What Motivates Suicide Attackers?
Abstract
This article examines the factors that most often make up the motivation behind suicide attacks. The author argues that it is rarely one issue that influences the behaviour of individuals and groups who resort to suicide attacks, and addresses several misconceptions that exist regarding these dangerous enemies.
Do not kill yourselves. God is merciful to you, but he that does that through wickedness and injustice shall be burned in fire. That is easy enough for God.
- Koran, Surah 4:29
In recent times the world, particularly the Middle East, has seen a rise in suicide-related terrorist activities. An example of suicide attack is when a terrorist with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) strapped to their body enters a crowd of people and detonates the device, killing themselves and any bystanders unlucky enough to be near the explosion. In some cases this is spectacularly successful—the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) assassinated a world leader by this method.1
With the attendant media coverage a significant attack receives, there are still many misconceptions about suicide attackers. The Queensland Police Service undertook a recent survey, which asked: ‘What are the characteristics of a typical suicide bomber?’. The answer was, universally: ‘They are always male’.2 Another misguided opinion is that suicide terrorism is purely an Islamic creation. While Muslims may be the most vocal of the proponents of suicide attacks,3 the greatest number in the last twenty years have been carried out by the Tamil Tigers, a Hindu organisation.
The main difference between a suicide attack and a suicidal attack is that a suicide attacker must die to achieve their objective, whereas a suicidal attacker, while having full knowledge that they are unlikely to survive the attack, does not have to die to meet their aim and may in fact emerge from their mission alive. While this chance of survival may be overwhelmingly theoretical, it marks a crucial difference to the mental state of the attacker.4
This article will aim to outline the various factors that may motivate a person to volunteer for a suicide attack. While considered by many to be an overriding factor, religious fanaticism is only one of a broad range of possibilities. From revenge to national survival to an order from a higher authority; rarely are any of these seen as individual motives. A combination of factors will normally come together to create a suicide terrorist. Recruiting, training and the mission are important factors; however, this article will focus primarily on the issue of motivation.
Revenge has been a powerful motivator for attack for almost the entirety of human history, but is it a causal factor in suicide attacks? There is little evidence to suggest any suicide bombings have been due to a single person solely attempting to gain restitution for a previous grievance against them or someone close to them. However, there is evidence that some suicide attackers have approached terrorist groups, motivated by personal revenge.
A famous case in point is the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi, on 21 May 1991 in Madras. The assassin in this case was a female, known only as Dhanu, who had reportedly been gang raped by Indian soldiers as they looted her town and killed her four brothers.5 The acts committed against her by Indian soldiers may have given her a strong personal motivation for an attack against the Indian Prime Minister. The successful assassination of Ghandi, a major political opponent of the Tamil Tigers, was a vital victory for the organisation. Some grievances can stretch back many years, even centuries. Arab and Asian communities have been known to carry on blood feuds over long periods of time, and this can influence individuals—driving them to volunteer to be a suicide attacker.6
Another interesting subset of the terrorist is the bereaved widow. The death of a spouse may leave her cut off from productive society and/or leave her with a sense of hopelessness, especially in very traditional communities, as seen in Islamic societies.7 Volunteers for the increasing number of suicide attacks in Iraq are often local Iraqis attempting to avenge the occupation of Iraq by US forces and the Global War on Terror, increasingly seen as a war on Islam.8 Many of these volunteers have witnessed clashes between civilians and occupying forces that steeled their resolve to fight, or are merely fighting to remove US forces from Iraq.9 The theme of avenging the occupation is mirrored in the Israeli experience in Gaza, the West Bank and Southern Lebanon. While maintaining a military presence in these areas, Israel saw the highest concentration of suicide attacks launched against its territory. After withdrawing from Southern Lebanon the suicide attacks by Hezbollah stopped,10 whereas Hoffman maintains suicide attacks from Palestinian factions increased following 2002.11
The overpowering and occupation of one country by another larger, militarily superior country will most often be seen as a threat to the very survival of the occupied country. When survival is at stake, more and more desperate measures are brought into play. A society that can see or feel a threat to its way of life, values or even survival may react in such a way as to make the attacking party rethink the value of the conquest in relation to the cost. In this situation the suicide bomber becomes a more attractive proposition—the average suicide attack can be achieved very cheaply, for a cost reportedly as low as $150.12 This offsets the numerical, technical and training superiority of more developed nations.
