Army Aviation 2030: Aligning the Army Aviation Capability with the Army Objective Force 2030
Abstract
In response to the 2009 Defence White Paper, the Australian Army is developing the Army Objective Force 2030 concept based on the 1st, 3rd and 7th manoeuvre brigades. This article examines the extant Army Aviation capability and identifies that due to its size and structure it is unable to effectively support this emerging force. This article argues that in order to fully embrace the Army Objective Force concept, radical change may be required within the Army Aviation capability and the development of multi-type aviation regiments directly supporting each manoeuvre brigade is the optimal means to provide this support.
In October 2010, for the very first time, elements of all three Army Aviation (AAvn) regiments, as well as the Army Aviation Training Centre, formed Battle Group Pegasus to support Townsville’s 3rd Brigade as part of Exercise HAMEL 2010. During this exercise Battle Group Pegasus, which included 36 aircraft and over 750 officers and soldiers, conducted multiple battalion-level airmobile operations as well as aviation operations across the full spectrum of operations.1 The support that Battle Group Pegasus provided was a high-water mark for the AAvn capability and one of which it can justifiably be proud.
However, AAvn support to the exercise came at a heavy cost. Indeed, supporting this exercise required the complete commitment of the 16th Aviation Brigade and was effectively a one-shot weapon; is this sufficient or instead should the provision of battalion-sized, multi-aircraft type units to manoeuvre brigades become the norm? This article aims to explain why the extant AAvn force size and structure does not meet government-mandated force requirements and recommends an alternate AAvn force structure to support the Army Objective Force (AOF) 2030.
Army Objective Force 2030 - The Future Army
The Australian government gives clear guidance to Defence planners on the capability that it must provide through Defence White Papers supplemented by classified Defence Planning Guidance. The Defence White Paper 2009 describes that the Army must be capable of supporting one brigade-sized group capable of deploying to engage in sustained combat operations, a separate battalion-sized group deployed to a separate area of operations, and a residual capability to support other tasking including support to Special Forces.2 Of note, these requirements are not new, with the 2000 Defence White Paper including almost identical requirements.3
To support these requirements, recent initiatives such as the Hardened and Networked Army and the Enhanced Land Force advocated that the Army reduce its number of single capabilities and develop to an ‘Army of Twos’;4 with the current force structure the AAvn capability could largely comply with this requirement. However, with the release of recent government guidance, the Army has identified that the AOF must now be an ‘Army of Threes’ and that enabling forces, including AAvn, must be capable of supporting three Army task groups based upon the 1st, 3rd and 7th Brigades while simultaneously supporting Special Operations Command.5 Further, these manoeuvre brigades must be balanced and task organised to conduct both training and operations as carving forces from multiple manoeuvre brigades for operations, as currently occurs, is disruptive for training, unit cohesion and force preparation.6
The environment in which these ‘like-brigades’ must fight and win is described in the Army’s Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, which recognises the enduring nature of warfare as ‘dynamic, unpredictable, difficult to control and therefore chaotic’.7 As such, it identifies five mutually supporting and interdependent lines of operation: Joint Land Combat, Population Support, Population Protection, Indigenous Capacity Building and Information Actions.8 While Joint Land Combat will have primacy for structure and training of the like-brigades, Army must be prepared to lead or complement whole-of-government support to these four supporting lines of operation.
... Army must be prepared to lead or complement whole-of-government support to these four supporting lines of operation.
AAVN Support to AOF 2030 - The AOF AAVN Battle Group
Once the requirement for three like-brigades has been identified, as has the need that these brigades be ‘balanced’, an implied requirement is that each of these brigades are supported by dedicated, organic AAvn forces. To sustain an ongoing brigade-sized deployment, all three brigades require integral ground, air and littoral mobility; as such, attached AAvn forces must support the full ‘readying’ training continuum of combat team, battle group and task group-level exercises, training and certification before deploying on operations. Indeed, relying upon these brigades learning how to employ AAvn manoeuvre during pre-deployment mission readiness training or exercises is clearly unsatisfactory, as is relying on the triennial formation training opportunities presented by the HAMEL and TALISMAN SABRE series of exercises. Therefore, it is apparent that an organic AAvn force must support each of the three like-brigades throughout their entire ‘readying-ready-reset’ operational deployment cycle;9 the extant AAvn capability is unable to be divided three ways to provide this support.
