An Interview with Warrant Officer Kevin Woods

Australian Army Journal (AAJ): Warrant Officer Woods, thank you for taking the time to speak with us as part of the series of interviews we’re conducting with former senior officers and soldiers to learn from the past to inform the future as the Army transitions from operations in Afghanistan, East Timor and the Solomon Islands.

In order to understand the environment post Vietnam, what was the situation Army faced in the period after the withdrawal?

Warrant Officer Woods: I was a young soldier just after the withdrawal from Vietnam. There was a mass exodus of the Nashos and other guys that didn’t want to play anymore due to the end of the war. So the Army was quite small. The size of each platoon in the battalion was about twenty men. It took a bit of time to get people back in. Units became a priority, including which units received new soldiers. Other than that, it was business as usual in the battalion. You still got up and did PT in the morning and you still did your training.

All of our corporals and some of the diggers had ribbons. The sergeants and the CSMs had ribbons—everyone except for us younger blokes. This wasn’t a daunting thing, but it made you think that they knew their stuff, which most of them did. They really passed on some good knowledge and skills to develop really good soldiers. But numbers wise it took many years to get us back up to strength, which in those days was a platoon of thirty.

AAJ: Did you find that there were limitations in finances and therefore limitations with what you could do for training?

Warrant Officer Woods: In the late ‘70s—I would say from ‘79 to late ‘80—there were a lot of resource constraints. Our unit was told that we may become mechanised and undertook the trial in the late ‘70s. However, when we finished the trial, due to money constraints the APCs were taken off us. One company maintained the skills and it wasn’t until a couple of years after that we became a mechanised unit. I remember in the ‘80s, we could only drive five kilometres a week. There was no money for fuel or anything. It was once around the ring road at Holsworthy just to keep the APCs going. We did all of this training and became mechanised and all of a sudden they were saying that we couldn’t continue as there were no resources. There was no ability to drive to the range to fire the .50 Cal as there was no ammunition. It was hard.

From my experience we lost a lot of good guys who said ‘I’ve had enough of this’. To give you an example, we did a fourteen-day exercise in either ‘79 or ‘80 and were given three blank rounds for the whole exercise. As a corporal, I asked what we were supposed to do when we had used our three rounds, and was told that we were to run around yelling ‘bang bang’. I said to the officer, ‘You’re joking, aren’t you sir? We are grown ups.’ He said, ‘You have to go “bang bang”‘. The machine gunner was meant to yell ‘machine gun, machine gun’. Those were the resource constraints and that went on for a while. It was just appalling. You join the Army to be a soldier and, particularly as an infantryman, you want to fire your weapon. You don’t want to be playing cowboys and indians at the back of your house as a ten-year-old going ‘bang bang bang, you’re dead’. That annoyed a lot of people. Back in those days, everyone longed for or would have killed for a Butterworth, Long Look, Pac Bond or Southern Star. They would have killed to go and do something different.

Resources were just really tight and there was no answer. Back in late ‘70s and early ‘80s, there was just nothing. It was just terrible, a terrible time to go through. As a corporal I got a bit disillusioned. The only thing that saved me was that they sent me on Long Look in 1980 and that motivated me again. It was an interesting comparison, going from an army where you get three blank rounds to working with the Brits who seemed to have all the resources. It was completely different. Maybe I was blinkered in my view, but they seemed to have it all. That really saved me as I came back refreshed from Long Look. But at the time the availability of resources in the Australian Army was terrible.

As a young sergeant I recall going to RMC to do a demonstration in 1981. While for obvious reasons they had more resources than we had in the battalion, they still only had one magazine. I thought, ‘You have to be kidding me, how are we supposed to train our future leaders if this is all the resources that are available?’

I may have been a bit spoilt in my first unit, 10 Independent Rifle Company, in 1974. The unit used to put companies through the BE Course, which took six weeks. The establishment had a huge amount of resources, including ammunition.

AAJ: Were there constraints on other resources, such as rations?

Warrant Officer Woods: Yes. I remember an exercise as a corporal in ‘83 or ‘84 where we had fresh rations, because rations packs were too expensive. I thought the CO was trying to save money. Despite this there were basically no fresh rations. We had a boiled egg for breakfast, and a pre-prepared roll with a piece of meat and some salad for lunch. The evening meal wasn’t much better, that was just a stew. Yet you were still required to do all the physical work. We were completely drained at the end of that exercise.

