COINs in the Dust: Battlespace Commanding and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
Abstract
In order to best synchronise operations in Kandahar Province in 2009–10, Canada implemented the Battlespace Commander concept, where one military commander, partnered with Afghan government elements, became responsible for all security, reconstruction, governance and development in each district. A number of critical lessons remained a constant thread throughout one combat team’s deployment to Kandahar’s Dand District. While operations in other theatres and future conflicts will present challenges that differ from those found in Afghanistan, these lessons form a framework of enduring principles, proven in operations, that future generations of soldiers will find useful in whatever conflict they may face.
Contemporary military forces, acting on behalf of recognised states, that seek to generate and then apply combat power to destroy their opponents through fires, manoeuvre and massed, synchronised high tempo effects,1 are easy to find but hard to kill. While modern combat formations lack stealth, advertising their presence by virtue of their size and mass, they compensate through protection, firepower, manoeuvrability, tempo and battlespace fire effects provided by a breadth of sophisticated, lethal combat systems. Non-state actors who simultaneously hide amongst2 and intimidate a country’s population, attacking through night letters,3 information campaigns and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are, conversely, easier to kill4 but much, much harder to find. As the nature of the Afghan conflict has shifted from sustained incidences of hard, kinetic combat to its present, more insidious nature, the tactics, techniques and procedures used by Canada’s soldiers to combat insurgents in Kandahar Province have also evolved.
B Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, an armoured reconnaissance squadron located on the southern flank of the Task Force 3-09 Battle Group area, was tasked to secure the population of Kandahar Province’s Dand District from September 2009 to May 2010. Augmented with attachments and enablers from across Task Force Kandahar, to include whole-of-government partners from Canadian civilian police departments and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), it captured a number of key counterinsurgency lessons during its mission. This article is a distillation, compilation and explanation of eleven critical lessons—coins of knowledge and experience mined from Kandahar’s dusty plains by soldier sweat, blood and effort that held true throughout the deployment.
Background
It is a given in counterinsurgency theory that insurgencies are political power struggles5 in which insurgent movements seek to overthrow an existing government.6 In this struggle, the population’s attitudes, perceptions and support are often the centre of gravity7 for both insurgents and government forces. In order to engage the population and influence it to support the legitimate government and not the insurgent, kinetic military action alone cannot succeed. While sometimes killing is necessary, recent history continues to prove that in a counterinsurgency one ‘cannot kill or capture our way to victory’.8 Government forces, locked in ‘a competition with the insurgent’9 for influence, must convince the population to deny insurgents the succor and support, both tacit and overt, that they need to live, operate, hide, manoeuvre and attack.10 This task is far more difficult than it appears; when planning operations, key terrain and vital ground are no longer defined solely by physical areas on the ground, but rather must take into account attitudes and actions taken by residents of an area to render the insurgent ineffective. In order to defeat the insurgent, the counterinsurgent force, whether indigenous or foreign, cannot disregard the population or act in isolation and expect to prevail. One must take a page from the insurgent’s playbook and influence the population by acting on multiple concurrent axes, not just the purely military plane, to win. When planning counterinsurgency operations, the people are the terrain.
One must take a page from the insurgent’s playbook and influence the population by acting on multiple concurrent axes ...
Kandahar Situation, Fall 2009
While the ‘what’—influencing the population—is clear, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan has proven that the ‘how’ to accomplish this task is more difficult. Successive Task Force Kandahar11 rotations have made significant steps in positively influencing the population and denying insurgents freedom of action in southern Kandahar Province.12 However, experience has shown that the spectrum of battlespace effects in Afghanistan can often be fragmented and cause friction at the tactical level as different elements with different mandates, different capabilities and different commanders operate in the same piece of terrain and seek to influence the same population. Much as fires and manoeuvre must be closely synchronised to achieve concentration of force, maximise economy of effort, husband scarce combat power and prevent fratricide, non-kinetic effects must also be similarly synchronised. The majority of Kandaharis care far less about command structures and the division of responsibilities between different units than they do about effects. To them, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldiers, no matter the unit or nationality, are a homogenous group of foreigners. The concept that within ISAF there are different groups responsible for different things and effects is inconceivable. In order to best focus on Kandahar’s population and influence it to reject the insurgency, reconstruction, development, governance, security operations, raids, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)13 development and stability—which are all intertwined in the population’s perception—must all be synchronised. In theory, this synchronisation is easy to achieve. In practice, the frictions of war, differences in organisational culture, national mandates, time, space, resources and the ever-present threat can all serve to make synchronisation immensely difficult.
The majority of Kandaharis care far less about command structures and the division of responsibilities between different units than they do about effects.
Enabling Synchronisation
In order to better synchronise the disparate and dispersed elements of its deployed units, Task Force Kandahar began implementing the Battlespace Commander (BSC) concept in southern Kandahar Province late in 2009, first in Panjwayi District, followed by Dand District. Much as the concept of one commander responsible for tactical effects in a single area of operations is part and parcel of kinetic operations and a given in our military culture, the BSC concept extended this unity of command into a broader spectrum. It saw one sub-unit commander, appointed as the BSC, made responsible for synchronising and guiding all battlespace effects and activities in a specific district, including non-military stabilisation, governance, reconstruction and development efforts. This same BSC was also responsible for all interactions between ISAF elements and governmentally-appointed District Leaders, Afghan government officials and ANSF in the district. Government of Afghanistan Order 3501,14 issued on 16 September 2007, mandated the creation of Afghan National Army-led15 Operational Coordination Centres (OCC) across Afghanistan to coordinate the activities of disparate ANSF elements with each other and with ISAF, as identified in Figure 1 below.
These centres, working at provincial and district level, coordinate security efforts and act as a central source for information about incidents, events and upcoming plans. They are frequently co-located and partnered16 with ISAF elements. The OCC establishment in Kandahar province was predicated on the security situation, ANSF capacity and local Afghan government officials’ political will. Prior to late 2009, the conditions for OCC-D establishment were not right; as soon as conditions evolved sufficiently, the BSCs in Panjwayi and Dand established district-level Operational Coordination Centres (OCC-D) to satisfy this Afghanistan government requirement. Each OCC-D was a partnered Afghan-Canadian synchronisation and information node which supported each BSC, their partnered ANSF elements and each district’s appointed District Leader.