With respect to aircraft locations, the Army currently has all operational Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) aircraft in Darwin, Black Hawk and Multi Role Helicopter (MRH) lift aircraft in Townsville and Sydney, and CH-47 Chinooks in Townsville. The extant AAvn force structure of homogenous regiments, while logistically preferable, is unsatisfactory and AAvn must re-balance its structure to form three multi-type, multi-role AAvn battle groups, co-located with their supported manoeuvre brigades. For the purpose of this article, these AAvn groups shall be named the AOF AAvn Battle Group. To conduct doctrinal brigade-level manoeuvre in support of Joint Land Combat, I argue that the following AAvn force elements are required within each AOF AAvn Battle Group:
a. One ARH Squadron. This squadron, in the structure currently used within the 1st Aviation Regiment, is the minimum force that could be deployed to an overseas operation and remain effective without relying on support from other ARH elements within Australia. While in the short term as few as six ARH aircraft may be capable of providing sufficient support to a manoeuvre brigade, for sustained deployments this would be insufficient as factors such as simultaneous escort, reconnaissance and attack operations, the requirement to support relief out of country leave, in-theatre deeper maintenance of aircraft, in-theatre continuation training requirements, and attrition would demand more aircraft.
b. One MRH Squadron. One squadron is the minimum force that could be deployed to an overseas operation for an extended period of time. Three MRH troops, with three online aircraft per troop, would provide a seated marching order lift capacity of approximately 110 personnel; this would be sufficient to support an infantry-based combat team airmobile operation.
One squadron is the minimum force that could be deployed to an overseas operation for an extended period of time.
c. One Medium Lift Helicopter / Light Utility Helicopter Squadron. As well as the manoeuvre brigades being balanced, subordinate battle groups must also be balanced, and to balance a standalone AAvn battle group, both CH-47 Medium Lift Helicopter (MLH) and Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) aircraft are required. Each MLH/LUH squadron should have two troops of CH-47 and two troops of LUH:
(1) MLH. The medium lift CH-47 capability is critical to all contemporary land manoeuvre. CH-47 is essential for large-scale direct action missions, operations in a high density altitude environment and supporting Artillery manoeuvre in an amphibious environment.10 Two troops are required to ensure that a troop of CH-47 is reliably available to the manoeuvre commander and to permit a concurrent airmobile operation of a second combat team should it be required. Finally, CH-47 are a key logistics enabler of the balanced AOF AAvn Battle Group through provision of an organic airborne forward arming and refuelling point and aircraft recovery capability.
(2) LUH. The argument for LUH has been generally accepted by Army, noting that personnel and funding constraints prevent their acquisition in the short to medium term. Indeed there are recurring requirements of all operations that are best addressed by an LUH capability including command and liaison, airborne command and control, combat support, combat service support and aero-medical evacuation.11 Using MRH or MLH aircraft in these roles is inefficient and draws these few aircraft away from their core function. Further, operations across the four supporting lines of operation identify that for many missions the ARH/MRH/MLH platforms are unsuitable for a number of reasons, including aircraft availability, physical footprint, psychological footprint and political constraints.12 For the same reasons as MLH, two LUH troops are required to ensure sustained LUH support for longer-duration deployments.
d. Technical Support Squadron. There is a requirement for each ‘balanced’ AOF AAvn Battle Group to have an organic technical support squadron to support operations. The fact that each battle group will now have four aircraft types makes the requirement for RAEME soldiers to be multi-type qualified essential; however, the means by which this should occur is beyond the scope of this article.
e. Logistic Support Squadron. For the same reasons as above, the AOF AAvn Battle Group cannot rely upon task group combat service support battalions or the 17th Combat Service Support Brigade for routine operations and must be supported by an organic logistic support squadron.
Where Should These Forces be Located?
While there are clear training, logistic and sustainment benefits to consolidating all AAvn forces in the one location (potentially Townsville or Oakey), this would significantly reduce the support provided to the manoeuvre brigades not co-located with this force. I argue that the 16th Aviation Brigade is different to the other two enabling brigades (6th and 17th Brigades) as helicopters are a key component of the combined arms team that must work beside, train and fight as a part of its supported brigade. Consolidating all AAvn forces in the one location would result in the AAvn capability becoming introspective at best and self-focused at worst; to support the land force one must become part of the land force, and the benefits of habitual relationships and training opportunities achieved through co-location would counter any training, cost or logistic benefits achieved through consolidation.
Consolidating all AAvn forces in the one location would result in the AAvn capability becoming introspective at best and self-focused at worst ...