We were operating in Darkes Forest down the bottom of Holsworthy, which is tiger country. It was all on foot as they took the carriers off us because we didn’t have the money for fuel. That was our view at the junior level. We all thought it was the CO’s fault. But now that I have been exposed to higher levels of the Army I see it from a different perspective and believe the government of the day never gave us the money. A lot of people became frustrated and it took good leadership to keep people in the Army. I remember talking to the RSM course last year, as ex RSMs of the Army are placed on a panel session. We were asked, ‘What are the main challenges you believe we will face in the future?’ My response was, ‘How do you intend to keep your soldiers and corporals motivated when operations finish? That’s going to be your biggest challenge, because I saw it post Vietnam.’

AAJ: So why do you think people left post Vietnam?

Warrant Officer Woods: I can only comment on what the corporals said at the time. They said it was because there was no more war. Back in those days we were told that there would be no more deployments, so a lot of guys got out and went on to be successful in other areas. Some got disenchanted in the ‘75-77 period when there were no more resources. The Army had gone from a period of operations where we had all the resources. Everything had been given to the Army on a silver platter, and when that goes away people get out. I must admit, they never really did anything to challenge anyone. This didn’t kick in until the mid to late ‘80s where I think one of the saving graces was sport. They placed a lot of emphasis on sport, both individual and collective. They need to start looking at this again. Look at the current training regime of a battalion—where is the Tuesday sports training and Thursday sport day? I think those activities kept a lot of people going.

In a peacetime Army, one of the few challenges you have is sport. I don’t care if you play netball, it’s still challenging. Look at touch football. It is supposed to be a non-contact sport yet it is one of the most injury-prone sports in the world. The Army needs to challenge our people to play sport and be aggressive and take knocks. We also need to get away from the favouritism displayed in the ‘70s and ‘80s. We need to treat all people the same. When I was a battalion RSM, the CO said, ‘We are going to watch the rugby’. I told him that despite us both being rugby nuts, we needed to watch another sport. I said to him that we could come back and watch the last game of rugby, but we had people playing mixed netball, soccer, Aussie Rules, and people had gone to the rifle range because rifle shooting was a sport. In the end he agreed and we went to the other sports. I think you need to treat all sports equally. You can have a favourite, but as a CO or an RSM, you need to support them all. They’re all members of the battalion.

AAJ: In the years following the withdrawal did Army experience any internal cultural issues? Was there a divide between those that had and hadn’t served in Vietnam?

Warrant Officer Woods: I noticed that there was favouritism. If the platoon sergeant or CSM asked a question or asked for an opinion, they would ask the guy with ribbons. The guys without ribbons would never be asked. So there was always favouritism. This is important; just because you have ribbons, doesn’t mean you have all the answers. The man with no ribbons might give you an alternative view. Although they had operational experience and the Australians did very well in the jungle in Vietnam, what were they like in other terrain? The Army will face a similar situation as we transition from Afghanistan. The guys are very good in a desert environment, but how will they perform in the jungle?

I noticed the favouritism for about four or five years. When I was a platoon sergeant, within the company two of the sergeants had been nowhere and the third had been to Vietnam. This sergeant was still living in the jungle in 1984. However, if all the platoon sergeants were in the one location, the OC would always ask the sergeant who had been to Vietnam for his opinion.

AAJ: In the wake of Vietnam there was an increase in female involvement in Army. Are there any lessons that may be learnt in increasing the participation of women, especially with the recent removal of restrictions in combat roles?

Warrant Officer Woods: This is one of the ones that I can’t answer because as an infantryman I didn’t see a female in uniform until I became a sergeant in ‘81 and was posted to 2 Training Group to teach for the Army Reserve. There were platoons of forty of them. It was a bit of a culture shock for me. The only thing that I would say here is that we need to treat women appropriately. I always used the example of a female brickie who can lay 250 bricks a day, yet a bloke can only lay 200 a day—which one do you employ if you can only employ one of them? It is the same in the Army. When I was the Academy Sergeant Major at ADFA, the best NCO that I had was a female RAAF flight sergeant. She was tough, physically fit and she was good at her job. There are some girls out there that I would pit against some of the infantry.

