Abstract
This article briefly discusses Combat Service Support (CSS) operations in a complex warfighting environment, based on the author’s recent experiences while serving in Iraq. The article places an emphasis on urban operations, using operational observations, and shares his insights for developing CSS capability to meet the requirements of current and future land warfare.
This article has been titled ‘Urban Combat Service Support (CSS) Operations in a Counterinsurgency Conflict’. It could be titled, using emerging military vernacular, ‘CSS operations in complex terrain with a complex threat’ or, more simply, ‘Complex warfighting CSS operations’. The article is written from the perspective of an Embedded Officer in the Coalition Military Headquarters (HQ) in Iraq during 2004.
These observations and insights will, to many readers, seem both obvious and intuitive. However, when there are currently CSS personnel engaged in an environment of mortal combat, readers should reflect on:
- why such observations continue to be discussed as ‘lessons’; and
- from an organisational perspective, why has significant inertia been experienced in addressing these issues.
Lining up the Wagons
In the Al Anbar province of Iraq, at a United States Marine Corps (USMC) base in the town of Ramadi in mid-2004, a USMC officer explained to the author as they observed a CSS convoy, ‘every time you drive out the gates of the camp, you have to treat it like a combat operation’. They continued to watch as the convoy of CSS vehicles—with a resupply of stores and supplies—went through its battle preparation. The CSS detachment commander gave his orders after earlier being briefed by intelligence and operations staff on the latest route conditions, intelligence data, and activities of friendly forces. Ammunition was issued for the crew-served weapons, weapons were test-fired, and communications checks carried out, followed by a walk through of counter-ambush drills and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) rehearsals. The base was in an old fort, with a high stone wall for a perimeter and a big elaborate gate at the entrance. The scene was a modern-day version of ‘lining up the wagons’ prior to heading out into ‘Indian Territory’.
Phase IV: Support and Stabiltiy Operations
Coalition combat operations in Iraq commenced in March 2003, with major combat operations declared over by the end of the following month. By the start of 2004, the Coalition had established Support and Stability Operations (SASO). In early February 2004, the author deployed to Baghdad as one of 20 Australians embedded in CJTF-7, the Coalition military HQ. CJTF-7 was essentially a corps HQ (based on HQ US Army 3 Corps) that had just completed a Relief In Place (RIP) with HQ US Army V Corps. From a logistic perspective, CJTF-7 focused on the planning and execution of CSS to land-based Coalition forces in the Iraq Area of Operations (AO).
The author was the senior Australian CSS officer in CJTF-7 and was assigned to the C4 branch, headed by a US Army One Star officer. The author was employed in the Coalition Support Cell that had responsibilities for staff actions to integrate the planning and execution of CSS for non-US troop contributing nations. The Coalition Support Cell also managed the US Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) program. There were more than 30 countries in the Coalition. Most contingents were part of one of the two multinational divisions—one under command of a UK Divisional HQ and the other under command of a Polish Divisional HQ. A number of other nations with force elements embedded within the US Army and USMC divisions.
Support arrangements for each country varied and were based on government-to-government agreements. The main hub of support for CJTF-7 was Kuwait, and was based on a Theatre Support Command. Logistic support was considered to be a national responsibility, with support being available from other nations, primarily the United States, via the ACSA program, on a cost-reimbursable basis. Support arrangements for the US divisions were based on US doctrinal support structures, using a combination of US CSS units and the US Logistic Contracting Assistance Program (LOGCAP) contract. The UK-led multinational division support arrangements were based on North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) principles, where each nation deployed its own National Support Element (NSE) and, when required, utilised UK support contracts on a cost-reimbursable basis. Support to the Polish-led multinational division was based on support from the US LOGCAP contract and allocated US CSS units, with some contingents having their own NSE.
Key Observations from CSS Operations in the Iraq AO
Observation 1: Complex Terrain and a Complex Threat
Urban terrain is classified as ‘complex terrain’. Key issues are:
- high densities of non-combatants, i.e. crowds, vehicles, and traffic jams;
- buildings and other structures;
- limited line of sight for observation and early warning;
- well-defined routes with limited alternatives;
- minimal ability to establish standoff distance from neutral and/or threat forces;
- often easy surveillance options on own CSS installations by threat forces;
- Ready Reaction Force (RRF) and incident first responders being easily blocked or channelled in their movement; and
- storage (class III and class V) being forced into high-density situations with limited options for dispersion.
A complex threat is often asymmetric in nature and based on irregular forces (including insurgents), who operate using non-conventional military methods. Such forces are characterised by:
- not wearing uniforms or having a clear method of identification;
- a preparedness to operate outside the laws of armed conflict; and
- having asymmetric objectives, including a preparedness to achieve objectives through suicide missions.
However, key to a complex threat environment is the range of threat groups. The threat is not just a single group motivated by a single cause and a single C2 structure with common methods of operation. Each threat group is likely to have its own objectives, moral values, tactics and techniques.
