Are We Failing the Government’s $1.37 Billion Defence Innovation Strategy?
Abstract
In late 2019, the Australian Minister of Defence Industry commissioned a review into the Centre of Defence Industry Capability to be conducted in early 2020. This article contributes to the broader discussion on the way the Defence Innovation Hub and Next Generation Technology Fund have performed from the perspective of an Australian Army officer. Under headings borrowed from key statements in Army’s futures statement Accelerated Warfare, this article will discuss how centralising innovation functions since 2016 has caused a loss of focus on the warfighter’s problem set, removed collaboration on innovation priorities, and produced all-encompassing ambiguous priority areas which are disjointed from the soldier’s future warfare concerns. This article concludes with recommendations for an online portal, accessible to registered users of all ranks, through which users can search, review and recommend unsolicited proposals. This portal would support industry with clear, verifiable and unambiguous ‘problem statements’ aligned with current project gaps and requirements, and provide successful innovations with an actionable procurement pathway.
Introduction
Current processes are not responsive to need; the Department is over-optimized for exceptional performance at the expense of providing timely decisions, polices and capabilities to the warfighter. Our response will be to prioritise speed of delivery, continuous adaption, and frequent modular upgrades. We must not accept cumbersome approval chains, wasteful application of resources in uncompetitive space, or overly risk-averse thinking that impedes change. Delivering performance means we will shed outdated management practices and structures while integrating insights from business innovation.1
The extract above was articulated by former US Secretary of Defence James Mattis in the 2018 United States of America National Defence Strategy under the heading ‘Delivering Performance at the Speed of Relevance’. In Australia, the Australian Government is investing heavily in new procurement programs, including a $1.37 billion innovation strategy to enhance Australian Defence Force (ADF) capability. Three years into this 10-year strategy, this article seeks to cast a critical lens over this program and question whether the Government’s Defence innovation strategy is ‘delivering performance at the speed of relevance’. The article explores the sometimes-ineffable process of innovation from the perspective of defence industry, and the subsequent effectiveness of the Defence Innovation Hub and the Next Generation Technology Fund to facilitate innovation for members in Defence.
The article begins with a description of the current driver of innovation— how ideas enter the current innovation ecosystem—before discussing the concept of organisational innovation to achieve capability overmatch. It discusses industry as a fundamental input to capability and the way Australia’s Five Eyes partners have integrated industry to achieve their innovation priorities and, based on this success, propose a remodelling to align Australia’s driver to innovation. To conclude, it suggests ways the Department of Defence and Department of Industry could enhance the access of small enterprises to innovation funding, create sovereign capability and, importantly for uniformed readers, provide a measurable capability enhancement to our fighting men and women in accordance with specified tasks of the key Army statements Army in Motion and Accelerated Warfare.
‘Ready now’
In 2015 the First Principles Review (FPR) was critical of the Department of Defence’s capability development construct, which it believed created a disconnect between customers and the purchaser, as well as multiple and unnecessary handover points which increased complexity and risk.2 The FPR recommended that Defence establish a single end-to-end capability development function3 and recommended that Defence partner with academia and industry to promote innovation.4
In the following year, 2016, the Australian Government released its Defence Industry Policy Statement. This statement recognised industry as a fundamental input to capability, and established the Centre for Defence Industry Capability (CDIC), tasked explicitly to help transform the Defence– industry relationship and facilitate access to Defence’s new innovation programs for small to medium enterprises.5 These new innovation programs saw the materialisation of the $640 million Defence Innovation Hub (DIH) and the $730 million Next Generation Technology Fund (NGTF)—a combined $1.37 billion innovation opportunity over 10 years.66
The DIH and NGTF adopted broad, equivocal descriptions of their priority areas to shape an industry response towards preferred innovation themes. The DIH runs an open call for proposals against defined innovation priorities, while the NGTF is more conservative, releasing calls for submissions intermittently throughout the year against what it terms ‘collaboration vehicles’. Any submission to the DIH or NGTF is assessed against each program’s priority areas, an example of which is ‘better understanding the online, digital and cyber environments, to identify and predict risks to strategic interests in order to support and guide decision making’.6 In the case of the NGTF, one priority area is simply described as ‘Space Capabilities’.7
The generalised description of priority areas supports an unofficial philosophy of ‘Technology-Push’ regarding innovation, whereby industry responds with what it interprets as Defence needs to meet the published priority areas. This philosophy is useful to mitigate cognitive bias by institutionalised members who have become indoctrinated in the ways and means of their highly disciplined training. Yet one criticism of the Technology- Push philosophy is the disconnect between what industry perceives Defence may want, and the deliberate military planning and appreciation process which has analysed what Defence members actually need.
