Retrospective - A Modern Armoured Force is Vital to Australia’s Defence

Journal Edition

The ability to concentrate superior forces at the critical time and place has been a hallmark of successful commanders throughout history. Since warfare emerged from the inter-tribal squabbles when a few dozen men endeavoured to cut each other’s throats, to the stage when state and national armies were formed, man has been constantly striving to develop more powerful weapons and improved means of mobility. During the 15th Century B.C., Ethiopia fell to the empire-building Egyptians, not because of any lack of courage on the part of the defenders, but because, to a man, the invaders were equipped with copper weapons and armour against which the stone axes and hide armour of the Ethiopians were of little avail. In contrast, the battle of Kadesh in 1286 B.C. saw a powerful Egyptian army decisively defeated by a similarly equipped Hittite force. The Hittites employed their 2500 chariots in mass and thereby achieved shock action with consequent disastrous results for the Egyptians, who had deployed their chariot force in ‘penny packets’. Operation ‘Crusader’ and the battle at Gazala during World War II provided an interesting comparison and demonstrated the failure of some modern commanders to learn from past lessons.

The comparatively poor cross-country mobility of the chariot led to its eventual replacement by the more flexible horseman. By about 500 B.C. the highly manoeuvrable cavalry had become the decisive arm on the battlefield. This position of supremacy was maintained until mediaeval times when the increasing weight of personal armour resulted in the horseman becoming a ponderous shock weapon with little ability for rapid manoeuvre. With the invention of gunpowder and the subsequent ability of the foot soldier to penetrate armour at relatively long ranges, the employment of cavalry in wild charges to break the enemy line began to go out of fashion: by the time of World War I defensive weapons had achieved complete supremacy. Apart from isolated actions in the Middle East, the cavalry found little to do.

The dismal battles of attrition in France during the first three years of World War I must represent the nadir of military art. The interminable attempts to force a breach by the ponderous advance of massed manpower over a ‘moonscape’—every square inch of which was registered by artillery of all calibres and lashed by the cross-fire of countless machine-guns—were foredoomed to failure. The need to develop some device or tactic to break the stalemate should have been obvious to all who were involved in the conduct of the war, but unfortunately this was not the case. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, had the vision to see the potential of a tracked armoured vehicle, but received little support from his contemporaries who referred to the new machine as ‘Winston’s Folly’.¹ Indeed, one of Churchill’s principal subordinates, the Fourth Sea Lord, stated:

Caterpillar landships are idiotic and useless. Nobody has asked for them and nobody wants them. The officers and men working with the Landships Committee are wasting their time and not pulling their weight in the war. If I had my way I would disband the lot of them. Anyhow, I am going to do my best to see that it is done and stop this ... caterpillar landship nonsense.²

This resistance to new ideas is not unusual; however, in spite of all opposition, development went ahead and by the end of the war the tank had more than adequately demonstrated its ability to penetrate fixed defences.

Between the wars, development of armoured vehicles and the techniques to use them effectively were continued by Germany and, as was later discovered, Russia. Britain, on the other hand, failed to realize the potential of the weapon she had created and apart from the efforts of a few dedicated enthusiasts interest in tank design and employment stagnated. The Germans maintained their lead throughout the war; a lesson which should not be forgotten. It was not possible, even with the enormous industrial capacity of the United States, for the Allies to make up the leeway in six years of war. The knowledge of design, industrial capacity and the training of commanders in the employment of armour, are skills and abilities which result from progressive development. They cannot be quickly created to fill a sudden need.

