Contemporary Employment of Infantry in a Combined-Arms Stability and Support Operations: SECDET VIII in Baghdad

Abstract

The role of infantry in contemporary deployments is proving to be in tasks other than combat, such as the Stability and Support Operations underway in Iraq. The author argues that, in addition to close combat skills, infantry soldiers require a range of wider capabilities. These include security of assets and installations, close protection and escorting of diplomatic and civilian personnel, and the softer skills of tact and discretion that help minimise the ‘footprint’ of deployments.

Introduction

Based on current operations, the future Australian Army is most likely to be deployed not to defend territorial Australia, but rather to uphold Australian interests overseas.¹ In these types of operations, the threat environments in which future soldiers operate are likely to be characterised by a non-state enemy that is increasingly willing to fight in urban areas.² Within these parameters, asymmetric warfare has emerged as the primary strategy of an enemy unable to gain victory by conventional means, but who conducts operations that are aimed to achieve victory through the erosion of national will.³ Within this setting, modern armies find themselves tasked with the conduct of Stability and Support Operations (SASO) in urban areas.

As part of the Hardened and Networked Army (HNA) concept, infantry will increasingly operate within combined-arms combat teams, creating a hard-hitting, mobile, networked, and better-protected force with increased combat capability and lethality. Furthermore, HNA will see the compilation of mission specific combat teams assembled from regiments in Australia.⁴

The Australian Security Detachment (SECDET) in Baghdad, Iraq, is a useful example of such a mission-specific force, comprising a combined-arms combat team mounted in Australian Light Armoured Vehicles (ASLAVs). SECDET is tasked with providing the requisite protection to facilitate continued Australian diplomatic function in Baghdad. The purpose of this essay is to generate awareness and discussion of the likely future employment for infantry as part of a combined-arms combat team conducting Stability and Support Operations. The experiences of SECDET VIII provide insight into the tasking and capability of infantry deployed on future ADF operations that may be executed under the HNA framework. Employment of infantry will be discussed in the context experienced by the author, both at the Australian Embassy, Baghdad and the nearby Australian compound also within the International Zone (IZ)—’The SECDET Cove’.

The Australian Embassy, Baghdad

Vital Asset Protection

As part of the SECDET combat team, the mission of the organisation located at the Australian Embassy was to defend the Embassy from attack. Although infantry-centric, this was achieved in concert with other force elements through a layered defence, incorporating a variety of screening, surveillance, overwatch, and static guard positions, as well as dismounted patrols that gathered information and conducted liaison with Coalition forces and private security elements operating within the battlespace. All of this information was fed through to the Embassy Watchkeeper, who was able to monitor activity within the Embassy and surrounds supported by closed-circuit TV and secure communications, and was able to manoeuvre additional soldiers to surge when required. The protected mobility and firepower of cavalry-enhanced Vital Asset Protection came through the provision of a spatially dislocated but highly responsive and agile combined-arms Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that was able to reinforce defences and move key personnel to and from the Embassy as required.

Protecting Diplomats

From the Australian Embassy, Baghdad, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and other Government agencies conduct diplomatic operations in support of the national interest. Being located at the Australian Embassy brought certain responsibilities and restrictions that would not normally be experienced by young Australian riflemen. For example, it was necessary to develop a rapport and exercise tact when dealing with foreign VIPs and Australian Government officials. The infantry platoon worked with parallel chains of command, reporting threats and significant Anti-Iraq Forces (AIF) activity around the IZ to SECDET HQ as well as to the Australian Consul General, who was designated by DFAT as the Post Security Officer (PSO). The soldiers contributed to battlefield awareness by reporting insurgent activity that had bearing on Embassy security and operations.

Australian riflemen assisted DFAT in providing tailored security for Australian Government VIPs and other dignitaries visiting the Australian Embassy. In maintaining stringent entry criteria, infantry soldiers needed to display confidence as well as tact and discretion when dealing with the visiting Personal Security Details (PSD) of foreign diplomats and high-level Coalition force personnel. The infantry platoon at the Australian Embassy was required to balance its manning of mission-critical defensive positions and visibility of lethal force with the DFAT requirement of maintaining the diplomatic sensitivities of an Embassy. Defensive infrastructure constructed by the platoon had to be visibly discrete and keeping with the character of an Embassy. The Australian rifleman is well suited to this task and consistently showed maturity in dealing with such situations.

