Letters and Commentary

Journal Edition

TO THE EDITORS

Congratulations on publishing, in the Winter 2006 AAJ, the article by Captain Daimien Patterson entitled Army Force Structure - What has gone wrong?

As a staff officer serving with HQ 1st Division, I am simultaneously impressed that Captain Patterson wants to sack me: ‘we don’t need a Division Headquarters’[1], while he also provides some excellent critical thinking on the future of our Army. This type of critical thinking should be encouraged at all levels within Army, especially if we are to continue succeeding in this long war against violent extremism.

I note two points with regards to Captain Patterson’s commentary. Firstly, in this time of high operational tempo for our Army, change is occurring so rapidly that many of Captain Patterson’s seemingly radical ideas have now been significantly progressed. Examples include: the widening of on-line/off-line readiness cycles, which in 2006 have been shared, within 1st Division, between 1st Brigade, 3rd Brigade, and 7th Brigade; the consolidation of Reserve units, which is planned to be considerable in 2007; and the impending de-linking of 5/7 RAR into two mechanised Battle Groups.

Secondly, I applaud Captain Patterson’s desire to eliminate Army’s Ettamogah Pub force structure, but I note one word of caution with regards to his views on the rank of Major being worn by Battle Group Operations Officers (OPSO). I make the important distinction here regarding Battle Group OPSOs. In Army we have eight Battle Groups, which at present can be selected from, and centred on, a maximum of 12 units, from 1st Division, Special Operations Command, and 16th Aviation Brigade, as follows:

Ready Battalion Group, centred on 1 RAR or 2 RAR;
Follow-on Battalion Group, centred on 1 RAR or 2 RAR;
Airborne Battle Group, centred on 3 RAR;
Mechanised Battle Group, centred on 1 AR or 5/7 RAR;
Cavalry Battle Group, centred on 2 Cav Regt or 2/14 LHR;
Motorised Battle Group, centred on 6 RAR;
Special Forces Battle Group, centred on SASR or 4 RAR; and,
Aviation Battle Group, centred on 1 Avn Regt or 5 Avn Regt.

Each Battle Group may be centred on any combination of units shown above, but they are always complemented in their combined-arms effects by combat support and combat service support units throughout Army, and indeed Defence and coalition partners.

Army therefore has two types of units: those units that provide the centre (or core) of Battle Groups, and those units that support the Battle Group effect. Thus, units upon which Battle Groups are centred actually expand when a Battle Group is formed, while units that support the Battle Group effect actually contract under the same circumstances.

I therefore agree with Captain Patterson that units supporting Battle Groups do not need Majors as OPSOs because, when Army forms Battle Groups, these units get smaller. However, for units that provide the core of Army’s eight Battle Groups, which in turn increases the core unit’s span of responsibility, I strongly disagree.

It should be noted that in recent times, Townsville-based Battle Group HQ has received challenges from the Directorate of Officer Career Management – Army (DOCM-A) regarding the preference in 1 RAR and 2 RAR to hold Majors for a third year in those Battle Groups as OPSOs. The friction between DOCM-A and the Townsville based Battle Groups is caused by career imperatives versus operational effect. This has resulted in some Majors in 1 RAR and 2 RAR taking significant personal risk, regarding Staff College selection, to remain for a third year in either Battle Group. The fact that this friction occurs is emblematic of Army’s difficulties in digesting the broad implications of the Hardening the Networked Army plan, which holds Battle Grouping and warfighting as core outputs.

In closing, I would note that Captain Patterson makes a significant point about rank levels in all Army units, and Army’s Ettamogah Pub force structure. Perhaps, given current personnel shortages and high operational tempo, now is the time to appoint Captains as Combat Team Commanders in order to provide even greater influence for our Battle Group OPSOs in the Hardened and Networked Army.

Chris Field

Lieutenant Colonel

G3 HQ 1 Div