Post-Operational Debriefing in the Australian Army

Abstract

This article reviews the current state of post-operational debriefing in the Australian Army, demonstrating its strengths and weaknesses and comparing it with similar coalition processes. The author concludes by offering two recommendations for enhancing the utility of post-operational debriefing, suggesting that it occur prior to departure from the theatre of operations and that the Chief of Army’s Lessons Seminars be expanded.

---

After the Second World War the United States chief combat historian, S L A Marshall,¹ brought together groups of soldiers to discuss their immediate reactions to their combat experiences. The focus of the debriefing was a cognitive review of the events, and was described as ‘beneficial to the soldiers because they were able to share their experiences and group unity was re-established’.²

An effective post-operational debriefing process benefits the Australian Army at both the organisational and the individual level. Firstly, the benefits to the organisation include improved knowledge management and organisational learning. The information gained from deployed personnel ideally flows into strategy and capability decisions, enabling the Army to implement changes that could increase the effectiveness of future deployments.

Secondly—and just as importantly—individual members benefit psychologically from expressing what they experienced and learned while on operation; such a cathartic release would help during the decompression process. Conversely, if personnel perceive that they are being ignored they may become disillusioned or disgruntled and stop expressing recommendations for improvement, or may even leave the Army.

This article outlines the current system of formal psychological screening and operational debriefing within the Australian Army, and proposes two options for expansion: the introduction of operational debriefing occurring prior to personnel returning from deployment; and the expansion of the Chief of Army’s Lessons Seminars, an informal forum for sharing combat experiences conducted since 2006.

As many deployments include a Tri-Service component, effective debriefing and information sharing is important to future planning and coordination between the Services; and to ensure that all personnel receive access to the same debriefing opportunities.

While the logistics and benefits of a joint post-operational debriefing program are important topics, they are outside the scope of this article.

Current Situation

There are two main components of the Australian Army’s post-operational phase: psychological support—which is carried out for a specific mental health purpose—and operational debriefing.

Psychological Support

The aim of operational psychological support in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is to assist personnel to deploy, perform their operational duties effectively and then return to their work and private lives with minimal disruption.³ For each operation, a psychological threat matrix is developed, which considers the following factors: additional harm to self; threat of psychological harm from exposure to others being injured; psychological harm relating to organisational factors (such as leadership and communication); operational tempo (such as the ability to work and rest); and isolation (either from family/friends or from Australia).⁴

The results from the psychological threat matrix have an impact on all three stages of psychological support provided to operations: Pre-Deployment Psychological Preparation; In-Country Support; and Return to Australia Psychological Support (RTAPS).  

1. Pre-Deployment Psychological Preparation: Prior to deployment, all personnel receive a psychological preparation for deployment briefing. If specific risks are identified in the psychological threat matrix then additional briefings may also be included, for example hostage survival skills, fatigue management and dealing with human remains. At this brief the post-deployment psychological screening process is outlined⁵ and personnel receive a deployment guide booklet that contains detailed information on separation, strategies for managing stress, critical incident mental health support and potential issues that may arise during homecoming.⁶  
    
2. In-Country Support: While personnel are deployed, medical officers typically manage any mental health issues. However, for larger deployments or missions that have been identified as having an increased risk of personnel being exposed to large-scale psychological trauma, psychological support teams⁷ may also be deployed.⁸ In situations where there is no embedded psychological support team, psychological support can be provided by coalition partners or through ‘fly-in’ capability—although this depends on the operational requirements and the tempo of the units involved.  
    
3. Return to Australia Psychological Support (RTAPS): The aim of RTAPS is to assess the deployed member’s current level of psychological functioning and to promote successful reintegration back into non-operational roles.⁹ The first stage of RTAPS commences either prior to personnel leaving the area of operations or immediately upon returning to Australia, and consists of a reintegration brief and a screening questionnaire.¹⁰ This brief targets key issues from the deployment as well as regular topics including reintegration to family/work/social environment and alcohol usage (potential for decreased tolerance). Once these questionnaires have been completed, a screening interview is conducted to clarify and expand on any issues identified.  