Working with Local Nationals

DFAT in Baghdad employs a number of Iraqi civilians as either office workers or as contractors, who assist with ongoing construction and maintenance work within the Embassy. It is not unusual for up to 60 Iraqi nationals to be searched, processed and monitored within a working day by the Embassy Group. Most Iraqis working at the Embassy lived in non-secure areas of Baghdad, which meant that they needed to hold a host of relevant passes for entry to the more secure area where the Australian Embassy is located. The issuing of these passes to Iraqi citizens is a necessarily lengthy process, and it became an additional role for the infantry platoon HQ to support the security screening and pass issue for both ADF- and DFAT-employed workers through the US military. The risks that local nationals take in working for the Coalition forces in Iraq are considerable, both because of daily movement through the Anti-Iraq Forces–targeted IZ checkpoints, as well as reprisals from other Iraqis for working with the Coalition. For staff workers at the Australian Embassy, the perceived danger was considerable. At the request of DFAT, discrete entry procedures for locally employed staff were developed at the Embassy. For the infantry platoon, the challenge was to maintain the mission-critical force protection of the Embassy and ADF personnel whilst alleviating the perceived risks for Iraqi civilians who filled a vital role in the functioning of the Embassy. The flexibility of the defensive solution provided by the Australian Army in this event is noteworthy, as without the locally employed staff, the Embassy’s functions are significantly reduced. By being able to provide a range of security options—due to the unique skills offered by the Army—workable solutions for almost all situations could be secured.

Indirect Fire

The screening of vehicles and pedestrians at International Zone checkpoints meant that the threat within the IZ came predominantly from AIF rocket and mortar indirect fire. The AIF’s Technique, Tactic and Procedure (TTP) was to fire only one or two rockets before withdrawing from a fire base in order to escape detection by the Coalition and ISF. The unsustained and random nature of indirect fire in Baghdad meant that the enforced wearing of personal protective equipment, such as helmets, Enhanced Combat Body Armour (ECBA) and ballistic-resistant goggles in exposed areas played a greater role in force protection than traditional ‘actions on’, which are generally implemented only once the threat has passed. Although the built-up nature of Baghdad was often sufficient to isolate any explosion, thereby reducing the lethal radius of mortar and 122 mm rockets, the necessity of individual protective equipment to mitigate the risks of indirect fire was demonstrated midway through the deployment by the death of two locally employed Embassy staff members, who were killed when an AIF mortar hit their car whilst driving home from the IZ. Stray rounds from celebratory fire, Iraqi Police traffic control and random shooting originating from outside the IZ made the wearing of protective equipment mandatory for soldiers working in exposed locations.

Maintaining Force Sustainability

Maintenance of sustainability was identified as a pertinent issue whilst conducting the Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) prior to deployment. The nature of tasks and complexities of defending the Embassy required a level of flexibility that was not produced by the traditional method of rotating sections in defence responsibilities. SECDET VIII used a troops-to-task approach that pooled soldiers from the sections into a central group, who rotated through a variety of individual or paired security tasks on a fixed time interval. This approach worked well and relieved soldiers of routine work by changing their jobs with each rotation. The platoon found this work-rest cycle superior to that used by other Coalition forces where soldiers, as part of a squad, would be tasked with a single job daily for an 8- or 12-hour shift. Rotating jobs regularly not only kept the soldiers alert but broke up work during the quiet hours of the night. Command and control was provided by the platoon’s Section Commanders and Headquarters, who along with NCOs from a Military Police Search Team working OPCON to the Infantry Platoon, rotated through a Watchkeeper role.