Figure 1. Afghan National Security Forces – Primary Organisations17
Evolution and Organisation
Becoming a BSC sub-unit and establishing the Dand District Operational Coordination Centre was a significant challenge for B Squadron. Figure 2 depicts the squadron’s general composition on its initial deployment, while Figure 3 shows its configuration as the Dand District Combat Team, an evolution which brought an approximately three-fold increase in personnel and a great deal more responsibility to the existing squadron command structure.
The additional responsibility and command challenge that the Dand Combat Team entailed was balanced by the significant capabilities that the Combat Team’s attachments and enablers provided, coupled with the OCC-D’s ability to interact and coordinate with local government officials and ANSF. The Construction Management Organisation (CMO) team focused on village-level or multiple-village projects such as building irrigation canals. It had excellent contacts with local labour organisers and the ability to monitor local attitudes and impressions during its interactions with local work teams. The Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) team was the Combat Team’s overt, public and friendly face, manning a reception centre oriented to mitigate dissatisfaction over manoeuvre damage, land claims and other issues. It also had the ability to assess village needs, then initiate precisely targeted, quick, low-level projects to
Figure 2. B Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, after deployment as the Task
Force 3-09 Battle Group Reconnaissance Squadron as of September 2009.
Figure 3. B Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, after augmentation and establishment as the Dand District Combat Team, December 2009. While the District Leader, Afghan National Police and CIDA Stabilisation Officer were not subordinate to the BSC, they are included with dotted lines reflecting their partnered status.
resolve minor grievances and provide limited employment. The Police Operational Mentor Liaison Team (P-OMLT) focused on training, mentoring and developing the individual and collective skills of the district’s Afghan National Police (ANP) detachment, from basic weapons handling, to scene management, to first aid, to search techniques, to conducting basic investigations and interacting with the public as the professional face and primary constabulary apparatus of the Afghan government. The P-OMLT, which contained a civilian police officer from a Canadian municipal police force, also acted as the BSC’s primary link to and liaison with the ANP command structure. P-OMLT facilitated partnered planning and operations and ensured a consistent approach and style of interaction between the ANP and the Combat Team. The Combat Team’s civilian Stabilisation Officer and the OCC-D(D) worked closely with the District Leader and his staff. They worked together to professionalise legitimate local government officials to contribute to ongoing stability, governance, reconstruction and development efforts, synchronising them with both ANP and ISAF security activities. This organisation ensured that every facet of counterinsurgency efforts in the district, from kinetic operations to construction projects, from village meetings to ANSF activities, was synchronised. Every Combat Team element knew what every other element was doing, which enabled the BSC to set priorities, resolve conflicting demands quickly, maintain flexibility and keep pressure on the insurgents through a full spectrum of synchronised effects.
Lessons Captured and Applied
During the American counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam, Bernard Fall observed, ‘If it works, it is obsolete.’18 Adaptability is a necessity. In order to maintain the tactical initiative, confuse enemy observation, and avoid pattern-setting and complacency in planning and operations, the Combat Team captured lessons through after-action reviews, both Canadian-only and partnered with ANSF, throughout its tenure. Throughout its deployment, the Combat Team noted the following eleven consistent and critical principles which proved their worth through every operation, every evolution, every interaction and every change in situation. All of the events described below occurred in Kandahar Province’s Dand district.
During the American counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam, Bernard Fall observed, ‘If it works, it is obsolete.’
1. Partnering is Critical
Partnering with the ANSF is the most effective way to operate because of the effects it achieves, not just because it is ordered from higher.19 Partnering may sound like a theoretical construct that is impossible to execute in real life, but it actually is workable. Some ANSF elements may not perform the same way their ISAF counterparts do; sometimes they do not meet timings, may have different hygiene standards, may not plan operations in as much detail, and may have limited combat service support capability than their ISAF counterparts. Despite these differences, the effects of partnered operations outweighed the challenges they presented, had a much more significant effect on the population, and achieved far better results than unpartnered operations. ANSF personnel generally know and understand the population and its dynamics far better than their ISAF counterparts ever could, can often tell when they are being lied to, can use force when and where required, can avoid being browbeaten by village elders and can often tell if there are foreigners in a village. They are Muslims, are not as restricted as ISAF in searching compounds,20 do not offend the locals by their presence in villages and compounds, and are, for the most part, extremely brave.
A reasonably-planned partnered operation actually leads to better effects on the ground than a perfectly planned and executed unpartnered one and keeps more combat power intact to fight another day. In the fall of 2009, an ANSF element partnered with B Squadron conducted patrols in and around a contentious village. Partnered patrolling caused local insurgents significant consternation and positively influenced the population so well that the insurgent leadership panicked. An information source indicated that a local insurgent commander had harangued his fighters to immediately emplace IEDs in the road and on the tracks where the ANSF element had been patrolling. Despite protest from insurgents on the receiving end of the order, the local commander ordered his fighters to ‘do something immediately’. That evening, IED emplacers brazenly attempted to position a number of devices on tracks under overwatch and were subsequently destroyed. The partnered nature of the operation overwhelmed the insurgents’ command and control, which caused a local insurgent commander to panic and needlessly sacrifice his fighters.
Fully partnering and living with ANSF eases the transition to living amongst the population and may allow soldiers to live in close proximity to culturally significant locations. A close presence will often prevent insurgents from using mosques, shrines, schools or other emotive locations as meeting places, recruiting or messaging locations. Locals in villages where both ANSF and ISAF live together are less afraid to approach positions, and are more willing to offer information and discuss security concerns than in locations without a partnered presence. In one small village, a combined ISAF/ANSF position located next to a prominent local shrine is part and parcel of the village’s makeup. Residents are extremely comfortable with both soldiers and police, and remark favourably on partnered patrolling, vehicle check points and the presence of a security force close to their shrine.
Fully partnering and living with ANSF eases the transition to living amongst the population ...
