Refining the Military Appreciation Process for Adaptive Campaigning

Abstract

This article argues that the Military Appreciation Process (MAP) does not support adaptation or complex problem solving, which are fundamental requirements of contemporary operations. An alternative model is presented that would preserve most existing doctrine while facilitating a shift away from linearity and prescription in favour of concurrency and description.

---

How often people speak of art and science as though they were two entirely different things, with no interconnection. An artist is emotional, they think, and uses only his intuition... A scientist is cold, they think, and uses only his reason... That is all wrong. The true artist is quite rational as well as imaginative and knows what he is doing...The true scientist is quite imaginative as well as rational, and sometimes leaps to solutions where reason can follow only slowly.

- Isaac Asimov

Introduction

LWD 5-1-4 The Military Appreciation Process is the ADF’s primary decisionmaking and planning doctrine. It provides a model for all military planning and decision-making at home and on operations, and it provides the concepts and theories through which officers and soldiers develop their understanding of problem solving in general.¹

This article argues that the MAP contains a number of critical flaws that significantly detract from its utility, and while these flaws could be largely circumvented when planning for conventional operations, they are a major barrier to planning in complex environments characterised by ‘ill-structured problems’² and a ‘continuous meeting engagement’.³ The article argues that the MAP is burdened by linear procedures that do not reflect natural cognitive processes and proposes an alternative model based on six (concurrently developed) components derived from the systems approach to problem solving. It is proposed that progress in planning should not be perceived as progression through pre-defined steps, but as the changing state of key attributes of planning models and the environment—attributes such as scope, uncertainty, accuracy, precision, risk, resources, criteria and objectives. While generic pre-defined steps will always be a fallacy, these key attributes are always real and must always form the basis of decision-making. In other words, our planning model should be descriptive, not prescriptive. By seeking to prescribe a sequence of activities, the MAP forfeits the ability to properly describe the problem and proposed solutions. This article attempts to represent the logical evolution of the MAP in accordance with Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept 2009, Army’s capstone document, intended to guide the evolution of doctrine and other systems.⁴

In the solution proposed herein, readers may recognise some basic principles of design thinking, a methodology with relatively extensive military and civilian literature, and recently introduced into US Army doctrine. The design thinking movement inside and outside the military has significant momentum and Australian officers have argued convincingly for its inclusion into our doctrine.⁵ This article will argue that US doctrine is compromised by their attempt to synchronise design thinking (strictly non-linear) with their old linear planning model, and if we introduce design thinking into Australian doctrine, we must first develop a non-linear MAP that can handle design thinking or any other problem solving methodology that planners may choose to employ.

... if we introduce design thinking into Australian doctrine, we must first develop a non-linear MAP ...

Before proceeding, it is worth addressing one common objection to the arguments presented in this article. It is clear that many people have found the MAP to be a useful tool over the years and this in itself is evidence in support of its utility and suitability. It is true that the MAP does work at least moderately well as a tool for expedient decision-making under certain conditions. These are:

• Objectives are predefined and very simple;
• Much of the plan is provided by a superior headquarters in the form of specified tasks and control measures;
• There is a period of inactivity followed by a defined period of activity (an execution phase); and
• Flow of intelligence is primarily top down from a superior headquarters to its subordinates.

Training scenarios usually include all of these conditions, and current operations almost always include none. Adaptive Campaigning describes a future operating environment in which few or none of these conditions can be expected to exist. This article will demonstrate how the utility of the MAP is dependent on these conditions and propose a model that is not.

The Error of Linearity

While conducting the MAP, progress toward completion is judged by the step being performed: Mission Analysis, COA (Course of Action) Development, COA Analysis, or Decision and Execution. Within each of these steps, there are sub-steps and sub-sub-steps. It seems everything, no matter how trivial, must be done in sequence. In LWD 5-1-4, the word ‘step’ appears over ninety times in the table of contents alone.

Only intelligence preparation and monitoring of the battlespace (IPMB) is prescribed to occur constantly and concurrently. While this makes the model a little less bad, it also reinforces the fact that the other components of the model are not intended to occur concurrently or continuously. What’s more, the IPMB is also a procedure to be followed (it has twenty-two steps with a clearly intended sequence)⁶ and the criticisms of linearity that follow are equally applicable.