Combat First Aiders

Being deployed at the Australian Embassy offered some opportunities to infantry soldiers that they would not otherwise experience. The Embassy Group worked closely with Coalition forces, in particular with the nearby 86th then 10th Combat Support Hospital (CSH). Australian soldiers regularly assisted their United States counterparts with the smooth movement of Coalition and local national casualties through the Entrance Check Point (ECP) of the hospital. This prevented access into the hospital of unscreened security contractors and local nationals as they dropped off their wounded and dead for collection by US Army medics. The Combat First Aiders (CFAs) from within the infantry platoon provided regular assistance in the emergency room of the CSH, which was the first point of treatment for seriously injured Coalition personnel in Baghdad. Using their skills, the CFAs were able to cannulate and dress significant trauma wounds. In the instances of large incidents with an influx of wounded, they were given responsibility for stabilising individual patients. Their first aid skills were further developed as they assisted US Army medics and learnt how to apply the latest techniques in the treatment of blast and gunshot wounds.

The SECDET Cove

The ‘SECDET Cove’ was the name for the Australian compound within a US Army Forward Operating Base (FOB) located within the International Zone. Rifle platoons located at the ‘Cove’ perform a variety of tasks that fell under three main categories; Surveillance, Armed Escort and Red Zone Patrols.

Surveillance

Australian and US Army units shared the security responsibilities for the FOB. SECDET contributed primarily by manning observation posts that provided situational awareness to the TOC (Tactical Operations Center) of the US FOB and the SECDET Command Post. The SECDET observation posts were incorporated into a network of US-manned observation posts that were positioned to provide overwatch of the FOB, identify suspect vehicles and activities, and report incidents as they occurred within the IZ and adjacent Red Zone. Large explosions and smoke from IDF, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and IEDs could be seen from some distance as they occurred throughout Baghdad. The type of explosion would dictate whether a plume of smoke or dust was visible to the soldiers manning the OP. In these instances laser range finders produced accurate reporting, which was relayed to the Tactical Operations Center and SECDET Command Post via Multi Band Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) and SINGAR radios. When there were no visual cues as to the location of the explosion, soldiers would report the explosion as ‘heard not seen’ and would estimate bearing and distance. The reporting of incidents provided commanders with access to threat information that was relayed to ADF personnel working throughout the IZ and in the Red Zone. The level of reporting by Australian infantrymen in these tasks was widely recognised as the best in Baghdad, as the information was almost inevitably confirmed by more detailed investigations, but importantly the initial deduction from the soldiers manning the observation post would be accurate, and assisted in the deployment of additional forces to the incident.

Armed Escort

The daily provision of armed escort to unarmed Australian Defence civilians working in the IZ was performed by infantry soldiers based at the ‘Cove’. Driving civilian-style Suburban vehicles, they operated in small teams supported by a combined-arms Quick Reaction Force to provide armed escort to their principal. Principals were picked up at a secure location and escorted to their workplaces at Iraqi Government ministries or to other destinations in the IZ for meetings and social events.

The provision of Multi Band Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) and Personal Role Radios (PRRs) to soldiers undertaking armed escort tasks allowed their movements to be ‘battle tracked’ through the SECDET command post. As they provided security to Defence Civilians, infantry soldiers could communicate internally to the patrol via the PRR or alternatively to higher or supporting sub-units via the MBITR. Following incidents within the IZ, these small teams could be accounted for and request QRF support through the SECDET Watchkeeper. Furthermore, the Watchkeeper was able to immediately direct soldiers to move their principal from locations deemed unsafe following intelligence leads that indicated a threat warning for the Defence civilian’s location.

The convergence of Iraqi Security Forces, foreign nationals with plain-clothes PSD, and Coalition forces in Iraqi Government buildings created a highly complex, dynamic and volatile threat environment. Armed escorts for Defence civilians and other ADF personnel were often commanded by senior private soldiers, and provided opportunity for these men to work independently within their small teams. In some circumstances, where a high level of discretion was required to protect the identity of key personnel, infantry soldiers were also tasked in ‘follow and support’ roles. They did not visibly associate with their principal, but were able to intervene and request an extraction force provided by QRF if required. Armed escort in small teams provides an example of a new employment of infantry through the ‘network enabled’ operations, made available by HNA. Advances in communications and interoperability facilitate the economy of scale and allows command and control to be maintained as small teams operate across the battlespace.