2. The Whole-Of-Government Approach - A Winning Combination
Whole-of-government partners, such as civilian police officers and Canadian International Development Agency Stabilisation Officers, offer capabilities that both counterbalance and complement those inherent in the military force:
a. Non-military thinking and problem resolution styles that can frequently help the BSC resolve challenges in dealing with Afghan government officials.
b. Expertise and credibility that soldiers often lack in the governance, reconstruction and development spectrums when dealing with local governments, non-governmental organisations, relief and aid organisations.
c. Understanding of and access to operational and strategic-level government-sponsored programs and larger governmental development initiatives.
d. The ability to mentor, shape, teach and develop the capacity of the ANSF and government bodies in ways that uniformed personnel cannot.
e. A civilian face of leadership and guidance to represent the BSC at governance and development-oriented fora such as district development assemblies, administrative shuras, education shuras and in mentoring sessions with district and other Afghan officials.
f. A less-threatening option than uniformed personnel in conducting meetings, liaison and interaction with locals, leaving the BSC room to broaden the approach to resolving challenges by introducing uniformed personnel into a situation as required. In Dand, the CIDA Stabilisation Officer worked, on a daily basis, very closely with Afghan district government staff to improve governance and accountability. This cooperative civilian-led approach tangibly demonstrated that despite a significant military presence, security, governance, reconstruction and development activities were and must continue to be conducted in accordance with directives from the legitimate Afghan government, not foreign military officers.
g. Many civilian experts do not deploy on a six-month rotation cycle as Canadian military personnel deployed in forward locations do. In many cases, they represent long term commitment and organisational stability to locals and district staff. They often offer the BSC a vault of institutional memory that can be called upon to outline the history of current relationships and ongoing programs that a new BSC may be unaware of after taking responsibility for an area.
3. Value of the Battlespace Commander Concept - Unity Of Command Is Essential
Prior to the BSC concept’s initiation, there were, in some areas, multiple sub-units operating in the same villages and interacting with the same villagers, but pursuing different mandates. At times, certain villages would be patrolled by multiple disparate Task Force Kandahar elements on the same day, while others were missed completely, lessening the effect of deterrent patrolling.21 Information gathering was fragmented as different elements reported information through separate reporting chains, limiting lateral commander awareness. Patrols were unable to effectively address queries from locals about needs or grievances addressed in project proposals by other Task Force Kandahar units, drawing capability and credibility into question in the eyes of local leaders. This gap in understanding created difficulties in the aftermath of kinetic operations and during the course of normal patrolling, often confusing and infuriating village leaders when they attempted to ask questions or make complaints. Once the BSC concept was implemented, kinetic operations, patrolling, projects, messaging, meetings and ANSF interactions were all tightly synchronised and more effectively targeted. Soldiers and civilians on patrols, attending meetings and interacting with the population gathered information, which the Combat Team headquarters analysed, then acted upon quickly, using the full spectrum of battle and war-winning effects. One commander remained responsible and accountable for effects on the population across the spectrum from kinetic events to influence operations. The BSC concept makes the whole greater than the sum of its parts.
This gap in understanding created difficulties in the aftermath of kinetic operations and during the course of normal patrolling ...
4. The Combat Team is the Building Block
The breadth of skills and the dedicated command and control element that the doctrinal combat team22 brings is essential in conducting operations across a broad spectrum of situations. While influencing the population and supporting the government is critical, the provision of assistance, conducting meetings, targeting humanitarian assistance, establishing development projects and conducting negotiations with local leaders can only accomplish so much; in some instances, the only way to protect the population and maintain force protection is to kill or capture insurgents. As it is based upon an existing combat arms sub-unit, a combat team maintains its core skill of defeating the enemy through kinetic action, whether by closing with and destroying the enemy, or defeating it through firepower and the aggressive use of battlefield mobility. Combat teams also contain a headquarters that is well established and practiced in regrouping with attachments and enablers without requiring significant reorganisation. The counterinsurgency combat team must have additional skills and enablers over and above those found in the traditional combat team grouping in order to best achieve a mix of effects, as Figure 3 identifies. Throughout deployment, the author grouped the Dand District Combat Team’s elements under two general classifications based on the effects they achieved:
a. Battle Winners. This category comprises most of the traditional combat team grouping of armour, infantry, engineers, artillery and, in the case of the Dand District Combat Team, armoured reconnaissance forces. The battle winners are exceptionally capable of destroying the enemy and achieving kinetic effects on the ground through fire and manoeuvre. A flexible, agile and responsive grouping, it has proven effective in combat, offering a robust spectrum of effects within the span of control of a sub-unit headquarters. The Battle Winning side of the combat team is essential to providing the necessary security, conducting kinetic operations such as clearing villages, seizing key terrain or destroying insurgent elements, while remaining capable of supporting non-kinetic operations such as village surveys or humanitarian aid distribution. The Battle Winners ensure that the combat team is a hard target, is resistant to enemy action and is capable of rapidly applying force, up to and including lethal force, anywhere in the battlespace.
b. War Winners. This category comprises those elements that provide ‘softer’ effects in the battlespace and are focused on achieving longer-term changes by connecting with and influencing the population more than the traditional Battle Winners can. In the Afghan context, they are the enablers that develop ANSF capabilities, build stability and governance, and support reconstruction and development, which further serve to separate insurgents from the people through actions and positive effects that the insurgents cannot bring. The Dand District Combat Team’s War Winners included its CMO team, CIMIC elements, P-OMLT, the CIDA Stabilisation Officer and the OCC-D.
5. Always Know, Understand and Use the Full Team
Every plan must include and synchronise the actions of both the Battle Winners and War Winners and the effects they have on the population prior to, during and following any operation. For example, in preparation for a partnered ANP/ISAF cordon and search operation, battle procedure and preliminary moves saw the P-OMLT conduct a ten-day training program to bolster ANP capacity and prepare patrolmen to conduct building searches. Had this training not been synchronised with the operation, ANP soldiers would not have been properly prepared to conduct their mission. Their training was a success and the ANP successfully executed thorough, professional and effective searches throughout the initial operation and successive iterations in different villages. During the cordon and search, CIMIC operators followed immediately behind the partnered lead search teams to complete village surveys, gather critical local information from the population, carry out information operations messaging, locate key leaders to set the conditions for future meetings known as Key Leader Engagements, and identify potential quick impact projects to further influence and support the population.
Every plan must include and synchronise the actions of both the Battle Winners and War Winners ...
