New Zealand Civil-Military Affairs Experience in Afghanistan

Abstract

The New Zealand Army has not had experience in high-intensity urban warfighting for over sixty years. However, as Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate, stability and support operations (SASO) in a complex human environment can be just as daunting as the actual warfighting stage. It is within this enivornment that the New Zealand Army has been repeatedly successful.

Analysis of the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (NZPRT) in the province of Bamyan Central, Afghanistan, reveals the New Zealand approach to SASO has enjoyed notable success in ensuring local stability. The analysis examines the composition of the NZPRT and its development, then considers its reconstruction tasks, interagency coordination and coordination of security and reconstuction activities. Additionally, the review will examine the NZPRT Five Pillar strategy and the implications of the New Zealand experience in Afghanistan. It will also be argued that work is still required to ensure New Zealand government agencies are well-represented to truly achieve a ‘whole of government’ approach to future conflicts.

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Introduction

Events in Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated that stability operations can be more challenging than the combat phase. Recent experiences in both countries have sparked international debate about how best to prepare for stability and support operations (SASO). It is within these two blocks of the ‘3 block war’—peace support and humanitarian missions—that the New Zealand Army has enjoyed great success. A broad analysis of the New Zealand Army’s SASO experience is beyond the scope of this paper. Primary attention will be focused on the performance of the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan, which performed a security and reconstruction/de facto civil-military affairs (CMA) role.

For the purposes of this paper the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) adheres to the doctrinal definition of CMA as stipulated in ADDP 3.11. CMA is defined as: 

the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-government organisations and agencies.¹

Composition of Bamyan

The area of operations (AO) within which the NZPRT operates has a significant impact on performance and effectiveness. Bamyan Central, where the NZPRT is located, lies in the central highland region. The province includes six districts, each surrounded by mountains and easily isolated during the winter months.

The majority of the population are Hazara with a number of Tajiks and Pashtun in the region. The Hazara (Shia) suffered significant atrocities under the Taliban and were hence very receptive to the New Zealanders presence. As a result, the Bamyan province, when compared to other parts of Afghanistan, was considerably more accepting of Western military forces. Whilst the benign security environment of Bamyan allows for more rapid implementation of development programmes, the widespread physical destruction, deterioration of the province and loss of skilled people, has complicated reconstruction and development efforts.²

Development of the NZPRT

The PRTs in Afghanistan were initiated by the United States in November 2002, as coalition commanders prepared for the transition from predominantly warfighting operations to stabilisation and reconstruction. The idea was to use small civil-military teams to expand the legitimacy of the central government to the regions and enhance security by supporting security sector reform and facilitating the reconstruction process.

The PRT is a relatively new concept, with the American Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) experiment in Vietnam providing the only real historical experience. The concept of operation for PRT’s throughout Afghanistan was not clear during the planning process. This constraint was not surprising in view of PRT doctrine and the concept’s infancy within Afghanistan.

The New Zealand team arrived in September 2003 with the aim of promoting security within the Bamyan Province. The operational concept used to achieve the mission was to marginalise the cause of instability and enable the key Afghan institutions to establish self-sustaining governance. In doing so, the PRT is working in support of the Provincial Government, the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the international aid community, to assist in security sector reform and enable good governance, key infrastructure, reconstruction, education and development of the economy.³ These objectives were imperative to strengthen security and stability within Bamyan to prevent the re-emergence and export of terrorism.

The NZPRT included an amalgamation of Army, Navy and Air Force personnel. Although a pre-existing CMA force did not exist, the diverse nature of the NZPRT was not significantly detrimental to its performance. Functional specialists from Headquarters, such as engineers, were designated to coordinate aid efforts, while other specialists were sent to the PRT HQ in Kabul to coordinate efforts with other PRTs and civilian organisations. Non-NZ elements embedded in the NZPRT included American and Afghan government representatives, interpreters, security personnel, and other foreign aid development representatives.

