions or warlords, or they may be entirely ideologically opposed to the existing policies or government. Furthermore, their social or livelihood situation may be a source of conflict: their human rights may be abused; they may lack political freedom, access to healthcare and educational opportunities; there may be a lack of other social services and infrastructure; or their lives or security may be threatened. NGOs are in a unique position, having been working to address these issues for decades. CIMIC Personnel are ideally placed to engage them, interact with these issues and inform the commander’s response.

An insurgency ‘provides a source of identity and empowerment for those members with few sources for such things. Without a gun, most insurgent soldiers are simply poor, uneducated, disempowered people with no prospects and little hope.’23 Development organisations work to address issues of poverty, education and empowerment. Community groups and NGOs often have an understanding of these social, political, economic and cross-cutting grievances. CIMIC personnel are often uniquely qualified to liaise with these organisations, and coordinate and guide the post conflict reconstruction and development that is required to generate the lasting effects of sustainable peace and security. Only through effective liaison with civil actors in the AO can we win the peace as well as the war.

Peacekeeping

History is littered with examples of peacekeeping operations that have been unsuccessful because there has been no peace to keep or unaddressed tensions run so high that eventually one side breaks the peace. Thus, effective liaison between the military and the civil population is necessary for a successful peace operation. Peace operations occur in a range of scenarios from peace building to the enforcement and maintenance of peace. The various scenarios involve differing levels of conventional warlike activities. In each, ADF troops protect and defend nation builders who will be either rebuilding a nation after the devastation of conflict, or building a new independent nation. Nation building is a transitional process primarily carried out by civilian groups, both governmental and non-governmental.

Groups involved in nation building may include new and old political leaders, human rights organisations, peace and justice groups, organisations working for refugee repatriation, social service and welfare providers as well as freedom fighters. In post-conflict societies, all civilians play a role in the rebuilding of a democratic nation, because each individual plays a role in the greater community, whether they be a parent, school teacher, justice worker or politician. A peacekeeping mission will not be successful if the peacekeeping force cannot learn from these parties, understand their concerns and address or appropriately redirect them.

Successful peace support operations are dependent on addressing the concerns of belligerents and the general populous as well as directly addressing violent conflict. ‘Peacekeeping forces themselves have to learn how to behave and operate in a way that generates acceptance rather than antagonism.’24 It is necessary that freedom fighters witness and experience a smooth and effective transfer of political power to civilian structures. Militaries and militia that have helped the government come to power or perceive themselves as ‘guardians of the state’ are more likely to retain an interest in politics and return to violent approaches to addressing grievances. In order to avoid continued threats to government institutions and actual or threats of violence, it is of great importance that the transition to civilian control and nation building processes address the concerns and grievances of all concerned parties.

A Healthy Dose of Pessimism

There are some primary concerns with the military effectively carrying out tasks in support of the civil dimension. They include: sustainability; the driving values of CIMIC activities; compliance with humanitarian and development codes of conduct; risks posed to humanitarian actors by military involvement in civil tasks; the willingness of NGOs to coordinate their activities with the ADF; the Army’s knowledge base for civilian needs assessment; and the organisation’s capacity to manage participatory development and humanitarian projects in accordance with needs identified through participation.

The sustainability of any civil–military relationship is questionable due to the fact that from the outset, the military must plan to withdraw. Many of the issues that the local population face will be present indefinitely, and international organisations and NGOs may plan to stay for the long term. While many actors in the AO will be working toward sustainable peace and development, the military and civil organisations will not always be working to the same goals.

Many critics will take issue with CIMIC activities if they are based on winning hearts and minds and not directed at addressing the causes of frustration in a population or offering a holistic approach to achieving and maintaining peace and security. The information gathering role of the ADF and CIMIC operators will greatly concern many civil actors. Another concern for many civil actors will be how being seen to work in cooperation with the military will affect the external perceptions of their organisation. This is particularly the case for Médecins sans Frontièrs, who define their independence from political, economic and religious powers very strictly.