Priority areas described in broad, equivocal statements can provide flexibility to enable disruptive and unconventional thinking; however, this has unintended consequences for stakeholder perceptions, contracting and milestone reporting, due to a weakness in adhering to the principles of requirements-engineering. If we compare the DIH and NGTF priority descriptions to the principles of ‘requirements writing’ as taught by the UNSW Capability Systems Centre, we quickly observe how statements such as ‘… identify and predict risks to strategic interests in order to support and guide decision making’ or ‘Space Capabilities’ fail to be clear, verifiable and unambiguous according to the teachings of the ADF’s own academic military academy.8
‘Technology is not the sole answer’
In the US 2018 National Security Strategy, Mattis makes the observation:
… success no longer goes to the country that develops a new technology first, but rather to the one that better integrates it and adopts its way of fighting.9
Closer to home, the Chief of the Australian Army, LTGEN Burr, acknowledges a similar challenge, observing in his futures statement Accelerated Warfare:
Technology is not the sole answer. Our challenge is to underpin technological change with a joint warfighting philosophy linked to future investment, force structure, mobilisation and logistics transformation to be relevant, adaptable and survivable in the modern operating environment.10
Both these statements allude to the importance of internal reform to meet the challenges of future warfare, with the acknowledgement that innovation is more than a physical product; to be truly effective it must come with organisational change. Organisational change for a government department subject to a culture of hierarchy, discipline, and governance could easily be considered unattainable, yet the ADF does have a proven capacity to pursue innovative change and procure disruptive technology into the hands of soldiers.
One example of this was a project called LAND129, which in 2018 conducted a nationwide delivery of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with accompanying training and formal qualification for every full-time, part-time and Army Cadets unit in Australia—from training institutions to combat brigades and from military polices to cooks.11 While there were tactical constraints due to the cyber risk of the commercial off-the-shelf equipment,12 the intent was not the hardware acquisition per se, but rather to innovate the organisational and employment concepts of every warfighter. LAND129 was arguably the vanguard of the Chief of Army’s future concept to ‘leverage emerging technology … integrating new technologies within the joint force’.13 Through the LAND129 example, Defence demonstrated how we may adapt and innovate beyond just a procurement model. The physical UAV product was not the solution; nor was it an innovation—remote aerial systems have been used in warfare since 1849.14 Rather, the solution was the ability of LAND129 to integrate the UAV into every facet of the fighting force and have Army’s best asset—its people—learn, adapt and innovate its future force.
The Chief of Army’s command statement Army in Motion states ‘Potential exists in every corner of Army’, and the Minister for Defence has previously commented ‘Our people are our best asset’.15 Yet assessment of a DIH proposal is made by a committee consisting of Band 1 APS and 1-Star uniform members in the Hub Investment Advisory Group16—the military equivalent of centralising innovation to a Brigade Commander. This is contrary to commentary in Army in Motion, which goes on to state that ‘we have many hidden talents and soldiers with innovative ideas with which to pair technology and tactics’. The assessment of good ideas, disruptive thinking and innovative approaches should not be restricted to the staff officers in Russell Offices. 69
There may be good reasons for controlling access to innovative and emerging technology. One reason traditionally raised is the need for proposals to be marked commercial-in-confidence and the desire for industry to protect their intellectual property. Yet ‘Commercial-in-Confidence’ remains equivalent to an ‘Official: Sensitive’ classification17—a low security classification for which all Defence members are vetted. Accessing and assessing capability is not without precedent in Army: the online Report on Deficient or Unsatisfactory Materiel, better known as RODUM, is an example whereby any soldier of any rank can view and report on every piece of materiel in Army’s inventory—and at an equivalent classification level of Official: Sensitive. This is in contrast to the DIH and NGTF, whose information management system is not accessible through the Defence Protected Network and which maintains tightly controlled access privileges even for capability development staff. Why are there additional access restrictions for innovation?