Although the NZDF’s pre-deployment training is of only a short duration, it involves numerous actors performing the role of enemy forces, contractors, or local civilians, recreating the full spectrum of potential scenarios. Primary emphasis was placed on weapons training, with some time also devoted to cultural and language training. This included an understanding of local customs and a number of key phrases, which were improved with successive deployments. Training focused on how the NZPRT would conduct operations to support elections, humanitarian distributions and local meetings. These utilised Afghan role-players and previously deployed personnel.⁴ A representative from NZAID also outlined the goals and aims of their organisation. A robust lesson-learned apparatus also allowed for the exchange of tactics, techniques and procedures for operating in Bamyan. After each rotation, key lessons and observations were passed on to the next deployment to ensure important developments were not undermined. Previous deployments to East Timor, Solomon Islands, Nuie and Iraq also meant most New Zealanders had a good appraisal of CMA/reconstruction tasks.

Reconstruction Tasks

Despite popular perception, the PRTs were not established for the sole task of nationbuilding. Undertaking reconstruction in Afghanistan, a nation with limited infrastructure, after two-and-a-half decades of civil war is a daunting and difficult task.⁵ As a result, the PRTs were to achieve a broader objective, namely the extension of central Afghan government authority and the provision of a secure environment to undertake reconstruction by PRT or local Afghan elements.

Like other PRTs, the NZPRT was designed to improve civil-military coordination and enhance the quality of the military ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. This was achieved by drawing on civilian expertise and facilitating the distribution of government funds for relief and reconstruction projects and security sector reform. When elements of the NZPRT were not occupied with other tasks, such as base security, the engineers would undertake short-duration but high-value reconstruction projects to establish rapport with the local population. For reconstruction tasks, the US Civil Affairs team supplied the financial assistance while the US Political Advisor provided the political weight to ensure the project was completed. Afghan locals were also employed to undertake reconstruction projects; however, the quality of work was sometimes unreliable and required close supervision.

The NZPRT, in conjunction with the Afghani Director of Rural Reconstruction Development (RRD), has also facilitated the Aga Khan Foundation in establishing well and irrigation projects. The NZPRT has assisted the RRD in determining important future projects. Other projects include the Bamyan Boys School construction, snow clearance of three major passes, construction of five district police stations, provision of vehicles and maintenance training to police, and the conduct of a literacy training course for police.⁶

The extreme climatic conditions in Afghanistan meant some deployments were limited in what development projects could be implemented. Attention was therefore focused on consolidating what had been done, developing project management systems, accounting for the current state of projects and then preparing other deployments for the warmer season. Other complications to reconstruction tasks included the absence of an NZAID representative. Although this did eliminate the possibility of duplication of effort, it did place significant pressures upon the New Zealand Engineer Officer to coordinate NZAID and other reconstruction projects. During the seventh NZPRT deployment it was calculated that the Bamyan Province was missing out on 50 per cent of US Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding that other provinces received.⁷ This was attributed to the fact the New Zealand Engineer Officer was too preoccupied with NZIAD projects to devote time to CERP initiatives. The rate at which reconstruction tasks could be undertaken was therefore vulnerable to numerous factors.

The relatively permissive environment in Bamyan has allowed for a far smoother transition between security and reconstruction operations. The secure environment within which the NZPRT has been operating should not detract from the success thus far achieved.

Interagency Coordination

The relationship between humanitarian organisations and the NZPRT has been significantly better than that experienced by other PRTs. The focus of some foreign PRT teams on quick-impact projects has soured relations with the humanitarian organisations. The humanitarian organisations object to this practice, arguing that it overlaps with their own activities, creating unnecessary duplication. The NZPRT was able to alleviate many tensions with humanitarian organisations through personal relationship building and active participation in Provincial Coordination Forums. This coordination was further enhanced by a local Government Provincial Strategic Plan, the development of which was sponsored by the PRT.

Internal Coordination

Internal coordination was aided by a Memorandum of Understanding between Defence and NZAID, which was useful in outlining guidance and cooperation before the NZPRTs deployment. However, conflict between the NZPRT and NZAID was not totally eliminated. Disagreements have emerged over projects constructed and excessive focus on ‘quick impact’ reconstruction tasks without sufficient attention devoted to how these short-term projects would be incorporated into the long-term development and sustainability of the region.⁸ Whilst this is a valid concern, these ‘quick impact’ projects are also important to establish rapport with the local people, establish trust and goodwill, without which the possibility of establishing long-term stability and hence strategic development are remote. All ‘quick impact’ projects are carefully planned by the NZPRT to ensure they don’t provide a foundation for future discontent.