After deliberate operations, follow up ANP/ISAF partnered patrols comprised of both Battle and War Winners maintained presence in and attention towards villages affected by the operation. In so doing, they were able to confirm information, gauge changing local attitudes, target non-kinetic effects, or aid and continue to positively influence the population. This technique was used successfully in several cordon and search operations; over the course of several months, it paid dividends in every instance. Relations between ISAF/ANSF patrols, gauged by patrol interactions with village residents, improved and several key villages that had previously been overtly hostile and suspected of supporting insurgents took a neutral stance, opening the door for future ISAF/ANSF influence. Without the potential for kinetic operations and the overt physical security provided by the Battle Winners, the War Winners would be unable to act, while insurgents would have a free hand to intimidate the population and win undecided residents to their cause. However, the long-term tangible daily benefits that the War Winners provide make the insurgency unattractive and counter the insurgency’s claims that the government cannot care for the population. To be most effective, BSCs must know and understand how all attachments and enablers operate, what they can achieve, plan for and ensure their employment in each and every operation.
6. Living Amongst the Population Must Be Tailored - There is No Blanket Solution
The concept of living amongst the population, close to villages in small forward positions23 rather than in massive fortified encampments in larger cities, is viable and has demonstrated excellent results. During a village security survey conducted in March 2010, one village leader, known as a Malik,24 noted that ‘for 2 years, ISAF sat in the Kandahar Airfield and only came here sometimes to fight and never talked to anyone. Now, we see you living here with us and it is better for everyone.’25 Living amongst the population increases both the population’s physical security and, more importantly, its perception of its own security, while denying insurgents a free hand to threaten or otherwise negatively influence the population.
Living amongst the population increases both the population’s physical security and, more importantly, its perception of its own security ...
However, living amongst the population is a concept that must be applied differently in every different village, enclave and community. It cannot be applied ‘top down’, forced upon locals, or implemented in a blanket or cookie cutter fashion. Much as the enemy has a vote in any tactical plan, the population has a vote when a military force attempts to live amongst it. The following examples outline some challenges, successes and ways forward found in living amongst the population:
a. Finding real power-brokers takes time and patience. Different elders, families or family clusters within a single village will have widely varying opinions of the counterinsurgents’ efforts and may hold their opinions very closely, exposing them only after time. Showing early support or favour to the most outspoken or overtly welcoming of the villagers may isolate those who actually wield power and influence or represent the majority of the population. Quite often after a force enters a new village, a number of locals will quickly offer themselves up as village representatives, seeking to curry favour and ingratiate themselves as a means to discrediting or achieving vengeance against those who are their historic, family or tribal opponents, those who owe them money or are in contention in land claim or water access disputes. Moving too quickly to take up residence in or in close proximity to a village on the assurances of only one representative can, in the long term, work counter to the desired effects and actually isolate counterinsurgent forces from the villagers they seek to influence.
b. How to live amongst the population? It is different every time. The definition of ‘living amongst the population’ will vary from village to village. Some villages will feel comfortable and secure with soldiers occupying a compound, school or other facility in the village proper or a short distance away. Others will consider a close presence an affront and either ask the military force to leave or become silent, sullen, fearful and uncooperative. At worst, a military presence too close may make them uncomfortable or fearful enough to flee. Obviously villagers fleeing a location once a force arrives telegraphs friendly force movements to enemy observers, is counter to the strategy of connecting with the population, and gives the insurgents a ready grievance to exploit. In 2009, ISAF elements occupied a school on the outskirts of a village that was less than 200 metres from the nearest inhabited compound. The village’s residents had little complaint. A similar position was established in the vicinity of two villages in a different area of the same district, using a series of abandoned compounds more than 800 metres from the nearest inhabited residence. When surveying villagers in an attempt to find a new location closer to either village, the residents of both villages indicated that they would be frightened of soldiers living closer to them and asked that the soldiers remain in their current location. Villagers insisted that they felt very safe with soldiers patrolling in and around the villages during the day and at night and living within sight of, but not too close to, their villages.
At worst, a military presence too close may make them uncomfortable or fearful enough to flee.
c. Finding balance – too many tasks, not enough people. There will always be more villages to secure than forces available to secure them. While it may not be possible to permanently place soldiers in every village, non-standard patrolling techniques can mitigate this factor for forces working to secure a large area with scarce personnel and resources. Leaguering vehicles in proximity to isolated villages for two to three days and conducting extended dismounted patrols into the villages from leaguers has proven effective in improving the perception of security without intimidating residents or damaging property by driving armoured vehicles through their villages. As patrols revisited remote village clusters during successive operations, residents grew more at ease with continued soldier presence; in some cases, residents approached patrols and offered compounds or fields closer to the villages for patrols to use temporarily. By working with the existing village leadership, whether by seeking local advice or listening to Malik or village elders’ recommendations, patrols can select locations that provide a security presence while avoiding offending or threatening the village’s residents. This technique gives local residents some ownership of their own security and creates the perception that security is a cooperative effort between the people and the government, not something forced on the village by outsiders. More importantly, it respects traditional tribal and village governance structures, empowering village elders26 and demonstrating that ISAF does not wish to destroy or change the traditional way of life, an allegation often made by insurgent groups seeking to discredit ISAF/ANSF efforts.
7. Battle Procedure, War Games and Rehearsals are Critical
Kinetic operations are never conducted without proper battle procedures, wargaming and rehearsals whenever possible and followed up by after action reviews.27 Jirgas, shuras, tribal meetings and interactions with local officials must be planned and executed with the same rigour. Jirgas are the Afghan traditional ruling body, a council of adult males that comes to decision by consensus. Jirgas are only ever called by Afghan leaders; even if invited to observe or speak, foreigners are never part of a jirga in any decision-making capacity.28 Shuras are a traditional Islamic means of community participation in decision-making, similar to a jirga, but less formalised and used for different functions.29
Kinetic operations are never conducted without proper battle procedures, wargaming and rehearsals ...