Probity is the restriction commonly cited in relation to Defence–industry engagement. However, detailed policies already exist within Defence for probity, industry engagement and conflicts of interest.18 These policies define probity as acting with integrity, honesty and ethical conduct, and provide clear guidance for industry engagement throughout the procurement process. Furthermore, restricting access because of probity implies a mistrust of the perceived ethical standards of ADF members. Contrast this to the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office in the United States, which allows any member of Five Eyes nations to register and review all submissions to their broad agency announcements.19 This leads to deeper questions as to why it is easier to access the innovation portal of a foreign nation than our own sovereign Defence Innovation Hub. LAND129 has demonstrated the power of decentralising innovation, yet the DIH and NGTF continue to maintain centralised control with no open, transparent and searchable database, denying our soldiers with hidden talents the capacity to pair technology and tactics, as demanded by Army in Motion.20
‘Partnerships through teaming’
As I mentioned at the beginning of this article, a cornerstone of the 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement was the recognition of industry as a ninth fundamental input to capability (FIC). FICs are commonly defined as the essential inputs that are combined in order to achieve capability.21 This recognition was widely applauded by defence industry, and for many industry insiders reflected an overdue reshaping of Defence’s relationship with commercial business.
Yet for Defence, the practicalities of this fundamental change to capability are unclear. Doctrine, a means of underpinning the guidance and knowledge for Defence, remains unchanged with the Capstone and Executive series of Australian Defence doctrine publication Preparedness and Mobilisation continuing to list only the previous eight FIC areas.22 This is perhaps due to the uncertainty of practically integrating industry into the single end-to-end capability development function as demanded by the FPR. This guidance vacuum has left a significant amount of interpretation by capability managers as to what role industry should play, and how, in serving the Defence mission.
This lack of guidance can be seen manifesting in the little-known Performance Exchange Scorecard, which provides insight into the relationship between Defence and the industry sector. The ‘Top 5 Industry Partner Issues’ reported in the latest scorecard were: 23
- Slow decision-making is affecting performance
- Procedures are still too cumbersome
- Need more events for exchange of ideas
- Lack of results-focused culture—still process focused
- Too much paperwork for the level of complexity.
Importantly, when discussing Defence–industry relationships, issues 1, 2 and 5 were rated equally from the perspectives of both Defence and industry members. This is interesting in terms of reflecting that Defence wants to innovate and the Government has gifted $1.37 billion to industry to support Defence to innovate, yet the relationship between Defence and industry continues to be slow, cumbersome and overly complex. Why? How can Defence integrate industry as a FIC while simplifying processes, exchanging ideas, increasing the speed of relevance, and simultaneously empowering and supporting our junior leaders as directed by Army in Motion.24 To achieve this, the Defence organisation needs to innovate—not through equipment or technology, but organisationally and attitudinally with regard to integration of industry into the Strategy and Concepts stage of the Capability Life Cycle (CLC).