In developed nations (primarily Israel and occupying US forces) the effects of suicide terrorism can far exceed the effect of most conventional weapons. First and foremost is the negative psychological effect of an unseen but devastating enemy. When any member of a crowd could be seconds away from detonating a device, the awareness and attentiveness needed by nearby soldiers quickly rises to unsustainable levels, making them prone to fatigue, mistakes and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.13 Second, the suicide campaign will have flow-on effects to the civilian population of the invading or occupying force. The population ‘back home’ will quickly tire of seeing its soldiers blown up and killed and will consequently pressure the government to change its policies, achieving the terrorist’s main aims.14 Third, the targeted army’s response to the suicide bombers and parent organisation is to divert resources, already in short supply, sometimes too thinly spread to be effective. As this shows, a terrorist organisation with limited funds but a supply of willing volunteers can tackle a much larger force. The image of a smaller, weaker society struggling to survive against a larger, stronger invader is one that is particularly stirring to terrorists. With differences, particularly in religion, it becomes easier to demonise the enemy, to convince the populace that they are here to destroy them and their way of life. For a number of already dispossessed peoples this has become a reality and they are now fighting to regain their homelands. Typical of these is the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), of Kurdish origin and the LTTE in Sri Lanka.15 These two organisations have committed the great majority of suicide attacks, with both using systematic suicide attacks as a regular tactic rather than an extreme measure, although the PKK no longer uses this level of violence to forward its cause. The occupation of traditional homelands leaves most native to the area with little recourse but to resort to suicide attack for the same reasons outlined previously—psychological, civil and financial effects—and is arguably the only way a smaller, weaker force can hope to overcome a large advanced foe.16
Another causal factor in the decision to use suicide attacks can be the motivation of the parent group and its leadership. This is the result of a group’s leadership deciding to use suicide attack, either singly or in a sustained campaign, and then systematically selecting and training would-be recruits. There can be several reasons for this. The organisation might merely see it as a natural progression, the next step in a sustained campaign where success has been lacking. This has been a primary motivator for Chechen rebels in the Caucasus.17 After suffering setbacks at the hands of Russian forces the Chechens took a change of direction, moving the fighting to major Russian centres with suicide attacks primarily perpetrated by women. This tactic goes against the grain of the traditional Chechen role of women as nurturers. This change has been blamed on an influx of fighters from other nations bringing their traditions and ideologies with them, and military losses depleting the number of available men, which has led to a change in the ideology surrounding a Chechen woman’s place in society.18
Also in this vein was the change of tactics by Hamas. The signing of the Oslo accords did nothing to legitimise or even recognise Hamas, so the decision was taken to continue the offensive against Israel, without the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). But without support from the larger and more capable organisation, Hamas became nothing more than a nuisance to Israel. It was at this point that Hamas moved into the area of suicide bombing, with its first instance in 1994.19 While the transition to suicide attacks can be seen as a natural step for some groups, others have had their hand forced. At the time of Hamas’ first suicide attack, another group was competing for attention as the pre-eminent Palestinian terrorist organisation. Religiously motivated, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was in danger of being eclipsed when Hamas began to use suicide attacks. In order to keep up and maintain its relevance PIJ had to resort to similar tactics, launching its first suicide attack in 1995, shortly after Hamas.20
The issue of these groups moving to a more violent and deadly course of action such as suicide bombing has become more pressing as the relative success of this tactic has been demonstrated in recent years. Smaller, less influential groups may see the need to resort to these methods as a way of becoming a known quantity and gaining new recruits in a competitive market.21 Larger organisations that already have a history of terrorism may consider the suicide attack as a way to reaffirm their commitment to the cause and maintain relevance in the face of greater demands by their civilian supporters.
While terrorist organisations may identify the need to resort to suicide attacks, they do not have the opportunity to explore these methods without widespread support from the community they claim to represent. Whether actual approval (sanction by community or religious leaders) or tacit approval (no opposition or resistance from the community) is gained, the empowerment of working for a cause that benefits the entire society can be a powerful motivator for fresh recruits.
In the case of the female LTTE assassin Dhanu, an event such as rape leaves a Tamil woman seen as unfit to marry or bear children. However, employment as a suicide attacker is seen in Tamil society as an acceptable, if not encouraged, option for women who would otherwise have little to contribute.22 The same can be said of Middle Eastern cultures. Women have been known to accept the role of suicide bomber to escape the social stigma of being unable to bear children.23 A disturbing trend in recent years, confined primarily to Islamic societies, is the practice of blackmailing young women into becoming suicide attackers against their will. This is achieved in several ways. A young woman may be seduced by a man selected by the terrorist organisation and, when approached with evidence of the illicit affair, is told that the only way to bring honour back to herself and her family is to undertake a ‘martyrdom’ mission. The male operative from the terrorist group may aim to get the woman pregnant to guarantee her participation. The only option left to her after this is a so-called ‘honour’ killing by the male members of her family. Where women have not been induced to follow these schemes there is evidence that terrorist groups have arranged for their rape. In Islamic society, the social stigmatisation of real or implied promiscuity can mean the end of a woman’s desire to remain an effective member of society, and there are few options left to them.24
The acceptance of suicide tactics is dependent on the society’s view of the legitimacy of suicide. All major religions of the world consider suicide an abomination against God, on the basis that it is against the laws of God to kill or only God should have the power of life and death, even over one’s self.25 All texts are quite clear in this respect but also incorporate passages to justify killing others in religious wars. In Islam, in comparison to any other religion, the interpretations of the Koran by spiritual leaders has massive influence over the view of certain acts by the whole community. Although suicide is specifically banned, legitimacy can be gained for suicide attacks if it can be shown that suicide is acceptable under certain circumstances, such as during a Jihad (holy war) declared by Muslim clerics. During this time it becomes allowable to kill infidels, even other Muslims under particular circumstances,26 waive daily prayers or even commit suicide attacks,27 This theological legitimacy extends to the benefits received after death. Much has been made of the ‘seventy-two virgins’ a martyr will receive in heaven, but less well known is the promise of the ability to intercede with Allah and bring seventy relatives directly to heaven—surely a strong motivation for socially awkward young men with little direction.