Insight 1: Complex Terrain with a Complex Threat
A requirement exists for consideration to be given to:
- Revising doctrine, with supporting Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), for CSS operations in complex terrain;
- Formations bidding for the required resources and programming exercises to practise and further refine TTPs and supporting doctrine, rather than being content with playing logistics and CSS operations offline on exercises; and
- Complex warfighting CSS operations being included in exercise objectives.
Observation 2: CSS is the Target of Choice - Force Protection in Complex Terrain
Logistic convoys and installations do not have the high density of weapons found with concentrations of combat forces, and thus the logistic forces are ‘softer’ targets for threat forces. In Iraq, logistic convoys and installations are the target of choice.
The key force protection issue in urban terrain is the difficulty in creating any significant standoff distance from potential threats. In urban areas, where blue forces are attempting to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the locals (probably the best form of force protection), putting up concertina wire 300m in front of a base and clearing ground in between in order to provide both a standoff distance and observation for early warning is just not feasible. Mitigating the risk of suicide vehicle-bombs approaching close to the perimeter in an urban environment requires consideration of specific force protection measures.
Given the number and frequency of both Coalition military and contractor vehicles entering and exiting logistic bases, controlling access gains another dimension of complexity if force protection measures are not to be compromised. Vehicles have to be stopped to positively identify drivers and passengers, and searched for explosive devices. This requires the appropriate equipment and obstacles, together with specific TTPs—all to ensure a high level of certainty in preventing any penetration of the perimeter. This action is undertaken while also mitigating the risks of vehicles and personnel being attacked in search areas, and reducing the vulnerability of convoys being attacked while queuing to gain entry to a protected base.
Insight 2: Force Protection in Complex Terrain
Consideration is required to refine and document TTPs in the hardening of logistic areas and access control measures for a range of threats includes:
- Developing user requirements for capabilities to be acquired to enhance both hardening and access control of bases in urban areas, including threat alert systems for bases; and
- Ensuring that training regimes and the inclusion of force protection training objectives on exercises are put in place in order to expose more of the ADF to force protection issues in urban areas, and to use the opportunity to refine TTPs.
Observation 3: Class IV
The hardening of HQs, units and logistic installations invariably requires greater quantities (and, in the case of concrete blast barriers, greater tonnages) of class IV (construction materials) than have been previously factored into doctrine and planning guidance for sustaining operations.
Insight 3: Class IV
The different types and increased tonnages of class IV are all issues for consideration of design (i.e. user requirements), acquisition/manufacture, movement, handling, storing and accounting.
Observation 4: Class V Usage in Urban Operations
In urban operations, class V small-arms usage is significant in comparison to other ammunition natures. The ability to suppress an enemy, so as to enable friendly force manoeuvre in complex terrain, is often limited to small-arms fire by those troops in direct contact with the enemy. Indirect fire is often limited by such issues as the Rules of Engagement (ROE), proximity of civilians and friendly forces, and the likelihood of collateral damage. Thus, small-group engagements consume large quantities of small arms ammunition. In late March and early April 2004, when insurgent activity peaked in locations such as Ramadi, Fallujah and An Najaf, the ‘just-in-time’ philosophy, based on high levels of demand certainty, came unstuck. In this case, supply had to be increased in the form of a step function to match the surge in demand. The tonnages were huge, and the unit measure with which the C4 staff were dealing in, were ‘ship loads’.
Insight 4: Class V Usage in Urban Operations
An ADF review is required to ensure that there are appropriate class V personnel—handling, storage, and transport assets—with the doctrine, expertise and manning to deal with the expected class V usage rates of operations in complex terrain. Ammunition noted for high usage were 5.56mm, 7.62mm, sniper rounds, and 40mm (High Explosive and Allum). Innovative approaches will be required to mitigate the risks of high-density storage with the inability to provide peace-time safety distances.
Observation 5: Distribution and Convoy Operations
‘What does an RPG gunner call the two ASLAVs providing close front and rear escort to a Unimog loaded with supplies? The left and right of arc!’
Distribution operations in the Iraq AO were initially established as a high-velocity system with a just-in-time approach. This was an attempt to reduce the Coalition footprint in Iraq, thereby minimising the impact on the local population and, in particular, reducing the number of US forces required to manage large stockpiles of supplies. However, a high-velocity sustainment system required convoys to move up and down the main supply routes along lengthy land lines of communication on a daily basis. Therefore, regardless of the threat, sustainment convoys were required to push through every day with very limited available options to vary routes and timings. It was no wonder in early 2004 that the line of communication forces (transport units and their Military Police escorts) were being awarded more Purple Hearts than combat arms unit personnel.
Insight 5A: CSS Vehicle Convoys - Convoy Live Fire Training Ranges
The US forces learned that having convoy counter-ambush drills (practised as dry-firing activities or with blanks) was not always sufficient preparation for optimising the execution of such drills. Providing effective suppressive fire from a moving truck takes some practice. Combat Arms units conduct live fire and movement shoots regularly in order to develop skills and enhance the effectiveness of their fire, and their vehicles are specifically designed to be fired from—this is not necessarily the case for most CSS vehicles. As a result, the United States was beginning to build convoy live-fire ranges in the continental United States. The Australian Defence Force needs to do something similar in Australia for all the same reasons.