Numerous NGOs have also compiled a significant database of the social composition and core requirements of numerous villages. Information sharing between the NGOs and NZPRT meant the New Zealanders had a good understanding of where CMA efforts should be focused. Furthermore, no PRT reconstruction initiative was undertaken in isolation but integrated to form a part of the ‘reconstruction system’ to ensure projects reinforced one another.⁹

Provincial Government Coordination

The NZPRT did not want to be seen as a separate agency or administration and went to great pains to promote local governance. This was achieved by ensuring local officials were involved in the decision-making process, serving as liaison officers for central government, and by employing local contractors. The New Zealand PRT was part of what was known as a Provincial Task Force. This body included non-government organisations, local Afghans, and was chaired by the Governor, and the Provincial Task Force outlined the strategic direction for development in Bamyan. Any request for development assistance had to be passed through the local shura [community consultative group], District Sub Governor and Provincial Government for endorsement/approval in accordance with the Provincial Plan, involving the local capacity building as much as possible.

District Coordination

Out in the field, the New Zealand patrols conducted regular meetings with local government shura. These were not necessarily elected officials, but local elders of prestige. Meetings covered the provision of water, the reconstruction of schools, and criminal activity. The New Zealand PRT also sought to consolidate good governance through regular meetings with government institutions. This included district sub-governors, judges, prosecutors, mayors, village elders, community councils, chiefs of police, education department officials and health authorities. NZPRT experiences with local officials and Afghan government agencies were positive; however, due to a lack of education and training most government officials were in need of constant mentoring.

Local government officials and security services were often reported to be corrupt, incompetent, or both. Corrupt officials could not be summarily removed as they were often important political icons at the local level. The NZPRT conducted meetings with key figures, corrupt or not, gaining greater situational awareness and establishing relations with the key people of the region. This did not significantly undermine the local’s perception of the New Zealand forces. Having been involved in war and instability for decades, the local Afghans were more than aware of corruption, which is endemic throughout many institutions, and the necessity to work within the limitations it imposed.

Another unique trait of the NZPRT is that it did not have the same military-civilian divide to that experienced in the American and British PRTs. For example, the British PRT military commander makes all the decisions related to security issues, while the civilian components run their programmes with minimal military involvement and report back to their respective organisations. The American area of operations (AO) also included a manoeuvre battalion responsible for security and three PRTs trying to synchronise their efforts. This division of labour was different to the ‘fully integrated’ NZPRT approach.¹⁰

Regional/Sector Coordination

To minimise operational differences, the PRT Executive Steering Committee sought to coordinate PRT strategies. The committee, which meet once a month, was made up of Afghan government officials, United Nations and NATO representatives, as well as ambassadors of PRT contributing countries. The committee also formulated joint terms of reference for all PRTs operating in Afghanistan to minimise the differences in operational styles between coalition and ISAF PRTs. The New Zealand contingent had representatives at these meetings, which provided useful information and a means to resolve outstanding issues with other agencies.

The Coordination of Security & CMA Operations

Success required the consent of local parties and hence the quality of the New Zealander’s negotiating skills was of utmost importance. The New Zealand soldier possesses an outstanding ability to establish good relations relatively easy. Although no specific attention was devoted to extensive language training before deployment, local Afghans were employed as interpreters and provided a crucial insight into Afghan livelihood. Simple measures, such as basic language skills, respecting cultural values, waving, removing sunglasses and body armour, or basic manners were important to establish rapport. The NZPRT also lived in small villages, despite the risks to personal health, or forward patrol bases in their respective districts. The cultural diversity of the New Zealand Army and presence of females are significant advantages when establishing good relations with the local people.¹¹ Another useful example is playing football with local children while PRT commanders held discussions with local elders. This aided significantly in easing tensions and provided the security climate for attaining local support and intelligence.¹² As one retired American colonel stated, ‘the Kiwis had cracked the code’ when it came to establishing effective relations with the local populace.¹³

