Bombers and Tanks: Understanding the Myths
Abstract
The decision by the Australian Government to purchase the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank, although widely misunderstood by analysts and media alike, complements exactly the Australian Defence Force’s concept of combined-arms teams in complex environments. Much of the poorly informed commentary about the decision drew inspiration from myths about the role and utility of armour in the Australian context. Here, the author dispels those myths with a careful study of the importance of the firepower, mobility and protection the Abrams offers, especially when used in conjunction with infantry and air power. The approach to the town of Cambrai in northern France traverses a windswept, bleak landscape of poplar-lined avenues, dense woods and chalk downs: the backdrop to the First World War. In the public gardens, near the town centre, is a war memorial next to a monument commemorating the pioneer aviator Louis Blériot.
The Angel's Wings
While the sheer number of war monuments on the Western Front is somewhat overwhelming, the memorial at Cambrai, scene of the first major tank battle in history, is unique. It is surmounted by an angel, leaning forward into the wind, wings trailing. Huddling for protection under the angel’s wings are several grim-faced infantry soldiers. The wings, as they sweep backward, gradually assume the form of a tank. For an infantry officer, the symbolism is obvious. The guardian angel of infantry in battle—and rarely did anyone have more need of a guardian—is the tank.
Many innovations emerged from the slaughter of the Western Front. One was the dream of armoured warfare, appositely expressed in the angel’s wings—the notion that tanks could break the deadlock of the trenches and protect the infantry in close battle. Another, evoked by the Blériot monument, was the idea that aeroplanes could defeat the enemy through long-range strategic bombardment, avoiding the close battle altogether. Between the wars this came to be known as the ‘Bomber Dream’, and found its clearest expression in the writings of Italian theorist Giulio Douhet.
Both ideas influenced warfare into the new century: consider the ‘shock and awe’ air campaign and the armoured ‘battle for Baghdad’ in the 2003 Iraq war. Both notions contain a large measure of truth and yet, unfortunately, their protagonists have often seen land and air forces as competing capabilities when, in fact, their greatest strength is that they are complementary. The attempt to portray tanks and aircraft as opposites dominates recent writing—much of it from people who should (and perhaps do) know better—on the Government’s decision to replace the obsolete Leopard 1 tank, in service since the early 1970s, with the newer Abrams M1A1.
The public discussion over the need for a new tank has spawned several myths—myths in the classical anthropological sense of validatory beliefs that justify the holder’s attitudes and behaviours. In this article, my aim is not to contribute to the polemics of the debate, but rather to examine some of these myths from a military–technical standpoint, and to show how the claimed contradiction between air forces and armoured forces (the sub-text that underlies the ‘bombers versus tanks’ debate) is equally mythical.
Ten Tank Myths
Based on a completely unscientific survey of Australian media reporting, academic and pseudo-academic writing about the tank purchase, it appears that the ten most widely held myths about the tank are these:
1. Tanks are old technology.
2. Tanks are primarily intended for killing other tanks.
3. Tanks are primarily intended for high-intensity warfare.
4. All tanks are basically the same.
5. Tanks are very expensive.
6. Attack helicopters have assumed the role of tanks in modern war.
7. Infantry bunker-busting weapons can do the job of the tank.
8. Tanks send an unacceptable political message.
9. Tanks are unsuited to the terrain of Australia and the Asia–Pacific.
10. Tanks are difficult to deploy outside Australia by ship or aircraft.
Since these myths are sometimes exploited in support of arguments about Australian strategy and capability, each is worth exploring in detail.
Myth 1 - Tanks Are Old Technology
According to the first myth, warfare has moved on since tanks were invented in the early 20th century. Given today’s technology, this myth suggests, there must surely be a better approach than to put a cannon into a big metal box and drive it at the enemy.
Of course, the idea of the tank has been around for a long time. Leonardo Da Vinci produced a number of tank designs, Richard Edgeworth developed the caterpillar track as early as 1770 and a small number of steam-powered tracked vehicles were used in the Crimean War. In late 1915, responding to the deadlock of trench warfare, a British team under Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Swinton designed the first true tank—a protected, direct-fire weapon on a high-mobility platform, used for crossing broken terrain under fire, to conduct close combat. By 1918, tanks were used by all major armies and achieved key successes in lives saved and territory gained.
So, yes, tanks are old technology. But they are old technology in the same sense that aeroplanes and interplanetary rockets are old technology. Modern tanks bear about as much resemblance to ‘Mother’ (the first tank of early 1916) as modern combat aircraft bear to the Blériot monoplane, or modern guided weapons to Goddard’s experimental rockets of the 1920s. The technologies have changed enormously since the early days, but the basic principles of these weapons are still valid. Homo sapiens is still a terrestrial, landdwelling mammal. There is still a need to defeat the enemy and control the land—where human beings live—to prevent conflict or prevail in war. To do this, some form of protected firepower and mobility is still required.
