Taking Tactics from the Taliban: Tactical Principles for Commanders

Journal Edition

Abstract

This article lays down the author’s experiences commanding RTF-3’s Security Task Group in Afghanistan during 2007 and 2008. From a significant study of the Mujahideen and Taliban prior to his deployment, the author was able to determine eleven tactical principles that guided the employment of his forces, and they are provided in this article for the benefit of future commanders. The author points out that his eleven principles, and his experience of employing them, clearly proved the enduring wisdom of the Australian Army’s doctrine and demonstrated that the collective wisdom it represents is an asset that all officers should draw upon when thinking about how to employ their own forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperilled in every single battle.

- Sun Tsu (400–320 BC)

Introduction

In October 2007, Reconstruction Task Force 3 (RTF-3) deployed to southern Afghanistan; its mission was to conduct protected reconstruction operations in Uruzgan province as part of the ongoing struggle to assist local Afghans to achieve some degree of self reliance.¹ RTF-3 was a versatile mix, comprising a conglomerate of elements from the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment, the 2nd and 6th Battalions of The Royal Australian Regiment, the 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (QMI), the 4th Field Regiment, and other units from the broad spectrum of the Australian Defence Force.

Uruzgan is one of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces and lies in the heart of that rugged and strife-torn land. The province is culturally and tribally linked to Kandahar and thus often considered part of southern rather than central Afghanistan. Uruzgan is Taliban country, regarded, like the Helmand and Kandahar regions, as the birthplace of the insurgency. The Taliban fighters are overwhelmingly ethnic Pashtuns—predominantly Durrani Pashtuns. Their leader, Mullah Omar, was born in Singesar village in Uruzgan.²

Uruzgan province lies at the edge of the fabled Hindu Kush and features three distinct types of terrain. Bare rocky peaks that tower over the valleys, known colloquially by the soldiers on the ground as the ‘mountains’, are inaccessible to most vehicles, but offer excellent vantage points for observation and fire by dismounted troops. The ‘dascht’ is an arid band of desert that lies between the rocky peaks and the area known as the ‘green zone’ and is ideally suited to mounted manoeuvre, boasting clear fields of fire.³ The ‘green zone’ is the irrigated agricultural area that sits astride the major permanent water courses where the vast majority of the population lives in compounds called ‘qualas’. This is highly complex urban and rural terrain characterised by close vegetation, similar, in some areas, to primary jungle. This is a terrain that offers little opportunity for mounted manoeuvre and promises only the prolonged agony of street fighting and torrid close country combat.

I was deployed as the Officer Commanding the Security Task Group which formed Combat Team (CT) Spear, part of RTF-3. In the lead-up to my deployment with its endless briefings and conferences, I snatched some valuable time to read into the lengthy and turgid history of conflict in Afghanistan. What drew my attention were the favoured tactics, techniques and procedures of the Afghan insurgents and resistance fighters: the Mujahideen and the Taliban. My underlying motive was to formulate a set of my own tactical principles—my version of their tactics, techniques and procedures—to guide my combat team in its fight against these bands of guerrillas. My objective was to use the Taliban’s own tactics to defeat them.

This article describes those general principles uncovered in my research that established the foundation for those tactical operating principles that I used during my deployment with CT Spear. My aim was twofold: to derive tactical principles based on this general—and proven—foundation and to develop a set of tactical principles to counter the primary Taliban tactics used to fight my combat team. I have not described my own principles in isolation, but have used supporting vignettes to explain their employment and to build an accurate picture of the campaign scenario as it unfolded. Perhaps my most significant discovery was that my principles, derived as they were from Coalition partners’ lessons learnt, historical and academic sources, consistently confirmed the principles expressed in the Australian Army’s own doctrine—the documented product of the experiences of my predecessors.