Within three to six months after returning from operations, personnel are required to complete the post-operational psychological screening (POPS) process. POPS consists of readministering several of the RTAPS tests, the alcohol use disorder identification test and another interview. If personnel are identified as requiring follow up, the psychologist will refer them to appropriate agencies for further assessment and treatment.¹¹

On 6 May 2008, the Defence Instruction (General) Personnel 16–28¹² was released, with the aim of ensuring that post-operational psychological screening is universally implemented. The goal is for all returned personnel to receive the opportunity to ‘unload’ about their experiences while on deployment. While debate exists on whether psychological debriefing impacts on the onset of post traumatic stress disorder¹³—and that the benefits of debriefing differ amongst personnel—the main benefits include the perception of social support and emotional assistance.¹⁴ However, as psychological screening has an understandable mental health focus, it has limited scope to act as a formal lessons collection mechanism, and therefore operational debriefing is required.

Operational Debriefing

Operational debriefing relates to the actual experiences from the deployment and may include reflections on the command process, the equipment used, the tasks undertaken and the team environment—including interoperability with coalition partners. In the past, debriefing has occurred when members return from deployment. However, the Army has not been able to capture all of the unique, ‘non-mainstream’ experiences which would have flowed into the Army’s ‘Adaption Cycle’.¹⁵

A move towards formalising the debriefing program was the Chief of Army’s Lessons Seminars Program. Commencing in March 2006 and facilitated by the Centre for Army Lessons (CAL), the seminars aim to capture personal insights from operations (in a non-threatening environment) in order to identify lessons.¹⁶ Through a combination of group discussions and one-on-one interviews, the seminars aim to achieve the three therapeutic components of debriefing: ventilation in a context of group support, the normalisation of responses, and education about post-event reactions.¹⁷

While the sessions are flexible in regard to the themes of discussion, topics that often arise include leadership (across all levels), Defence policy, mission command, training, coalition partners and interoperability, equipment and planning. In each three-day seminar there are usually 300 to 700 observations collected, which are recorded for further analysis. The results from the seminars are disseminated through the Smart Soldier publication, pre-deployment handbooks and to the Army Doctrine Wing, which incorporates appropriate lessons into their publications. Seminar reports have also been distributed on occasion to the Future Land Warfare branch (although again, this is not a formal reporting process) with the aim of eventually influencing Army gap analysis, experimentation and capability development.

While the seminars provide a formal debriefing mechanism within the Australian Army, several challenges exist. First, there is a large percentage of personnel that return from deployment who do not participate in the seminars. In particular, individual embedded staff, small group deployments and third country deployments are usually not included in the seminars. These members may not be debriefed at all from an operational perspective, which may mean that valuable information could be overlooked.¹⁸ Second, the Centre for Army Lessons is still perfecting techniques for inputting, storing and extracting the information. Finally, once the information has been collected and potential lessons identified, the challenge is then getting this information through to the appropriate committees and/or decision-makers. For example, there needs to be a straightforward way to identify any information relating to specific equipment so that it can be disseminated to the in-service support organisation, who will then decide whether the item is retained in inventory, upgraded or replaced. This concept also relates to information that would have an impact on operational concepts, the intelligence cycle, cultural understanding priorities and even major capability systems.

Comparisons with Coalition Partners

The United States Army has developed an official website that allows companygrade and non-commissioned officers to post their lessons learnt either while in-country or following a deployment.¹⁹ The United States Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center also conducts a program that is similar to the CA Lessons Seminars—the us Army Readiness Assessment Program (ARAP).²⁰ While the ARAP focuses on organisational safety, it provides a mechanism for individuals to tell their battalion commanders anonymously about things that are going well (or not well) within the unit. Once this information has been collated, ARAP personnel brief the commander about the overall results and themes. The commander is then expected to back-brief their unit and higher command.²¹

The Canadian Forces run a ‘Debrief the Leaders’ program, which surveyed more than 800 officers using a combination of focus groups, survey questionnaires and individual interviews, on the key categories of chain of command, mission-own troops, unit cohesion and cultural training.²² The program—which is currently being expanded—aims to equip leaders by learning from the successes and mistakes of previous operational leaders.