Armour was engaged in all theatres during World War II, and was often the decisive arm. In the Far East, tanks were used in lesser numbers but proved their worth in many battles. During the invasion of Malaya, tanks were used by the Japanese in terrain which the British planners had regarded as impassable. At the Slim River, Japanese tanks punched a gap to a depth of nineteen miles in a night attack. This success was achieved without the night vision aids available today. The campaign in Burma provides many instances where tanks were employed effectively in unfavourable terrain. Field Marshal Lord Slim described one such action during the battle for the fortress of Razabil:

This was the first time we had assaulted an elaborate, carefully prepared position that the Japanese meant to hold to the last, and we expected it to be tough. It was ... The guns suddenly paused and the Lee-Grant tanks roared forward, the infantry, bayonets fixed, yelling their Indian war cries, following on their tails. The Dismal Jimmies who had prophesied, one, that the tanks would never get to the line, two, that they would never climb the hills and, three, that if they did the trees would so slow them up that the Japanese anti-tank guns would bump them off as sitting targets were confounded. The tanks, lots of them—the more you use the fewer you lose—crashed up the slopes and ground over the anti-tank guns ... the old problem ... how to get the infantryman onto his enemy without a pause in the covering fire that kept his enemy’s head down ... was solved in the Arakan ... by tanks firing, first, surface burst high explosive to clear the jungle, then delay-action high explosive to break up the faces of the bunkers thus exposed, and lastly solid armour-piercing shot as the infantry closed in.³

These lessons, learned in 1943, should have great significance for the Australian Army when considering the characteristics of its current and likely future enemies. The ability of the enemy soldier to construct complex and deep fortifications is well known. Past experience has proved that the employment of tanks in support of infantry, when assaulting prepared defensive positions, will save the infantry a high proportion of the casualties they would otherwise suffer. ‘... [A]ny power fighting in the jungle against an enemy with unlimited manpower used to a low standard of living must have some equalizer if it hopes to win.’⁴ This quote from an article published shortly after the end of the wars in Korea and Indo-China remains valid. The present conflict in Vietnam has seen air power employed in support of ground forces on a scale never before envisaged, and yet the enemy retains his offensive capability. Figures are not available to the writer on the scale of the air interdiction over North Vietnam or along the supply routes to the south, but, although there can be no doubt that the enemy is being hurt, there appears to be no significant reduction to his ability to continue with his war of aggression. Douhet’s theory on the use of massive air power to bring an enemy to his knees has once again been proven invalid. Air power, even in a situation of absolute air superiority, is not the complete ‘equalizer’. We must maintain the ability to defeat the enemy on the ground with air power as an adjunct to that ability. Future conflicts involving Australian forces will almost certainly be against an Asian power possessing vast manpower resources. The balance can only be restored by firepower. For the direct, intimate support of infantry, armour will continue to provide the best source of this firepower.

Britain’s withdrawal from the Far East will place demands upon Australia to play a more important role in the security of this region. To do so in the military sphere we must be militarily significant. As we do not possess the manpower resources to maintain a large standing army, our military significance must rely upon quality, not quantity. We must make maximum use of our technological advantages and gain superiority in firepower and flexibility to redress the imbalance in manpower. This requirement, of course, affects all three Services; however, this paper deals only with factors which involve the Army.

Since World War II the Australian Army has continued to develop as a basically infantry force with armour in a limited, supporting role. No emphasis has been placed on the need for an integrated armoured/infantry force, and only token attempts have been made to train the two arms in the techniques necessary for successful co-operation on the battlefield. The armies of all the major powers recognize the need for balanced forces containing armoured, infantry and artillery elements, together with other supporting arms and services. These forces have compatible flexibility, protection and manoeuvre potential, and are trained together as a combat team. The aim of this article is to show that such a modern armoured force is vital to Australia’s defence.

It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the circumstances whereby Australian forces might be deployed in the future, or the time frames in which such deployments might occur. There do, however, appear to be three possible areas in which we may be committed: mainland Australia, New Guinea and mainland Asia.

Australia is a vast continent with a very low population density—three per square mile—and those areas which are the most vulnerable to external attack are those which are the most sparsely populated. The necessary limitations upon the size of the Australian Army and the vast distances involved make it quite impractical to pre-position forces in the hope of preventing an enemy landing on the mainland. The requirement is for a force which is capable of rapid deployment once the main enemy threat has been established. This need for a mobile force possessing heavy combat power was recognized during World War II when, by 1943, the Armoured Corps reached a strength of three divisions, plus an independent armoured brigade and two tank battalion groups. Admittedly, the problems associated with the redeployment of forces have been eased by the increased capacity of air transport to move large bodies of troops and their equipment rapidly over long distances. Unfortunately, Australia’s capability in this field is very limited and is likely to remain so. In addition, only relatively lightly equipped forces may be moved by this means; the heavy paraphernalia necessary for the conduct of deliberate, longterm operations against a well-equipped enemy must follow by other means. The threat to the security of mainland Australia is not one of insurgency; such a situation does not exist in this country and is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. If a direct threat to our security arises, then it will involve the overt invasion of our shores by an army equipped and trained for conventional or nuclear war.