Reconstruction projects required a high degree of security to ensure the construction, repair and utilisation of infrastructure, ranging from roads to irrigation systems. Well-functioning infrastructure and an inclusive political system also provided an indirect means of force protection. The NZPRT, like our other coalition partners, believed security patrols and CMA activities were mutually reinforcing. Significant efforts were made to ensure NZPRT civil-military integration was effective, with attention devoted to ensuring security/presence patrols were coordinated with the humanitarian assistance or reconstruction work of the Development Group.¹⁴ The Development Group met regularly to coordinate and align their activities with security operations, to keep the Commander’s intent in line with the pillar strategy (see below), and their individual donor/agency guidance.¹⁵

Improvements in the security situation are reinforced by a functioning, representative, and inclusive political system. Economic growth in Afghanistan will only occur if security is improved and the political situation becomes more stable, but increased economic growth is itself the foundation upon which a sustainable political and security outcome can be built over the longer term.¹⁶ Poor security can render it more difficult to construct, repair, and utilise infrastructure, ranging from roads to irrigation systems. A well-functioning infrastructure can further reinforce political stability. The diversity of the security challenges in Afghanistan means only an integrated approach can achieve long-term success. Uncoordinated progress in one area of development will contribute little to the overall security environment.¹⁷

Whilst the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP) is not the core focus of this paper, it illustrates another complication prevalent when trying to revive a collapsed state. The poor status of the police force is not due to the failings of the New Zealand police advisors embedded in the PRT, but indicates the difficulty in establishing a professional force in a nation that has been undermined by corruption and bloodshed for years. Any efforts to focus on counterinsurgency or counternarcotics efforts are fruitless, particularly when the ANP do not have the foundation for a professional police force—morals, values, ethics, or basic writing skills.¹⁸

The Five Pillar Strategy to Success

The Five Pillar Strategy was initially devised by the fourth deployment to Afghanistan referred to as Task Group Crib 4. The New Zealand PRT in Afghanistan from February–July 2005, Task Group Crib 5, continued to implement this strategy that focused on security sector reform, governance, infrastructure, education and the economy.

The pillars are arranged in priority from left to right with all aid agencies contributed across all core areas, whilst one agency has the lead for each pillar. The NZPRT patrols had the task of providing the security environment to allow reconstruction and development to proceed.

The following outlines key areas of success for the NZPRT for each of the five pillars from February–July 2005.

Security

The PRT has:

• Written the strategic plan for the Bamyan Afghan National Police.
   
• Facilitated training for and wrote the National Directorate of Security (NDS) strategic plan.
   
• Provided an ANP security checkpoint station building.
   
• Provided transportation resources and uniforms for the ANP.
   
• Provided basic para-military training for ANP in all districts.
   
• Provided legal training for judges, police and public prosecutors.
   
• Provided HR training for police, NDS and prison staff.
   
• Constructed 12 police check point huts and drop-arm barriers.

Governance

The PRT has:

• Sponsored the Provincial Planning Conference.
   
• Written the Provincial Strategic Plan.
   
• Assisted the Provincial governance and co-ordination meeting structure.
   
• Provision of essential equipment for Ministries.

Infrastructure

The PRT has:

• Sponsored three district road projects.
   
• Provided fuel, maintenance, training and labour to grade local roads.
   
• Expanded the Radio Bamyan capabilities to better cover the Province.
   
• Sponsored construction of District Government Buildings in Kahmard, Panjaw and Waras.
   
• Sponsored ongoing construction of various Bailey type bridges.

Education

The PRT has:

• Established various vocational training courses in Wara, Panjab, Shahidan and Bamyan Centre—approximately 400 students.
   
• Provided computer and literacy courses in Bamyan Centre.
   
• Provided support to Bamyan University including the provision of a security fence, furniture, equipment and staff salaries
   
• Undertaken construction of several of small schools.
   
• Provision of utilities to established schools.

Humanitarian Assitance

The PRT deployment has distributed (as a result of the NZPRT/US Civil Affairs representative assistance):

• Approximately three tonnes of food to Bamyan Hospital (delivered weekly), Yakawlang Hospital and other medical clinics.
   
• Approx 400 stoves.
   
