Lessons in Managing the Australian Army’s Capability – Part One

Threat Strategy and Concepts

The career management agency is engaged with Officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) about their placement for Career Management Cycle 2026. Some will find themselves coming to Land Capability Division within Army Headquarters for the first time. I was in the same position as you, two years ago.

The aim of this series of posts on the Land Power Forum is to pass on what I have learned about the role of Land Capability Division over the last 12 months, in helping the Chief of Army to manage the capability provided by the Australian Army.^[1] It is this capability that contributes to land power, and it is this same capability that enables Army to project force in and from land in peace, crisis and war to achieve strategic and operational objectives.^[2]

I intend to publish approximately six posts over the next six months on the following topics:

1. This introduction to the series that also includes a focus on threat, strategy and announcements.
2. A description of committee system as it relates to Australian Army capability. Capability is a team sport, which requires a host of interactions both within and outside the Department of Defence. These interactions are formalised through the committee system.
3. An introduction to the ‘One Defence Capability System’. This is both an established and an evolving system that helps the Department of Defence manage the acquisition, sustainment and disposal of capability.
4. A focus on the importance of resources. This post will describe how the resources of money, people and time impact on the management of the capability of the Australian Army.
5. A deep dive on industry as a fundamental input to capability, as industry is an enterprise that few Army personnel will have dealt with in their careers to date.^[3]
6. The final post in the series will cover how the Australian Army manages the land capability system by monitoring performance and risk. As Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe during the Second World War and later the US President emphasised, war experience teaches us that ‘plans are worthless, but planning is everything’.^[4]

This post starts with some definitions that are relevant in the field of capability development and management. It then highlights how the deteriorating security situation have forced Defence to adapt the strategy that guides its capability development efforts. Finally, it concludes with some recent capability announcements to highlight how quickly the Australian Army is responding to the Government’s emerging strategy.

Capability Definitions

Capability is defined as the ‘power to achieve a desired operational effect in a nominated environment within a specified time, and to sustain that effect for a designated period’.^[5] Capability is generated through a combination of inputs known as fundamental inputs to capability (FIC). No individual FIC is a capability. Instead, generating capability depends on integrating, coordinating and managing the various FIC, which need to deliver the integrated force by design.^[6] The FIC are introduced here before the next section that deals with strategy. This is because Australia’s strategic context drives whether we focus on efficiency or effectiveness (additional resources are not efficient, but build resilience) as we acquire and sustain capability.

The Defence Capability Manual outlines the nine existing FIC:

1. Organisation: This FIC ensures that capability is employed within flexible functional groupings with an appropriate balance of competency, structure, and command and control. Organisation is the responsibility of Military Workforce Design Division within Defence People Group.
2. Command and Management: These are the arrangements that exist at all levels to safely and effectively employ the capability, including its integration across Defence. Effective command and management depend on the availability of information. Command and Management is the responsibility of the Capability Manager, which in Army’s case is the Chief of Army.
3. Personnel: This FIC covers the role of a competent workforce component, which includes the Australian Defence Force (ADF) (permanent and Reserves), Australian Public Service (APS) and contractors, in the delivery, operation, sustainment and disposal of the capability. This is the responsibility of Defence People Group.^[7]
4. Collective Training: The support of a defined collective training program is to validate the performance levels of Army’s units of action (like the Ready Battle Group) against the Defence planning requirements and based on the original need. The responsibility for collective training rests with Army’s G7 and Forces Command.^[8]
5. Major Systems: This FIC cover the platforms, fleets of equipment and operating systems that enable the effective generation of Defence capabilities. This is the FIC most people think of–a tank or a rifle. The acquisition and sustainment of major platforms is undertaken by the Delivery Manager within Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group.^[9]
6. Facilities and Training Areas: These are the infrastructure requirements necessary to support the delivery, sustainment and operation of a capability system. They include training areas, which may mean any area of land, sea, undersea or airspace that may be designated for military manoeuvres, or simulated wartime operations. Facilities and training areas are the responsibility of Security and Estate Group.^[10]
7. Supplies: Supplies include the management of all classes of supply to maintain a capability at the designated readiness state, including sustainment funding and fleet management. Supplies is managed by the Logistics Army Branch within Army Headquarters.
8. Support: Support includes: engineering support; maintenance support; supply support; training support; packaging, handling, storage and transportation; facilities; support and test equipment; personnel; technical data and computer support. Supply and support functions are undertaken by Joint Logistics Command.
9. Industry: This FIC includes consideration of the resilience and capacity of industry, such as the reliability and health of supply chains.