MAP apologists often respond to criticisms of its linearity by suggesting that the MAP is only linear for beginners, and more experienced operators can move at their leisure between its components. There is an element of truth in this but it is a very unsatisfactory defence for at least three reasons. Firstly and most importantly, any marginal benefits to beginners come at a very high cost to the utility of the model. This article seeks to demonstrate that a far more robust model is available if we are willing to give up the sequential mindset. Secondly, teaching inexperienced decision-makers to aim for linearity is to teach them poorly. Thirdly, there is nothing preventing the use of additional checklists, procedures and aide memoires for expedience or as training wheels for beginners (most of which can be lifted straight out of the existing doctrine).

... a far more robust model is available if we are willing to give up the sequential mindset.

Decision-Making Is A Natural Process With No Definable Steps

It is quite simply impossible to define a chronological procedure that represents effective decision-making. The human brain is incapable of considering a problem one cognitive step at a time, and by trying to force such thinking, the MAP often becomes a barrier rather than a support to decision-making.

It is both impossible and highly undesirable to separate our analysis of the environment from our ideas about how we might achieve certain effects in that environment. Reconnaissance and analytical assets are scarce and it is only by reference to our likely COAs that we can decide which information to gather from the near infinite information that might otherwise be gathered. There is no COA development without COA analysis and evaluation, so all these things must occur concurrently whether we like it or not.

The simplicity of a model based on chronological steps is notoriously tempting, especially to large prescriptive organisations like armies. Academic support for this argument is abundant. From their extensive studies of the US Military Decision-Making Process, Schmitt and Klein draw the following conclusions:

... existing planning models...view planning as an orderly, sequential process. ... [They] do not do justice to the non-linear complexity of real planning, and in many cases actually inhibit and degrade planning.⁷

Friend and Hickling state:

The most orthodox progression might appear to be from shaping problems, through designing possibilities, to comparing their consequences and then on to a final choosing of actions. However, such a progression is likely to be neither straightforward nor realistic.⁸

Erroneous linear decision-making models seem likely the result of a simple category error. Cyclical decision models are a relatively obvious way to represent many decision-making processes, and the prevalence of such models is evidence enough of this. The category error occurs when one sets out to turn their cyclical model into a procedure with the same steps. The steps in a cyclical decision model are not temporal steps, they are steps of logic only, and therefore cannot be extrapolated to a linear procedure. Procedures require steps in time, while cyclical decision models contain only steps of logic. The MAP appears to have been conceived in this way. In the doctrine, it is presented first as a cycle and then as a procedure with the same steps.

Intuition Is An Indispensible Tool For Everyone

Army doctrine and Army culture in general appears enamoured with a commonly held myth of intuition. This myth is that we use intuition occasionally to make quick decisions when we do not have time for carefully reasoned analysis of the situation. Intuition is therefore often pitched as the commander’s unique prerogative. It is not uncommon for commanders to insist that they are responsible for the art of war and their staff responsible for the science; that they alone use their intuition and the staff crunch the numbers. This is a popular and almost romantic view of intuition, like some kind of magic reserve of the maestro. But it is not the case. Everyone uses their intuition all of the time. Our brains solve problems by repeatedly throwing up propositions and knocking them down. Coming up with those propositions is very dependent on intuition, no matter how junior or inexperienced. There is a great deal of evidence that the brain conducts much (if not most) information processing subconsciously; indeed ‘our consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg’.⁹

Army doctrine and Army culture in general appears enamoured with a commonly held myth of intuition.