I challenge any ADF member to consider the hypothetical response they would have received in 2016 if they had submitted a concept to their chain of command for a single-person jetpack. That year was before any high-profile publicity stunts took place and when this technology was still considered the bastion of science fiction and spy movies. Undoubtedly, they would have experienced substantial resistance and ridicule in proposing the adoption of such a new concept, similar to Everett Rogers’s ‘diffusion of innovation’25 (also known as the Innovation Adoption Curve). Indeed, the concept was raised in a 1964 edition of the Army Journal26 and resisted progression past the first stage of the Innovation Adoption Curve for 55 years—that is to say, until 2019, when Flyboard inventor Franky Zapata demonstrated its military applicability at the French military’s Bastille Day parade on 14 July 2019.27 This very public and awe-inspiring stunt was broadcast around the world, immediately capturing the public’s imagination and catapulting the concept into the minds of military planners and strategists. Now suddenly the concept of a single-person jetpack was not ridiculous at all.
What the Bastille Day parade displayed was not just the incredible capability of the Flyboard invention; instead the French military demonstrated an example of a truly integrated industry partner working as a fundamental input to military capability. By involving military members early in exploration of new concepts in the CLC—from desktop assessment of DIH proposals to more practical exploration of concepts as proposed through the Innovation Warfighter series28—Defence can challenge the organisation’s preconceived ideas and cognitive biases early in the life of an innovative concept.
The ADF should not need a foreign military parade to challenge our preconceived ideas. By integrating industry into the Strategy and Concepts stage of the CLC, our industry partners can be working on the technological problem while our Defence members are concurrently responding by preparing, experimenting and adapting29 to the eventual 72 innovation. This organisational concept has been publicly demonstrated by our United States and British partners integrating jet-propulsion concepts with US law enforcement and the UK Royal Marines30 for tasks such as call-for-fire or rapidly deployable overwatch on previously inaccessible urban terrain.31 Are the Australian Department of Defence and the CDIC comparable to the French, US and UK programs? That is not conceivable in size or expenditure. Yet CDIC has an identified focus area of ‘Facilitating Innovation’.32 Currently this facilitation starts and ends at the DIH; instead this facilitation needs better teaming with Defence as its military partner.
‘Thinking of new ways to operate’
We previously argued that the priority areas of the NGTF and DIH are too broad and equivocal for industry to understand Defence’s actual technological requirements. This obscuration has some merit, as there is an inherent sensitivity to publicly advertising capability gaps, because of the risk of exposing the ADF’s critical vulnerabilities to targeting by a potential hostile adversary. While this has sound reasoning, we should link this cognitive process to Army in Motion, which directs us to challenge such preconceived positions by ‘thinking of new ways to operate, by experimenting, innovation and accepting risk’.33
To assist us in this challenge, let us consider the US Special Operations Command. Every year, the Special Operations Force Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Center outlines its developmental and acquisition lines of effort at the Special Operations Forces Industry Conference in a week-long unclassified, publicly accessible town hall style conference. This is despite the many threats and state actors with hostile intent against the US. Even with this existential threat, the capability gaps of the US elite special forces are still published online.34
This is a demonstration of an alternative to the Technology-Push philosophy unofficially adopted by CDIC through the DIH and NGTF. The alternative is a ‘Market-Pull’ philosophy which empowers Defence to advertise its gaps, needs and capability problems for industry to subsequently solve. This assists industry by providing clear, verifiable and unambiguous requirements. More importantly for Defence, Market-Pull follows a deliberate appreciation process to identify the capability deficiency. It therefore has an immediate customer within the Defence organisation who wants to integrate the solution into their organisation area, thereby fostering early ownership and integration.
The concept of Market-Pull is not without precedent in the ADF. ‘Plan Jericho’ is the Royal Australian Air Force’s project to develop augmented intelligence capability to protect Australia from technologically sophisticated and rapidly changing threats.35 As part of the implementation model, Plan Jericho established offsite labs with partnered universities which are essentially physical spaces for service members to collaborate, discover, test and prototype opportunities, ideas and technologies.36 Current Army initiatives involving Good Idea Expos, hackathons37 and the recent MakerSpace initiative38 are examples of the Australian Army pursuing similar objectives to the Plan Jericho model and fostering early ownership and integration. These are positive engagements and contribute to the Defence ecosystem, but arguably they still lack an identifiable procurement pathway to commercialise a ‘concept’ to a ‘capability’. Only by implementing industry as a FIC to these Market-Pull opportunities will we provide capability off-ramps to move good ideas to an available, employable and sustained solution across the Services.