The main problems facing a potential aggressor are the difficulties of transporting an invasion force of sufficient strength and the build-up of that force to the stage where it is capable of carrying out its mission of taking over the country. We cannot, from within our own resources, hope to defeat an aggressor once he has been permitted to develop his full potential. Apart from interdiction of his force before it reaches our shores, the answer to this threat lies in our ability to contain and destroy an enemy bridgehead before it can be built up to the stage where the breakout can take place. To achieve this we must have a mobile force, possessing superior combat power, capable of decisive offensive action against an enemy bridgehead. That is, an armoured force. Provided we possess this ability, then the invasion of this country by conventional forces is unlikely to occur.

The future of New Guinea is far from clear; however, present indications are that Australia will carry the main burden for the defence of the Territory for many years. The indigenous army in New Guinea is trained for specialist tasks such as keeping the peace and border patrolling; it is not capable of countering an overt attack by conventional forces. In the event of such an attack intervention by forces from the Australian mainland would be essential.

There can be no doubt that most of the terrain in New Guinea is unfavourable for the use of armour; however, there are reasonably large areas, particularly near the main centres of population, where armour can be used to good effect. The road system into the Central Highlands is also being developed and, once completed, further areas will be opened up where armour may be usefully employed. These centres of population and production are the areas which an invader must capture if he is to achieve his aims; thus any struggle for New Guinea will be mainly concerned with the defence or capture of these areas. Experiences during World War II graphically illustrate the difficulties in defeating an enemy who has had time to prepare his defences.

In his comments on the operations at Buna-Gona, Colonel Keogh refers to the inadvisability and folly of ‘sending inadequately supported infantry against undamaged fortifications manned by a determined garrison plentifully supplied with automatic weapons’.⁵ He was referring, in the main, to the paucity of artillery support; however, the comments, quoted earlier, of Field Marshal Lord Slim indicate the results which were obtained with tanks against the same enemy in similarly difficult terrain. M3 light tanks (General Stuarts) were used by the Australians during the campaign, but were unsuitable for the task. That they did achieve some success is remarkable, as a maximum of only eleven tanks was available at any one time, and as these were used in twos and threes there was little chance of them having a significant effect upon the battle. The Lethbridge Mission to the South-West Pacific Area reported: ‘With relatively small losses to themselves and to the infantry they were supporting, the tanks enabled positions to be won which would otherwise have imposed long delays and very heavy casualties.’⁶ One of the lessons from the campaign showed the need for a heavy tank, mounting a big gun, capable of taking punishment and forcing its way through thick undergrowth. However, these lessons tended to be forgotten by the Australian Army, which persisted in the belief that tanks could not be used effectively in jungle or difficult terrain.

Fortunately, this archaic attitude seems to be changing. Main battle tanks are now deployed with the Australian Task Force in South Vietnam. As the After Action Reports are still classified, their contents cannot be quoted in this paper; however, it can be stated that the wet season, which many predicted would bring the tanks to a standstill, does not appear to have significantly restricted their freedom of movement. The cannister round has proved a most effective weapon in repulsing regiment sized atacks on fire support bases. These discoveries are not surprising to the armoured soldier, and it is heartening to see that the message may now be getting across to those who have the most to gain from the correct employment of armour. During the battle of Long Tan in 1966, reinforcements were carried to the scene in armoured personnel carriers, driving rain precluding the use of air support. This force inflicted heavy casualties upon a Viet Cong unit which was attempting to assault D Coy 6 RAR from a flank. It in no way detracts from the performance of the units involved to conjecture upon the results which might have been obtained had tanks been employed in this situation where a large enemy force had been located and fixed. The Americans have used armour in Vietnam with considerable success since 1965. One typical example of the results armour can obtain occurred in 1966 when the Viet Cong attempted to ambush a column which was escorted by tanks. When the ambush was sprung the tanks moved into echelon formation and advanced into the ambush firing cannister; the result—complete failure of the ambush and some 270 enemy dead left on the battlefield.