For sure intuition is not a reliable master. We humans are subject to a gamut of natural biases that disguise themselves as intuitive knowledge. Many are cognitive shortcuts, relics of two million years of evolution that might once have been useful to less capable hominid ancestors living in a world void of technology. But the MAP seeks to manage these risks by setting routines that block intuition, and then supposing that one might call it up in the situations for which it is advised. The idea is that by placing our thoughts in a defined sequence, we can stop it from jumping to conclusions. So we avoid the risk of prematurely jumping to conclusions by actively blocking the inception of ideas that might be accepted as conclusive—like amputating the leg to avoid the possibility of trench foot. The well-studied tendency of people to ‘situate the appreciation’ (define the situation such that it suits their pre-conceived plan) is a real risk to planning and decision-making; but it should be managed by education and the provision of tools that mitigate it. Such tools would include checklists and procedures but they would always be applied at the discretion of the decision-maker and they would exist outside the core decision-making model.

Delaying COA Development Is A Wasted Opportunity

The current rule of thumb is for COA development to begin after approximately 30 per cent of the available planning time has lapsed. By this time a thousand ideas have come and gone. The ideas that follow will be made in an environment perhaps better informed, but also polluted by biases that have built up during the planning process. Groupthink bias, sunk cost bias, and information bias to name a few, will increase their negative effect over time. Planning staff with great ideas will lose confidence if they get the impression those ideas are not what the commander (or the majority) is looking for.

Bad information increases over time as well as good. A fantastic idea forming intuitively in one’s mind is quickly destroyed by weak and superficial evidence to the contrary, and as time goes by there is more weak and superficial evidence to kill those ideas. Of course it is usually better to be informed than not, but only where the information is reliable, valid and relevant. Dubious analytical models and historical analogies may also prevent the consideration of perfectly good COAs. Our first impressions may not be well informed and they are indeed subject to intuitive biases, but they are formed with a clarity of mind that is not redeemable. To routinely discourage COA development for the initial period of planning, or to make it the reserve of a few individuals, is to entirely miscomprehend the place of intuition in planning.

Of course it is usually better to be informed than not, but only where the information is reliable, valid and relevant.

Adaptation Requires Concurrent Planning And Execution

One of the preconditions for productive use of the MAP is a period of inactivity followed by a period of activity. The MAP assumes conventional warfare scenarios whereby contact with the enemy will be made upon commencement of the operation, and the timing of that contact can be more-or-less calculated or set. This is, and has for many years been a false assumption, and it is now a very dangerous one.

Adaptive Campaigning states, ‘Joint Land Combat is predicated on the effective application of the Adaptation Cycle’ and assumes a ‘continuous meeting engagement’¹⁰ during which forces must take action to unmask the enemy. This clearly requires a planning model that assumes constant and concurrent planning and execution. The MAP is not such a model and is therefore not an appropriate tool of adaptive campaigning.

Recent US doctrine comes to the same conclusion as Adaptive Campaigning with slightly different concepts. The [US] Army Capstone Concept – Operational Adaptability requires a force to ‘develop the situation through action’.¹¹ FM 5-0 The Operations Process 2010 introduces ‘design’ as a means of dealing with ill-structured problems. An ill-structured problem requires the problem solver to engage with the system in order to understand it.¹² Necessarily, ‘Design, planning, and execution are interdependent and continuous activities’.¹³

Some may protest that the MAP handles adaptation. Just join the ends and it becomes a cycle, as it is occasionally presented in the doctrine. But this fails to recognise that adaptation must occur during the planning process, not in subsequent planning cycles, and a sufficient understanding of the problem is only achievable through action, hence there is no planning without action. Only a model that assumes planning and action to be concurrent can handle the kind of adaptation demanded by adaptive campaigning.

An Alternative Model

A common feature of all models is categorisation of some kind. Decision-making and planning models attempt to categorise the elements of a problem and its solution, and the following six categories are proposed here to be the most robust and useful:

• The environment – what exists, has existed, and will exist
• Objectives – how do we want to affect the environment
• Courses of action (COA) – consisting of designs, methods and plans
• COA analyses – how will COAs affect the environment
• COA evaluations – what value do we place on these outcomes
• Decisions and execution – communication of COAs to those that will realise them.