This requirement for protected firepower and mobility is what is sometimes referred to in military circles as the problem of ‘the last three hundred metres’. This is the zone where the enemy can see and kill friendly troops using rifles and heavy weapons, but where friendly air-delivered bombs and artillery cannot be used because, due to their blast radius, they damage friendly troops as much as the enemy. In this zone, precision direct fire—fire from weapons where the firer can see and engage the enemy directly—is essential to allow the force to close with the position. But in the extremely lethal environment of modern battle, a direct-fire system must be protected if it is to survive long enough to do its job. This means it must avoid being hit (through stealth and mobility) or be able to survive a hit (through protection—which, given today’s technology, means armour). When firepower and protection are combined with mobility, we have an armoured platform that can manoeuvre across the lethal zone of the last three hundred metres, apply precision fire, and allow the force to manoeuvre. We call this platform a tank.
A related misconception is that tanks are less necessary in modern network-centric warfare with an all-pervasive communications network providing situational awareness and responsive fire support. In fact, the communications systems that enable this network-centric approach are a critical factor. Without armoured vehicles, every communications system has to be carried through the firefight on someone’s back. This limits the power and range of communications systems to the amount individual soldiers can carry across rough terrain while someone is shooting at them. Needless to say, this amount is tiny compared to what vehicles can carry. Moreover, in an infantry fight everyone is constantly taking cover, entering buildings and tunnels, crawling through confined spaces and so on—the ability to communicate is severely hampered by interference from the terrain. By contrast, when tanks are present they provide a protected, mobile communications node that can survive ‘out in the street’, providing an anchor for the dismounted soldier’s communications network and relaying information without terrain interference. The tank’s thermal and visual sensor systems also provide a wealth of information that contributes to the sensor and communications networks. Far from being an anachronism, tanks are central to a network-centric capability for close combat.
This leads to the next myth—that tanks are designed for killing other tanks.
Myth 2 - Tanks Are Primarily Intended For Killing Other Tanks
Most people visualise tanks as heavy armoured behemoths sweeping across the desert or the plains in Blitzkrieg style, destroying enemy tanks at long range. In the Australian context, tanks have never been employed in this way. The notion previously described—tanks as the key to the ‘last three hundred metres’—is quite different.
Australian tanks have always operated primarily as part of a combined-arms team with infantry, engineers, air power and artillery. They have mostly been employed in complex terrain—urban, jungle and coastal areas—rather than in open country. High mobility and the capacity to traverse open areas under fire are still essential, but the primary role of the tank in close combat has been as part of an infantry–tank team. For this reason, tanks employed by the Australian Army have often been quite different from those of other armies that do primarily engage in sweeping manoeuvre in open country. A few historical examples serve to illustrate this fact.
In the Second World War, the Matilda tank was almost useless for tank-on-tank combat in Europe and North Africa. It was too slow and, although very well protected, its gun was too small for tank-on-tank engagements. By contrast, in New Guinea, Bougainville and later in Borneo, the Matilda was an ideal intimate support weapon for infantry fighting in jungle and plantation areas. Even in mountainous country, these tanks were so valuable in saving lives that the pace of tank movement often regulated the speed of an advance. Tank-on-tank engagements were very rare, whereas actions against bunkers and infantry were the norm.
Similarly, in Vietnam, the Centurion tank—already obsolescent in NATO and heavily modified by the Israelis for desert manoeuvre—was found to be ideal against bunkers and in complex urban and jungle terrain. Indeed, it was introduced into the Vietnam conflict specifically to address an identified weakness in the survivability of Australian infantry forces against Viet Cong heavy weapons and bunker systems. A 2002 study by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation found that attacks on bunker systems in Vietnam by Australian infantry and artillery without tanks only succeeded in 65 per cent of cases and involved significant Australian casualties. When tanks were present, the success rate climbed to 95 per cent while the ratio of friendly to enemy casualties was six times lower than in attacks without tanks. The study’s authors concluded that ‘armour made a major contribution to the effectiveness of attacks’, both in terms of lives saved and increased chance of success.
Are these historical conclusions still valid? Ask anyone who participated in the battles of Basra or Baghdad, or the fighting in Fallujah. No tank unit in the Coalition forces in 2003 suffered a single fatality through enemy tanks or anti-tank weapons during the entire period of major combat operations. Although many tanks have been disabled in the insurgency that followed, the firepower, communications capability and protection afforded by armour—as part of a combined-arms team, including air power— has been shown to be essential time after time.
