Book Review - The Partnership

The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US–Australian Alliance Under Bush and Howard

Written by: Greg Sheridan,

University of New South Wales Press, 2006, 

ISBN: 9780868409221, 260pp.

Reviewed by: Bree Larkham, Researcher, Land Warfare Studies Centre

From its inception in 1951, the debate in Australia about ANZUS has been conducted broadly between two forces. There are those who oppose the alliance on the grounds that it is a manifestation of an ingrained Australian cringe to a distant imperial power, reminiscent of the early years of Federation when Australian foreign policy was subservient to Britain’s. On the other hand, others argue that forging an alliance with a like-minded hegemon is essential to Australia’s national interests. In the eyes of the former, the history of Australian foreign policy is a litany of subservience to successive great powers—Great Britain and then the United States—with the parlous result that thousands of young Australians have been wantonly sacrificed in ‘other peoples wars.’ This debate has since intensified. In 2001, Prime Minister John Howard invoked ANZUS following the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States mainland. Subsequently, Australia committed itself to the US-led invasions of Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003. As a result, the traditional polarity that divided Australian politics over Australia’s alliance with the United Kingdom in the first half of the twentieth century and then the United States thereafter has been deeply reinforced.

Greg Sheridan challenges these assertions by arguing that John Howard has transformed the US–Australian alliance by taking the initiative in the relationship. Unlike previous Australian Prime Ministers, Howard runs the alliance and maintains the upper hand over George W. Bush and his Administration. Essentially, while America has been busy with the preoccupations of a superpower, Howard has made the most of this opportunity to extract what he wanted from the relationship at very little cost to him personally or the country at large.¹ The Partnership is dynamic in that Sheridan has composed a body of evidence to support this proposition. It is written in an easily comprehensible style with insightful glances into key military and political personalities instrumental to the development of the alliance.

People are the focus of this book. It is not a political analysis of either the ANZUS alliance or the relationship between Bush and Howard. Rather, Sheridan wants to demonstrate that ANZUS has evolved into a more dynamic, multifaceted ‘partnership’ that extends beyond the influence of its national leaders, which has made it more beneficial to Australia’s national interests. In his effort to do so, he addresses both sides of the divide by using the diversity of his interviews to demonstrate—at least in the political and security realms—that the alliance is functioning at many different levels. Therefore, he argues, this illustrates an important truth: ‘the precise wording of a security treaty doesn’t really matter very much so long as the broad intent, for the allies to help each other, is clear.’

How has the alliance evolved? What did Howard want from it? The answers Sheridan provides are: enhanced intelligence access and deeper co-operation between relative defence and security organisations; more influence in US decision-making processes; a free-trade agreement; increased US involvement in Asia, especially Indonesia; and the prestige that comes from international recognition of Canberra’s direct access and influence in Washington. Plus, of course, the political pay-off at home. It is safe to say that Howard has achieved most of these objectives; however, how much say Canberra has in Washington is another matter for another time.

In 1996, after his electoral victory, Prime Minister Howard immediately sought to intensify Australia’s relationship with the United States. Even though he enjoyed civil relations with former US President Bill Clinton, it was not until Bush came to office in January 2001, and then the 11 September terrorist attacks that same year, that greater opportunities emerged for Howard to develop deeper bilateral relations. Since, Sheridan argues, they have changed what was for the most part a regional affair into a ‘truly global partnership’, which is evidenced by the revolution in Australia’s defence doctrine and philosophy.

In 2005, Howard said: “I am always wary of grand pronouncements of doctrines as I think they can sort of create a false and wasteful argument.”² This is the ‘true Howard doctrine’. No grand rhetoric or sweeping gestures; simply justify ‘each step to the electorate on its merits.’ The Howard Government began its term by cautiously accepting Labor’s continental defence of Australia (DOA) policy, which was the legacy of former defence minister Kim Beazley. After their experience in East Timor, the Howard Government abandoned this paradigm because they realised it had distorted the ADF’s force structure through two decades of under-investment in land forces. This meant that the Government lacked options to deal with regional instability. As a result, the narrow conception of DOA has been largely abandoned, and today Canberra is developing doctrine and structuring its forces for the defence of Australia and its national interests. This fundamental strategic shift reflects the slow, quiet revolution instigated by the Howard Government. The fact that it was implemented incrementally shows that Howard wanted to ensure that its principles became institutionalised.

However, Sheridan inadvertently weakens his own argument. Although the majority of the Australian public support the alliance, even if they don’t like the current US President, he does not adequately (or perhaps deliberately) tackle the over-arching concern: how much is Australia paying for this partnership?

Robert Garran, an Australian journalist and author of True Believer: John Howard, George Bush and the American Alliance, agrees that yes, Howard—more than any other previous Australian Prime Minister—is a ‘true believer’ in both the benefits of the alliance and the values espoused by the Bush Administration, but argues that Australia is paying too high a price. Howard’s commitment to the alliance is explained by his realist understanding of international politics, as well as his belief that Australia and the United States are bound by democratic values and a shared history and culture. By joining the US-led wars in Afghanistan and, in particular, Iraq, the costs of the alliance have significantly risen. Specifically, by supporting the use of force in international politics at the expense of multilateralism, Australia has overestimated its value.

Nevertheless, Sheridan’s contribution to what has become a rather unproductive debate in Australian politics is noteworthy and insightful. The book delivers what it promises: a rare perspective on the inner-workings of a close, multifaceted partnership at a particular time in history when ANZUS was at its strongest ever.

Endnotes

1     See Greg Sheridan, ‘Canberra push reaps rich rewards’, The Australian, 3 August 2006, <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20876,19997745-25377,00.ht…; [first accessed 8 November 2006].

2     Sheridan, The Partnership, p. 129.