These six components are the planning models that we must over time make increasingly accurate, precise, specific and certain. These components are consistent with the systems approach that is best practice for complex problem solving and decision-making.¹⁴ It is acknowledged that the systems approach has evolved and diverged into a large variety of models and methods including ‘soft systems methodology’,¹⁵ which purports to be more suitable for social environments than the original systems approach. The six components model presented here reflect the basic foundations of all problem solving and can thereby accommodate input from a diverse range of models and methods that planners may see fit to employ from time to time, while also providing a common planning picture that is necessary for collaborative planning within and between organisations.

It is acknowledged that the systems approach has evolved and diverged into a large variety of models and methods ...

Clearly this is only the skeleton of a useful decision-making model. Thankfully, most of the omitted detail is in fact exactly the same as our current MAP. This skeletal model is all that is needed to elucidate the most important changes to planning and decision-making being proposed here, which are primarily concerned with the implementation, rather than the content of the MAP.

Most importantly, all the components are concurrently and continuously developed. There is no beginning and no end to any component of this model. Steps are for procedures, not doctrine.

This model places ‘objectives’ where one might expect to see the Mission Analysis. This is an important departure from the MAP and it is discussed in detail shortly.

Note that ‘evaluation’ is considered to be a separate component. A systems approach requires a more strict definition of the word ‘evaluate’, which is to attribute value. It is a largely subjective activity that will determine the preferred COAs. LWD 5-1-4 uses it synonymously with ‘analyse’ or ‘examine’. For example, ‘The combined obstacle overlay is evaluated to identify corridors’. The word ‘examine’ would be more appropriate. It also describes as ‘stakeholder evaluation’ what most people would consider to be stakeholder analysis. Though not trivial, this is the least consequential departure from the MAP and the reader shall be spared any further discussion of it.

This alternative model supports continuous adaptation by assuming constant feedback between every element of the decision-making process from analysing the environment and defining objectives all the way to decision and execution. The aim is to describe the problem and solution set as clearly as possible at any given moment, and there is no right or wrong time to do anything; the state of the model will be the determining factor. Outcomes of decisions feed immediately into the planning model, thereby making adaptation an integral part of the planning process. This does not imply that decisions should be made with less consideration. It implies that a decision should be made when the model is sufficiently developed to warrant it, and such moments will arrive continually throughout the planning process.

Complexity Is A Function Of Objectives

When people talk about complexity these days, it is usually with respect to the ‘complex environment’.¹⁶ While understanding the environment is of course vitally important, it is not the environment that makes our problems complex. Had General Montgomery been charged with bringing the North African tribes together under a single national government with functional democratic institutions, he would have certainly been engaged in what we would describe as complex warfare.¹⁷ So either we are just amusing ourselves with faddish terminology, or there is something other than the environment that determines the extent to which warfare is complex.

Complex problems, ill-structured problems and wicked problems (all largely synonymous) are roughly speaking problems where multiple objectives compete for resources, and the pursuit of one objective can affect others in ways that are extremely difficult or impossible to predict. This is where the environment matters. The environment is responsible for the unpredictable effects on objectives and of course some environments are easier to predict than others. But all natural systems are complex at some level of abstraction, so when we talk about a complex environment we must recognise that this is a relative condition determined by our objectives.

... when we talk about a complex environment we must recognise that this is a relative condition determined by our objectives.

While conventional warfare is concerned primarily with physical effects on physical entities, complex warfare is additionally concerned with social effects on social entities. Commanders must these days be military leaders, aid workers, economists, politicians, educators, and even social engineers. And with each additional objective there is an exponential increase in complexity.

What is more, while armies have evolved to destroy complex systems, today they are being asked to construct them. This is an important distinction. Not only are commanders being asked to achieve multiple objectives, they are being asked to design and build sustainable systems that will achieve multiple objectives well into the future; systems of infrastructure, political engagement, security and military institutions. This is perhaps why many have suggested that armies should learn to think like designers, and consequently the most significant change to the US Army’s planning doctrine published last year is the introduction of design. Design has always been part of all planning but the MAP in its current form is a barrier to the design of anything other than relatively simple (and usually largely templated) manoeuvre operations.

Objectives are the cause of complexity and the impetus of all design, so they must be recognised as a central component of any robust planning model. Military leaders must be prepared to, in collaboration with other organisations, define objectives and continually test and adjust those objectives throughout an operation. It is difficult to overstate the significance of this requirement and the inadequacy of the MAP in dealing with it.

