Book Review - Strategy and History
Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice
Written by: Colin S. Gray,
Routledge, London, 2006,
ISBN: 9780415386357, 234pp.
Reviewed By: Lieutenant Colonel Gav Reynolds, Senior Military Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre
With twenty books and three hundred articles to his credit, Colin Gray’s name has become synonymous with the analysis of strategy. It must surely have been a daunting task to select eleven essays from his existing collection and use an unpublished twelfth to summarise his current thoughts on strategy. This collection comprises essays that have retained a contemporary resonance and stand the test of time in their original form. Strategy and History is a summary of strategic issues over a period of 30 years and, as those who ignore the lessons of history do so to their peril, it is a book that enables strategic lessons to be identified and utilised by the adaptive strategist in his quest to learn and evolve.
Gray is an avid follower of Carl von Clausewitz and uses history as an effective foundation for his investigation of strategy and the bridging role that it plays between politics and the military. This is particularly evident in Part I of the four parts to this collection. The essays that comprise this first part concern those enduring traits of warfare that transcend the fads and fashions associated with individual weapon systems or tactics. Gray’s argument throughout is that only a flawed logic would dismiss strategic considerations from a previous era as no longer relevant. Identifying that pre-nuclear military theory is not redundant simply because it predates the existence of nuclear weapons is an important subtext throughout the book. The initial essays highlight the utility of history and raise many questions which, while left unanswered, provide fertile ground for the essays that follow. The abundant historical examples and the use of the British Empire as a case study evoke images of Australia’s own ‘fortress island’ strategy through the end of the last century.
In ‘Why strategy is difficult’, Gray explores the place of strategy, which he sees as somewhere between ‘political competence and military skill’, and focuses on the relationships between key players. He skilfully develops the concept that a successful strategist requires training and must be an expert in the use of force or the threat to use force for the achieving of policy goals. Successful strategy, he asserts, should therefore be entrusted to professional strategists—a notion which may appear to be justification for the creation of a position that could best be filled by one Colin S. Gray. Nonetheless, there is no denying the consistent failure of strategy through the pursuit of political goals beyond military means as illustrated only too poignantly in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Part I concludes on a Clausewitzian note, as Gray advances his argument that the principles of war relate more closely to warfare than to war itself, proposing that a new style of principle be adopted. This final paper was written in 2005 and is designed to provide a template for a strategy transformation within that global superpower, the United States. Gray argues that the so-called ‘fourth generation warfare’ should be treated with some scepticism as over-reliance on technology can lead to failure on many levels. Indeed, this is a consistent theme throughout the book as Gray reminds the reader that, while technology can change warfare, the nature of war itself remains immutable given that it will always involve a human element. Clarifying the distinction between war and warfare makes sense. In putting politics back into strategy, Gray aims his arguments at the United States, a nation, he argues, which operates well at the tactical and operational level, but is not gifted with the ability to craft effective strategy. Gray’s ‘new style’ principles are carefully crafted and designed to foster strategic planning that is tolerant of flaws—and thus essentially adaptive.
MAD, that infamous acronym for ‘mutually assured destruction’ returns to parlance in the first essay in Part II. This piece was written some 27 years ago and is imbued with the Cold War flavour of a time when the world faced the very real prospect of a global nuclear war. Gray’s reminiscences and descriptions of Cold War–era strategies are timely, despite the fact that this is a vastly different world. The recent resurgence of a nuclear threat, particularly on the border between India and Pakistan, Iran and Israel, and the Korean Peninsula, serve to remind us of the somewhat cyclic nature of warfare. Nuclear weapons are still very much a part of our world and the formulation of any strategy must always take into account factors such as the restraint, selectivity, useability and precision of these weapons. The use of such weapons in any military action to produce desired political ends is a conundrum that endures—relentlessly so.
Side by side with the hapless strategist’s efforts to grapple with the ongoing presence of doomsday weapons are the theories of cyber war that rose to prominence with the debate surrounding the Revolution in Military Affairs in the 1990s. Gray neatly summarises the different schools of thought, cutting through the apparent contradictions and infusing a healthy dose of common sense and a clear perspective. While information is vital, admits Gray, it does not hold ground or clear the streets of Baghdad. As in all warfare across the ages, only soldiers can do this and these tasks are no less difficult and bloody for all the technological advances that time ushers in.
Gray’s final essay in the second part of this collection deals with arms control. He argues that, throughout history, treaties and arms control measures have largely failed. Gray’s assertion is that there is no net security benefit from arms control as it represents a misunderstanding of the basic relationship between weapons and a political posture. Ultimately, ‘arms control works when politicians are not strongly motivated to break out of the confining embrace’; yet history is filled to overflowing with a myriad of at times ingenious examples of the flouting of arms control regulations. It is people who make war, not weapons, and Gray’s careful dissection of arms control regimes is intriguing and, at times, alarming.
Gray’s maxims are prevalent throughout the book, and many of these resonate with truth, including ‘proximity breeds issues for dispute’. The fact that geography is an important influence on strategy is surely self-evident. Yet Gray argues passionately in his first essay in Part III that geography remains largely ignored as an element of strategy. Once again, he provides a useful mix of historical examples to illustrate this point and his careful division of physical and political geography is a useful entrée to his next piece on the context of strategic culture. In this essay, Gray explores the link between strategic culture and behaviour, bemoaning the fact that culture is an under-explored dimension of strategy, yet adamant that it is just one of many equally important dimensions. While Gray provides an excellent summary of the limited theoretical works on this rather rarefied topic, he lays siege to the ideas proposed by Alastair Iain Johnston using them effectively as a rebound to advance his own approach to the concept of strategic culture. Gray’s final essay in this section treats that central conundrum of strategy debates: the moral imperative versus the national interest. Gray provides ten precepts (rules of conduct) which aim to guide the strategist through the moral imperative or, on the other hand, pragmatic justification for national action. He also lists what he terms ‘six sources of authority’ for moral judgement and ethical reasoning which he treats as a handy ‘ready reckoner’ for the strategist.
Gray’s book provides a broad sweep of strategic theory, a portrait of the role of the strategist and the myriad influences on strategy. His final comments turn to the future with a useful piece that summarises his thoughts as a strategist and his view on the enduring aspects of war as well as the continuing need for strategic analysis. His avowed ‘world view’ is a practical summation of the concepts, ideas and realities that have both underpinned and dominated his essays. He completes his collection with the brave forecast that strategy is the key to the future—albeit a highly developed and honed strategy, a much more refined version of its current form.
Gray’s collection of essays provides an excellent treatise on strategy. In addition, the blending of the essays over a significant time-frame illustrates the way in which strategists have searched for their place amongst policy and defence planners as the global context has evolved. This is particularly evident in the essay ‘New directions for strategic studies?’ which was published in 1992 and highlights the lack of strategic direction following the end of the Cold War. A fascinating discussion, this forms a continuing theme throughout the book, exploring the role of the strategic theorist and the relevance of strategic studies in reducing the risk of nuclear—and conventional—war. This collection of essays, while merely indicative of Colin Gray’s contribution to the recent evolution of strategic thought, is a thought provoking and informative body of work. This book is a welcome addition to the libraries of those with an abiding interest in military strategy and, more significantly, has the ability to assist politicians and bureaucrats, military planners and commanders, in the shaping of strategy in today’s complex world.