The thirst for organisational learning from individuals’ experiences is clearly one shared, and in the future it may be possible to bring these and similar programs from other coalition countries together, so that lessons learnt can be shared across allied partners.²³

Proposal One - Universal Debriefing Should Occur Prior to Personnel Returning from Operations

As memories are perishable, there is strong argument that universal operational debriefing should occur prior to personnel returning from operations. While memories gained on operations are often strong (there is a recognised relationship between the level of stress experienced and memory intensity), much of this detail and often the specific memories themselves fade with the passage of time and as other experiences accumulate.²⁴ Therefore, capturing experiences while the memories are fresh will assist the lessons learnt process. A key supporting reason is that by being debriefed while still overseas, personnel are more likely to feel a sense that the deployment has been completed prior to returning to Australia, reinforcing a sense of ‘event closure’. This is likely to help facilitate the transition to a non-operational mindset.²⁵

This proposed method of operational debriefing could occur in two ways—quite possibly in tandem—either by capturing lessons in theatre through deployed lessons teams and/or through debriefing immediately after the deployment ends or during the decompression phase, possibly at a staging location.

Capturing Lessons in Theatre

The ideal time to capture information about the operation is while the deployment is still occurring. However, in-theatre collection is complicated; the lessons collection team are classified as ‘visitors’ and, as they have to be escorted at all times, personnel are diverted from achieving the goals of the operation.²⁶ Also, there is resistance to having visitors in-theatre, with negative perceptions about their utility and value—particularly in combined deployment situations.

One way to mitigate this challenge is to establish a team of qualified²⁷ personnel dedicated to collecting and collating lessons. The CAL could prepare this embedded team, which would undertake ongoing collection and debriefing activities (for medium and long-loop learning²⁸) and prepare mid-rotation reports on the status of each deployment.

These reports would be beneficial for short-loop learning, where lessons identified could be implemented for the second half of the rotation—if possible—or prior to the next deployment arriving. An embedded lessons team would also mitigate one of the existing challenges involved in the Chief of Army’s Lessons Seminar by being well placed to capture information from deployed personnel who do not return as part of a large group.

Some countries within the ABCA Programme²⁹ have dedicated lessons staff deployed on operations. If the Australian Army implements capturing lessons in-theatre, it is recommended that this be approached in consultation with these units, to determine what level of interoperability between the deployed lessons staff would be possible.

Debriefing Occurring During the Decompression Phase

An alternative, or complement, to an embedded lessons team is having all personnel debriefed while they are in the decompression phase of their rotation. While there is no formal policy within the Australian Army about the length of decompression, the aim of decompression is to provide a perceptibly safe environment—potentially in a third country location—which facilitates personnel transitioning from the operational environment to a home environment.³⁰ In an ideal setting, decompression should be about releasing issues and achieving a resolution for the deployment, with a focus on resting.

One nation that has salient experience with decompression in a third-country location is Canada.³¹ In 2002, the Canadian Forces with Operation Apollo—Canada’s initial military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism—undertook a period of decompression in Guam. During these few days, personnel were involved in exercise, sightseeing, private time, lectures and debriefing. According to a 2004 report commissioned by the National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, the main benefits from the Guam decompression period included:  

• Recognition: Members appreciated the extra effort and expense, which the Canadian Forces invested to ensure that they were properly cared for and followed up. They appreciated this recognition of their value and contribution to the mission  
   
• Comfortable environment  
   
• Ability to unwind  
   
• Access to education and training.

However, the report stated that it is hard to quantify the impact third country decompression has on stress reduction or if there is any long-term effects on reducing operational stress injuries among those deployed. The other challenge associated with debriefing during the decompression phase is that there is no time to implement any changes for the next group, as they have already arrived in-theatre when the preceding group enters decompression.³² One way to mitigate this challenge is to also capture the lessons in-theatre, as discussed previously.