While there is a cause to fight for, most communities will endure extraordinary hardships and sanction retaliations that may not ordinarily be within their scope of thinking, but what happens when the battle is over? Robert Pape has stated that suicide attacks are not committed for their own sake but as part of a sustained campaign.28 When the campaign achieves its objectives, the original motivating factor is removed and public support, upon which terrorists are as dependent as any political party, is in danger of waning. Without public support the organisational, financial and recruiting needs of the group cannot be met. It is at this point that further theological justification may be required to spur a reluctant community into further action.29
This article has presented factors which have been previously identified as significant in the motivation of people freely or coercively undertaking suicide terrorism. As such this list is not exhaustive, as an individual’s perceptions will colour their motivations. These perceptions are ultimately arbitrary and thus highly individualistic motivations are the most notable catalysts for suicide attack. Revenge and retribution for past acts can lead individuals to make themselves available for suicide attacks. In some communities the opportunity to strike back can appear to be the only option left to citizens. Societal survival as a motivator is closely linked to revenge. Invasion and occupation by another country, or even control by an unpopular or oppressive government, can spur the subjugated community to drastic measures. Opposition by an organised resistance or insurgent force will most usually take the form of guerrilla warfare as the smaller force attempts to undermine the larger. In this case suicide attack will be a progression of this strategy, as seen in the sheer number of suicide attacks in Iraq. Public support for this type of campaign is vital. If a terrorist organisation loses the endorsement of their community they can quickly find themselves separated from the support they need to carry out their campaign. Under these circumstances a uniting force, such as religion, can be called upon to create a surge in favour of and fervour for the battle.
With such a range of motivations, both for the individual and groups, it becomes apparent that stopping suicide attack is difficult. The best method for stopping an attack has always been to remove the reason for the attack; but in the case of suicide attack the range of motivations makes the task nearly impossible. Early successes have almost guaranteed its use into the near future, but an effective technique to nullify its popularity will become apparent and force another change in tactics by terrorist organisations.
Endnotes
1 The LTTE assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on 21 May 1991 using a female suicide bomber. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2005, p. 227.
2 Interview with Acting Sergeant Nichole Sampson, Regional Intelligence Office, Metro North Region, Queensland Police Service, 11 March 2008.
3 Mohammed M Hafez, Rationality, Culture and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study, Taylor and Francis, New York, 2006.
4 L Richardson, What Terrorists Want, Random House, London, 2006, p. 136.
5 Pape, Dying to Win, p. 227.
6 A Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 22–42.
7 A K Cronin, Terrorists and Suicide Attack, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington DC, 28 August 2003.
8 Bobby Ghosh, ‘Inside the Mind of an Iraqi Suicide Bomber’, Time Magazine, 4 July 2005.
9 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, p. 150.
10 Interview with Robert Pape, 7:30 Report, 20 July 2007, <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2005/s1418817.htm>.
11 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 153.
12 Ibid., p. 133.
13 John Crotty, ‘Stress, Soldiers and Students’, Curriculum Unit Yale-New Haven Teachers Institute, 2006.
14 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, pp. 22–42.
15 Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Suicide terrorism: a global threat’, Jane’s Security News, 20 October 2000, <http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/usscole/jir00…;.
16 Robert Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’, American Political Science Review, August 2003.
17 Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism, Taylor and Francis, USA, 2006.
18 M Bloom, Dying To Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, Columbia University Press, New York, 2005, p. 154.
19 Hamas carried out its first suicide attack on 6 April 1994 in Afula, northern Israel, killing eight and wounding thirty-four. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 150.
20 Ibid.
21 Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’.
22 Pape, Dying to Win, p. 230.
23 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, p. 155.
24 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Blackmailing Young Women into Suicide Terrorism’, 12 February 2003, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2003/Blackmailing%20Yo…;, accessed 31 October 2008.
25 The Bible (Ecclesiastes 7:17), The Talmud (Exodus 21:12) and The Koran (Surah 4:29) all make reference to the prohibition of the killing of oneself and others.
26 Robert Wuthnow (ed), Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion, 2 vols, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington DC, 1998, pp. 425–26.
27 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 153.
28 Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’.
29 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, pp. 22–42.