By conducting a first-principles analysis, it is clear that to provide enduring AAvn support to Army, both in-barracks and on operations, the current structure of homogenous regiments in Townsville, Holsworthy and Darwin is unsustainable. It is well established that to ‘fight and win the land battle’, organisations must train as they fight; in this case combat aviators must live and breathe combined aircraft operations and manoeuvre brigades must establish enduring, habitual relationships with co-located AOF AAvn Battle Groups throughout their entire readying-ready-reset operational deployment cycle.
AOF AAVN Support To Special Operations
The Defence White Paper provides clear guidance on the types of missions that Special Operations must be prepared to conduct in the future. AAvn support to Special Forces can be divided into two broad areas: conduct of counter-terrorism and hostage recovery operations in the ‘black’ role, and conduct of ‘green’ Special Forces support to the manoeuvre brigades. This support to the manoeuvre brigades includes strategic surveillance and reconnaissance, offensive action and strategic strike missions.13
AAVN Support To Counter-Terrorism
For the same reasons as explained previously, there is a clear requirement for the Special Forces to have dedicated, enduring AAvn support to enable the conduct of counter-terrorism operations. Further, experience of peer counter-terrorism agencies such as those in the United Kingdom and United States has shown that medium-sized helicopters are often unsuitable for these types of operations and that smaller, more easily deployable, more agile and lower signature helicopters are required.14 Further, this force needs to be supported by a small, low-profile fixed-wing capability (such as the B350 Super Kingair) to conduct low-signature deployment, airborne command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance and electronic warfare (ISTAREW) tasks. This force, which should remain a regiment to ensure sufficient command oversight, need not be deployable to the field environment, nor would its headquarters need to act as a manoeuvre headquarters. This AAvn force should have the following elements:
a. One squadron of LUH. This squadron of unmarked helicopters should be capable of supporting counter-terrorism tasking, conducting all aircrew individual and collective training as well as organic combat support and combat services support to the AAvn battle group.
b. One troop of fixed-wing. This is the minimum force to support C2/ISTAREW as well as low-signature deployment and sustainment of Special Forces operations.
c. Support squadron. A combined support squadron would be sufficient to provide maintenance and logistic support the aviation regiment.
AAVN Support To 'Green' Special Operations
Special Forces have a valuable role during support to brigade manoeuvre; particularly during the ‘shaping’ stage of the doctrinal task group operation.15 However, unless the size of the AAvn capability grows significantly, it is unreasonable to provide permanent AAvn forces to Special Operations Command to sustain this capability. Indeed, for conduct of complex offensive action and deep strike missions, ARH, MRH and MLH aircraft would be required, and to fully satisfy this requirement a fourth AOF AAvn Battle Group would be needed. Lift assets, particularly MLH, are critical to supporting the manoeuvre brigades and to assign them to a Special Operations Command-supporting AAvn unit would effectively remove them from Forces Command where they are sorely needed.
Special Forces have a valuable role during support to brigade manoeuvre; particularly during the ‘shaping’ stage ...
The lack of dedicated AAvn support to Special Forces ‘green’ operations can be mitigated by the fact that when these types of operations are conducted, they are largely an immediate precursor to manoeuvre brigade operations; indeed Special Forces will normally form the ‘vanguard’ of operations closely followed by conventional forces. Therefore, should the Special Forces require AAvn support for green operations, it is logical that the AOF AAvn Battle Group assigned or allocated to the deploying task group should provide that AAvn support to the Special Forces. Finally, this risk could be further mitigated by ensuring that the three AOF AAvn Battle Groups routinely support Special Operations Command training in these green Special Forces roles as part of their ‘readying’ cycle and that, at all times, there is an identified ‘online’ AOF AAvn Battle Group ready to support Special Forces green manoeuvre.
Developing the 2030 AAVN AOF
From the above analysis, it is apparent that four AAvn units are required to support AOF 2030, three multi-role AOF AAvn Battle Groups, and one ‘light’ LUH/fixed-wing regiment supporting Special Operations Command counter-terrorism. It is also equally evident that the current and future AAvn net personnel and operating costs allocation is unable to support this enlarged force. In order to meet this future capability, Defence should declare to government that the extant AAvn capability cannot support AOF 2030 and re-configure the extant AAvn capability to best support AOF 2030 within existing funding, personnel and aircraft constraints. As a follow-on activity, Defence leadership must develop and promulgate an incremental growth path to appropriately support AOF 2030 for review, test, assessment and consideration by Army Headquarters, the Army Force Development Group and the Capability Development Group.
Defence should declare to government that the extant AAvn capability cannot support AOF 2030 ...