AAJ: How did the Army ensure that its people were intellectually prepared for the next war?

Warrant Officer Woods: Though professional military education, from an officer’s to a corporal’s level, through their subject training. I have to say that our training in this area is probably second to none throughout the world. I have seen the training regime for the US and the UK. Our professional military education is outstanding, and this is one area we cannot afford to stuff around with.

We need to continue our training and lessons learnt. Incorporating lessons into our systems is something that we have done quite badly in the past. We need to do this to improve the training of people on IETs and subject courses; then the Army will have prepared its people for whatever the next war is going to be.

AAJ: Did the Army as a learning organisation capture the important lessons from Vietnam War and transfer these into training?

Warrant Officer Woods: The Army did not do this well. As an example, if you go back to the Vietnam War they had a lot of training on booby traps such as pungy sticks, and had booby trap lanes. There were lanes at SME, Canungra and Singleton. By the mid ‘80s Army, in their wisdom, had decided there was no requirement to continue to train in this area because we now fight conventionally. Well guess what? Now we are looking out for IEDs, which is a form of booby trap. By not training the junior level to search for and identify these threats we had thrown away all the lessons.

AAJ: As a peacetime Army, how did Army promote or undertake training to maintain motivation for service in order to retain personnel? Did the Army place a greater emphasis on adventurous training, sport, overseas postings/attachments, regional engagement or other means?

Warrant Officer Woods: Activities like Long Look and company exchanges are critical. Towards the end of my career I spoke to the Chief of Army about options to change our focus by halving Long Look and creating a similar activity with the US Army and Marines. I favoured the Marines as I believe their training was a better fit. I believe it was lost in the ether. But back in the late ‘70s and ‘80s, soldiers would have killed for these types of deployments. People will say that it costs a lot of money, but you need to look at the benefits. As an example, up until 1980 the Army had spent a large amount of money on training me, yet I was thinking about getting out. Then they sent me to the UK for three months where I learnt so much, as the UK had just returned from the Falklands. Long Look provided me the boost that I needed and I thought, ‘Just wake up to yourself Woods and get on with it’. I think those things are really important.

AAJ: With that in mind, what are your thoughts on adventurous training?

Warrant Officer Woods: Adventurous training is a bit like sport; it is one of the few things where you can put fear into a soldier without actually hurting him. I think the system did the wrong thing by reducing the amount of adventurous training. For soldiers to be happy they need to be challenged. I swear by adventurous training—we used to do it at least once a year at the battalion, particularly when I was the CSM. It is not that hard logistically to organise two days repelling off the Sydney Harbour Bridge or a trip to Wee Jasper to repel down a cliff. It may be a bit harder in the north of Australia with all the mobile handbags in the rivers. Adventurous training is one of the few activities that you can do to challenge soldiers and to put fear into them. There is a perceived risk and it improves their confidence to attempt new challenges.

The Army also used to conduct boxing nights. When I was RSM of 3 Brigade, the only unit that still did it was 2 RAR. All of a sudden boxing appeared on the list of prohibited sports. This was despite boxing nights having a qualified referee, the best protective gear, and the unit RMO on site. Participants had also undertaken training. We did all we could to prevent someone getting hurt. Understandingly, these activities have been thrown out as operations have taken priority. But when we are no longer on operations they are important.

AAJ: How did the Army provide support to the wounded, injured and ill post Vietnam? What was the policy for retaining wounded, injured and ill personnel? For how long did Army deal with both the physically and mentally wounded?

Warrant Officer Woods: Back then I don’t think we provided much support to the mentally wounded. In fact, I don’t think it existed. Now that I understand PTSD, I believe there were people who were showing the signs. However, it was a taboo thing, nobody spoke about it and the system failed to look at it. It wasn’t until the late ‘80s to ‘90s that the Americans started to mention PTSD, probably as a result of the first Gulf War, and that the Army began to think that PTSD was not a weakness and people were not being weak.

I think we now put a lot more effort into the mental side. People returning from operations recognise that they aren’t shunned like the Vietnam guys were when they returned. This will help. I believe the US Army has tackled the problem in a good way. Several senior guys have said they are suffering from PTSD, which I believe has shown the more junior guys that it is fine to seek assistance.