The military is a hierarchical institution not accustomed to managing anything in a participatory manner, let alone effectively engaging with the beneficiaries of a potential CIMIC activity. World Vision Australia has stated:

it is important to note the difference in cultures in humanitarian organisations and defence forces. Whereas defence forces work in a strict hierarchy with typically a clear command and control structure, humanitarian organisations work in a more fluid environment with flatter structures and attempt to include the people we serve in decision making processes.25

Military structure is designed to facilitate quick decision-making in an emergency. But for infrastructure developments that aim to have a long-term, positive impact on the civil community, reduce insecurity and address the causes of conflict, greater consultation with the civil population is required. Michael Pugh, from the University of Plymouth, has stated that ‘military personnel are clearly capable of performing humanitarian tasks, not least in civil emergencies’.26 But the question is ‘whether military establishments can do it well—or according to need rather than political interests and strategic calculation—at the same time as enforcing a peace or fighting wars’.27

CIMIC doctrine is relatively new in the ADF, there are few CIMIC qualified personnel, and CIMIC squadrons are very few and far between. This may be interpreted as showing a lack of skills, expertise and theoretical knowledge base for carrying out well guided civil development activities. However, the core staff who are currently establishing CIMIC squadrons and testing CIMIC doctrine are well aware of the development issues of dependency and the necessity for NGOs to be seen as independent from the military, and often from the government. Furthermore, CIMIC developing doctrine was written in consultation with specialists from the other services and representatives from humanitarian and aid agencies. The issues raised here must continue to be addressed.

A Conflict of Interest?... A Code of Conduct

The military offers a source of skills, personnel and equipment that are always at the ready to operate in arduous, often extreme and insecure conditions. Their mission and style, however, is very different, for instance, from that of the Red Cross, who maintain a strict code of neutrality, or of local groups who will have a complex understanding of the local needs and culture.

Various agencies who are already equipped to work in conflict or disaster situations have established codes of conduct that differ from the culture of, and legislative framework governing, the ADF. NGOs have their own points of accountability to donors, staff and volunteers that may be guided by many factors including religious belief, or a mission to protect a particular group of people; for example, children. If the military commander has needs that clash with those of NGOs and development organisations, the mission will, understandably, always have primacy. However, the differences between other civilian actors and the ADF do not intrinsically prevent them supporting each other and offering mutual guidance on specific and general points of interest.

There are many codes of conduct that various NGOs and international organisations have agreed to abide by to provide the best possible response and maintain accountability for effective, efficient and collaborative responses to disaster relief and complex emergencies. The Sphere Project’s Code of Conduct identifies ten key points, some of which overlap with the Red Cross principles of humanity, impartiality and independence. They are:

  • that humanitarian imperative is a priority;
     
  • aid is given on the basis of needs alone, without discrimination of any kind;
     
  • aid will be independent from political, religious or government standpoints;
     
  • local culture and custom will be respected;
     
  • sponsors will build disaster response capacities and reduce vulnerabilities as well as meet basic needs;
     
  • sponsors will include beneficiaries in program management;
     
  • sponsors will be accountable to both donors and beneficiaries; and
     
  • in advertising and publicity, sponsors will portray victims as dignified beings not hopeless objects.

The additional Red Cross principle of neutrality is not shared by all humanitarian agencies.

While the basic ADF CIMIC course includes awareness training in the Sphere Project, points of contention between civil and military actors will naturally remain. Humanitarianism is rarely the mission focus of the ADF; however, the driving values behind CIMIC reflect a holistic approach to security (including conflict resolution and peace building) which can be of overall benefit to that mission. CIMIC activities can and should be able to incorporate disaster risk reduction into project planning, and aim projects at reducing vulnerabilities as well as addressing basic needs. It is a truism that ADF deployments and CIMIC activities are dependent on the changing standpoint of the commander and Australian Government policy. While peacekeeping operations often require the military to take a neutral stance, this does not mean that they are necessarily acting in a humanitarian nature because their stance will vary before, during and after a mission, whereas a humanitarian one would not.