The Principles

I read extensively on the fighting tactics of the Mujahideen and Taliban prior to my deployment and made copious notes. I then refined my notes, listing what I considered to be the main principles in my notebook. I reviewed these principles constantly as my deployment progressed, matching them with available intelligence and my combat team’s experiences in an attempt to remain ahead of our opponent. The majority of these principles were proven time and again over the duration of the operation either through our experiences or those of other Coalition forces. The first set of principles relates specifically to the Mujahideen war of resistance against the Soviet invasion of 1979:⁴

During the Soviet occupation, insurgents would wait for armoured columns to be strung out in single file and attack from the flanks.⁵ Another frequently used resistance tactic was to allow a Soviet column to enter a valley along a single track and then destroy the last vehicle thus trapping the whole column.
Soviet motorised infantry were reluctant to leave their vehicles and were thus unable to dominate the little terrain suitable for mechanised forces on the high ground.⁶
Restricting Soviet forces to static bases provided resistance forces enormous freedom of movement, particularly through the winter months. The Khost and Urgun garrisons in Paktia province were besieged throughout the winter of 1982/83.
Resistance in Afghanistan was quite different to that of the Viet Cong in Vietnam. While the different Afghan factions pursued the same goal, there was very little central control, unlike in Vietnam where the North Vietnamese government controlled the campaign plan. The Mujahideen combined briefly on occasion to besiege and assault isolated forts.⁷
The Mujahideen operated in groups of thirty to forty men with some semblance of order. Within their ranks were small, full-time hard core groups used consistently for both offensive and defensive duties. They favoured guerrilla tactics such as setting ambushes near bridges or defiles, disrupting roads and destroying bridges, and opening fire from higher ground to take advantage of the limited elevation of some Soviet weapons.
Troops in Soviet motorised formations conditioned to riding and fighting in their armoured vehicles were forced to leave their vehicles and fight on foot.⁸
One particularly successful Mujahideen tactic involved the use of a bait box to cause a casualty. The helicopter landing zones in the immediate vicinity would then be mined, often with an improvised explosive device (IED), or ambushed to target the casualty evacuation helicopter.⁹
The Mujahideen would use similar tactics and the same ambush sites months later, particularly if replacement units were repeating previous mistakes.¹⁰
Mujahideen forces routinely used darkness to conceal their approach to and departure from the target area.¹¹

I drew a number of general principles from other sources, including the US Center for Army Lessons Learnt which documented many of the tough lessons learned by US forces in Afghanistan since the early days of the fight against the Taliban in 2001:

Anti-coalition militia (ACM) forces are adept at setting ambushes to intercept reaction forces responding to shelling attacks on bases and other fixed establishments.¹²
ACM forces typically respond with immediate mortar fire, their primary fire support weapon.¹³
Control of high elevations is key to ACM defensive positions.¹⁴

My research then produced a number of general principles that had influenced previous campaigns and that I considered retained their currency in today’s fight against the Taliban:

The limited number of access roads and their appalling condition makes it difficult to concentrate conventional motorised/mechanised forces. Valleys are narrow and deprive mechanised forces of the ability to manoeuvre.¹⁵
Afghans are well aware of psychological and information operations campaigns and are easily alienated if promised action is not delivered.¹⁶
Individual Afghans tend to change sides at whim.¹⁷
Most convoy ambushes occur on return trips.¹⁸
Helicopter (or, more recently, uninhabited aerial vehicle) support is crucial in preventing ambushes.¹⁹
The Afghanistan campaign is very much a platoon leaders’ war of finding and closing with small, indigenous forces which will only stand and fight when the terrain and circumstances are favourable.²⁰

Countering Taliban Tactics: CT Spear Tactical Operating Principles In Action

From the general principles I noted during my research, I derived my own set of eleven tactical operating principles for use by CT Spear. Some of these were simply a matter of commonsense, but I believed that these needed to be reinforced during planning, orders groups and addresses to ensure that the combat team remained focused. These principles shaped the way that CT Spear responded to Taliban tactics during the period of our deployment.

My first—and perhaps primary—tactical operating principle involved the time-honoured practice of maintaining constant pressure through patrolling in depth.²¹ Australian forces have established a reputation for patrolling the ‘green zone’ in strength and reacting aggressively when attacked—a reputation built on the actions of the Special Operations Task Group and RTF-2 and reinforced by CT Spear. Discussions with local Afghans and intelligence sources supported the anecdotal evidence that Taliban fighters prefer not to engage Australians. This is not to say that the Taliban would not attack if they saw an opportunity; however, they are far more wary of Australians than of some of the other Coalition forces or the Afghan National Security Forces. On this basis I developed my second tactical principle: action on direct fire contact must involve ‘rapid aggressive offensive manoeuvre’.²² I used aggressive patrolling to force the Taliban to be constantly reactive and pressured by our very presence.