There are many areas in Vietnam where the use of armour would be impracticable due to the difficulty of the terrain; however, as was proved in Malaya, provided the enemy can be separated from the population and driven into the back country, his ability to achieve his aim is greatly reduced. The relative speed with which armoured forces may be deployed, and the inhibiting effect their presence has upon an enemy who lacks armoured support, makes them a potent weapon in a situation such as that existing in South Vietnam. The inherent flexibility of armoured forces is aided by the use of air transport for replenishment of the echelon. In a counter-insurgency setting, the availability of air transport support may eliminate the necessity to hold open a long overland supply route for operations of short duration. It also facilitates the replenishment of armoured sub-units which may be operating at a distance from the main supply route or forward operational base. Armour should therefore be more readily able to co-operate with infantry in operations in depth. The factors influencing the employment of armour in South Vietnam will apply generally to most of South-East Asia. In a limited war setting the possession of armour confers great advantages upon the Free World Forces when dealing with an enemy who does not have an effective counter. Should the situation in South-East Asia ever erupt into general war, then the need for effective armoured forces to oppose the considerable armoured strength of Communist China is self-evident.

A great many articles have been written in recent years propounding the theory that the day of the tank is over. The more rational of these articles have based their arguments upon the improvements to infantry anti-tank weapons, the use of guided weapons and the employment of aircraft in ground support roles. The concept of an infantry soldier with a one hundred dollar rocket being able to knock out a two hundred thousand dollar tank is most attractive. The ability of the infantry to do this, provided they can get close enough, is not questioned. Unsophisticated weapons of the Molotov cocktail variety will effectively immobilize a tank if placed in the right position. The keys to the question are placement and lethality. It must not be forgotten that the tank forms only part of a combat team, and, provided the team is well trained and its actions co-ordinated, then the task of getting close enough to obtain a strike in a vital area can be made very difficult. In addition, the infantry weapon must, because of its weight limitations, be of the shaped charge type. These weapons are of doubtful lethality, and in fact, Australian tanks in South Vietnam have taken numerous hits from this type of weapon without suffering any serious damage to the vehicle or casualties to the crew. This ability to absorb punishment and remain in action is a characteristic of the main battle tank; the same cannot be said for the more lightly protected armoured personnel carrier or light cavalry tank, which provide only limited protection.

The guided weapon has come into great prominence in recent years and has many advantages, in particular those of relatively light weight and a high hit probability in good conditions. There are, however, many disadvantages associated with guided weapons. Once again they rely upon a shaped charge warhead for their effect and do not compare in lethality with the kinetic energy projectile. They have a relatively long time of flight, which is a considerable disadvantage when trying to hit a tank which is being manoeuvred tactically. The guided weapon relies upon some system of homing onto the target or is guided during flight by the operator. Both of these systems are open to counter-measures and do not compare with the kinetic energy projectile which, once fired, cannot be diverted from its pre-determined course. In addition, were the kinetic energy projectile to disappear from the battlefield, then it would be well within the capabilities of current technology to design armoured protection to defeat a shaped charge warhead. For these reasons there would appear to be a sound requirement to retain the kinetic energy gun, which has the advantages of reliability, accuracy even under poor conditions, and unsurpassed lethality.