Afghan tribal leaders, village elders and local officials,30 accustomed to gaining power and influence through negotiation and building consensus through the shura and jirga system, are practiced manoeuvrists that will seek to exploit any and every opportunity to gain concessions, promise or favour in any interaction. Some of them believe that interactions with ISAF are a zero-sum game; for them to look powerful and competent, they must make others, usually ISAF, look bad. In order to counteract this tactic, those participating in shuras, meetings or other gatherings must rely on proven battle procedure and planning techniques. Principal interactors must conduct a thorough estimate of the situation to include history of the participants, their grievances, their relationships and history with other participants. After understanding the dynamic and the history of the attendees, the event must be wargamed, with all participants identifying lines of discussion, delegating discussion issues, reviewing critical messaging points, and exploring discussion tactics that participants may undertake or issues that they may attempt to manoeuvre the discussion towards. Exit strategies, conversational diversion and ‘do not discuss’ issues must be covered in a group, focused on ‘if-then’ action/reaction/counteraction comparisons. Without planning, rehearsing and wargaming, non-Afghan participants run the danger of losing credibility or committing to unsustainable courses of action. Examples of kinetic-type planning for non-kinetic operations achieving success are as follows:
a. Meetings are Tactical Events – Preparation is Key. In February 2010, heavy rains caused extensive flood damage to a number of fields and compounds. The Afghanistan government formally asked ISAF to support ANSF flood relief efforts, but requested that ISAF allow ANSF to plan and execute these efforts without providing assistance unless asked. The morning after the rainstorm, the District Leader demanded an immediate meeting with the BSC31 and the district Chief of Police. Despite the urgency of the situation, the BSC and his key staff paused and conducted a quick planning session. Based on historical interactions and knowledge, they assessed that the District Leader would attempt to castigate ISAF in front of the district staff and a collection of notable village elders for not supporting the population with flood relief or supplies. During the subsequent meeting, after the formalities and pleasantries of greeting, the BSC opened the discussion with a generous statement of support for ANSF efforts and a selection of facts and figures concerning ANSF aid efforts to date, coupled with a description of efforts taken by ISAF soldiers in the district to support the Afghan government in a second-tier fashion. The District Leader was forced to publicly acknowledge that, like the BSC, his own plans and personal feelings on assistance were subordinate to the Provincial Governor’s orders and higher level plans, and that it was indeed excellent to see Afghan forces leading the efforts to provide for Afghan needs. The District Leader also acknowledged the assistance that the BSC’s soldiers had provided the ANP in the aftermath of the flooding.32
... the BSC opened the discussion with a generous statement of support for ANSF efforts ...
The BSC further leveraged the discussion to demonstrate the effectiveness of the newly-created OCC-D, which included providing him and the District Leader up-to-date and accurate information about district happenings and security. At the close of the nearly two-hour meeting, the District Leader had been unable to blame ISAF for the flood or inadequate assistance to the population in front of the elders or district staff. The District Leader was also forced to acknowledge that working in partnership offered benefit to the district’s people and to pledge further cooperation. Had the interaction not been carefully wargamed, the outcome could have been markedly different and the elders negatively influenced, which would have harmed future ISAF credibility in the district. In this instance, rigorous preparation, awareness of potential grievances, identification and manoeuvre to avoid inflammatory topics and sticking points allowed for a messaging victory.
b. Consider, then Wargame Mixed Courses of Action. A private security company owned and operated by the District Leader’s brother had been notable throughout the district for conducting questionable business practices. The company was not properly registered with Afghan authorities and its members were frequently found to be in violation of Afghan law by not wearing uniforms or carrying proper identification cards while carrying arms. Locals and ISAF contractors frequently complained that this company’s agents extorted money from road traffic at illegal vehicle checkpoints. As the District Leader was resistant to any suggestion of malfeasance by his brother, he was unwilling to permit the ANP to investigate the matter or take any actions to prevent questionable practices.
Experience from other Task Force Kandahar units in similar situations identified that attempting to resolve the situation by taking a hard line with the owner and threatening his business with closure or the loss of ISAF-sponsored project security contracts produced little success. The District Leader refused to support ISAF with any action other than platitudes such as ‘all companies should obey the law’ and ‘my brother is the only one I can trust’; eventually the situation became a friction point hampering District Leader/ISAF cooperation. In order to resolve the situation, the BSC and his staff surveyed the collective knowledge, skills and experience of the Combat Team’s leaders, particularly the CIDA Stabilisation Officer’s invaluable historical knowledge of the situation throughout the past year. The BSC and staff collectively wargamed through several courses of action and determined that an indirect influence operation could achieve success where direct pressure, threats and a hard line had failed.
In order to resolve the situation, the BSC and his staff surveyed the collective knowledge, skills and experience of the Combat Team’s leaders ...
In the course of meetings and discussions both with the District Leader and the company’s owner, the BSC and his staff conducted messaging emphasising the fact that the owner was a respected businessman in the community, who set the example for others to follow and who was relied upon by his brother, a fair and just District Leader, so would obviously seek to become properly registered. ISAF/ANP patrols quickly investigated allegations of extortion and reported their results in writing to the company’s owner for resolution with the message that ‘we are sure your company would never do this to the District Leader’s people, because ISAF knows that the people respect you and you too are working to build security’. Any illegal weapons carriage by company agents resulted in immediate confiscation, with written receipts and a letter provided both to the District Leader and the owner identifying the circumstances of the confiscation. The campaign was successful—after a month of consistent messaging and measured, documented action, weapons confiscation events dropped to marginal levels. Extortion complaints dropped to zero and the company’s owner sought proper accreditation after being influenced by his brother, the District Leader, to do so. Tactical actions to verify local grievances caused by the company’s actions through patrolling and interaction, synchronised with influence actions using meetings as manoeuvre and messaging as fire, executed consistently over time, achieved success where other, more direct but single-spectrum short-term plans had failed.
8. Tactical Patience - The '48 Hour Rule'
In conventional warfare, when conducting high-tempo, synchronised kinetic operations, pausing instead of taking quick and decisive action may be fatal. When dealing with Afghan village elders, tribal leaders and government officials, resisting the impulse to act quickly and pausing to let situations develop may in fact be the best course of action.33
... when conducting high-tempo, synchronised kinetic operations, pausing instead of taking quick and decisive action may be fatal.