Formal Policy

Aside from the debriefing process, the Australian Army currently does not have a formal policy for decompression and reintegration.³³ This means that while personnel deployed to the Middle East often spend time in a third country location at the end of their deployment, there is no formal decompression program with lectures, relaxation time and focused debriefing. Also, personnel deployed to locations closer to Australia, such as East Timor and the Solomon Islands, do not have access to time in a neutral, transitional locality at all.

Having formal decompression would not only benefit deployed personnel, but also their families. In the Canadian case study, some family members were initially opposed to decompression in Guam, as they felt that this was making the deployments even longer. However, once the benefits were explained, such as their loved one being able to take time to transition out of an operational mindset and receive support, they became supportive of the initiative.³⁴

The Army—or preferably the Department of Defence—could consider developing a formal decompression policy that covers the following issues: the objectives of decompression, length of time, suitable location, activities that should occur, and specific policy for embedded personnel who are not deployed as part of a wider unit. However, the costs of a decompression phase, especially in a third country location, will need to be weighed against any potential benefits.³⁵

Proposal Two - Continuing The Chief of Army's Lessons

Seminars Program

According to the CAL, the Chief of Army’s Lessons Seminars have produced positive results and are a step forward for achieving a formalised debriefing project,³⁶ especially in the short-term. Feedback from individuals is also very positive to date, and it is envisaged that greater effect will come from a maturing of its application through linkage to the Army Gap Analysis. Further benefits will also flow from broadening the target audience to capture personnel who were deployed as either individuals or in a small team.

Information Sharing

Effective communication is a major challenge for any debriefing process, whether it is conducted within the area of operations or in Australia. Communication needs to flow not only from those being debriefed through the collection and storage process to the relevant decision-makers, but also back to those that provided the initial information. A key component to any effective post-operational debriefing process is an equally effective knowledge management system, where knowledge owners or authorities have agreed responsibilities for lessons and Army knowledge is managed through recognised and delegated authorities.³⁷

Communication directly relates to the issue of managing expectations, especially those from the personnel being debriefed. It is not possible to utilise all of the information provided during debriefing, so a balance is needed so that relevant information is identified as being important and then flows onto decision-makers.

Conclusion

Formal post-operational debriefing benefits both the individual solider and the Australian Army. However, expanding this process to include items such as third country decompression would be complex, and further consideration is needed regarding areas such as managing expectations and potential interoperability with other ABCA lessons teams.

The timely passage of information and lessons sharing is essential for learning from the experiences of deployed personnel. When teamed with an effective knowledge management system, the information gained from deployed personnel has a direct impact on Army’s strategy, capability and tactical/procedural decisions. This process will provide the catalyst for institutional adaptation that Army recognises as indispensable, but just as importantly, it will contribute to maintaining that vital contract of mutual trust and interdependence between the soldier and the organisation.

This paper is the author’s own thoughts and does not reflect either the Department of Defence or Australian Red Cross policy.

Endnotes

---

1     Noting the various critical views of S L A Marshall’s findings in other fields, this reference should not be taken to infer wholesale support for his other work.

2     Z Kaplan, I Iancu and E Bodner, ‘A Review of Psychological Debriefing After Extreme Stress’, Psychiatric Services, Vol. 52, No. 6, 2001.

3     Director-General Defence Health Service Health Bulletin No. 11/2003 – ‘Mental Health Support to Operationally Deployed Forces’, Department of Defence, 13 August 2003.

4     Lieutenant Colonel Maree Riley, ‘Presentation to 9 FSB Operational Stress’, Presentation to 9 FSB (Grade 3 Course), 2005.

5     ‘Defence Instructions (General) Personnel 16-28 – ‘Operational Mental Health Screening, Department of Defence, 30 April 2008.

6     ‘Director-General Defence Health Service Health Bulletin No. 11/2003 – ‘Mental Health Support to Operationally Deployed Forces’.

7     Services provided by the embedded Psychological Support Team include screening, assessment, counselling, critical incident mental health support and continuing psycho-education. Lieutenant Colonel Maree Riley, CO 1 Psych Unit, ‘The Provision of Psychological Support to Australian Defence Force Personnel on Operations’, Presentation to the 41st International Applied Psychology Symposium, Enduring Psychological Readiness and Resilience for Deployed Forces.