Dividing the Tasks ... Identifying Roles and Responsibilities

In all civil–military tasks, there must be a clear division of military and civilian roles and responsibilities. Shared or common goals between actors in an AO must be identified and mutually exclusive or different goals must be acknowledged and respected. These must be made clear to all parties and, importantly, also to the civilian population at large.

With the convergence of civil and military tasks, the boundaries of humanitarian and military roles have also been blurred. Many NGOs have stated that the preservation of the ‘humanitarian space’ is vital. In Afghanistan, troops have dressed as aid workers and military reconstruction teams drive around in the same white vehicles as aid workers, leading insurgents to link NGOs to military operations. This has proven to damage the perceived and actual neutrality and independence of humanitarian and development workers and greatly impinged on their safety.

While there is an increasing overlap of civil and military tasks, it is still important that each is clearly identified and their role is known to the public. If military members engage in projects in support of the civil community it is vital that they do so in uniform so they can be clearly identified. Should conflict erupt it would be increasingly difficult for humanitarian workers to negotiate access across military lines to those in need, as is their role. According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs:

It is important to maintain a clear separation between the roles of the military and humanitarian actors, by distinguishing their respective spheres of competence and responsibility...The need for the humanitarians to maintain an actual and perceived distance from the military is especially important with regard to belligerent forces or representatives of an occupying power.28

These issues may mean that some NGOs are not willing to collaborate with the military; however, if all efforts are made to address their concerns, there is no reason that many NGOs will not be prepared to work collaboratively and communicate with the ADF. The principle of neutrality of the Red Cross superficially appears to exclude working with the military; however, the Red Cross will and does work alongside defence forces from around the world while maintaining their integrity and code of conduct. Civil–military operations centres are established ‘outside the wire’ so that members from the civilian community or NGO representatives do not need to enter a military compound, hence compromising their neutrality. Furthermore, CIMIC training incorporates work with various NGOs and international organisations including UNHCR, the Red Cross, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Oxfam, as well as training in codes of conduct for humanitarian assistance.

The Way Forward for CIMIC

The future of CIMIC will likely be influenced by the forthcoming Defence White Paper. Regardless, a CIMIC specialisation must be nurtured within the Army. This necessitates a unit establishment for the CIMIC Squadron in 2 Division, and greater consideration of CIMIC issues in planning at all levels. Further consideration should also be made regarding the location of CIMIC assets in the brigades, as independent division assets, and possibly at Joint Operations Command.

CIMIC specialists need to expand their understanding and appreciation of the techniques and approaches of NGOs and other non-defence actors in the field while continuing to separate and highlight the differences between military and civil actors. Understanding of the requirements of IDPs, non-combatants and other civil actors can be expanded by completing the suite of courses conducted by the RedR national training and registration body of disaster and humanitarian workers, or a similar organisation. Some lessons could also be learned from both the content and delivery of training conducted at Germany’s Centre for International Peace Operations, which recruits and trains European personnel for peace operations.

CIMIC activities in support of the civil dimension must act as peace building projects. They should put into practice the accepted connection between peace and development. Thus, they should express many of the same characteristics as development projects and seek to address the root causes of conflict. CIMIC can identify and manage contracts for or redirect projects, which may include infrastructure development such as roads and sewage, or education and training initiatives to increase human and social capital.

Military planning considerations must include the utilisation of local knowledge and the approaches of humanitarian and development organisations. Projects should:

  • be participatory in nature to ensure they accurately reflect the needs of the local population;
     
  • have a degree of local ownership to ensure there is the will to maintain and sustain the project post-withdrawal;
     
  • be low cost and use appropriate technologies to avoid unnecessary use of scarce resources, avoid the risk of looting, and artificial inflation of the economy or resource base;
     
  • increase the capacity of civil organisations and authorities; and
     
  • reduce further vulnerabilities to disaster or conflict.