In many cases, Afghans expect and count on military leaders to try and take quick, decisive action to resolve frictions, conflicts or unpleasant situations as quickly as possible, whether on their own initiative or after being pushed by their superiors. They are well aware that problem solving and speed of response is part and parcel of Western military culture. Pausing may often turn the initiative in a negotiation or conflict between ISAF elements and Afghan officials back to ISAF’s advantage, as the following examples demonstrate:
a. On one occasion, in an attempt to manoeuvre the BSC into a hasty reaction and force him into a position of relational weakness, the District Leader one day refused to occupy his office at the District Centre. With great public show, stating that he was displeased with access control and security measures at the District Centre, the District Leader and his staff took up temporary residence in a nearby unoccupied medical office. He quickly passed word to provincial-level officials that the BSC was preventing him from consulting with the district’s residents and keeping him from occupying his own District Centre. Rather than moving quickly to appease the District Leader, offer entreaties to him to return to his office, or accommodate the District Leader by reducing the facility’s partnered security posture—thus endangering his own and the facility’s ANP soldiers—the BSC ordered that business proceed as usual and no special attention be paid. When questioned, the BSC assured his own staff and his higher headquarters, which was understandably anxious and being queried from its own higher headquarters, that the situation would be resolved within 48 hours. Within 24 hours, the District Leader’s staff, ANP representatives and the local National Directorate of Security agent met and, with the assistance of the BSC’s staff, spent several hours devising and reviewing an Afghan-led, collaborative security plan for the facility that was amenable to all participants, the District Chief of Police and the District Leader. Within 48 hours, the District Leader had approved the new security plan, returned quietly to his office and made no mention of his previous exodus. The tactical pause had achieved significant effect and tangibly demonstrated BSC resolve in the face of District Leader threats. The BSC’s actions allowed the District Leader to save face by successfully negotiating a resolution to his grievances and demonstrated the BSC’s support to, respect and consideration for the District Leader and his wishes. It was a tangible and public demonstration of the collective will for ISAF and Afghan government officials to cooperate, despite the often conflicting demands for both security and access to the population that partnered facilities create.34
b. In front of a collection of tribal elders, the District Leader remonstrated that ‘Canadians did nothing for the people’, then he refused to grant certain villagers any projects and loudly lambasted a member of the BSC’s staff. Rather than rushing back to the District Leader with facts and figures to prove him wrong, or take umbrage at the allegations, the staff officer executed a tactical pause, politely concluded the meeting and ensured he had no further interaction with the District Leader for the remainder of the day. The next day, the District Leader cordially invited the same officer to sit with him, treated him to chai,35 assured him that he was pleased with the number and type of ongoing projects and apologised profusely for his poor manners. Pausing and refusing to rise to provocation demonstrated that the BSC staff was not subordinate to the District Leader and paved the way for a more cooperative working relationship for the remainder of the rotation.
... refusing to rise to provocation demonstrated that the BSC staff was not subordinate to the District Leader ...
c. During a shura with a group of village elders, the District Leader became agitated and indicated that Canadians had insulted him by searching his private security detail, which had attempted to gain entry to the District Centre in an improperly-marked vehicle earlier that day. He then went on to identify to the elders that Canadians ‘never paid damage claims’, did not conduct operations with the ANP, never provided projects or employment to the district’s villagers and that working under such conditions was ‘offensive to his religion’. He then explained that he was going to resign his position as District Leader and left his office. During the next several days, during which even the District Leader’s own staff were unable to reach him, the BSC and his staff continued operations as normal, neither making reference to the District Leader nor inquiring about him to his staff. The District Leader returned to his office with the excuse that the provincial governor had refused his resignation and returned quietly to work, subdued and cooperative. The BSC and his staff’s actions demonstrated that while the District Leader was an important man, governance and improving the lot of the people could and would continue without him. In this and several other interactions, tactical patience and a measured approach to provocation maintained the BSC’s freedom of action and prevented him from becoming subordinated to the District Leader’s whims in a reactionary posture.
9. Listen, Don't Tell
When interacting with Afghans, particularly when attempting to institute change, listening often pays better dividends than talking. When conducting an influence operation to set the conditions for police recruiting and the establishment of new police stations in the district, the BSC met with a series of village leaders, elders and tribal leaders. During each and every interaction, he listened to what the Afghan people had to say, asking their opinion of security activities and soliciting their opinions on police checkpoints and patrols paid dividends. Counterinsurgency experts identify that ‘re-empowering the village councils of elders and restoring their community leadership is the only way’36 to counter religious leaders and others who have been ‘radicalised by the Taliban’. The local leaders were, in every instance, flattered to be asked their advice vice being ‘told by foreigners what was going to happen’.37 Listening instead of telling made measureable gains in maintaining an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between local leaders and ISAF/ANSF elements and further served to support and legitimise traditional village governance and leadership.
Listening instead of telling made measureable gains in maintaining an atmosphere of trust and cooperation ...
10. Every Soldier is a Mentor - Learning is a Two-Way Street
When occupying joint ISAF/ANSF tactical positions, conducting partnered patrolling or deliberate operations, every soldier acts as a mentor, whether intentionally or not. In partnered facilities, the Dand Combat Team’s soldiers conducted daily garbage sweeps and took collective efforts to maintain cleanliness. After a time, the young, untrained ANP patrolmen who also occupied the facility were seen picking up garbage, disposing of it properly and keeping their own positions in better repair. During partnered vehicle checkpoints, ANP vehicle search teams working in conjunction with ISAF soldiers demonstrated a high level of consistency and attention to detail when searching vehicles. During security patrols, ANP patrolmen often took their lead on interactions with locals from their Canadian counterparts. Patrols which interacted frequently with locals during patrols were emulated. In many cases, the actions, attitudes and activities undertaken by Canadian soldiers were emulated by their partnered ANSF, demonstrating that in a partnering-focused atmosphere, every soldier, whether overtly or inadvertently, is a mentor and can significantly influence the attitude and performance of indigenous forces.
While ISAF soldiers often mentor their ANSF counterparts, influence and mentoring can often work both ways. During his tenure as the Dand District Combat Team commander, the author was fortunate enough to work closely with the District Chief of Police, a twenty-five year veteran of Afghan policing and survivor of multiple assassination attempts. Whether planning partnered operations, interacting with local leaders or conducting joint training, his local knowledge and advice was invaluable. During a partnered cordon and search operation in February 2010, villagers received word that a woman from the village being searched had died in Kandahar City and the village began preparing for a funeral. Based on the Chief’s advice, the search was stopped38 and the partnered force withdrew to a respectful distance to continue less-unobtrusive surveillance. The author had been unaware of the impact of the woman’s death; continuing the search would have demonstrated disrespect, validating insurgent claims that ISAF and ANSF are disrespectful of traditional ways and Islam.
11. Personal Interaction is Critical
While digital communications make the transfer of large amounts of data simple, electronic means cannot transmit the intangibles of relationship, attitude, intent and feeling. Further, flanking military units, particularly those from other nations, may not be able to connect digitally due to equipment constraints. Personal liaison and relationship building between allies is critical to ensuring comprehension, synchronising actions and passing information. Whether interacting with ANSF, governmental officials or flanking units, personal liaison always proved more effective and often faster than attempting to convey critical information, plan or synchronise operations by any electronic means.