The Taliban employed three basic tactics during our deployment: the calculated or indiscriminate use of IEDs, the ‘fire pocket’ and the ‘swarm’.²³ By far the most common tactic employed by the Taliban was the asymmetric threat of the IED. These devices can assume many forms and can be carried by suicide bombers or planted in vehicles. Most of the IEDs in Uruzgan were activated by a pressure plate, while others we encountered were detonated by remote control or command wire. Suicide bombs were largely used against troop concentrations close to built-up areas. IEDs were laid principally in the vicinity of defiles both large and small, primarily near the edges of the ‘green zone’ but also on the dascht along the approaches to the ‘green zone’ and the dascht overwatch positions that covered the ‘green zone’.

The IED threat was real and omnipresent and CT Spear countered this threat through deliberate manoeuvre using the doctrinal advance as a baseline.²⁴ I developed this tactic further in my third tactical principle: combined arms grouping should be employed at the lowest level possible (usually platoon teams).²⁵ As a result, the advance guard was broken down into the vanguard—consisting of a combat engineer troop minus and an infantry platoon minus—and the main guard—comprising a cavalry patrol and the CT tactical headquarters.

The main body included the CT main headquarters, any engineer construction elements and the echelon. The rearguard comprised an infantry platoon and a cavalry patrol while an uninhabited aerial vehicle screened the front and flanks. The vanguard cleared the route conducting either an ‘on occurrence’ check (essentially an engineer route check) or a ‘deliberate’ search (route search),²⁶ depending on the route classification, with the main and rearguards holding key points.²⁷ The main body then moved from secured location to secured location until it reached its destination, a manoeuvre supported by my fourth tactical principle: cavalry and mounted elements must conduct dismounted clearance of all track and water course junctions.²⁸ Clearing and securing each location was crucial to safe forward movement.

If CT Spear was hit by an IED, all vehicles would halt. Any vehicle in a tactically exposed position would then manoeuvre to a position of tactical advantage and conduct a ‘5 and 25’²⁹ check before dismounting.³⁰ My fifth tactical principle was overarching and designed to cover this contingency: vehicles must not enter the ‘green zone’ without infantry support.³¹ The manoeuvre commander would conduct a clearance, setting up a hasty defence with his infantry; at the same time, the combat engineers would establish an incident control point and clear the incident site of secondary devices. Once this was completed casualty evacuation and recovery would occur.

Having reached the area of operations, the team would employ a deliberate deception plan, creating the impression that it was resting overnight and moving on the next day, in an attempt to deceive the Taliban.³² This deception was consistently feasible mainly because CT Spear and other Coalition forces would routinely transit similar routes due to the restrictive nature of the terrain. This deception succeeded on almost every occasion, surprising the local Afghans during the follow-on phase when the team would approach the ‘green zone’ in the pre-dawn darkness and conduct deliberate cordon and visit operations. These differed slightly, but significantly, from the established cordon and search practice—a necessary difference given the stigma and higher command focus on the term ‘search’. As a result, we did not always ‘search’ as, at times, there was insufficient information to support a search approval from the higher levels of ISAF command. Often we would simply establish a cordon and ‘visit’ specific compounds with the aim of flushing out persons of interest, conducting a ‘mini-shura’ (consultation) or finding evidence to support a search. This practice followed my sixth principle: a small force cannot be everywhere, but it can sow uncertainty in the mind of the enemy by creating the perception that it could be anywhere at any time.³³ While these activities did not achieve the kinetic effect of taking detainees or locating caches, their non-kinetic effects—the uncertainty they sowed—proved immensely valuable.

Once these preliminary actions had been completed, the combat team would move into an area defence posture around the worksite, taking into account the principles of key point defence, and commence a defensive routine of digging in and patrolling while the construction engineers began their work.³⁴ The combat engineers were always in high demand. Initially they would conduct deliberate searches of all positions prior to occupation, then establish observed cleared routes between battle positions and ‘support by fire’ locations to enable rapid mounted manoeuvre during defensive actions. They would then assist on the construction site and provide splinter teams to the infantry patrols for cache search and demolition.