In today’s context, the primary purpose of Australian tanks remains close combat as part of a combined-arms team with infantry, artillery, aviation and engineers. Infantry and tanks work intimately together—the tanks systematically destroy enemy positions that could harm the infantry while the infantry destroy anti-armour weapons that could harm the tanks. Combined with air power and suppressive artillery or naval gunfire, this method produces excellent results in complex terrain such as cities and jungles. In protecting themselves against one weapon system, enemy soldiers expose themselves to another. Clearly, however, the requirements for tanks in this type of operation may be quite different from the requirements for rapid manoeuvre in open country, regardless of the intensity of the battle.
This leads to the third myth—the idea that the tank is primarily intended for high-intensity conflict.
Myth 3 - Tanks Are Primarily Intended For High-Intensity Warfare
Just as people tend to visualise tanks conducting sweeping manoeuvre and destroying other tanks, likewise there is a persistent—albeit inaccurate—notion that tanks are best suited for high-intensity warfare and are irrelevant in lower-intensity conflict. Again, it is true that tanks originated in the extremely high-intensity environment of the First World War, were refined and developed in the Second World War, and have been widely used in high-intensity conflicts since then.
However, it is important to understand what we mean by ‘high intensity’. The notion of ‘high intensity’ reflects factors such as the size of forces engaged, the tempo of combat action, the degree of sophistication of weapons employed, and the overall cost in lives. Clearly, the problem of ‘the last three hundred metres’ exists in any conflict where two opposing sides engage in close combat, independent of the factors that make an overall campaign ‘high intensity’. Indeed, the difference between high-and low-intensity conflicts actually reflects how often troops encounter highly lethal force, rather than the absolute level of lethality. In a high-intensity conflict, lethal force might be encountered every day, whereas in a lower-intensity conflict this might be a less frequent experience. Yet the absolute level of lethality would be the same—there is no such thing as a ‘low-intensity’ lethal firefight. Particularly for a defence force and a national population base as small as Australia’s, even a few casualties during these (albeit infrequent) lethal firefights in low- or medium-intensity conflicts can have major strategic implications.
The implications of battle casualties have largely provided the impetus behind the widespread use of tanks in peacekeeping or peacemaking operations and low-intensity conflict. All major peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslavia, Africa and the Middle East have employed armoured fighting vehicles, often including main battle tanks. Tanks have been critical in preventing bloodshed by dissuading militias or guerrillas from interfering with the peace process. Where combat has been unavoidable, even in peacekeeping situations, tanks have allowed peacekeeping forces to quickly overmatch the opposition, saving both enemy and friendly casualties and preventing combat from escalating by ending it quickly. Many instances of the use of tanks in Bosnia-Herzegovina fall into this category.
This successful employment of tanks has made them an imperative for any army before it can engage in military operations involving the possibility of serious armed opposition—including peacekeeping. Even in East Timor, had only a few engagements gone slightly differently, there would have been an immediate need for tanks to avoid significant Australian casualties. Indeed, the Army’s tanks were forward-deployed to Darwin’s port facility during the Timor campaign in order to meet precisely that eventuality. In a very real sense, an army that lacks tanks is limited to all but the most benign threat environments and to the conduct of constabulary-type tasks. An army without tanks is, in effect, a police force.
These factors apply to armoured vehicles more broadly, not just tanks, and here it is important to understand another myth—that all armoured vehicles are basically the same.
Myth 4 - All Armoured Vehicles Are Basically The Same
Many people assume that all armoured vehicles represent essentially the same capability. In fact, even in the smaller category of ‘main battle tanks’, the variation between models is enormous. Moreover, as described, the requirements for tank-on-tank engagement are different from those of intimate support in complex terrain; so, not only are Australian tanks different from other tanks, they need to be different.
Thus, when the United States Army and the British Army announced their intention to move to lighter-weight tanks that were more deployable in a greater variety of circumstances, some assumed that the same requirements applied to Australia. That is, they assumed that we too should be replacing our tanks with a lighter-weight ‘medium vehicle’ such as the US ‘Stryker’ vehicle, which is similar to the Australian six-wheeled light armoured vehicle (ASLAV).
It is important to understand that ASLAVs are not tanks and cannot be employed in the same way. ASLAVs have extremely light armour, excellent speed, good sensors and capable weapons. They protect themselves by detecting the enemy first, moving fast, and engaging the enemy from stand-off range before they can be hit. This makes the ASLAV an outstanding asset for reconnaissance and fast-moving operations in open country. But it also means that taking it into a close fight in complex terrain without support is asking for trouble. As cities and jungles are ‘cluttered’ environments, the enemy cannot be detected except at very close range, or until they reveals themselves by firing. Under these circumstances, the ASLAV’s method of protection breaks down—it cannot avoid being hit, and it is too close for stand-off engagement.
