The Complexities of Counterterrorist Operations

Abstract

Counterterrorist operations are a visible sign of government efforts to ensure the safety and security of their citizens. Yet, when a nation hasn’t suffered direct attack and its general population may not feel itself at war, such operations can be easily misunderstood and may generate significant backlash, especially in the all-pervasive media. This article explores the challenges of counterterrorist operations and offers some insights and suggestions to mitigating the risks.

The 9/11 terrorist strikes, the Bali bombing and the London suicide bombings were events that shook much of the world from a comfortable and long-held complacency. The response to these incidents, and the era of fear and insecurity that they heralded, varied throughout the international community. The Australian Government responded by enacting a brace of anti-terrorist legislation that led to the conduct of the first counterterrorist operations on Australian soil. Australians, unprepared for the intrusion of terrorist reality into their ‘relaxed and comfortable’ lives, greeted this unprecedented legislation with a mixed response. Doubts over the validity of this unwelcome intrusion rankled in the minds of ordinary Australians. Like many of their overseas counterparts, Australian citizens tend to regard counterterrorist operations with some suspicion and react badly to media images that imply that the forces involved are inexperienced and heavy-handed in their dealings with alleged offenders. Such adverse media coverage is inevitable in a nation in which success is not universally lauded, while failure—particularly obvious and public failure—draws widespread and bitter condemnation.

For the agencies responsible for enforcing the Government’s anti-terrorist legislation, the question is whether, realistically, the pitfalls of counterterrorist operations, such as adverse media coverage and harsh recrimination, can be avoided. That such operations will become a permanent feature in a world without sanctuary from the threat of terrorism is beyond doubt. Ideally, therefore, counterterrorist operations must be conducted without the attendant hail of bad publicity. How will Australia achieve this? There is no easy answer to this fundamental question. Yet, particularly for nations such as the United Kingdom and India, terrorism is an age-old dilemma. The experience of these nations may provide an insight into ways of winning the battle for hearts and minds on home soil. Their experience also adds an experienced perspective in justifying counterterrorist operations to the public and media alike.

The conduct of counterterrorist operations is fraught with difficulty—even with the blessing of public and media. These problems are further compounded if such actions take place in densely populated urban areas. Aside from the complexity inherent in their conduct, these operations occupy a particular place in the public psyche. Given the necessary veil of secrecy, the public may never be aware of the extent of the terrorist threat that may have been averted by the action of counterterrorist agencies. Yet the aftermath of such operations—successful or otherwise—may be infused with acrimony. Australia’s strong civil liberties movement and the Aussie sense of natural justice and ‘fair play’ may well adversely affect the public perception and persuade ordinary Australians away from the official explanation—often precisely because it is ‘official’. In Australia, in particular, community groups are fierce in their protection of the rights of the individual, and it is this sense of looking after the ‘battler’ that may predispose many Australians to regard counterterrorist operations with a jaundiced eye.

Threat Perception

Australia’s perception of its terrorist threat is, naturally, based on the experiences of its overseas counterparts. Yet, rather than dictate precisely what shape a terrorist group would universally adopt, the overseas experience demonstrates that a terrorist cell shapes itself specifically to the conditions of the target country. Logically, therefore, an Australian-based terrorist force is likely to be very restricted in size, probably limited to squads of up to twenty members. Given the size of the country, these squads would most likely be based in different cities, operating under one umbrella organisation and controlled externally and receiving funding from overseas. Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Canberra and the other state capitals could potentially all host a terrorist squad or cell. In structure, these squads may resemble those operating in Palestine, Israel or Kashmir, which typically comprises a commander, one or two intelligence agents, two members trained in the handling of explosives, a few well-trained security personnel and some suicide bombers. Well-structured and funded terrorist cells are not simply a motley bunch of criminals intent on mindless violence and creating a public nuisance. Rather, these cells consist of a highly motivated force capable of causing deadly chaos and mass hysteria. Terrorists seek to strike at the very heart of the public psyche, to threaten Australia’s most highly prized asset—a sense of safety. Unlike their counterparts in Afghanistan or Kashmir, Australian terrorist squads are unlikely to pose a military threat and would not become involved in attacks on security forces, police stations or any other form of military operation. For the most part, they have no need to launch such attacks; a well-placed suicide bomber can wreak far more havoc by targeting the haunts of ordinary Australians, such as pubs, cafes or popular beaches.