The favourite Taliban defensive tactic is the ‘fire pocket’, used to protect either a command and control node or the location of a major cache. The fire pocket itself is an engagement area on the likely avenue of approach. Qualas on the perimeter of the fire pocket will contain a one or two-man Taliban piquet with small arms. Approaching patrols will receive little or no warning as qualas do not need initial coordination and will immediately engage any force entering the fire pocket from two to three sides. The fire pocket is sometimes mistaken for a Taliban swarm, but differs in that there are fewer fighters and few if any rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) or heavy weapons.

The ‘swarm’ is the Taliban offensive tactic, usually employed against dismounted elements in the ‘green zone’ that remain static for too long (two to three hours) and defensive positions such as overwatch and patrol bases. Some warning of a swarm is often—but not always—provided by the exodus of local Afghans from the area some ten to twenty minutes prior to the attack and an increase in intelligence warning of an offensive. During a swarm, Taliban fighters will manoeuvre on two to four flanks using fire teams of three to six men armed with medium machine-guns and RPGs who attack simultaneously. This was a tactic with which CT Spear became very familiar and tactically equipped to confront. I developed my seventh tactical principle as a response to the Taliban fire pocket and swarm: dismounted patrols must always operate within mortar range.³⁵

CT Spear countered the Taliban’s major tactics with carefully planned tactics of its own. The team defeated the fire pocket by fighting into one side while suppressing the other firing points and then rolling them up from the flank. The Taliban fighters would occasionally withdraw to alternate firing points as the team advanced and the commander would then decide how far he wanted to pursue them given his existing boundaries and task.

The team used the same tactic to counter the swarm, although a platoon was unlikely to be able to handle a larger force on its own and such a confrontation would usually turn into a fully-fledged combat team engagement. The element in contact would go into, or remain in, all round defence and allow its JTAC or JFO to call in indirect fire and close air support to buy time for the combat team commander to manoeuvre his cavalry and infantry to support. My eighth and ninth principles supported this and carried the necessary corollaries: any force must contain at least three elements that can support one another while patrolling deep in the ‘green zone’.³⁶ Dismounted sections must operate within 500 metres of one another and platoons within 1000 metres of one another, particularly if they are operating away from the protection of overwatch. Use of this tactic facilitated rapid offensive manoeuvre in support of an element in contact.³⁷ In essence, we aimed to ‘swarm the swarm’, in keeping with my tenth principle: fight the most likely course of action, but be postured for the most dangerous.³⁸

The Taliban are masters of battlefield clearance and rarely leave their dead where they fall. Effective battlefield damage assessment can occur only through immediate follow-up or careful monitoring of hospitals, health clinics and local cemeteries over the ensuing days. The Afghans like to bury their dead quickly and sporadic funerals may occur over the week following a fight as more insurgents succumb to their wounds.

CT Spear’s patrol program not only performed the usual task of denying the enemy the ability to obstruct construction, but was also aimed at effective engagement with the locals to support the information operations plan. This activity supported my eleventh and final principle: use a ‘firm, fair and friendly’ approach with the locals to build understanding and respect.³⁹ Critical support was provided by an engagement team comprising a mix of specialists from information operations, intelligence and the Provincial Reconstruction Team. The engagement team was equipped to conduct key leadership engagement and ongoing human terrain and needs-based analysis in order to provide information and also as a base for future reconstruction operations.⁴⁰

Conclusion

The majority of the principles garnered through my research were clearly in evidence over the duration of CT Spear’s deployment. The tactical operating principles that I derived from these proved highly effective in guiding CT Spear in the conduct of its mission. As a situation changed, the team adapted these principles and tactics to maintain its momentum. The effectiveness of these principles was proven time and again in the determination of the Taliban forces to actively avoid fighting the Australians. Their perception that Australians patrolled the ‘green zone’ in strength and reacted aggressively when attacked was constantly vindicated. At the same time, CT Spear developed a good rapport with the local Afghans through a firm, fair and friendly approach and delivering on promises made in good faith.

For me, the time-honoured trio of doctrine coupled with knowledge and experience worked. The doctrinal wisdom that underpins our own tactics, techniques and procedures is developed from many years of operational experience such as mine and I suspect that this is too often forgotten. My experience in Afghanistan taught me that this operational wisdom retains its relevance and effectiveness in the ongoing fight against the enemy of the modern age. Commanders ignore it at their peril.