Its sensors are degraded and its light armour becomes a critical weakness. Importantly, one way ASLAVs can survive in this environment is to shoot first (at anything that looks as if it might be a threat) and ask questions later. Yet this approach is unworkable where innocent civilian bystanders are present—particularly in urban operations. By contrast, tanks have excellent armour and a capable weapon, although they are slower and less stealthy than ASLAVs. They can sit in a street or a patch of jungle, accept and survive an unexpected hit, and decide whether or not to fire back or move, depending on the threat of collateral damage or civilian casualties. Tanks, in this type of environment, are much better protected against short-range snapshots from a hidden enemy using RPGs. The ideal situation is to fight with both ASLAVs and tanks, along with infantry and air power as part of a balanced combined-arms team. But ASLAVs cannot stand in for tanks in such a team—both are needed.
So, all armoured vehicles are not the same. Medium-weight vehicles are not a cheaper substitute for tanks, they have a different purpose. Moreover, if Australia were to match the new ‘lighter’ tanks sought by our allies, this would actually mean increasing the weight of our tanks. Of course, Australia’s strategic requirements are not necessarily the same as those of our allies, but the point is that the word ‘tank’ applies to a wide range of vehicles. Arguments that are valid in describing our allies’ heavy tanks cannot be simply transplanted across to Australian conditions. Leopard 1 is like Merkava or Challenger in the same way that a Porsche is like a Range Rover. Both are luxury cars but their uses, characteristics and relevance to any particular owner’s lifestyle are quite different. The use of luxury cars as a metaphor highlights the next myth—that tanks are extremely expensive.
Myth 5 - Tanks Are Very Expensive
It is true that military capabilities are extremely costly. Warfare is one of the most capital-intensive enterprises in the world, and its tools are expensive to purchase and to maintain—which is a good reason for ensuring this process is efficient. In this sense, tanks are expensive; yet there is more to ‘expense’ than meets the eye.
In the first place, in comparison with other capabilities, tanks require a relatively modest outlay. A Leopard 1 tank cost about A$1 million (in 1971 dollars) when purchased, whereas a modern tank today could be purchased for about A$3.5 million (a broadly equivalent amount in today’s dollars). In context, the Government’s decision to replace Leopard with Abrams (Project Land 907) involves a total cost of around A$550 million. This compares to a total cost of around A$15 billion for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. This is not to criticise the cost of the Joint Strike Fighter—there is a demonstrated need for advanced air warfare capability and this is inevitably expensive. Rather, the point is that all military capabilities are expensive, but advanced land capabilities—in this instance the tank—tend to be an order of magnitude cheaper than advanced capabilities for air or maritime warfare.
Further, the cost of tanks needs to be considered in the context of the cost involved in conducting military operations without them. These costs are both human—as discussed previously, tanks save lives by a factor of about six—and financial, if we mount a military campaign at enormous cost but without success, thus wasting large amounts of taxpayers’ money for no national benefit.
The example of the Joint Strike Fighter highlights the Bomber Dream—the notion that air power can eliminate the need for close battle, rendering ground forces irrelevant. The latest iteration of this is the myth that attack helicopters have replaced the tank.
Myth 6 - Attack Helicopters Have Assumed The Role of Tanks in Modern War
The attack helicopter is a phenomenal capability. It is fast, agile, well-armed and has outstanding sensors and surveillance capabilities. As an air platform, it is free from the friction of topography and can manoeuvre more easily than ground elements. As an anti-tank platform the attack helicopter is highly capable, and thus appealing as a potential replacement for the tank. This viewpoint was expressed by a very senior civilian Defence official at an Army conference in 2003, and is thus a viewpoint that deserves to be taken seriously.
Unfortunately, in the Australian context, this too is a myth. As previously discussed, the Australian Army uses tanks far differently from its allies, its primary purpose in using tanks being to provide intimate support to a combined-arms team in close combat, not just to kill other tanks at long range. In terms of long-range anti-tank capability, attack helicopters are highly capable. But in terms of close combat, they are severely restricted in comparison with tanks.
Tanks have direct protection—the ability to survive being hit. They can sit on a street or in a jungle, under the canopy or the urban clutter, identify targets of immediate threat and neutralise them in an extremely precise manner using optics, sensors and direct-fire systems. Given appropriate rules of engagement, the risk of civilian casualties is low compared to air systems that sit above the canopy/clutter and have more difficulty in identifying targets. Tanks have indefinite endurance—they can accompany other elements of the team and stay present on the ground permanently. Helicopters require immense amounts of fuel to achieve such endurance and, in fact, can achieve only a fraction of the full-time intimate presence achieved by tanks.