With the alternative philosophy of Technology-Push, CDIC resurrects problems identified by the FPR (a disconnect between the customer and the purchaser) as it searches for a customer within Defence for the technology. In the case of Market-Pull, the customer is already identified and waiting. Could this be a contributing factor to explain why, after four years of operation, there continue to be no items from the DIH which have been introduced into service in Defence? This criticism could be seen as unfair. Followers of these programs may highlight the DIH Special Notice mechanism and the aforementioned priority areas, which all help to shape industry’s response to a Defence problem. Yet, after four years, the DIH’s own website lists just five Special Notices39 and, as demonstrated earlier in this paper, the priority areas provide little to no clarity as to the scope or complexity of the problem.
‘Understand what Defence needs’
Let us consider Army’s Special Operations Command and its capability enhancement program Project Greyfin—a 20-year, $3 billion program— announced by the Government in August 2019.40 We assume that a prioritised list of capability, equipment and infrastructure was outlined in the business case presented to the Government in order to achieve Gate 2 approval. This assumption is based on the Government’s own media release in which the Minister for Defence was quoted as saying the project would procure:
… the best body armour; weapons; diving, parachuting, roping and climbing systems; medical search and rescue; communications; human performance training and support.41
Where can we find this published list outside a classified government submission or a vague media release? It would be reasonable to assume the answer is that it is published on AusTender, yet this occurs only at such time as the Commonwealth is scheduled to acquire in a 12- to 18-month timeframe. No industry partner can turn a developmental product to an off-the-shelf, production-ready product in such a short time frame. We must consider time a scarce commodity. If Defence is to prepare for increasing volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity as outlined in Accelerated Warfare, then it must devote time to industry to research, invest, innovate and respond to its emerging requirements.
Considering the Minister for Defence’s Greyfin announcement, ADF soldiers in special operations must have a problem with diving systems, or else the Minister would not be allocating taxpayer funding to buy ‘the best’. So where is Greyfin’s diving-themed problem statement to shape industry’s research into and development of this system while we wait for specifics to be released on AusTender? CDIC recognises such an initiative as a key factor in building success, stating:
Defence is making its requirements clearer so that Australian businesses can understand what defence needs and invest accordingly in their own capabilities.42
But NGTF priority areas such as ‘Space Capabilities’ are anything but clear or easily understood. The Defence Innovation Network (DIN)—a New South Wales state-based innovation program—has recognised this dilemma and75 regularly calls for defence-themed ‘problem statements’ in which to conduct rapid feasibility studies of new ideas and develop these ideas into concepts or technology that can attract further investment from the government or industry.43 For instance, instead of the NGTF priority of ‘Space Capabilities’, the DIN expands this into a workable problem statement under the banner of ‘navigation in denied environments’. This nests within the space priority area, yet focuses the industry response towards a real, verifiable and unambiguous end state.
‘Unlock our full potential’
The 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement identified the disparate nature of innovation across Defence, and the department subsequently established the Defence Innovation Hub to aggregate the five separate innovation streams into one portal.44 The effects of this change have been to remove grassroots visibility and influence on innovation priorities, reduce the focus on warfighters’ perceived problems, and produce ambiguous priority areas which are difficult for industry to address. Assessment of innovation proposals has become stovepiped within Defence, resulting in delays, a lack of ownership, and mistrust through lack of transparency. Defence can address these problems to refocus on capability effects by doing three things. First, it can remove organisational restraints to provide any Defence member monitored access to the information management portals of the DIH and the NGTF, matched to their role and position (similar to the RODUM portal or the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office). Second, it can re-invent the portal interface to enable rapid online ranking and discussion of industry-submitted proposals, allowing all ranks and trades to contribute to the assessment process. Third, it can re-focus the Defence priority areas for inclusion of unclassified ‘problem statements’ to direct industry’s focus towards innovative proposals and subsequent research and development efforts.