The provision of armed escorts accounted for a significant amount of the riflemen’s tasks. Given the ‘Whole of Government’ approach to recent ADF deployments, as well as the ongoing necessity of protected mobility for both commanders and embedded ADF personnel, and the increasing capability of small teams, I argue that the skill of ‘armed escort’ in pairs or small groups be further developed by the Infantry Corps. This skill-set is not SECDET mission-specific; it is relevant anywhere commanders and other ADF personnel are required to transit through or conduct meetings with interest groups in a dynamic threat environment. An increased level of training will allow the Corps to more effectively provide security to ADF and other personnel that are not afforded a dedicated Military Police Close Personal Protection (CPP) team or Special Forces PSD. A small team of subject-matter experts could provide formal training to riflemen deploying on Stability and Support Operations, and once established in the Corps, armed-escort training could take place alongside other security operations lessons, such as vehicle and personnel screening, in which the Corps already has considerable experience.

For soldiers operating from vehicles and in confined areas, the long barrelled weapons and especially the F89 were less effective as primary weapons due to decreased manoeuvrability. The 9 mm pistol, as an alternate weapon, was a necessity, especially whilst in vehicles. An increased emphasis on training scenarios involving the 9 mm pistol, specifically concentrating on firing inside buildings and from vehicles, would benefit future infantry soldiers deploying to Baghdad or similar environments.

Red Zone Patrols

The ‘Red Zone’ refers to the Baghdad city area that is outside the relatively secure International Zone. Conducting operations in the Red Zone as part of a combined-arms battle team was another task for infantry soldiers based at the ‘Cove’. In the Red Zone, there were two principle tasks for the infantryman. Firstly, to provide dismounted security at either objectives or when halted, and secondly, to provide the ‘shooter’ capability for the ASLAV Type 2 vehicles. As a ‘shooter’, the rifleman with his personal weapon was responsible to ensure that the integrity of a security bubble around the convoy was maintained within his arcs of responsibility. He was also required to identify and relay the position of potential threat vehicles to the ASLAV Crew Commander, and relay to the driver the changing positions of ASLAV vehicles to the rear as they conducted blocking drills at crossroads and roundabouts. Through their posture in the ASLAVs, soldiers portray the psychological image of a ‘hard target’ to the enemy as a strategy to deter a planned or opportune attack. The ‘hard target’ image is visually demonstrated to the enemy by well-equipped soldiers mounted in the turrets of ASLAVs using their personal weapons to constantly scan rooftops, windows and overpasses for potential sniper hides, as well as employing escalating force in accordance with their Rules of Engagement to maintain an appropriate distance between vehicle traffic and the patrol.

On the streets of Baghdad, the US-preferred ‘closed left fist’ is the universal signal for ‘Stop’ and shooters ward off civilian traffic whilst entering roundabouts and crossroads. Generally, civilian traffic, which has become accustomed to obeying instructions from the military, complies with the soldier’s signals immediately. One of the challenges in Baghdad is distinguishing between Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the AIF. To avoid reprisal attacks from the AIF, the ISF and other personnel working for Coalition forces regularly wear balaclavas or other masks to hide their identity. This masking of identity, combined with the ISF’s inconsistent military uniforms and the prolific use of civilian vehicles by armed personnel, creates a chaotic and volatile environment within which soldiers have to ensure security.

To mitigate the risk of concealed Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) upon dismount, Coalition forces in Iraq conduct a searching drill known as the ‘5 and 25’ check. Whenever halted, a visual search is coordinated by the vehicle commander to radius of 5 meters from the vehicle. If halted for greater than 5 minutes, the convoy commander coordinates a thorough physical search to a radius of 25 meters of the convoy. It is likely that the senior dismounted commander will be responsible for conducting this dismounted scan. Once dismounted to conduct a task, the infantry commander, usually a brick commander, assigns areas of responsibility to his soldiers, who scan for enemy activity and ensure civilian traffic and pedestrians are kept an appropriate distance from the vehicles. Infantry bricks also provide local protection for snipers placed in overwatch and secure key ground that is unable to be accessed by the ASLAVs. The infantry brick enhances the combined-arms effect of the patrol by providing the capability to clear buildings of enemy, position personnel in overwatch, secure compound entrances, establish cordons, A-Frame damaged vehicles, and extract personnel from hostile locations as ordered by the Patrol Commander. It is this wide range of tasks conducted by the infantry brick that provides significant flexibility to the combined-arms manoeuvre commander in a diverse range of environments.