In regards to the physically wounded, our QM at 5/7 RAR had one leg, because it had been blown off in Vietnam. For the first fifteen years of my service I was always coming across blokes like that. When I was a sergeant at 2 Training Group there was a sergeant instructor with a claw and the QM had one eye because his face had been blown apart in Vietnam. Despite this, the Army looked after them.

I know we continue to do similarly with our people that get hurt on operations, and that’s a good thing. That’s probably one of the really good things that Peter Leahy brought in from the Canadian experience. We also need to look after our people that get hurt when not on operations. If a member broke a leg, we don’t and shouldn’t have to wait for some doctor to make a decision on their future employment. If they want to get out because of the injury, then that’s fine, but if they don’t then they should be allowed to remain in the Army in some capacity. We need to look after our people if they get hurt on operations. Rehabilitate them and get them back into the system, or rehabilitate them and let them get out if that’s what they want to do.

AAJ: Are there any other issues the Army faced in the years post Vietnam that you foresee the modern day Army is able to learn from?

Warrant Officer Woods: Yes, do not cut training. Training from both an all and single corps perspective. They did that post Vietnam and we suffered. When I did my corporals course, Subject 1 in those days, it went for seven weeks. In the late ‘70s and early ‘80s to save money the course was reduced to approximately four weeks and they cut the leadership training. It was the same for the sergeants and warrant officers courses, and also officer training. Leadership training is always one of the first things cut from the courses.

Kapooka was another example; it was reduced to six weeks. Thankfully we convinced General Leahy that the course had to be extended back to thirteen weeks as we weren’t indoctrinating our people within six weeks—it just wasn’t happening. One of my big fears is that they will cut training to save money. It’s the wrong way to go.

Resources to training and individual and collective training are the two priorities. If I have to walk my platoon to the range, I don’t care—as long as there is a Land Rover to take the ammunition, then I am a happy man. But don’t say that I can’t go to the range.

AAJ: Upon reflection, what was your greatest contribution to Army?

Warrant Officer Woods: I’d like to think that I was pretty dedicated in everything that I did, to the job, to the people, both my subordinates and superiors. I tried to impose good leadership, which I think is one of our great strengths. When I became RSM of the Army a lot of people on subject courses, particularly the warrant officers,

would say that they hadn’t been on operations, yet they were wearing a DFSM. I would say to them that I had ribbons from operations but this doesn’t mean I am a good soldier. To me the medal that matters is the DFSM. This means I dedicated a large part of my life to this institution.

AAJ: So if you had your time again, what would you change?

Warrant Officer Woods: I wouldn’t change much at all. I would change the ‘70s and ‘80s where we didn’t have ammunition, stores or money to train. I would place more emphasis on leadership training as this will be tested when we return to a barracks environment. In my farewell speech I said to those present that they are part of the best led organisation in the world. This is because of our leadership. We don’t always get it right but generally we do. I believe that over the last ten years the first thing we always took out was leadership. Well that’s dumb.

AAJ: What’s your most fond memory from your 34 years of service? What’s the one thing that you look back at with the biggest smile?

Warrant Officer Woods: I’d have to say all of it. On a comical point, and it probably won’t go into the paper, sticking a blue tongue lizard into the platoon sergeant’s sleeping bag at the end of an exercise. That’s one of my fondest memories. I enjoyed every moment of my life in the Army; it’s been challenging and that’s what the system is all about. If it’s not a challenge, then it’s not worthwhile. I love the people. I loved working with and for the people. So, I wouldn’t change a thing. Actually I would: when we were doing the mechanised trials at Puckapunyal I was doing a gun piquet and it was minus four and the rain was pouring down... would I change that? Hell yeah, I would.

AAJ: Warrant Officer Woods, thank you for your time.

About the Interviewee

Warrant Officer Kevin Woods

Warrant Officer Kevin Woods commenced recruit training in January 1974 and was allocated to the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. After completing initial employment training he was posted to the 10th Independent Rifle Company at the Jungle Training Centre in Canungra. In 1975 he was posted to the 5th 7th Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment where he served as a rifleman, section 2IC, section commander and sniper section commander in Sniper Platoon.