Prior to World War II critics stated that aircraft would drive the tank from the battlefield, but this was not the case. In the closing stages of the war the Allies possessed almost complete control of the air and employed large numbers of ground attack aircraft in tank-hunting roles. These aircraft achieved considerable success, but were unable to prevent German armour from playing a significant part in battles right up until the war ended. It is interesting to note that the Russians have been developing anti-aircraft tanks for some years, and now the Americans are developing this type of vehicle. The chance of an anti-aircraft tank shooting down a fast-flying jet are probably not very high; however, the effect of heavy ground fire upon a pilot who is endeavouring to hit a pinpoint target may be quite significant. It has been stated that the helicopter, hovering a few feet off the ground, can provide the infantry with the accurate, intimate fire support normally provided by tanks. The mind boggles at the thought of helicopters being employed in this way on a conventional battlefield. In view of the amount of assorted ironmongery being thrown into a fairly restricted area by both sides, grave doubts must arise as to how long a helicopter would survive. The anti-aircraft tank would become extremely effective in combatting helicopters used in this way. In addition, it is difficult to visualize a helicopter being able to provide intimate fire support beneath the canopy in wooded terrain; nor can it remain with the infantry to provide close protection by day and night. Helicopters have a role to play; they cannot, however, replace the tank upon the battlefield.

What then are the requirements for a modern armoured force? First, it must be centred around the main battle tank. There is no escape from this precept. To be effective the armoured fighting vehicle must be able to survive on the battlefield with the infantry. It must be capable of providing the infantry with a variety of effective fire support: high explosive, cannister, machine-gun, and have a bunker-cracking ability. It must be capable of engaging and defeating enemy armour at long ranges. No interim, lightweight, air-portable, multi-purpose armoured fighting vehicle can effectively carry out all these roles. Current main battle tanks are far from satisfactory in a number of aspects. Their weight precludes them from movement by air, and many bridges, especially in South-East Asia, will not support them. The repair and maintenance bills are too high at present, but with improvements in design these bills should reduce in the future. Limited endurance has been a problem in the past, but this situation is improving. It should be possible, within a few years, to produce a tank which will not require replenishment, except for ammunition, for at least three days. The Centurion is proving the value of a main battle tank in South Vietnam but this tank, which was designed during World War II, has seen eighteen years’ service in the Australian Army. It is, undoubtedly, good for a few years yet, but in ever decreasing numbers as spares cease to become available. The lead times involved in the development of major equipments mean that the main battle tanks for the period 1975 to 1990 are probably either on the drawing boards or under development at this time. Australia must remain abreast of these developments to ensure that orders are placed in time for a new tank to be available to us when Centurion is eventually phased out.

What are the broad economics of this proposition? The critics of armour are fond of quoting the high capital cost of armoured equipments as a prime reason for Australia relying upon a basically infantry army. That an armoured force is expensive, both to purchase and to maintain, cannot be denied but cost must be coupled with effectiveness if one is to obtain a true picture. One tank regiment possesses the gun power of slightly less than three artillery regiments, plus one hundred and eighty machine-guns, at least forty-five of which are 50-mm calibre. This roughly approximates the General Purpose Machine Gun capacity of three or four infantry battalions. These weapons are carried on vehicles which offer protection to the crews, have excellent mobility and flexibility, and give to a commander the capacity for decisive, offensive shock action. All of this an armoured regiment achieves with only four hundred and five men as against some four thousand in the infantry and artillery units. Australia is an affluent country in all aspects except that of manpower. Our high rate of national growth should allow us to spend considerable sums of money to ensure our security; however, to divert large numbers of men into such a non-productive field as defence would be quite unacceptable. The foregoing is not intended as an argument for the abolition of infantry or artillery; such a premise would be ridiculous. It is hoped, however, that it will indicate that the armoured regiment does give value for money.

Secondly, a modern armoured force requires an integral infantry element, mounted in armoured personnel carriers and highly trained in the techniques of infantry/tank co-operation. These skills are not developed in a ten-day exercise on the Puckapunyal range. The restricted size of the Australian Army and its many commitments probably does not allow permanent affiliations of armoured and infantry units and, in any event, this may be undesirable. The need is for infantry and armoured units to conduct integrated training at suitable stages during the annual training cycle. This training should be progressive and be aimed at producing efficient combat teams. To achieve this aim it would be desirable to co-locate infantry and armoured units, but logistic problems probably rule this out. The main difficulty lies in moving the armour and therefore the best solution is for ‘Mahomet to come to the mountain’. Puckapunyal does not provide the ideal venue for infantry to conduct their large-scale exercises prior to deployment in South Vietnam. There is, therefore, a good case for siting an armoured force at Shoalwater Bay in order that units of all arms may be trained together before moving to an operational theatre.