Terrorist threats may range in size and complexity depending on the nature of the cell and the sophistication of the group’s aims. At the lowest level, terrorist groups may issue a series of bomb threats directed at public places, such as airports and markets, and on public transport infrastructure, including bus and train lines, resulting in mass evacuations. Such threats seek to heighten community frustration and anger, eroding the public sense of security. Other forms of threat may include extortion and the kidnapping of state or federal leaders. At the top of the scale is the use of bombs or other explosive devices in crowded places or public spaces. This form of threat is the deadliest, given its potential to incur a high cost in collateral casualties.

Australia’s most likely terrorist targets can be found in her largest centres of urban population—cities such as Melbourne. Terrorist targets in Australian cities could include:

• commuter trains
   
• railway stations
   
• airports
   
• shopping complexes
   
• stadiums and sporting venues
   
• schools and educational institutions
   
• power stations and transmission lines

The community response to a perceived terrorist threat will typically move through a series of levels or stages:

• Initial heightened suspicion of a particular community—often dictated by media scrutiny or the actions of security forces.
   
• Media hype may also uncover latent social tensions that will find expression under cover of reaction against a threat to public security.
   
• Public reaction and a heightened sense of insecurity may also work to pressure the Government to introduce tough legislative measures that have a perceived impact on the sacred realm of civil liberty.

The Complexities of Counterterrorist Operations

Counterterrorist operations are the most dangerous, complex and, at times, confusing forms of combat—they are not simply another form of police operation. The members of counterterrorist security forces require special training and equipment to tackle the threat of terrorism. However efficiently the operations may be conducted, the greatest risk remains that of collateral damage involving the harming of innocent bystanders. Collateral damage has the potential to seriously undermine the morale of the community and harm the image of the security forces. As a result, there are very few countries that accept collateral damage as inevitable. The negative consequences of such incidental casualties are accentuated in many democratic countries because of the depth of media scrutiny and the activity of community and non-government organisations. During 2003, a terrorist attack on Srinagar Airport in Kashmir was foiled by security forces. During this counterterrorist operation, there was significant collateral damage to vehicles and buildings and a number of casualties among bystanders. The public outcry was immense and completely overshadowed the success of the counterterrorist operation in preventing greater carnage. This is a significant factor that should be considered in any assessment of the reaction of security forces to a terrorist threat.

Media coverage is an issue which merits careful consideration as it can have dramatic implications for security forces and their relationship with the community. A major terrorist act or incident can lead to an adverse public reaction unless handled deftly. In the aftermath of the assassination of Indira Gandhi by a Sikh, public reaction took an ugly and violent turn as many Sikhs were killed in retribution. The unfortunate Sikhs were already prominent in the public’s consciousness given the often militant separatist movement in the Punjab at the time. In a case such as this, the media can be used in a positive way to persuade the public of the individual nature of such an act rather than allowing it to be imbued with an ethnic or religious motive.

The combination of command, control and coordination is singularly the most crucial factor in counterterrorist operations. Within international security forces there are many examples of various command, control and coordination systems. During the British security forces’ involvement in Northern Ireland, the police hierarchy retained overall control, whereas in Israel control is vested in the defence force. In Kashmir, a unified command led by the Chief Minister exercises control. The real challenge for any security force, however, lies at the tactical level. Psychological operations also comprise a necessary component of any counterterrorist operation—albeit, perhaps the least understood.

Civil libertarians and their organisations that seek to scrutinise the conduct of security forces add another complexity to counter-terrorist operations. While these agencies play a vital role in safeguarding civil liberties and hard-won freedoms in democracies such as Australia, they are often quick to enlist media and public support where they believe that individual human rights have been violated by security forces.