• Approx 600 bags of coal.
   
• Benches, desks and teacher chairs and desks to two schools.
   
• Over 200 school kits (sufficient for 15 000 children).
   
• Over 50 teacher kits.
   
• Over 50 tool kits throughout Bamyan Province, including via work for tools programmes.
   
• Over 200 radios to teachers in various schools.
   
• Over 5000 sandbags to flooded areas.
   
• Over 350 tarpaulins throughout Bamyan Province.
   
• Over 2500 blankets.
   
• Over 1000 winter jackets.
   
• Over 10 MT of miscellaneous foodstuffs.
   
• Conducted personal hygiene classes and distributed over 5000 personal hygiene kits.

Implications of the New Zealand Experience in Bamyan

The ability of the New Zealand soldier to establish good relations with the local population and mitigate many issues has brought the NZPRT significant praise. For example, Political Advisor to COMCJTF-76 stated that, ‘the NZPRT is a model for other PRT’s to follow’.¹⁹ Although the environment within which the New Zealanders operated was permissive in comparison to South East Afghanistan, from all accounts it is believed the New Zealanders would have been equally successful when operating in a more hostile environment, albeit with a higher risk of casualties and demanding a larger security force contribution.²⁰

Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated the complexity of stability and support operations (SASO). It is predicted that these types of operations will be a common theme in future deployments. As a result, the Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC), which outlines how the New Zealand Army will operate beyond 2015, has incorporated important lessons from the Army’s experience in Afghanistan and other stability type operations.²¹ The objective of SASO is to shape the environment in order to set conditions for political aims to be achieved. A key milestone is winning support from the local population to assist security and development, and hence provide the foundation for the expansion of indigenous institutions.

Innate New Zealand characteristics of neutrality and an ability to work in an honest and collaborative manner with all parties have been proven to greatly improve cooperation and appreciation of the situation. The NZPRT experience has also reinforced the need for junior commanders and soldiers to have appropriate cultural and linguistic skills available to them to assist in dealing with the complex environment.

Experiences in Bamyan have vindicated the need for a ‘human-centric’ approach to future conflicts, especially those conducted, as General Sir Rupert Smith observes, ‘amongst the people’²². Whilst advances in technology have great potential to enhance situational awareness, it does not diminish the primacy of human interactions to decipher the confusing complex battlespace. Furthermore, the ability to put high-quality individuals and teams into an area of operations, in close proximity to the enemy and the population, is critical. In complex stability and support operations, human intelligence gathering is a critical capability, without which New Zealand land forces will fail to capitalise on our national strengths and struggle to detect those opponents that operate below the detection threshold of sophisticated surveillance systems.

Future requirements also testify the need for a joint, interagency and multi-national approach to future operations. In addition to a continuing emphasis on multi-national and coalition operations, there will also be an increasing emphasis on whole-of-government approaches to operations carried out by joint and interagency means.

Successful nation-building programs require a broad and unified approach from a number of governmental departments. In many cases, like Afghanistan, not all representation will come from a single contributing nation. Yet they must work in unison to effect balanced long-term change. As the New Zealand experience in Bamyan illustrates, representation from other New Zealand governmental agencies is still lacking. In the future, the land force will more often find itself operating alongside government agencies from New Zealand, coalition partners, and the United Nations in pursuit of the overall objective.

The challenging mountainous terrain, climatic extremes and small but irregular layout of local villages reinforces the requirement for the NZ Army to train for operations in complex terrain. Initiatives are underway within Army to provide an improved framework to achieve this and in particular address the Army’s ability to operate effectively in the urban environment.

Underpinning the way in which the NZ Army contributes to stability and support operations is the effectiveness of the individual soldier and small team. The Army’s soldier modernisation vision is for a soldier system that has a good level of interoperability with our allies, and that enables soldiers and small teams to operate effectively across the spectrum of operations. We seek to equip the soldier with capabilities that give them a significant advantage over threat forces by day and night, regardless of season, weather or terrain. There is recognition that the quality of the force is not just reflected by the equipment they use, but is an end product of a recruitment, education and training regime.