Personal liaison and relationship building between allies is critical to ensuring comprehension, synchronising actions and passing information.
Conclusion - Consider 'A' War, Not Just 'This' War
Debate continues in offices, at mess tables, on hangar floors and in schools throughout Canada’s army on the relative merits of orienting training and efforts to focus on preparing for the present counterinsurgency war at the expense of mechanised, high-intensity unit and formation-level warfighting skills. Counterinsurgency, particularly as practiced in the limited scope of one of many Afghan districts, may not define future Army operations; however, failing to recognise, understand and apply lessons hard-won through recent experience would be short-sighted. While the 1990s have been described popularly as a ‘decade of darkness’, characterised by military deployments to support United Nations efforts in a number of failed states, 1990s-era Balkan experience taught valuable practical lessons concerning convoy escorts,39 VIP security, military negotiation techniques, house clearing,40 gathering human information and working with non-military partners that have been and continue to be successfully applied in Afghanistan. Similarly, lessons from Afghanistan should be identified, used, refined and then, when and where possible, applied, no matter the shape or nature of future conflicts. The blanket application of Afghan experience will not solve every new problem. However, understanding and applying lessons from the current conflict may help save soldiers’ lives and resolve future challenges.
Many of counterinsurgency’s lessons—involving interacting with and respecting local leaders, and influencing and providing security to the population—can be directly applied during domestic operations, where soldiers will have to influence and support their fellow Canadians. In future wars, even high intensity mechanised conflicts, there may be times when firepower and manoeuvre will not solve every problem, such as in the aftermath of a successful kinetic operation in an area where the local population has been unable to flee. A force that occupies terrain for any length of time will likely cause grievances amongst the local population, which will have to be resolved lest they provide subversive elements the opportunity to negatively motivate and influence the population. In a contiguous, linear battlespace with defined forward and rear areas, soldiers will likely have to secure their lines of communication, establish remote positions, influence a local population, contend with displaced persons or refugees, and work with allied forces of varying capabilities. Units will have to maintain force protection through awareness, synchronised fires, manoeuvre, influence, information operations and myriad other effects across a broad spectrum. In future stability operations or counterinsurgency operations in countries other than Afghanistan, soldiers may need to accomplish tasks working in and through ad hoc organisations not found in any doctrine manual, in uncertain and potentially lethal situations. All of these challenges have been met in Afghanistan.
Despite the constant flux and evolution of operations in southern Kandahar Province in 2009–10, the eleven lessons identified above ran through B Squadron’s Afghan deployment as a constant thread. While operations in other theatres and in future conflicts will present a host of tactical, enemy, environmental and human challenges that differ from those found in Afghanistan, these ‘COINs in the Dust’ form a framework of principles, proven in operations, that future generations of soldiers may well find useful in whatever conflict they may face.
Endnotes
1 Many Canadian doctrinal references, valid at the time of the experiences outlined in this article, support this assessment of the conventional threat and seek to guide actions in response that will defeat them:
B-GL-300-002/FP-000 - Land Force Tactical Doctrine, Vol. 2, Department of National Defence, Canada, 1997, p. 100.
B-GL-300-001/FP-000 - Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army (English), Department of National Defence, Canada, 1998, p. 153.
B-GL-300-007/FP-001 – Firepower, Department of National Defence, Canada, 1999, p. 132.
2 David Kilcullen, ‘Counter-Insurgency Redux’, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 2006–07, p. 120.
3 Thomas Johnson, quoted in Olivia Ward, ‘ “Model” District no Safe Haven’, The Toronto Star, 1 January 2010, <http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/afghanmission/article/744846---model…; accessed 5 September 2010, offers analysis of ‘night letters’, a Taliban intimidation tactic, being used in Dand District. Night letters are written texts, often interspersed with Koranic verse, that exhort locals not to support the Afghan government or ISAF and may threaten reprisals. They are normally posted on significant buildings such as mosques, shrines or village leaders’ residences and serve to demonstrate the Taliban’s reach and ability to watch villages and maintain freedom of manoeuvre and action.
4 David Kilcullen, ‘ “Twenty-Eight Articles”: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency’, Military Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, May 2006, p. 104, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=21388378&s…;.
5 Dan Green, ‘The Taliban’s Political Program’, Armed Forces Journal, 2009, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/11/4294842/> accessed 5 September 2010.
6 Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, ‘Learning About Counterinsurgency’, Military Review, March–April 2007, p. 5.
7 As outlined in detail in Kalev Sepp, ‘Best Practices in Counterinsurgency’, Military Review, May–June 2005, p. 9, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf> accessed 25 July 2010.
8 General David H Petraeus, COMISAF COIN Guidance 1 August 2010, International Security Assistance Force, Headquarters, Kabul, 2010, p. 2.
9 Kilcullen, ‘ “Twenty-Eight Articles”: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency’ p. 103.
10 Analyzing the Taliban Code of Conduct: Reinventing the Layeha, Understanding Afghan Culture Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 6 August 2009, p. 10, offers the text and an analysis of the 2009 Layeha, or Taliban code of conduct. Guideline #59 states: ‘The Mujahedeen must have a good relationship with all the tribal community and with the local people, so they are always welcome and are able to get help from the local people.’ A note from Mullah Omar written on the back page directs fighters to ‘Keep good relationships with your friends and the local people, and do not let the enemy divide/separate you.’
11 Task Force Kandahar 3-09 was comprised of a provincial reconstruction team, a battle group, a national support element, a task force headquarters and a host of smaller elements, many of which operated in the same terrain, but with different mandates.
12 The Army’s collective experience, captured in Army lessons learned documents, demonstrated through changes to pre-deployment training at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre, a reduction in violence in Task Force Kandahar-controlled areas and increases in freedom of movement/freedom of action in these same areas all support this statement.
13 C J Radin, ‘Afghan Security Forces Order of Battle (OOB)’, Public Multimedia Incorporated, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/oob/afghanistan/index.php> accessed 28 August 2010, contains a comprehensive description of ANSF organisation, manning, training, budgets and development, current as of 15 April 2010. In common terms, ANSF generally refers to the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, while smaller police elements such the Criminal Investigation Division, Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Civil Order Police also interact with ISAF elements. Not mentioned in the reference is the National Directorate of Security, an internal security and intelligence gathering body reporting to the Ministry of the Interior with wide powers of arrest and detention. National Directorate of Security methods have been called into question as indicated in Gil Shochat, ‘Tories Alerted to Afghan Secret Police Legal “Risk”’ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News, <http://www.cbc.ca/politics/story/2010/04/06/afghan-detainee-transfers.h…; accessed 7 September 2010. In the Dand district, one CID officer and one National Directorate of Security detachment were co-located with the ANP in the District Centre compound.