Moreover, the Army’s new Eurocopter Tiger helicopters are not ‘attack helicopters’. They are instead ‘armed reconnaissance helicopters’ optimised for stealth, reconnaissance, long-range fire support and strike missions. Unlike tanks, they rely on indirect protection—the ability to avoid being hit. They lack some of the anti-tank punch of true attack helicopters, which is appropriate since their role is different. They are operational-level tools applied by the commander to affect the course of an entire campaign, rather than assets such as the tank, which also have operational-level application but are primarily tactical tools.
None of this is a criticism of attack helicopters, or of air power generally—these are essential, war-winning elements in an overall combined-arms and joint service team. But they do not replace the tank. It is not a question of air power versus tanks—both are needed. The question is one of balance: how much of each is needed? This will be examined shortly, but meanwhile there is another, similar myth that needs to be explored—the idea that infantry bunker-busting weapons can replace the tank.
Myth 7 - Infantry Bunker-Busting Weapons can do the Job of the Tank
The infantry capability to destroy tanks using unguided and guided weapons has increased dramatically in recent years. The Government’s purchase of Javelin missiles has given the Australian infantry unrivalled capability to destroy armoured vehicles—but Javelin requires long sight lines, has a distinct minimum range, and needs time to acquire a target. In close, complex fighting in villages, towns and jungles, such range and time are not necessarily available. To supplement guided weapons, infantry soldiers therefore carry unguided rocket and recoilless systems known as ‘bunker-busters’ because they are also effective against hard points such as fortifications.
Again, there is a view (outside the infantry, by the way—few infantry soldiers would agree with it) that bunker-busting weapons have now reached such sophistication that they can replace the tank. Unfortunately, again, this is not actually the case.
A simple logic flow clarifies this point. To replace tanks, infantry bunker-busting weapons would need to be capable of destroying enemy weapons and troops, reducing hard points and creating entry points in buildings. They would need sensors and communications to allow them to detect and engage targets and work with the rest of the combined-arms team. This would require a crew-served weapon and would mean carrying several rounds (tanks typically carry around 70) in order to sustain the battle. Even with only a few rounds, the team would need some kind of vehicle to carry their ammunition, sensors and communications, or they would quickly become exhausted. The bunker-buster team would also need to cross rough, broken terrain under fire in order to move around the battlefield. Thus the vehicle carrying their weapon would need all-terrain capability. In approaching the battle, they would need protection from enemy artillery and mortars—without such protection, they would not last long. They would also need sufficient protection to expose themselves to fire while scanning to acquire targets.
So, to make infantry bunker-busters a viable replacement for tanks would require a heavy weapon able to penetrate buildings and destroy strongpoints, served by a crew of two or three, mounted in a high-mobility vehicle with protection against enemy fire and with sensors to acquire targets. In other words, to replace tanks with bunker- busters would mean turning the bunker-buster into a protected, mobile weapon system able to conduct close combat: in short, a tank. What this means is that, given the technology of today and of the foreseeable future, some form of tank or armoured gun system will still be needed. Indeed, most lay people, when looking at any type of armoured vehicle, would consider it a ‘tank’.
This highlights the next myth—that tanks send an unacceptable political message.
Myth 8 - Tanks Send an Unacceptable Political Message
Some have argued that deploying tanks sends an aggressive political message, creates ill-feeling in the region, and thus counterbalances any tactical advantage gained by using tanks. Most recently, a well-known academic theorist expressed this in an article arguing that the Australian Government would be extremely unwilling to risk the opprobrium of deploying tanks in the capital cities of our regional neighbours.
Again, this is a myth. In the first place, a glance at the evening news will provide ample evidence that most people in the world cannot tell the difference between tanks and other types of armoured vehicles. Regularly, news footage of armoured personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles or ASLAVs is accompanied by voiceovers labelling them ‘tanks’. In the often-quoted example of East Timor, where tanks stayed behind but other armoured vehicles deployed, it is worth looking at the media reporting of the operation—many media reports mention ‘Australian tanks’ in Dili. Although the Indonesian media also spoke about ‘Australian tanks’ in Timor, criticism of Australian heavy-handedness focussed on troops’ demeanour rather than the presence of armour, emphasising posture rather than platforms. Looking at this same issue from a different perspective, should the Government decide that a situation warrants the deployment of military forces (with or without tanks) to a regional city, the situation would probably be so politically serious that the presence of tanks would make little difference to regional perceptions.