In order to effectively reconfigure the extant AAvn capability and develop an appropriate growth path, this article has not included 173rd Aviation Squadron within the 6th Aviation Regiment as an extant capability, as the future of this squadron is unclear. Further, if (when) Army confirms the requirement for an LUH capability, it should do so through robust analysis and doctrinal capability acquisition processes.16
A Proposed Path to the 2030 AAVN AOF
Stage 1 – Reconfiguration of extant capability. Stage 1, shown at Figure 1 below, is a ‘cost-neutral’ reorganisation to achieve better support to AOF 2030. Key elements of this structure include:
a. Dedicated support to the 1st and 3rd manoeuvre brigades. Of note, under current constraints the AAvn capability remains unable to provide dedicated support to the 7th Brigade.
b. Despite AIR 9000 Phase 5C replacing the extant CH-47D aircraft with seven CH-47F aircraft, analysis has confirmed that this is too few aircraft to split the fleet due to training and deeper maintenance constraints. As such, until at least twelve CH-47F have been acquired, all CH-47F aircraft should remain within the 5th Aviation Regiment.
c. Continued support to the Special Forces will be provided by the 6th Aviation Regiment with Black Hawk. As a result of this restructure, the 6th Aviation Regiment should focus solely on support to Special Operations Command and should be exempt from the Forces Command operational deployment cycle.
Figure 1. Structure 1 Extant Reorganisation
Stage 2 – Acquisition of LUH and additional CH-47F. In the short to medium term there will come an opportunity to acquire additional LUH as part of Project AIR 9000 Phase 7 Helicopter Aircrew Training System which will acquire LUH-type helicopters for ab initio rotary-wing flying training. Further, once the seven CH-47F are delivered under AIR 9000 Phase 5C, Defence will have the opportunity to have its extant CH-47D aircraft remanufactured to the CH-47F standard for a significantly reduced cost. Should these six CH-47Ds be remanufactured for a total fleet of thirteen CH-47Fs, this would provide sufficient aircraft to split the CH-47 fleet. Key elements of Stage 2 are:
a. Raising a new regiment (for this article the 4th Aviation Regiment), based at Oakey or Amberley, to provide dedicated support to the 7th Brigade. This regiment would initially consist of one MRH squadron and one LUH troop.
b. Acquisition of nine troops of LUH; two troops each assigned to 1st, 4th and 5th Aviation Regiments to provide organic combat support and combat service support to the AOF AAvn Battle Group and 171 Aviation Squadron re-roled to LUH with three troops.
c. Splitting the CH-47F Chinook fleet between the 1st and 5th Aviation Regiment. This would be achievable with thirteen aircraft as each squadron would have two CH-47 troops (four aircraft), C Squadron within the 5th Aviation Regiment would retain the training troop (two aircraft), and three aircraft would remain in deeper maintenance at any given time.
Structure 3 – Acquisition of fixed-wing and additional CH-47F and ARH aircraft. In order to fully equip the identified AOF AAvn Battle Groups, an additional six CH-47Fs would need to be acquired along with an additional squadron of ARHs. Further, additional fixed-wing aircraft would complement the 6th Aviation Regiment to ensure it is fully capable of supporting Special Operations Command to conduct counter-terrorism operations.
It is well acknowledged that achievement of the growth required for stages 2 and 3 are unlikely in the short to medium term due to personnel, aircraft, facilities and financial constraints; however, this does not take away from the fact that this AAvn capability is what the AOF 2030 requires. Indeed, the lack of lift support to the 1st and 7th Brigades, and the lack of ARH support to the 3rd and 7th Brigades, is currently directly affecting Army’s capability to provide the capability espoused in its Defence White Paper.
Figure 2. Structure 2 Additional CH-47F and LUH
Figure 3. Structure 3 Additional CH-47F, ARH and FW
AAVN Command and Control and The Role of the 16th Aviation Brigade
The final issue for consideration is the role of the 16th Aviation Brigade. Due to the requirement for better integration within Army, I argue that all AAvn units should be become direct command units under the three manoeuvre brigades.17 Brigade commanders need quantity time commanding AAvn forces, and the ‘quality time’ provided to one brigade per year through the HAMEL / TALISMAN SABRE series of exercises is insufficient to generate a habitual, integral relationship. Aviation battle group commanders need to work alongside their infantry, armour, artillery and enabling unit peers to their formation headquarters in barracks, in training and on operations to generate the outcome required by Army.