At first glance one might suggest that the Mission Analysis is the step at which objectives are determined, and therefore the MAP handles this requirement. But the Mission Analysis is not where objectives are determined, it is where they are received. There is a world of difference. Rather than supporting efforts to discover a suitable set of objectives, the Mission Analysis is configured to achieve almost the opposite. It actually seeks to prevent the decision-maker from considering objectives not specifically issued by superior command. The Mission Analysis assumes the existence of specified tasks and requires the decision-maker to define a centre of gravity from which targetable critical vulnerabilities can be identified; and all this eventually leads to a set of decisive events. But in complex warfare (including current operations) one can be certain that no centre of gravity will exist, and a procedure that requires one will do nothing but arbitrarily reduce the scope of the problem to a tiny fraction of its former self. Reducing scope through decisive events planning is a great way to conjure very simple problems out of very complex situations, but it is unfortunately also an act of self-delusion. It leads to simple solutions to the wrong problems. We must accept that there is no centre of gravity with which to magic away most of our problems, and trading off possible objectives according to available resources is a challenging task that never ends.

The Mission Analysis assumes the existence of specified tasks and requires the decision-maker to define a centre of gravity ...

Parallel And Collaborative Planning

Because the MAP considers decision and execution to occur only at the end of the procedure, the logical conclusion of the MAP is sequential planning by multiple levels of command. This is indeed what LWD 5-1-4 recommends.¹⁸

The MAP recommends a linear procedure that might once have been appropriate in a world where communicating between levels of command was more difficult and less relevant. The advance of information and communication technology provides an opportunity for collaborative planning that we cannot afford to squander.

Notwithstanding a warning order fired off almost immediately upon the start of planning, LWD 5-1-4 assumes that decision-making and information transfer will be concentrated in a single moment when decisions and other information will be formatted into orders and passed down. But orders (if they are produced at all) are the product of many decisions spread over the entire duration of planning, each of which should usually be communicated at the earliest opportunity. Even more importantly, the planning process of one headquarters produces a raft of information that is highly and immediately relevant to the planning and preparation of other headquarters (up, down, sideways, and even external). A set of orders should contain little that was not already known by those receiving them and often acts more as a legal document, officially charging subordinates with responsibility and command. The current doctrine encourages planners to horde their information and decisions until they have compiled a set of formal orders. This denies subordinates the opportunity to plan their own activities, and it denies them the opportunity to contribute to the planning and decision-making of their superior headquarters. Fragmentation orders may be used to intermittently pass information but they are not an assumed part of the MAP, they are always top down, and they do not provide the seamless transfer of information that is necessary and well within our capability.

While upward flow of information and counsel has always been important, it becomes increasingly important with increased complexity largely because the superior headquarters becomes decreasingly capable of understanding the environment without it. In conventional warfare the flow of information is primarily top down, but for highly complex operations the reverse is true.¹⁹ Current and likely future operations are too complex to get by without the upward flow of information that is only possible through parallel planning (multiple levels of command planning at the same time).

The alternative model naturally supports (but does not require) parallel planning and the upward flow of information. If we compared the planning models of one headquarters with those of a subordinate, we would find they consist of much the same information, with the higher headquarters being broader in scope and less specific. Information can pass at any moment up, down or sideways to enhance the various planning models, and action can be taken by any headquarters at any time within its authority.

The alternative model naturally supports (but does not require) parallel planning and the upward flow of information.

LWD 5-1-4 considers parallel planning to be an anomaly. The doctrine mentions it only once as something to be done in extremis, when time is very short.²⁰ In reality there should rarely be a moment when planning is not being conducted in parallel by all levels of command. That is the inescapable corollary of continual adaptation.

The persistence of the linear planning mindset may be largely to blame for our desperately unevolved planning software. Training establishments seem determined to stop any progress on this front for fear that students may find it a little too easy to complete the planning process if they receive information in a useful format. Rather than embrace collaborative technology and increase the quantity, quality and frequency of information passing to student planners, training establishments make a genuine effort to avoid information passing to students in digital form. There seems to be very little effort to develop tools and techniques for effective collaboration between levels of command. Collaboration tools used within a planning cell are also primitive, with most work being produced in Microsoft PowerPoint®—the one application in the Office Suite that was not designed for productivity.