It is obvious that some people will perceive any use of military forces, of any type whatsoever, as aggressive. The issue is not whether someone may be offended by the presence of armour. The issue is how many casualties Australia would be willing to accept in order to avoid giving such offence. As indicated, tanks are vital in minimising friendly casualties in close combat. Thus, in any situation where combat might occur, a decision not to deploy tanks would probably increase the likelihood of additional Australian dead or wounded. If these losses were accompanied by mission failure—quite likely in the absence of a complete combined-arms team—the political fallout could also be quite negative.
In short, the idea that tanks send an unacceptable political message is a myth. The same message is sent by any deployment of forces, of whatever composition. Moreover, failure to use tanks—and the accompanying increase in casualties and potential mission failure—would send an equally negative message.
Myth 9 - Tanks are Unsuited to the Terrain of Australia and the Asia-Pacific
Regardless of political impact, some have argued that tanks are of little practical value in the terrain of the Asia–Pacific. The region is perceived as an expanse of impenetrable jungles, impassable swamps and mountains where tanks are believed to be of little practical value. This too is a myth.
This myth is almost identical to a widespread misconception in Malaya before the Japanese invasion of 1941–42. This misconception held that the Malay Peninsula was impenetrable to tanks or mechanised forces and that, as a result, the primary threat was from the sea. This proved tragically misguided as the Japanese rapidly penetrated the peninsula with a balanced mix of light and mechanised forces—including tanks.
The fact is that the region is increasingly urbanised and even rural areas are often sparsely vegetated. Even in jungle areas the use of tanks is not particularly problematic, as Australian forces demonstrated during the Second World War in Bougainville, New Guinea and Borneo. Similarly, all parties to the conflict in Vietnam employed tanks, as does every major regional army today. Tanks are readily employable throughout the region as our regional partners continually demonstrate. The notion that tanks cannot be used in the region is a myth. The related idea that tanks cannot be used in northern Australia is equally mythical—Australia’s tank regiment has been based in Darwin for years and exercises regularly in the north.
Clearly, conditions in northern Australia and the Asia–Pacific are different, and methods of operating tanks in the desert or in Europe would not necessarily be appropriate for this region. The same issues apply equally to light troops and air power. But this is precisely the point: Australia does not need, or intend, to employ tanks for sweeping blitzkrieg or tank-on-tank manoeuvre at long range. The need is for protected firepower and mobility as part of a joint combined-arms team in the close battle. The issues involved in using tanks in the region are well understood, and Australia—and every other major regional army—have been using tanks for decades.
Myth 10 - Tanks are Difficult to Deploy Outside Australia
The final myth is that tanks are ‘strategically unusable’ because they are difficult to deploy outside Australia. They are portrayed as heavy metal machinery which cannot be moved by air or sealift and is therefore ‘stuck’ in Australia. Again, this idea is a myth.
In fact, tanks can be easily deployed using the Navy’s amphibious landing platforms, HMAS Manoora and Kanimbla, and will be even easier to deploy with the planned replacement ships for these vessels. Using these amphibious ships, the entire tank regiment can be moved in one lift and disembarked by landing craft that are easily able to handle tanks (indeed, they were specifically designed for such a purpose).
Moreover, amphibious ships only need to move tanks if the intention is to land tanks across the shore away from a port. This is a necessary capability but it would not be a first choice. Wherever possible, the preference would be to secure a port facility as a sea point of disembarkation. Wherever a port is available, any appropriate civilian ‘roll-on, roll-off’ vessel or car ferry can be used to deploy tanks. This is precisely what happened when the 1st Armoured Regiment moved from Melbourne to Darwin in the mid-1990s. For this move, the entire regiment with all its vehicles (including tanks, support vehicles and administrative transport) was shipped using only three decks of a nine-deck civilian commercial vessel. In a low- or medium-intensity environment, a port facility would almost certainly be available. Similarly, in both Gulf Wars, Korea, Vietnam and other high-intensity conflicts, ports were readily available to disembark armoured vehicles.
Clearly, tanks cannot be carried in Australia’s current RAAF transport aircraft. But the Government’s decision to purchase the C-17 transport aircraft will overcome this limitation, and in the meantime tanks can be carried in allied aircraft and chartered civilian transport aircraft. Similarly, all of Australia’s other armoured vehicles can be moved by C-130 Hercules. So the deployability issues surrounding the tank are well understood and represent no significant obstacle to their employment. The idea that tanks are difficult or impossible to deploy is, in short, a myth.
The Reality of Tanks in the Australian Context
Having examined these myths, it is clear that the word ‘tank’, originally used by Lieutenant Colonel Swinton in early 1916 as a codename to hide the real nature of the new vehicles, is still (unfortunately) capable of generating confusion. The myth is that tanks are old, expensive, technology, primarily intended for killing other tanks in high-intensity warfare. Those who believe this myth would argue that attack helicopters have assumed the role of tanks in modern war, while infantry bunkerbusting weapons can do an equally proficient job. Moreover, the same armchair commentators argue, tanks send an unacceptable political message, are unsuited to the Asia–Pacific terrain and are difficult to deploy outside Australia.