Conclusion

This paper has illustrated that at the tactical level the NZPRT has been successful. There are many tangible results, such as the number of projects completed, aid distributed, or training conducted. However, many of the real successes are intangible, such as the continued relative stability in the Bamyan region without incident, that the Afghan National Police are able to seize over 1700kg of opium without assistance, or the increase in the size of the bazaar and shop owners expressing confidence in the situation. The establishment of village markets and commerce is a positive sign of growing stability.²³ Greater economic strength will eventually allow the local Afghan people to support themselves rather than rely upon the New Zealanders. Progress is still required to ensure the central government exercises effective control. Firstly, the construction of facilities does not necessarily indicate strategic success. Having adequate buildings is one thing, ensuring the locals can maintain such facilities and not become overly reliant on external assistance is another issue. Whether the NZPRT has achieved this level of success is contentious. Overly successful CMA efforts can create a ‘cult of dependence’ or ‘cargo cult’. When the international assistance forces withdraw, the incoming government often fails to maintain these high standards. As illustrated by recent events in East Timor, this can lead to internal instability. The question therefore must be raised as to whether Bamyan will deteriorate after New Zealand withdraws. This question cannot yet be answered; one must only hope that involving local Afghans in the decision-making process will provide the experience to continue progress in the region after the New Zealand withdrawal. The international community should be well aware however, that to expect an infant democracy to work after five years of ‘development’ is a very ambitious objective.

Coordinating the amalgamation of local Afghans, NGOs, and other government agencies into a clear strategic plan has been a difficult process. For a nation that is one of the poorest countries in the world, plagued by a drug culture, poor health and education facilities, as well as ongoing tribal frictions, border security difficulties and geo-political complications, nation-building at the strategic level will continue to be exceptionally difficult. The Five-Pillar strategy has sought to provide this strategic development guidance, and at the very least introduce local Afghans to the policy-making process.

The situation in Bamyan is still dominated by the New Zealand military and Afghan military forces, with scarce representation of New Zealand government agencies. NZPRT commanders, like those from other nations, are required to operate in provinces with minimal expertise in the formulation of local government policies. While military training may provide the decision-making skills and maturity to deal with the majority of ‘government formulation’ development this is a short-term solution until indigenous policy-making experts can fill the void, only then can true long-term success be achieved.

Endnotes

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1     Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication ADDP 3.11 – Operations Series: Civil–Military Cooperation, August 2004, p. 1-1.

2     Dylan Hendrikson, Michael Bhatia, Mark Knight, Annabel Taylor, ‘A Review of DFID Invovlement in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTS) in Afghanistan’, International Policy Institute, London, July 2005.

3     Provincial Reconstruction Team: Bamyan, June 19 2005.

4     Discussion with officer, 14 June 2006.

5     Major Andrew M. Roe, ‘To Create a Stable Afghanistan: Provisional Reconstruction Teams, Good Governance, and a Splash of History’, Military Review, Vol. LXXXV, No. 6, November/December 2006, pp. 20–6.

6     Captain Neville Mosley, ‘Who’s involved in reconstructing Bamyan?’, New Zealand Army News, Issue 353, 2 May 2006, pp. 5.

7     Discussion with officer, 29 June 2006.

8     Discussion with NZAID officials, 7 July 2006.

9     Discussion with officer, 29 June 2006.

10    Discussion with officer, 26 May 2006.

11    Discussion with officer, 29 June 2006.

12    Discussion with officer (retd), 16 May 2006.

13    Discussion with officer, 5 May 2006.

14    Discussion with officer, 29 June 2006.

15    Discussion with officer, 31 July 2006.

16    Discussion with officer, 14 June 2006.

17    Ali A Jalali, ‘The Future of Afghanistan’, Parameters, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 4–19.

18    Discussion with Police Inspector, 20 July 2006.

19    Provincial Reconstruction Team: Bamyan, 19 June 2005.

20    Discussion with officer, 1 May 2006.

21    For additional information see: New Zealand Army, The Future Land Operating Concept, v. 4.0, July 2006.

22 General Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: the Art of Warfare in the Modern World, Allen Lane, Camberwell, VIC, 2005.

23 Provincial Reconstruction Team: Bamyan, 19 June 2005.