14 As indicated during a series of briefings from the commanding officer and key staff of the Kandahar Operational Coordination Centre – Provincial (OCC-P(K)) to Operational Coordination Centre – District (OCC-D) commanders, January 2010. At time of writing, the reference was not available from any open source or online repositories; this information was taken from the author’s personal notes.
15 Petty Officer Paul Dillard, ‘Afghans Coordinate for Safe&Free Election’, The Enduring Ledger, August 2009, <http://waronterrornews.typepad.com/home/2009/08/afg-occs-take-shape-in-…; accessed 25 July 2010; ‘Afghan Command Center in the Service of the People’ <http://www.sada-e-azadi.net/Joomla/index.php/en/afghanistan/north/907-a…; accessed 28 August 2010.
16 ‘Building Goodwill in Gereshk – Part Two’, Official blog for UK military operations in Afghanistan, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, <http://www.blogs.mod.uk/afghanistan/2008/07/page/2/> accessed 28 August 2010.
17 Radin, ‘Afghan Security Forces Order of Battle (OOB)’, p. 3.
18 French Indo-China war correspondent and counterinsurgency expert Bernard Fall, quoted in Kilcullen, ‘Counter-Insurgency Redux’, p. 124.
19 General Stanley McChrystal, ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, August 2009, Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, 2009, pp. 5, 7 – ISAF’s counterinsurgency guidance during Task Force 3-09’s deployment.
20 Unless in an emergency or a situation of extreme tactical necessity, ISAF forces are generally prohibited from searching compounds without being partnered with ANSF elements. Local ANSF commanders, however, may conduct compound searches as they see fit.
21 Kilcullen, ‘ “Twenty-Eight Articles”: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency’, p. 106, outlines that deterrent patrolling seeks to ‘flood an area with numerous small patrols working together. Each is too small to be a worthwhile target.’ The Dand District Combat Team used this tactic throughout its deployment to keep enemy observers off-balance and overwhelm enemy command and control by deploying multiple concurrent patrols, varying in tempo and avoiding patterns.
22 B-GL-321-006/FP-001 - Combat Team Operations (Interim), Directorate of Army Doctrine 4, Department of National Defence, Canada, 12 February 2004, p. 1.
23 Thomas H Johnson and M Chris Mason, ‘All Counterinsurgency is Local’, The Atlantic, October 2008, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/10/all-counterinsurgen…; accessed 5 September 2010.
24 In Kandahar province, village leaders are known as Maliks. They are often elected by the village population or appointed by a council of elders, and are normally trusted to speak on behalf of their villages in matters of security, development, agriculture, employment, education and most other facets of village life. Normally, formalised interactions between ISAF/ANSF and villages are conducted either through the village Malik or a selection of elders, one of whom may be the Malik, or a relative or representative of the Malik. In several villages in southern Kandahar province, the actual Maliks reside in Kandahar city and trust the day to day supervision of village affairs to an assistant or proxy. In the instance noted here, the Malik was supportive of ISAF/ANSF efforts; despite frequent death threats from Taliban agents, he continued to reside in his village.
25 Results of a series of security shuras conducted in villages throughout the Dand District with a view to bolstering ANP recruiting and gauging local support for ANP expansion and further police station construction. The village leader’s name and village are not provided for operation security reasons, both to protect soldiers currently serving overseas, but also the village leader and his family.
26 Operational Pashtunwali – Understanding Afghan Culture, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 15 June 2009, p. 8.
27 This practice is reinforced at every level of Army leadership training and is part and parcel of Canada’s current military culture.
28 Afghanistan - Cultural Awareness, Centre for Intercultural Learning, Ottawa, 3 July 2008, pp. 64–65, 71, 122.
29 Ibid., p. 71.
30 Often these are collectively known as Key Leaders. Interactions with them are known as Key Leader Engagements (KLE).
31 For operation security reasons names have been omitted; however, all accounts are factual, experienced personally by the author and the information provided taken from author’s notes.
32 Rising flood waters had washed away a police checkpoint securing a bridge and the District Chief of Police had requested assistance. Dand District Combat Team soldiers secured the bridge and concurrently established a new police checkpoint to replace one that had been destroyed.
33 Kilcullen, ‘ “Twenty-Eight Articles”: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency’, p. 105, supports this principle through a distillation of lessons learned from other counterinsurgencies. Operations during Task Force 3-09’s deployment validated it.
34 Ward, ‘ “Model” District no Safe Haven’. The Dand District Centre was attacked by two suicide bombers in March 2009, which severely damaged the main building that is the seat of Afghan governance in the Dand District. On 30 December 2010, an improvised explosive device destroyed a Canadian vehicle less than 2000 metres from the District Centre, killing five people. Throughout 2009 and 2010, Dand District government and police officials were frequently threatened and targeted by attacks on several occasions.
35 Operational Pashtunwali - Understanding Afghan Culture, p. 4, identifies that drinking chai (tea) is an important element of Afghan Pashto culture and a mark of honour and respect.
36 Johnson and Mason, ‘All Counterinsurgency is Local’.
37 This complaint was repeated frequently by many different elders and leaders during a series of security shuras throughout the district.
38 Eric Talmadge, ‘As US Starts Afghan Surge, Dug-in Canadians Plan Exit’, San Francisco Examiner, 6 February 2010, <http://www.sfexaminer.com/world/83714922.html> accessed 5 September 2010. The reporter, embedded with the combat team, describes the operation in greater detail.
39 ‘Convoy Operations’, Dispatches, Vol. 1, Army Lessons Learned Centre, <http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/ALLC-CLRA/Downloads/dispatches-eng.asp>
40 Major J H Vance, ‘Zero Template House Clearing Range’, The Bulletin, No. 2, February 1996, Army Lessons Learned Centre, <http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/allc-clra/Downloads/bulletin/TheBulletinVol…; accessed 8 September 2010, describes the creation of a zero-template range for building clearing based on a United Nations scenario.