The reality is that modern tanks are flexible, high-technology weapon systems that provide an enormous advantage, reducing casualties by a factor of six in the close battle. In the Australian context they operate primarily as part of a combined-arms team with artillery, light forces and air power. Long-range Blitzkrieg in open terrain is largely irrelevant to this reality—instead, agile, well-armed, well-protected tanks are essential in the manoeuvre of a balanced joint team. This applies at every level of intensity because of the need to cross ‘the last three hundred metres’, and it applies to warfighting, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations in any environment where Australian forces are likely to encounter opposition.
Air Power - The Bomber Dream and the 'Afghan Model'
Like the tank, air power has generated considerable myth and confusion, not least the idea that capable air forces and capable ground forces are in some sense opposed or competing assets. This has led to the myth that Australia must choose between high-technology, capable air forces and capable ground forces. This misconception is also a legacy of the same trench warfare that produced the tank.
In the 1920s the idea emerged that independent, self-protecting air forces could attack an enemy nation in its homeland. These air forces would conduct ‘strategic bombardment’, undermining the enemy’s industrial base and terrorising the enemy population, causing it to turn against the enemy government. This would cause the enemy to collapse without the intense ground combat that had characterised the First World War. Giulio Douhet, in his classic work The Command of the Air, was one of the first and most prominent advocates of this idea. American Billy Mitchell and British theorist Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris were also key advocates of independent strategic bombing that became popularly known as the ‘Bomber Dream’.
The application of these ideas in the Second World War produced mixed results—the Blitz merely strengthened British resolve, while German industrial production actually increased significantly under round-the-clock Allied bombing in 1944–45. However, the use of the atomic bomb to force Japan’s surrender and the terror bombing of Dresden and Tokyo demonstrated the impact of well-targeted strategic bombing. The idea of independent strategic air power has been powerful ever since.
The most recent incarnation of this idea is the so-called ‘Afghan model’—a concept that combines precision air power with a small number of specialist forward observers operating with local indigenous ground forces. The idea of using precision air power to reinforce local indigenous ground forces (known in the US as ‘surrogate armies’) was first advanced during NATO operations in Kosovo, but limited results were achieved because the Kosovo Liberation Army proved difficult to coordinate with NATO air power. In Afghanistan, the model was refined to include special-forces advisers coordinating the Northern Alliance ground forces. Combined with precision air power, these forces achieved significant gains against the Taliban—although considerable US ground forces still had to be committed. In the Iraq war, similar use of ‘surrogate armies’ occurred in northern Iraq in 2003, with US light forces acting as advisers and controllers for supporting air power.
The ‘Afghan model’ is a powerful idea and needs further exploration. It is not a new idea: like tanks and air power, originating in the early 20th century. The French artillery doctrine of the 1920s was remarkably similar—the idea that precision long-range strike plus a network of forward-deployed observers would reduce the need for manoeuvre forces. This, in fact, was the tactical concept around which the Maginot Line was devised.
Success in Afghanistan and in the initial combat phase in Iraq does not alter the fact that significant ground forces—and armoured forces, at that—are still required. In Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance contained a significant proportion of armoured forces (including tanks) and engaged in several large-scale battles before the campaign objectives were achieved. Similarly, in the 2003 Iraq War, the combination of precision air power and armoured forces approaching Baghdad from several directions was the key factor in the Iraqi defeat, more so than the Kurdish–US operations in the north.
The key factor is that, in order to destroy enemy forces from the air, they must first be identified and forced to concentrate. While they remain hidden and dispersed their chances of survival are high—as demonstrated by the survival of most of the Serbian 3rd Army in Kosovo against sustained NATO bombing. Through deception, dispersion and concealment, the Serbs preserved the bulk of their forces. By contrast, in Afghanistan the Northern Alliance ground forces made the Taliban break cover and concentrate—failure to do so would have left them vulnerable to ground attack—but once they exposed themselves they could be destroyed from the air. Indeed, this concept of combining the tactical effects of air and armoured forces to place the enemy on the horns of a dilemma is fundamental to modern tactics, and was a key element of Blitzkrieg in the Second World War.
The true power of the Afghan model is not the idea that large-scale ground forces can be rendered unnecessary. On the contrary, such forces were highly necessary as the contrasting results in Kosovo showed—but in Afghanistan the ground forces were indigenous, non-American forces working with American air power. The rather harsh logic of the Afghan model is not that ground forces can be eliminated, but rather that the ground operation can be ‘outsourced’, transferring the risk to the forces of indigenous allies. This logic is not necessarily applicable in all circumstances, as subsequent campaigns have shown. The (highly traditional) use of advisers to support local indigenous allies in Afghanistan was the key element—not the well-proven efficacy of precision air in concert with ground forces.