Now that we understand that capability comprises of nine FIC, we now need to understand what capability Defence requires. This assessment is based on the threats to Australia and the strategy that is produced to purposefully orientate Defence towards success.^[11]

Threats and Strategy

In the last five years, the strategic environment for Australia changed significantly. In the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU 20), the authors highlighted that ‘our region is in the midst of the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War… the risk of state-on-state conflict are further complicating our nation’s strategic circumstances.’^[12] This document flagged that Australia could no longer assume a ten-year strategic warning time for a major conventional attack against this country.

Next came the Defence Strategic Review in 2023 (DSR 23), which reinforced the threat assessment and the reduced strategic warning time.^[13] It provided recommendations for Government and the ADF in particular. Specifically, the ADF needed the capacity to:

1. defend Australia and our immediate region
2. deter through denial any adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches
3. protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world
4. contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific
5. contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.^[14]

As most of these objectives lie well beyond Australia’s borders, the ADF must have the capacity to engage in impactful projection across the full spectrum of proportionate response.

This strategic guidance has highly significant implications to Army. To nest within those objectives and to contribute to the integrated force, the Army needs to optimise for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime spaces, and to provide a long-range strike capability. It also needs to be able to synchronise the delivery of landing craft, long-range fires, and infantry fighting vehicles.^[15]

Much digital ink has been spilt on the results of the DSR 23 for Army since its publication.^[16] For example, Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, has highlighted that the strategy demands specific changes by Army including a significantly smaller, but no less capable, combined arms fighting system. Of importance to capability development, he has affirmed that Army will need to accelerate the delivery of our long-range fires and littoral manoeuvre capabilities with an increase in the use of robotics and autonomous systems, artificial intelligence and quantum technology.^[17]

Last year, the National Defence Strategy (NDS 24) was released.^[18] It built on the DSU 20 and DSR 23, and outlined that Australia’s strategic circumstances have continued to deteriorate. A Strategy of Denial has been adopted in the hope of: deterring any conflict before it begins; preventing any potential adversary from succeeding in coercing Australia through force; supporting regional security and prosperity; and upholding a favourable regional strategic balance. Deterrence is now Australia’s primary strategic defence objective. NDS 24 retained the direction to transform Army into one focused on littoral manoeuvre capable of control of strategic land positions, and investments in long-range strike capabilities.

These strategic requirements suggest that Army’s capabilities need to be effective rather than just efficient due to the higher probability of conflict than five years ago. The requirements have been quickly acted upon by Army. The following section highlights some of the recent capability announcements.

Capability Announcements

With clear direction and a degree of focus, Army has accelerated the delivery of land capability. These three series of announcements are important as you will recall from the last section there is a requirement for Army to synchronise the delivery of landing craft, long-range fires, and infantry fighting vehicles.

On 23 July 2024, the Government announced it would accelerate the build of 18 medium landing craft for the Army’s new littoral fleet under program Land 8710. This program will also deliver heavy landing craft as well as amphibious vehicles.^[19] The first of the medium landing craft vessels is expected to be delivered in 2026. On 22 November 2024, the Government announced the selection of the design by Damen Shipyards Group as the preferred option for the ADF’s Landing Craft Heavy.^[20] Eight Landing Craft Heavy vessels, based on the LST100, will be built by Australian shipbuilder Austal at the Henderson Shipyard in Western Australia, subject to acceptable commercial negotiations and demonstrated performance. Construction of the first Landing Craft Heavy is expected to start in 2026.

On 19 August 2023, the Government announced that it was accelerating Australia’s long-range fires capability, and the number of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers being acquired by the ADF will more than double.^[21] The project includes scope to procure the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), which is expected to have a maximum range beyond 500km. On 05 January 2024, the government expanded on its earlier statement to highlight that the HIMARS system will be in use by 2026-27, with the first long-range fires regiment established in 2030, seven years ahead of pre-DSR 23 plans.^[22] On 15 January 2024, the Minister for Defence Industry also announced that Australia had joined the development program for PrSM Increments 3 and 4 that have the objective of extending the range of PrSM for both land and maritime strike to around 1,000 kilometres.^[23] Finally, on 6 December 2024, the Government announced its decision on how it will equip the Australian Army with a second long-range fires regiment.^[24] The Government will select from one of two options. The first option is the PrSM fired from HIMARS launcher. The second potential option is the Naval Strike Missile fired from the StrikeMaster launcher vehicle. 