Endnotes

1 See the precise mission description in Department of Defence, Reconstruction Task Force 3, Sunset Digital, Brisbane, 2008, p. 26.

2 For more detail and other insights into Afghanistan, see the US Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Cultural and Conflict Studies at <http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Uruzgan.html>.

3 As described in Lester W Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, Routledge, London, 1998, p. xxi.

4 I drew most of these principles from Edgar O’Ballance’s seminal work, Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile Land: 1839 to the Present, Brassey’s, London, 2002, pp. 103–43. Other sources are indicated as they occur.

5 See Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, p. 135, for a description of this particular Soviet weakness.

6 Grau provides an excellent vignette describing the consequences of Soviet reluctance to leave their vehicles. Ibid., p. 203.

7 For anecdotal evidence of what was an unusual tactic for the usually fractious Mujahideen, see, Ibid., p. 65.

8 Grau provides a fascinating insight into the way the Mujahideen shaped Soviet tactics. Ibid., p. 33.

9 See also US Center for Army Lessons Learnt (CALL), Handbook No. 05-6, Operation Enduring Freedom III – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Kansas, 2005, p. 15.

10 Described also in A Jalali and L W Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, Military Press, London, 2000, Vol. I, p. 8.

11 Ibid., p. 19.

12 CALL, Operation Enduring Freedom III, p. 10.

13 Ibid., p. 16.

14 Ibid.

15 O’Ballance, Afghan Wars, p. 103.

16 Ibid., p. 107.

17 Ibid., p. 124.

18 CALL, Operation Enduring Freedom III, p. 10. See also vignettes provided by Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, pp. 136, 147.

19 Jalali and Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain, p. 12. See also Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, p. 203.

20 Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, p. xxvii. See also his excellent anecdotal evidence on p. 101.

21 See LWP-G 3-9-3 Operations in Desert Environments, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2005, p. 6–3.

22 This is a concept strongly supported by the British. See British Army Doctrinal Note 05/13, p. 9.

23 IEDs were sometimes buried in the dascht where they would lie for months before striking civilians or Coalition forces.

24 The doctrinal advance is a unit and formation method of tactical manoeuvre and had to be adjusted for the smaller groupings within a combat team. The manoeuvre is clearly articulated in LWD 3-0-1 Formation Tactics, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2003, p. 3–15 and LWP-G 3-9-3 Operations in Desert Environments, p. 4–1.

25 See LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup Tactics, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2004, p. 1–6.

26 Described in LWP-CA (ENGRS) 2-6-1 Engineer Search, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2006, p. 10–6.

27 Supported by British Army Doctrinal Note 06/04, Convoy Operations, Annexes E and F.

28 British Army Doctrinal Note 05/13, p. 13.

29 A visual and physical check conducted around a vehicle for signs of unexploded ordinance or IEDs.

30 British Army Doctrinal Note 05/13, p. 13.

31 Strongly supported by current doctrine, including: LWD 3-3-4 Employment of Armour, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2005, pp. 5–21, 6–21; LWP-G 3-3-6 Cavalry Regiment, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2005, pp. 7–23, 7–30; and LWP-CA (MDT CBT) 3-3-3 Mounted Minor Tactics, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2006, pp. 3–9, 4–41.

32 For the efficacy of deception, see LWP-G 3-2-2 Deception, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, p. 3–44.

33 British Army Doctrinal Note 05/13, p. 9.

34 According to the definition used in LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup Tactics, key point defence involves doing as much as possible within the immediate vicinity of a key point so it cannot be captured or destroyed. These measures may include patrolling, surveillance and the construction of obstacles. See LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup Tactics, p. 7–21, and British Army Doctrinal Note 05/13, p. 10.

35 LWP-G 3-3-8 Patrolling and Tracking, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2002, p. 3–5.

36 Ibid., p. 7–2.

37 Ibid.

38 LWD 5-1-4 The Military Appreciation Process, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2001, p. 3–34.

39 LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency Operations, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 1999, p. 2–10.

40 For further detail, see Reconstruction Task Force 3, p. 54.

Michael Bassingthwaighte