By removing barriers and increasing the number of Defence members who are able to access, search, assess and comment on innovation proposals, Army can expand its innovation ecosystem to include all ranks and trades to support the Army in Motion concept of pairing technology and tactics with the hidden talents of our soldiers. By providing clear, verifiable and unambiguous ‘problem statements’ aligned with current project gaps and requirements, we will begin to integrate industry as a FIC—not purely as product delivery tool but as an integrated and collaborative partner. This avoids overinvesting in unsuitable products for the warfighter, as the end user is an early contributor to the team. We will ‘fail fast’ instead of overinvesting in progressive and disjointed phases of product development. Importantly, Army will be able to maintain the recommendations from FPR and integrate innovation into a single end-to-end capability development stream to ensure innovation concepts— should they prove successful and suitable to the ADFs future warfare requirements—are aligned with an actionable procurement pathway from which the problem statements are drawn.
These simple changes will pull the CDIC innovation strategy inside Defence, create ownership, reduce unnecessary handover points, deliver performance at the speed of relevance and enable our people to lead, inspire and make a difference. Our people are our competitive advantage and, with these changes, will assist to pull the future towards us.45
Endnotes
1 James Mattis, 2018, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, D.C: United States Government).
2 Department of Defence, 2015, First Principles Review: Creating One Defence (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 32.
3 Ibid., 32.
4 Ibid., 42.
5 Department of Defence, 2016, 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 16.
6 Australian Government, 2020, ‘Innovation Opportunities and Priorities’, business.gov. au, accessed 27 April 2020, at: https://www.business.gov.au/CDIC/Innovate-in-defence/ Innovation-opportunities-and-priorities
7 Department of Defence, n.d., ‘Next Generation Technologies Fund’, Defence Science and Technology website, accessed 27 April 2020 at: https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/ nextgentechfund
8 UNSW Canberra, ‘Requirements Writing MOOC 1’, Capability Systems Centre YouTube video, 12 April 2018, at: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=W3qqXcVEGeA&list=PLd7LoepKQ3dRB68avOjb_uCL8qMpKSPU6 78
9 Mattis, 2018, 10.
10 Richard Burr, Chief of Army, 2018, Accelerated Warfare: Futures Statement for an Army in Motion (Canberra: Australian Army).
11 Department of Defence, ‘Training Services for Unmanned Aerial Systems’, AusTender, 7 March 2018, at: https://www.tenders.gov.au/Atm/ShowClosed/f4537db0-d7df-b140- 95ca-c5d6a7eeb11e
12 Department of Defence, ‘Statement on ADF Use of Da Jiang Unmanned Aerial Systems’, Defence News, 27 February 2018, at: https://news.defence.gov.au/media/on-the-record/ statement-adf-use-da-jiang-unmanned-aerial-systems
13 Chief of Army, Accelerated Warfare.
14 Monash University, 2003, ‘Remote Piloted Aerial Vehicles: An Anthology’, archived CTIE website, at: https://www.ctie.monash.edu/hargrave/rpav_home.html
15 Marise Payne, Minister for Defence, ‘New Campaign Launched to Build a Diverse ADF’, media release 28 July 2017, at: https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release…
16 Strategy, Policy, and Industry Group, ‘Defence Industry Policy Division’, Department of Defence website, accessed 27 April 2020 at: https://www.defence.gov.au/SPI/Divisions/ IndustryPolicy.asp
17 Department of Defence, 2018, Defence Security Principles Framework (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 61.
18 Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, 2019, Defence Procurement Policy Manual (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), at: DPPMFinalv1.51July19-9-8298.pdf (this link is no longer accessible)
19 Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, ‘BAA Information Delivery System’, CTTSO website, accessed 27 April 2020, at: https://bids.cttso.gov/
20 Chief of Army, 2018, Army in Motion: Command Statement (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).
21 Defence Industry Policy Statement, 19.
22 Department of Defence, 2013, Preparedness and Mobilisation, ADDP 00-2 (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service).