Many of the CIMIC activities in Iraq filled several of these criteria. The security situation there meant that very few NGOs were able to operate. CIMIC managed many projects in support of the civil dimension, often on request from civilian actors. These included infrastructure projects carried out by local contractors such as the construction of 11 Kilovolt-Ampere power lines to connect villages just a few kilometres from the power grid in the Al-Askavi quarter and electrical repairs to the village of Rywawsha. Renovations to the Al Salmon community centre showed an investment in local social capital. Construction of veterinary facilities in Al Darraji and veterinary storage in As Samawah are investments in sustainable livelihood strategies, increasing the capacity for animal husbandry through capacity for improved health of livestock, and the slaughterhouse and animal waste disposal project will ensure that slaughtering occurs in a safe and sanitary environment. Renovations to a grain silo laboratory in As Samawah were an investment in the long-term food security of Iraqis. Construction of an ambulance station and support to a mobile health clinic were also long term projects in the health of Iraqis. However, post deployment assessment would be required to verify the long-term effectiveness of these projects and learn from any required improvements. Such an assessment would prove beneficial as the Rudd Government pursues a more holistic response to security challenges.

In accordance with a Labor preelection promise, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd opened the new Asia Pacific Civil–Military Centre of Excellence in November 2008. ‘The Centre’s mission is to support the development of national civil–military capabilities to prevent, prepare for and respond more effectively to conflicts and disasters overseas.’29 This is to be achieved through research, capturing lessons learned, developing doctrine and facilitating training. The centre will work with relevant government and UN agencies, as well as tertiary and international peacekeeping institutions, NGOs and the commercial sector. It will function as an advisory body which will work to develop a strategy for peace and stabilisation operations and transitioning between the military and civilian phases of operations.

The centre should aim to create a ‘space’ for civil and military actors to express ideas, come to respectfully understand different goals and approaches, and then build on common ground between both government and non-government agencies. The centre is a civilian organisation, responsible to the Chief of the Defence Force and the Secretary of the Department of Defence. From the ADF, there are positions for a Military Affairs Advisor, a Liaison Officer to the ADF Peacekeeping Centre, and four ADF reservists. The centre also has positions for an NGO advisor from the Australian Council for International Development, a UN and International Advisor from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, two secondees from the AFP, and one each from the Attorney General’s Department, Emergency Management Australia, and AusAID. The inclusion of all these actors in an open environment should ensure there is a clearer understanding of the exclusive goals of various actors, and subsequently allow all actors to build on the shared goals while respecting the differences between actors required for successful civil–military interactions.

Conclusion

In 2004, Kofi Anan poignantly expressed that ‘development and security are inextricably linked’.30 In the current operational environment CIMIC is necessary for the successful completion of ADF disaster relief, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, urban warfare, and counterinsurgency operations. CIMIC activities should be carried out in accordance with government policy, commander’s intent, fulfilling the obligation to rebuild under the Geneva Conventions and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, and the responsibility to maintain peace and security under the United Nations Charter. The new Defence White Paper, new CIMIC doctrine, the new Asia Pacific Civil–Military Centre of Excellence, establishment of CIMIC units, allocation of CIMIC resources, and the application of CIMIC capabilities should reflect this.

Endnotes

1    Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.11, Civil-Military Cooperation, 2004, Department of Defence, p. 1–1.

2    Ibid.

3    This is the same definition used by NATO

4    Land Warfare Procedures-General, LWP-G 3-8-1, Civil-Military Cooperation, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Department of Defence, 2007, p. xix.

5    United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs & Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies, United Nations, New York, 2008, p. 8.

6    ADDP 3.11, Civil-Military Cooperation, 2004, p. 1–2.

7    Private military companies are another of the civil actors in the area of operation, further complicating the area of operation. However, they will not be discussed here.

8    Charles C Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marines Magazine, 1999.

9    Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies, p. 8.