Adapting to Combined Arms Operations

Working with ASLAVS

The cavalry element of the combined-arms team brought a suite of capabilities to SECDET; offering protected mobility, firepower and improved communication networks that promote tactical tempo. It allows QRFs to move combat capability across the battlespace with speed and security, and the protected mobility of the ASLAVs were instrumental in maintaining force protection whilst in the Red Zone.

For SECDET VIII’s Red Zone tasks, the nine-man infantry section was generally too large for the role of dismounted security, especially when the combined-arms patrol had to conduct moves to embassies and ministries that were sensitive to the size of our military footprint. Because of this, the infantry section was normally split into two bricks, one commanded by a corporal, and the other by the section 2IC. A brick was generally sufficient for dismounted security and, in our experience with ASLAVs, a five-man brick was superior to the four-man brick. With a five-man brick, the ASLAV shooter was organic and four soldiers could provide dismounted security on the ground. When the four-man bricks were tasked with Red Zone patrols, the shooter had to be sourced from an alternative brick, which is not ideal as it broke the integrity of remaining callsigns, which may be tasked to operate in a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) role.

Communication Networks

Operating as part of a combined-arms battle team increased the capability of the communication network and meant that the riflemen had to adapt to a higher tempo environment. Networking the combat team down to small groups added significant complexity to radio nets. To reduce radio traffic, soldiers were required to not ‘offer’ when sending in reports, and to succinctly relay the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). To increase tempo, infantry elements moved away from the ‘alpha stop...’ method of reporting, using instead the At, At, What, What, What format for sending in situation reports. Commanders utilised MBITRs at a brick level, which, when coupled with the Personal Role Radio (PRR), provided a networked brick down to the individual rifleman. With his dual depressor switch on the PRR, the brick commander could direct his soldiers on the ground via PRR whilst receiving orders from the ASLAV Patrol Commander over the MBITR, together with battlefield commentary from snipers positioned in overwatch. The PRR greatly enhanced communication and situational awareness for the riflemen. It allowed the brick commander to discretely pass on information and manoeuvre his men, unaffected by the noise of the battlespace. Soldiers were able to maintain visual on their assigned arcs and immediately report potential threat to commanders, enhancing the tempo and the accuracy of information in the decision-making cycle.

Conclusion

In combined-arms Stability and Support Operations, infantry is multi-roled and, when not employed in Offensive Operations, the Corps is called to perform a variety of security tasks, often in small teams that are network-enabled and supported by a highly mobile QRF. The high level of communications networking increases the independence and responsibility of infantry soldiers, who operate across the battlespace in small teams commanded by junior NCOs and controlled by an often spatially dislocated HQ. In the conduct of Stability and Support Operations, the Infantry Corps is a vital component of combined-arms and offers options to commanders through multi-skilled and highly adaptable soldiers who can be employed to achieve a broad range of tasks across the spectrum of conflict. An understanding of the new tasks for which infantry are likely to be employed is vitally important for commanders and trainers, as it is their role to shape the next generation of Australian riflemen through the training they receive and the equipment they are given.

Endnotes

1    Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, ‘The Army in the Air’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2003.

2    Alice Hill, Future War in Cities, Frank Class Publishers, London, 2004.

3    Lieutenant Colonel Mick Mumford, ‘Victory Despite Defeat?: The Pyramid Event Counter-Method, Unconventional Warfare and the use of Dominant Force’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, Summer 2005–06

4    Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, ‘Towards the Hardened and Networked Army’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, Winter 2004.