23 Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, ‘Performance Exchange Scorecard’, Department of Defence website, accessed 27 April 2020, at: https://www.defence.gov.au/ casg/Multimedia/Scorecard_Executive_Report_Presentation_-_Nov_18-9-9375.ppt (this link is no longer accessible)
24 Chief of Army, Army in Motion.
25 Everett Rogers, 1995 (1962), Diffusion of Innovations (New York: The Free Press).
26 LG Halls, 1964, ‘Military Rocket Lift Devices’, Australian Army Journal, no. 183.
27 Agence France-Presse, ‘“Flyboard” Wows Paris Crowds during Bastille Day Parade along Champs-Elysees’, ABC News website, 15 July 2019, at: https://www.abc.net.au/ news/2019-07-15/french-inventor-wows-bastille-day-crowds-with-flyboard/11308980
28 Richard Barrett, 2019, ‘The Innovation Warfighter: Improvising Capability and Embracing Industry’, Australian Army Journal 15, no. 1.
29 Chief of Army, Army in Motion. https://www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/ Are We Failing the Government’s $1.37 Billion Defence Innovation Strategy? 79 Are We Failing the Government’s $1.37 Billion Defence Innovation Strategy?
30 Gravity, ‘What a day at @RNASYeovilton. Jet Suits, helicopters and fire!’, @takeonGravity Twitter post, 17 July 2019, at: https://twitter.com/takeonGravity/ status/1151432510938800130
31 Patriot3 Inc, ‘Richard Browning and his @takeonGravity Jet Suit take off …’, @Patriot3Inc Twitter post, 26 September 2019, at: https://twitter.com/Patriot3Inc/ status/1176918942352388101
32 Centre for Defence Industry Capability, 2016, CDIC Program Guidelines: Centre for Defence Industry Capability (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 4.
33 Chief of Army, Army in Motion.
34 United States Special Operations Command, ‘Science and Technology Engagements and Opportunities’, 23 May 2019, at: https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ ndia/2019/sofic/ST_Exploring_Future.pdf
35 Royal Australian Air Force, ‘Jericho—Partnering at the Edge’, Air Force website, 3 November 2017, at: www.airforce.gov.au/our-mission/plan-jericho
36 Cara Wrigley, ‘Jericho Lab: Building Disruptive Capability Through Design & High-End Science’, At the Edge: Fifth-Generation Air Force, n.d., at: https://view.publitas.com/jericho/ at-the-edge/page/26-27
37 See, for example, ‘ANZDF Virtual Hackathon 15–17 May 2020’, at: http://anzdfhack.org
38 Warwick Miller and Lyndal-Joy Thompson, ‘MakerSpaces in Army—A Practical Application’, Land Power Forum (Australian Army Research Centre), 4 December 2019, at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/makerspaces…
39 Department of Defence, ‘Call for Submissions’, Defence Innovation Hub website, accessed 17 April 2020, at: www.innovationhub.defence.gov.au/call-for-submissions/
40 Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Backing Our Special Forces with Cutting Edge Equipment’, media release, 12 August 2019, at: https://www.pm.gov.au/media/backing-our-special-forces-cutting-edge-equ…
41 Department of Defence, ‘Funding Boost for Special Forces’, Defence News, 12 August 2019, at: https://news.defence.gov.au/national/funding-boost-special-forces
42 Centre for Defence Industry Capability, 2018, Building your Business in the Defence Industry, fact sheet, 1.
43 Defence Innovation Network, ‘DIN Pilot Project Grants 2020–21: Call for Proposals’, DIN website, 21 April 2020, at: https://defenceinnovationnetwork.com/din-pilot-project-grants-2020-21-c… (this link is no longer accessible)
44 Defence Industry Policy Statement, 71.
45 Chief of Army, Accelerated Warfare.