With the development of the Aviation Branch within Forces Command, Headquarters 16th Aviation Brigade has become increasingly dislocated, with the roles more typically completed within the formation headquarters such as logistics, capability, airworthiness and introduction into service being completed by Aviation Branch. I argue that the tasks being completed by Headquarters 16th Aviation Brigade could be completed by Headquarters Forces Command, Headquarters Special Operations Command and the manoeuvre Brigade Headquarters. Headquarters 16th Aviation Brigade was raised on 2 April 2002 and has worked tirelessly to develop the AAvn capability to where it is today. However, the AAvn capability must continue to develop and graduate from a niche, protected capability to a peer manoeuvre capability working directly for its supported manoeuvre brigades.
... AAvn capability must continue to develop and graduate from a niche, protected capability to a peer manoeuvre capability ...
Conclusion
Development of the AOF 2030 is a bold, inspirational concept. However, it is also the result of government providing clear and unambiguous guidance that Army must develop three like-brigades to permit the enduring deployment of a task group. In order to support this capability, each brigade must in turn be supported by an organic AAvn unit. While the recommendations within this article are both radical and expensive, they are also necessary and the natural result of government clearly identifying what Army is to achieve and Army identifying how it will meet these emerging requirements.
To support AOF 2030, AAvn must firstly restructure itself to better support the 1st and 3rd Brigades and identify clearly to the Army and government that without additional personnel, materiel and funding it is unable to effectively support the 7th Brigade. Further, the AAvn capability must then clearly annunciate the capability gap between the support it can and must provide and develop a clear, incremental path to achieving this capability. Army and Defence decision makers must be fully aware of the total cost of the requirements introduced by the 2009 Defence White Paper. Finally, to fully support Special Operations Command and the three manoeuvre brigades, these formation headquarters must be assigned AAvn direct command units with the resulting disbandment of the 16th Aviation Brigade.
About the Author
Major Keith Wylie was allocated to the Australian Army Aviation Corps in September 1999. After successful completion of Pilots’ Course, Major Wylie served as a Black Hawk line pilot and troop commander within the 5th Aviation Regiment deploying to East Timor on Operations TANAGER and CITADEL. Major Wylie is a graduate of the Capability and Technology Management College and has filled Army Aviation capability positions in Headquarters 16th Aviation Brigade and the Defence Materiel Organisation. Major Wylie is currently serving as the Operations Officer of the 5th Aviation Regiment.
Endnotes
1 J B A Brown, ‘Exercise HAMEL’, AAAA Fourays, Spring, 2010, p. 38.
2 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 88.
3 Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Department of Defence, Canberra, December 2000, p. 80.
4 P F Leahy, Chief of Army Directive 14/05 – ‘The Hardened and Networked Army’, 16 December 2005, p. 2.
5 J G Caligari, ‘Army Modernisation’, Speech delivered at the Chief of Army’s Exercise 2010, Brisbane, 15 November 2010, <http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/exercises/caex/speeches.cfm>.
6 In the AOF 2030 context, a ‘balanced force’ has the correct ratio of various components including combat, command and control, combat support and combat service support, regular, reserve and civilians to enable the mission.
7 Adaptive Campaigning – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, Department of Defence, Canberra, September 2009, p. 4.
8 Ibid, p. 28.
9 The ‘readying-ready-reset’ cycle was cogently explained in J G Caligari’s speech, ‘Army Modernisation’.
10 Indeed, during Ship To Objective Manoeuvre and Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment, the CH-47 will be the only platform capable of transporting the new M777 155 mm guns and supporting materiel. An organic OS is an essential and uncontested element of the Combined Arms Team; AIR 9000 Phase 5C is delivering seven CH-47F aircraft with the only significant non-military off the shelf modification being the installation of a rotor brake to ensure these aircraft can support amphibious artillery manoeuvre.
11 This requirement for LUH was explained in the Australian Technical Staff Officer Course (now the Capability & Technology Management Program) study: C Dutton, Q Masson, M Hose and K Wylie, ‘Final Report: Capability Requirements Definition Light Utility Helicopter’, Team Project: Technology Management, 8 October 2007.
12 Ibid.
13 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 61.
14 The UK 8 Flight, Army Air Corps operates unmarked LUH-type helicopters in support of domestic SAS counter-terrorism operations and the US Army 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment operates the MH-6 ‘Little Birds’ to support counter-terrorism operations.
15 Land Warfare Doctrine – 3.0: Operations, Department of Defence, 19 September 2008, p. 2-8.
16 Defence Capability Development Manual, Department of Defence, 2006, p. 16.
17 This should commence with the 1st Aviation Regiment being transferred to the 7th Brigade, the 5th Aviation Regiment being transferred to the 3rd Brigade, and the 6th Aviation Regiment being transferred to Special Operations Command.