8     Director-General Defence Health Service Health Bulletin No. 11/2003 – ‘Mental Health Support to Operationally Deployed Forces’

9     Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Maree Riley, Defence Force Psychology Organisation; and Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Deputy Director Strategy – Army, 4 October 2007.

10    The RTAPS screening questionnaire includes a deployment experience questionnaire, the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10), the Post Traumatic Stress Checklist – Civilian (PLC–C) and a Traumatic Stress Event Scale. Once these questionnaires have been completed, a screening interview is conducted to clarify and expand on any issues identified. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Maree Riley, Defence Force Psychology Organisation; and Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Deputy Director Strategy – Army, 4 October 2007.

11    Director-General Defence Health Service Health Bulletin No. 11/2003 – ‘Mental Health Support to Operationally Deployed Forces’

12    Defence Instruction (General) Personnel 16–28 – ‘Operational Mental Health Screening’

13    J L Bisson, A McFarlane and S Rose, ‘Psychological Debriefing’ Journal of Traumatic Stress, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 555–57.

14    ‘Individual Differences and Debriefing Effectiveness’ The Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies, Vol. 1, 1998.

15    Adaptive Campaigning outlines the four stages of the Adaption Cycle: Act, Sense, Decide and Adapt. The results from universal debriefing would have an impact on all four of these stages. Future Land Warfare Branch, Adaptive Campaigning – The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting, Department of Defence, Canberra, December 2007.

16    Interview with Geoff Cooper, Manager CAL, 14 December 2007.

17    Kaplan, Iancu and Bodner, ‘A Review of Psychological Debriefing After Extreme Stress’

18    Importantly, these groups comprise those individuals whose experiences are often unique, and whose insights are often valuable given the access, placement and seniority of those individuals.

19    Correspondence with Lieutenant Colonel Jayson Altieri, Commanding Officer, 2–82nd AVN Regt, US Army, 17 June 2008.

20    Army Readiness Assessment Program website< http://unitready.army.mil/what_is.asp&gt;, accessed 12 November 2007.

21    Chris Frazier, ‘New Release: Leader takes new approach to safety’, US Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center, Fort Rucker, 10 October 2007.

22    Debrief the Leaders Program (Officers), Canadian Officer of the Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff for Professional Development, 2001.

23    While it may be a logical and appealing idea, the concept of developing an ‘allied’ debriefing mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper.

24    E Bruce Goldstein, Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research and Everyday Experience, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, 2005.

25    Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Maree Riley, Defence Force Psychology Organisation and Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Deputy Director Strategy – Army, 4 October 2007.

26    Interview with Geoff Cooper, Manager CAL, 14 December 2007.

27    These qualifications would include psychological and operational analysis fields, as well as relevant humanities fields (such as anthropology, etc).

28    The Defence Instruction (Army) 10–1, Army Lessons outlines three learning loops: short (‘the war’), medium (‘a war’) and long (‘future war’). These loops are influenced by different types of experiences, for example the short learning loop is influenced by experiences from operations. Defence Instruction (Army) 10–1, Army Lessons.

29    The ABCA currently comprises of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. While New Zealand was officially accepted as a full member of ABCA in March 2006, the name remains unchanged.

30    National Defence & Canadian Forces Ombudsman, ‘Special Report – From tents to sheets: an analysis of the Canadian Forces experience with third location decompression after deployment’, 2004.

31    Ibid.

32    Interview with Geoff Cooper, Manager CAL, 14 December 2007.

33    Director-General Defence Health Service Health Bulletin No. 11/2003 – ‘Mental Health Support to Operationally Deployed Forces’.

34    National Defence & Canadian Forces Ombudsman, ‘Special Report – From tents to sheets’.

35    As an added return, the policy should also address the potential wider benefits, which include time to complete personnel and unit administration, Honours and Awards actions, Post-Activity Reports and Unit History Reports.

36    Interview with Geoff Cooper, Manager CAL, 14 December 2007.

37    Colonel Shane Amor (Director Doctrine Simulation Experimentation and Lessons (DSEL), Geoff Cooper (Manager CAL), ‘Inculcating Army Lessons’ 2007.