From a government perspective, Australia has already legislated to provide a legal basis for its counterterrorist operations; the efficacy of these laws will be judged as time elapses. The difficulty will always lie, however, in the enforcement of these laws. Australia’s security agencies must operate with great care in a society historically prone to regarding internal security laws as excessive and tending to encourage heavy handedness in those forces tasked with dealing with alleged terrorists. In the public mind, such laws may be equated with the sanctioning of security forces to ‘shoot on sight’ or ‘on suspicion’, sparking images of more draconian regimes in the public consciousness.

Some Suggestions

International models for counterterrorist forces often see the creation by security agencies of their own brand of special forces. Internationally, this has resulted, in some cases, in a plethora of highly trained, elite, well-equipped and effective forces often operating at cross-purposes or encroaching on the jurisdictions of others. Given this potential for duplication and the blurring of boundaries, the answer may be to have one special security force comprising members from a number of different agencies. The German GSG9 and the Indian National Security Guard are both special security organisations formed from a number of disparate agencies. The Indian National Security Guard comprises volunteers from all police units and the armed forces. Its roles include counter-terrorism, the resolution of hijacking scenarios, VIP security and a host of other specialised jobs. Yet this Indian model is far from perfect, as there are also a number of other special forces with similar roles resulting in a discordant effect—the bane of counterterrorist operations.

On the other hand, gaps in the tasking of the various security agencies involved in counterterrorist operations may also provide a window of opportunity for the terrorist cell. Guidelines for the tasking of security agencies may include:

• protection duties allocated to state police and civil security agencies in respect of static routine targets
   
• surveillance and patrolling to local police
   
• search and destroy missions including any large-scale operation in the hinterland or outback to the Regular Army
   
• strikes on terrorist hideouts and houses to the special forces

The best response to any terrorist threat lies in forward planning. It is vitally important to identify likely terrorist targets and construct a detailed security management plan to protect these targets. Poor planning can mean that areas of the target that are deemed less important are ignored, with disastrous consequences, as these may be the very areas the terrorists target. Some examples include:

• protecting power stations but ignoring transmission lines and infrastructure
   
• catering for the security of airports but overlooking approach funnels
   
• identifying important installations in the provision of security measures but overlooking their approaches

To draw a medical analogy, the correct form of medical treatment is to tackle the disease and not the symptoms. The symptoms must be used to identify the disease. In the world of counterterrorist operations, it is crucial to identify likely terrorist centres of gravity which could include terrorist leadership, sources of financial support for terrorist organisations, and terrorist training camps and bases.

A significant, yet frequently overlooked factor in any counterterrorist operation is the role of the media that can be used effectively as a force multiplier through:

• the formulation of a clear media policy
   
• the use of official spokespersons at various levels
   
• media training for all security personnel
   
• the conduct of regular media conferences and briefings

Key Result Areas in the Australian Context

While the techniques used by the different security forces internationally may vary considerably, the underlying principles are fundamentally the same. Key result areas must remain the point of focus so that security operations remain practical and workable. Some key result areas are:

• organisation and coordination of special forces
   
• protection of human rights and creation of human resource cells
   
• pragmatic tasking of all security agencies to achieve optimum results
   
• detailed planning for identification and security of likely targets
   
• media management
   
• coordination of intelligence acquisition
   
• timely introduction of appropriate legislation
   
• implementation of sound command, control and coordination structure
   
• identification of terrorist centre of gravity
   
• well-orchestrated psychological operations
   
• avoidance of collateral damage

Conclusion

Counterterrorist operations have become a necessary part of the Australian landscape in recent times and will take time to gather momentum and gain some degree of public acceptance. These operations are, by their very nature, complex and, at times, controversial. They require an immense degree of care in their planning and great skill and finesse in their execution. Success is difficult to measure and casualties equally difficult to justify. Yet operations such as these may be the only means to a secure and safe society in an uncertain age. Media support and winning the battle for hearts and minds on the home front may be the keys to ensuring that counterterrorist operations garner the support of those they seek to protect.