Design Thinking

The United States has addressed many of the issues described throughout this article by the introduction of design thinking, or simply ‘design’ as the US doctrine annoyingly calls it. The US implementation of design thinking is promising, but there are some good reasons not to copy it, which will be discussed in this final section.

The US implementation of design thinking is the product of a diverse range of influences.²¹ Their doctrine says: ‘Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.’ Anyone that has studied systems thinking, community operations research, futurology, complex adaptive systems, or any number of social science research methods, will be familiar with much of what design thinking is offering. While a meaningful description of design thinking is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that design thinking requires the kind of non-linear thinking that has been described as necessary throughout this article. Design thinking is amorphous and all inclusive. It is ‘a way of thinking more than it is a theory, process, or product’.²² It is ‘a discipline that uses the designer’s sensibility and methods to match people’s needs with what is technologically feasible’.²³ Though it is almost certainly not as revolutionary as its proponents would have you believe, let us assume for sake of argument that design thinking would make a useful contribution to Army doctrine.

While inclusion of design thinking in US doctrine marks significant progress towards non-linear planning, it is currently undermined by attempts to preserve the military decision-making process (MDMP), which is almost identical to our MAP. A certain degree of conservatism is undoubtedly necessary in order to protect good ideas from dubious ones well presented and to achieve a workable level of consistency; however, few would deny that armies tend to err significantly in favour of conservation over progress. This naturally generates bloated and occasionally contradictory doctrine as new ideas are adopted without the corresponding application of Ockham’s razor. The US implementation of design thinking is a good example of this.

The preservation of existing procedures was a stated constraint during development of the new doctrine. It was assumed that: ‘For design to be useful in the military domain, it must complement and interact with existing planning doctrine.’²⁴ Because the existing planning model (the MDMP) is distinctly linear, and design thinking is distinctly non-linear, the authors were forced from the outset to develop doctrine that was separated from the planning process. They perceive such a boundary thus: ‘if a subject or an issue is not concerned with understanding, it is a planning function, not a design product’.²⁵

‘For design to be useful in the military domain, it must complement and interact with existing planning doctrine.’

This conceptual boundary is certain to be an outstanding source of confusion and meaningless debate for as long as it remains. It is the perfect mix of error and irrelevance. By the definition of complex adaptive systems, there is nothing that is not concerned with understanding, as slight changes to some fine detail can have large effects on the system. It is also absurd to suggest that planning is not concerned with understanding. This very messy separation is completely unnecessary but for the desire to preserve the linear MDMP. Design thinking is simply a methodology that may be applied to any aspect of planning at any time it is deemed appropriate. One of the few features of design thinking that is absolutely certain is its holistic nature, and this means no separation from anything.²⁶ Some planners may not formally use design thinking, but this does not mean they are concerned with different information; it simply means they are using a different method. A robust non-linear planning model will enable planners to use any method at any time without concerning themselves with the nonsensical question of whether it is planning or design. Design is an important part of all planning, and any planning model that does not support it should be jettisoned in favour of one that does.

It is easy to perceive a separation between the design of some end product and the planning for that product’s realisation, but this divide is superficial when dealing with complex problems. Where a problem is regular and there is a common solution set, such as designing a largely standardised house in a known environment, it may be feasible to conduct design without concurrent development of the detailed plan. But even for an activity as predictable as construction, it is usually necessary to develop concurrently at least some of the fine details to prevent the design of elements that are impossible or unfeasible. Where the situation is relatively complex, designers cannot carry on designing the end product without constant consideration of how such a system may be developed (the detailed planning). There is no transition to detailed planning; there is simply an evolution of all aspects of planning, including design.