10  International Red Cross/Red Crescent, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), ICRC, Geneva, 1977, Article 70.

11  Johanna Grombach Wagner, ‘An IHL/ICRC perspective on “humanitarian space”’, <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2765&gt; accessed 7 January 2008.

12  LWP-G 3-8-1, p. 5–3, para 5.9.

13  IDPs are present in any emergency situation drastic enough to warrant people leaving their homes in search of safety, including humanitarian and natural disasters as well as conflict. As a result of the increasingly internal nature of conflicts across the globe, those fleeing conflict become IDPs. Refugees start as IDPs, gaining refugee status only once they cross an international border. IDPs either do not have the choice or do not wish to take the risk of crossing a national border. IDPs are one of a number of conflict affected groups that are extremely vulnerable. CIMIC personnel are trained to assist in the recognition of potential IDP camp sites, if required, using internationally recognised standards to assess associated infrastructure and coordinate the provision of the required services. CIMIC use measures of effectiveness and normality indicators to ensure that the provision of services and protection of IDPs does not lead to dependency. Being attune to activities in refugee camps and IDP camps will also provide a source of information on movements of IDPs and the inferred movements of conflicting parties.

14  Oxfam submission to Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations, 29 March 2007, <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/Committee/FADT_CTTE/peacekeeping/submissio…; pp. 2, 5.

15  See Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.

16  The military intervention in Iraq broke the precedence of escalating measures to restore peace and security that has been set by previous UN sanctioned military interventions such as those in Kosovo and the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. The last Security Council Resolution issued prior to the Iraq war was Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002. It gave Iraq a ‘final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations’. The briefing delivered by Dr Hans Blix to the Security Council 14 February 2003 showed that opportunity had not been exhausted. This precedence also correlates with the R2P principle of the responsibility to prevent.

17  A Hewett, ‘The Protection of Civilians, the Common Denominator’ speech at Force for Good: 60 Years of Australian Peacekeeping Conference, Oxfam Australia, 14 September 2007.

18  R Glenn, C Paul, T Helmus and P Steinberg, ‘People make the city’, Executive summary in Joint Operations Observations and Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq, RAND Corporation, 2007, p. 5.

19  Ibid., p. xix.

20  S Metz, ‘New Challenges and Old Concepts – Understanding 21st Century Insurgency’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. V, No. 2, Winter 2008, p. 29.

21  J Blaxland, Revisiting Counterinsurgency: A Manoeuvrist Response to the ‘War on Terror’ for the Australian Army, Working Paper No. 131, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, July 2006, p. v.

22  This is not meant to be a definitive identification on the causes of conflict internationally, but addresses many of those pertinent to current and foreseeable ADF operations. It is recognised that opportunistic crime often greatly increase violence during periods of conflict, and that many conflicts are over less ideological purposes, such as control of valuable resources including oil, water, diamonds and gold. However, these issues are beyond the capabilities of CIMIC and, indeed, most civil organisations.

23  Metz, ‘New Challenges and Old Concepts’, p. 35.

24  K Van Brabant, ‘Cool Ground for Aid Providers: Toward Better Security Management in Aid Agencies’ in Disasters, Overseas Development Institute and Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1998, p. 114.

25  World Vision Australia, Submission to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade: Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations, <http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/committee/fadt_ctte/peacekeeping/submissio…;.

26  M Pugh, ‘Civil Military Relations in Peace Support Operations: Hegemony or Emancipation?’ Seminar on Aid and Politics, ODI, London, 1 February 2001, p. 11.

27  Ibid.

28  Inter-Agency Standing Committee I, Civil Military Guidelines & References for Complex Emergencies, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, New York, 2008, <http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1087369&gt; accessed 18 April 2008.

29  Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, Role and Responsibilities as Approved by Government, Department of Defence, Canberra, December 2008.

30  Report of the Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, United Nations Department of Public Information, 2004, p. viii.

Latest Land Power Forum