On 08 December 2023, the Government announced it had signed contracts with Hanwha Defense Australia to deliver and support 129 locally built Redback infantry fighting vehicles.^[25] The delivery of the first vehicle is in 2027, which is two years earlier than the former Government planned. The final vehicle is set to be delivered in late 2028.

All three of these announcements highlight that these three capabilities will start to enter service before 2030. 

Conclusion

This article has introduced the forthcoming series of Land Power Forum posts dealing with lessons in land capability, and includes definitions of some key terms relevant to this field. It has highlighted how a deteriorating security situation has led to a fundamental change in the ADF’s strategy. In response, Army is in the process of shifting its focus towards littoral manoeuvre capable of control of strategic land position with long-range strike capabilities. While I am relatively new to capability development, the speed of these decisions and delivery timeframes is unprecedented. How has Army achieved this? The next post will discuss the committee system relevant to these projects. Capability is a team sport, which requires a host of interactions both within and outside the Department of Defence. These interactions are formalised through the committee system.

Endnotes

^[1] See Australian Army, Thinking Deep: The need for a Deep Battle Concept for the Australian Army', Land Power Forum, June 22, 2022.

^[2] See Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Power (Canberra: Australian Army, 2017).

^[3] Introduced in the 2016 Defence White Paper. See Department of Defence, Defence White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016).

^[4] Angel F> Garcia Contreras, Martine Ceberio and Vladik Kreinovich, ‘Plans Are Worthless but Planning is Everything: A Theoretical Explanation of Eisenhower’s Observation’, Proceedings of the 10^th International Workshop on Constraint Programming and Decision Making (3 November 2017), 1-5.

^[5] Department of Defence, Defence Capability Manual (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2022), page 12.

^[6] As per the advice of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, the ADF has been directed to ‘evolve into a genuine Integrated Force which harnesses effects across all five domains’. See Australian Government, Defence Strategic Review (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2023), 19.

^[7] Department of Defence, 'Defence People Group'.

^[8] Department of Defence, 'A unified approach to training', November 22, 2024.

^[9] Department of Defence, ‘Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group’, November 22, 2024.

^[10] Department of Defence, ‘Security and Estate Group’, November 22, 2024.

^[11] ML Cavanaugh, ‘What is Strategy?’, November 10, 2016.

^[12] Department of Defence, Defence Strategic Update (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 3.

^[13] Department of Defence, Defence Strategic Review (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2023), 6.

^[14] Department of Defence, Defence Strategic Review, 6.

^[15] Department of Defence, Defence Strategic Review, 60.

^[16] See, for example, Alex Bristow and Marcus Schultz, ‘Army has a critical role in defence strategic review’s ‘integrated force’’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 22 June 2023.

^[17] LTGEN Simon Stuart, ‘Chief of Army Message – The Defence Strategic Review’, The Cove, 24 April 2023.

^[18] Australian Government, National Defence Strategy (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2024).

^[19] Pat Conroy, ‘Albanese Government boosting ADF capability and safeguarding Australians with accelerated littoral fleet build’, 23 July 2024.

^[20] Pat Conroy, ‘Albanese Government continues record investment in Defence with selection of Landing Craft Heavy Design’, 22 November 2024.

^[21] Richard Marles and Pat Conroy, ‘Australia accelerates long-range precision strike capability acquisition’, 19 August 2023.

^[22] Richard Marles and Pat Conroy, ‘New Guided Weapons a significant boost for national security’, 5 January 2023.

^[23] Pat Conroy, Press Conference in Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 16 January 2024.

^[24] Richard Marles and Pat Conroy, ‘Government progressing historic land-based maritime strike capabilities for the Australian Army’, 6 December 2024.

^[25] Richard Marles and Pat Conroy, ‘Contracts signed for Infantry Fighting Vehicles’, 8 December 2023.