Insight 5B: Night Driving
Night driving will often be a safer option for CSS convoys and thus the Basis of Provisioning (BOP) of night-driving goggles should take this requirement into account, as should training regimes. Being a part of convoy operations in blackout conditions using Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) is both an individual and collective skill that needs to be acquired and maintained. Pilots consider night operations using NVGs a perishable skill; so should truck drivers and their escorts.
Insight 5C: Vehicle Communications
Every vehicle moving through urban areas requires a communications capability. In built-up areas, vehicles are easily isolated by traffic or crowds. Once a vehicle is isolated, reliable communications is an essential lifeline. All future communications capability projects and associated radio acquisitions need to include in their Basis of Provisioning plans for all CSS vehicles to be fitted with a communications capability.
Insight 5D: Hardening of CSS Vehicles
When travelling through urban areas, heavily armed and protected escort vehicles at the front and back of a convoy cannot guarantee protection for soft-skinned CSS vehicles. The United States has already hardened its escort vehicles, and the ADF needs to look at up-armouring its CSS vehicles. As there is certainly the demand, a number of options should soon be available on the commercial market.
Observation 6: Contractors in the AO
When the United States deployed their second rotation of forces at the beginning of 2004, they maintained essentially the same level of combat units, but were able to reduce the CSS force by 37 per cent. This reduction was achieved by augmenting the CSS force with contractor support, primarily through the US worldwide LOGCAP contract with Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR). The basis of the decision to use significant contractor effort was that the operation had been deemed to have moved from the combat operations phase to the support and stabilisation phase. There were not significant levels of contractors operating in the Iraq AO during the combat operations phase of the operation. The two key observations were that:
- As the threat activity increased in late March and early April 2004, contractors refused to drive along the line of communications unless they were given adequate military security, including an armed soldier who travelled as a passenger in the cab of the contractor’s truck. Unlike military CSS force elements, that provide most of their own security, the contractor force protection requirements reduced the available combat power for operations as combat units were re-tasked to provide security for the contractors.
- Contracting officers and the funds for the support contractors were allocated under command of the deployed Commander. This worked well in achieving unity of effort through unity of command.
Insight 6: Contractors in the AO
To separate operational responsibility from administrative responsibility is to breach a rule that I have never seen violated without someone paying a heavy penalty.1
- Field Marshall William Slim
Command and control of contracting staff and funds to the JTF commander ensured unity of effort. Contractor support is not always the solution to CSS forcestructure issues. Staff in force structure development debates should be wary of the argument that CSS forces are not required in sufficient numbers to provide second and subsequent rotations based on the assumption they can be replaced with contractor support.
Observation 7: Movement Control
The United States has a strong movement control system with well-established procedures enabling the movement of troops, vehicles, equipment and stores from the continental United States and within the AO. A movement control battalion (MCB) was allocated to the Iraq AO. The key to the success of the movement control system was the high level of synchronisation of CSS planners and CSS operations staffs with the movement control staff. This was achieved by the MCB being placed under command of the 3rd line (force level) CSS organisation, the Corps Support Command (COSCOM). The COSCOM commander located the HQ of the MCB within his own HQ, thereby enabling unity of effort (again through unity of command)—a strong theme in warfighting situations. Such unity of effort was not only critical for deliberate planning, but was also vital for contingency management when supply routes and bridges were interdicted. Contingency management involved 2000 3rd line CSS vehicles on the road each day being re-routed in accordance with threat assessments, CSS priorities and route availability.
Insight 7: Movement Control
Recent practice by the Australian Defence Force has not been to place deployed movement control force elements under the command of the deployed force commander, let alone under the command of the CSS commander. This has been the case for both exercises and operations. On operations, the Australian force commander is responsible for the Australian forces and equipment moving in the AO. However, if the force commander is not allocated the movement control resources, the commander cannot therefore be reasonably held accountable for the movement of Australian troops and equipment in the AO.
Conclusion
A short list of personnel observations and insights has been provided based on the author’s time deployed in Iraq. Space has prevented comment on a much longer list of observations, including container management, Logistic Information Management Systems (LIMS), convoy support centres, remotely controlled aerial delivery, and logistic liaison officers to name just a few.
Given the emerging requirement for complex warfighting CSS capability, there are many insights to be gained from recent warfighting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These and further insights should be used to inform how the ADF prepares for and conducts future CSS operations in a complex warfighting environment. The author hopes readers will be challenged to identify and discuss additional insights. The logistic and CSS community in the ADF does not engage sufficiently in philosophical and academic debate, particularly in published military literature. Readers are encouraged to contribute to complex warfighting CSS literary discussion and debate, thereby facilitating organisational learning and achieving effective change. If the ADF as an organisational group does not affect such change, history will judge the organisation as culpable for future failures and lives lost.
Endnote
1 Slim, Defeat into Victory, Cassell and Co., London, 1956.