Furthermore, in complex operations, the end product is often less important than the means of achieving it. That is, the detailed planning is the design. This kind of operational design requires one to work backwards from the detailed planning, not the end product. ‘Designers’ begin with the very fine detail of how meetings will run, how procurement will be conducted, how negotiations will be managed, how the community will be engaged etc. The question then becomes, what end product fits these processes while at the same time providing some desirable outcome to the relevant stakeholders? A common answer to this question in Afghanistan, for example, is roads.²⁷

... in complex operations, the end product is often less important than the means of achieving it.

The final criticism of US design doctrine is concerned with its name. US doctrine refers to design thinking simply as ‘design’. This is an unnecessary (and frankly quite galling) redefinition of a perfectly good English word. Design is not a method; it is a fundamental component of all planning and is something that all planners have always done. A design (noun) is a specification of some item, activity, or combination thereof that is intended to achieve objectives in a particular environment. Design (verb) is simply to create a design. At a time when armies need to maximise compatibility with foreign militaries and non-military organisations (particularly in the realm of planning and decision-making), the US Army has seen fit to redefine this vitally important word in a way that will make no sense to any person not familiar with US Army doctrine. It is difficult to imagine a reason for this etymological violation, other than an audacious attempt by design thinking theorists to achieve a monopoly on all design. One can only hope that if design thinking is included in Australian doctrine we can do so without weakening our lexicon.

Conclusion

This article has argued that Australia should develop a non-linear planning model based on six concurrently developed components. The model should be descriptive rather than prescriptive and it should recognise objectives as one of its core components, with the Mission Analysis relegated to a standard operating procedure to be used if and when appropriate.

Such a model will enable continual adaptation, collaborative planning, omnidirectional flow of information, constant decision-making, and genuine use of intuition. Being a descriptive model, it will not discriminate between the methodologies used to populate it, whether they are linear checklists, design thinking methodologies, analytics or pure intuition. This is a planning model that can handle complexity, while also lending itself when required to straightforward template driven activities. It is a model for Adaptive Campaigning.

About the Author

Captain David Walker graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 2003. He served as a troop commander in 39 Engineer Regiment and as SO3 Combat Engineers in the Headquarters Engineer in Chief. Captain Walker transferred to the Australian Army in 2006 and has served as a Project Engineer for the 19th Chief Engineer Works and as SO3 Engineer Doctrine, LWDC. He holds a Bachelor of Civil Engineering and a Masters of Engineering Science (project management). He has seen operational service in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan.

Endnotes

---

1     LWD 5-1-4 The Military Appreciation Process, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2009, p. 1-3.

2     FM 5-0 The Operations Process, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 2010, p. 2-4. 

17    In October 1942 General Montgomery led the Eighth Army (including the Australian 9th Division, led by Lieutenant General Leslie Morshead) to victory in the Second Battle of El Alamein (North Africa). This was the first large scale Allied land victory of the Second World War.

18    LWD 5-1-4, p. 1-5. Table 1-1 shows how LWD 5-1-4 intends for planning by each level of command to be conducted sequentially.

19    Major General Michael T Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger and Paul D Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, January 2010, p. 12.

20    LWD 5-1-4, p. 1-11.

21    The genesis of design thinking in the US Army is Israeli Brigadier General (Res) Shimon Naveh’s theory of Systemic Operational Design, which has diverse intellectual roots in Soviet Operational Art, French philosophy, General System Theory and architecture. However, with the truncation of Systemic Operational Design to Design, the US Army’s new design doctrine is often seen as just a military variant on the IDEO school of design thinking.

22    Banach and Ryan, ‘The Art of Design: A Design Methodology’.

23    Tim Brown, ‘Design Thinking’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 86, No. 6, 2008.

24    Banach and Ryan, ‘The Art of Design: A Design Methodology’.

25    Art of Design: Student Text, Version 2.0, US Army, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, March 2010.

26    In ‘Design Thinking’, Brown repeatedly stresses the importance of a holistic approach and the application of design thinking through all phases including implementation.

27    See David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, Scribe Publications, 2009. Kilcullen observes that contrary to the national trend, the security situation in the Kunar River valley region of Afghanistan significantly improved between 2006 and 2008. He attributes road building as a key component of this effort, noting that the ‘road itself matters less than the construction process’.