Thirdly, there is a requirement for artillery which is capable of keeping up with the mobile battle. Certainly artillery can be rapidly deployed by air but, unfortunately, air is subject to the vagaries of weather with the result that, under the very circumstances when it may be most advantageous to move armour, the air lift may not be available. There is a need for self-propelled artillery with armoured protection for the crews.

Fourthly, there is a need for an anti-tank capability. The best anti-tank weapon is a main battle tank, and in the presence of enemy armour this will remain an important role. It is quite wrong, however, to employ tanks as armoured anti-tank pillboxes within the infantry forward localities. If used in this way they will not be available to support infantry in the attack, counter-attack, counter-penetration, etc. roles. Current weapons available to the infantry give a reasonable anti-tank capability at ranges out to about one thousand metres; it is at ranges in excess of this that the problem lies. Armoured vehicles of the General Sheridan type have a good performance in the long range anti-tank field; however, the lightness of their armoured protection leaves them vulnerable to both tank and artillery fire. There is a case for an improved Entac type weapon which can be ground-mounted and fired by a controller who is dug in with overhead cover. This capability to conduct its own long range anti-tank defence should be given to the infantry battalion. Tanks should be employed to break up enemy armoured attacks in mobile operations, not as static anti-tank weapons.

With the development of increasingly effective surveillance and detection devices, air has become a most efficient means for conducting long and medium range reconnaissance. There is still, however, a need for medium range reconnaissance by ground forces to obtain more precise information about the enemy. There is also a requirement for mobile forces to provide flank protection, covering forces for the advance or withdrawal, and escorts for road columns in areas where there is guerilla activity against the lines of communication. The Australian concept envisages the initial deployment of our forces by air, with the heavier elements necessary to support long term operations following by sea at a later date. For these reasons there remains a need for air-portable armoured units possessing long endurance, good reliability, and capable of producing a large volume of accurate firepower. The cavalry regiment possesses these characteristics and should be retained in a modern armoured force; however, the temptation to regard the light cavalry tank as a main battle tank must be resisted.

The current organization of the Tropical Warfare Division provides one cavalry regiment as the only integral armoured unit within the division. One tank squadron and one armoured personnel carrier squadron are available from Army Troops. This allocation is quite unrealistic. Current operations in South Vietnam prove the value of a task force commander having the capability to deploy tanks and armoured personnel carriers in support of his operations. The organization should therefore be increased to provide, in addition to the cavalry regiment, one tank regiment and one armoured personnel carrier regiment within each division. This divisional structure would be adequate to meet our foreseeable commitments outside Australia. If, however, the emphasis does turn to a ‘Fortress Australia’ concept then a complete revision of current policy is required. There will then be a need to create armoured formations up to divisional size—each with its integral mechanized infantry and self-propelled artillery—if we are to take the task of defending this vast continent seriously.

This article has illustrated the value of armoured forces to the Australian Army in all its likely theatres of operations. It has tried to remain within the bounds of practicability and not enter into the field of science fiction. The writer firmly believes that the Australian Army has failed to realize that armour, skilfully employed, can win battles and save the infantry a large proportion of the casualties they would otherwise suffer. There is a need for all arms to co-operate in realistic exercises during training. Learning basic lessons on the battlefield is costly and may be disastrous. It is appreciated that the type of force required for operations in mainland South-East Asia and New Guinea would not suffice for the defence of mainland Australia. It has been indicated that the present divisional organization does not possess sufficient armoured support to conduct successful operations outside Australia and that the armoured strength of the current division should be increased. So long as the present forward defence concept continues then these increases will provide Australia with a viable force for deployment overseas. They will also provide a reasonable base upon which to build, when necessary, the modern armoured force which would be vital to the defence of Australia.