The Synergy of Ground and Air Forces
What deductions can be made therefore from recent operations? Among other things, one key conclusion is that air power and armoured manoeuvre are not actually contradictory or opposing methods of warfare. On the contrary, all successful modern military operations include both precision air power and protected ground manoeuvre, and a balanced, strategically relevant capability needs both. This combination of measures, particularly when sea power and information warfare have been factored into the equation, poses a dilemma for the enemy. To protect themselves from one class of threats, the enemy must expose themselves to another. To survive against armoured ground forces, the enemy must concentrate and manoeuvre—exposing themselves to detection and attack from the air. To survive against air forces the enemy must disperse and hide—becoming vulnerable to ground forces.
One implication is that, if a force develops capabilities to destroy the enemy in open terrain from the air, it must also develop the ability to fight and defeat the enemy on the ground in complex terrain, because this is where the enemy will be, taking cover from the air assault. Air power and armoured forces are not alternatives, they are two sides of the one coin—equally necessary components of a balanced force.
The term we in Australia use to describe this type of warfare is ‘combined arms’—a balanced, combined team in which each arm is employed to maximise its strength against enemy vulnerability, while the weaknesses of each arm are balanced by the strengths of the others. This is the context in which tanks would be employed—as part of a balanced, combined-arms team that includes capable light forces, air forces, maritime forces and other government agencies.
So, in developing the future ADF, the question is not ‘do we need new tanks?’ or ‘do we need new combat aircraft’? We need both. The question is how many of each we need, and how much emphasis we should place on armoured ground force capabilities as against air power capabilities. Again, the question is not solved simply by expanding the size of the infantry force, though the Government’s recent decision to do so was clearly a sound response to ongoing operational commitments. Australia has some of the most capable infantry forces in the world, well able to operate in intense combat environments in a range of circumstances. Rather, until the decision was made to upgrade the obsolete Leopards, the problem was the lack of a correspondingly capable armoured element in the combined-arms team—without such capable armour, the risk of casualties was simply too great. As it is a single team, the lack of a key element such as armour in the combined-arms team can undermine the entire force, rendering it unable to operate in some environments—and this applies to the whole ADF, not just the Army.
Instead, we need balanced, agile forces able to respond to a variety of environments and conflicts, and I would suggest that we will probably never achieve this while we seek to optimise the ADF for a given ‘snapshot’ in a rapidly developing strategic environment. By the time strategic assessments are written, let alone implemented—a matter of years not months—the situation they were intended to meet has almost always changed, sometimes fundamentally. Thus, in the 1990s the Australian Army undertook a series of expeditionary deployments (Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Bougainville, East Timor) with a force structure designed in the mid-1980s to defend continental Australia against a very low-level incursion threat. Meanwhile, the Navy and Air Force focussed on denying the so-called ‘sea-air gap’. These tasks were overtaken by events almost as soon as the strategic concept papers were published.
Would it not be better to optimise the force for balance, agility and versatility—the ability to conduct a variety of tasks in a range of environments, react quickly to change, and transition smoothly from one task to another? This would result in a balanced force that could provide a range of options for Government and operate in a joint ‘combined arms’ setting to maximise its capabilities. It would also avoid the need to second-guess a developing strategic environment.
Most importantly, this approach would allow us to distinguish capability acquisition decisions (what equipment we should own) from strategy (what activities we should undertake, in peace and war, to achieve national political objectives). Too often some commentators confuse equipment purchases with strategy. True enough, the capabilities we purchase set parameters around the strategic decisions the Government can make, but the two are not the same. Imagining that they are is like confusing a decision about which car to buy with a decision about which road to drive.
What Then?
What does all this mean? I would suggest that we need a balance between advanced air warfare capabilities, advanced maritime capabilities and capable ground forces—ensuring we do not purchase so much of one type of capability that we cannot afford a minimum acceptable level of the other types. All are important, and must be balanced within a joint team, if any element is to be viable.
We have moved an enormous distance beyond the battle of Cambrai, with its prototype tanks, primitive aircraft, and colossal casualties. The twin monuments at Cambrai—to the protective ‘guardian angel’ of the tank, and the pioneering spirit of air power—are a reminder that modern warfare is immensely harsh and hostile. It is an environment that cannot be overcome by blindly following ‘myths’ or ‘dreams’ of whatever hue, but only by considered and diligent development of a combined arms joint team that includes both air power and capable armoured forces.
