An Aid Worker Reports on the Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur

Editor's Introduction

Since the early 1990s, many hundreds of Australian Defence Force personnel have had experience as peacekeepers in humanitarian interventions in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. However, the reality is that the military are often the last group to arrive in areas devastated by war, genocide and famine. Aid workers from a variety of non-government organisations (NGOs) are usually the first on the scene. At great personal risk, such people work to bring aid to distressed populations long before the journalists and the military arrive. This report by Andjela Jurisic details the situation in the troubled Darfur region of Sudan in July and August of 2004, shortly before the arrival of peacekeeping troops from the African Union.

The Situation in the Darfur Region

The conflict in the impoverished Darfur region of western Sudan began in early 2003. Following claims that the central government in Khartoum was neglecting the region, a rebel group began attacking government targets. The rebels maintain that the government is oppressing black Africans in favour of Arabs. Historically, there have been tensions in Darfur between the Arab and the African communities over land and grazing rights.

The government has mobilised an Arab militia, known as the Janjaweed, to tackle the insurrection. Numbering several thousands, this proxy force has been carrying out attacks on villages and towns. The attacks follow a pattern in which Janjaweed forces, mounted on horses or camels, conduct ground assaults on a village after it has been bombed by government aircraft. Human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have accused the militia of numerous abuses aimed at bringing about the ethnic cleansing of the non-Arab population in Darfur. However, the Sudanese Government denies being in control of the Janjaweed, and President Omar al-Bashir has called the Arab militia ‘thieves and gangsters’.

By the end of July 2004, one million people had fled their homes and at least 10000 people had been killed. Nevertheless, the Government of Sudan has done nothing to rein in the Janjaweed militias, who continue to terrorise the people of Darfur. The lack of effective action by the Khartoum government is in breach of commitments that it made to United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, during his visit to Sudan in early July 2004. These commitments were formalised in a joint communique that was signed on 3 July. Following the Secretary-General’s visit, reports of Sudanese military forces assisting the Janjaweed in launching attacks against African villagers continued. These attacks have claimed hundreds of lives and displaced many thousands of Darfur’s African population.

During the first two weeks of July 2004, aid workers learnt of numerous attacks. The reports below are drawn from a variety of sources, including Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other humanitarian agencies:

• On 12 July, more than 400 armed horsemen attacked the village of Donki Dereisa. The attack was supported by a fixed-wing aircraft that bombed the village and also by several military vehicles filled with Sudanese soldiers. The death toll was reported to be as high as 150 villagers, including six young children (ages three to fourteen), who were captured during the assault and burnt alive later that day. A man who tried to save them was beheaded and then dismembered.
   
• At around the same time, the Janjaweed attacked the village of Talha, burnt it to the ground and killed at least twenty people.
   
• On 13 July, an attack on the village of Abu Noura by hundreds of Janjaweed was again supported by a fixed-wing aircraft and two military vehicles. Approximately twelve men were killed in the attack and the village was looted and burnt.
   
• Two attacks by the Janjaweed occurred in the village of Ghanja. The first attack took place on 1 July and was launched by a group of 400 horsemen, accompanied by a fixed-wing aircraft, a helicopter and several military vehicles. Eight men were killed during the assault and seventeen were injured. Hundreds of cows, goats and sheep were stolen. The second attack, by about 200 mounted militia, took place approximately three weeks later on 19 July. This time, the Janjaweed, escorted by four land cruisers filled with Sudanese soldiers, killed five villagers and wounded three others.
   
• On 7 July, an attack on the outskirts of the village of Janjawannah, by approximately twenty Janajaweed fighters, killed three men and stole livestock.
   
• In mid-July, mounted Janjaweed—accompanied by Sudanese soldiers in vehicles with machine-gun mounts—attacked the village of Moraia Jenge. The village was looted and a woman was shot in the thigh.
   
• Also in mid-July, dozens of Janjaweed attacked the village of Mosabikra. Sudanese soldiers in military vehicles also accompanied them. Livestock and personal belongings were stolen and one villager was shot dead.

In order to contain the violence, the Sudanese Government has allowed a small contingent of 300 unarmed observers from the African Union into Darfur to monitor compliance with the UN-brokered cease-fire agreement. However, by the end of July, only fifty of the 300 observers had been deployed. Importantly, these observers lacked the transport and logistical capacity necessary to carry out their mission. Furthermore, under the agreement governing their deployment, the African Union observers must have representatives from all sides present when investigating alleged violations of the cease-fire agreement. This requirement severely undermines the ability of the African Union observers to monitor human rights abuses effectively, since victims are understandably reluctant to tell their stories in the presence of Sudanese Government officials. Moreover, Khartoum has been extremely loath to allow experienced human-rights monitors into Darfur and has only recently given the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights permission to send a small team of monitors into the region.

Despite the continuing violence in Darfur, the Sudanese Government has adopted a policy to encourage displaced persons to return to their communities. The government has been attempting to persuade IDPs to return home by telling them that the security situation has improved and that their villages are now safe. There are also reports of bribes being offered to village chiefs if they will encourage their people to return home. In some instances, due to the paucity of aid reaching the existing IDP camps, Sudanese Government officials have lured displaced people back to their homes with promises of a generous return package. On 12 July, about 100 hungry families were returned to the village of Sania Dalaiba. The village is only 40 miles south of Donki Dereisa, which was attacked on the same day by Janjaweed and government forces. The Sania Dalaiba returnees later informed aid workers that the government had failed to make good the promise of assistance and now the inhabitants of the village were, not without good reason, also afraid for their safety. There are reports that returnees in other villages have been killed, beaten, raped and/or threatened by roaming bands of Janjaweed.

Other IDPs have been unwilling to accept the government’s assurances that the security situation has improved because the environment around the camps where they have sought sanctuary is dangerous. While there has been little violence in the camps themselves, camp residents have been the subject of frequent attacks when they have dared to venture out into the surrounding areas. In particular, a large number of women have been assaulted and raped by Janjaweed fighters when they have left the camps to plant crops or gather firewood. In one recent incident, four young women were abducted when they went to collect firewood outside the Otash Camp in Nyala. Women have been routinely raped while collecting firewood outside Kass Camp, and one recently died from her wounds after having been brutally gang-raped. In another incident, a woman from the Nerti Camp was gang-raped by ten Janjaweed, who then mutilated her breasts and genitals with a sword.

In response to these attacks, Sudanese police officers, both male and female, have started a course of training on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Camps, which is conducted by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Trained police officers have already been deployed to some of the camps and villages, but women continue to feel reluctant to report attacks and rapes to the police. Under Sudanese law, women who have been raped require two men or four women to witness the rape in order to be able to bring the case to court. Women and their families do not see much sense in reporting attacks and sexual assault, particularly as medical and psycho-social services are either nonexistent or not provided for free. In addition, in some camps, the government has instructed police not to take reports of alleged rapes. This policy means that victims do not have access to a referral document that would allow them to receive immediate medical attention. Even basic medicines are not manufactured in Sudan, and the general security situation in Darfur prevents immediate distribution of imported medical supplies to those in greatest need. This is particularly true when it comes to meeting the needs of raped women, especially considering that the Government of Sudan does not officially allow dissemination and use of the 72-hour ‘morning after’ contraceptive pill.

The Impact of the Security Situation in Darfur on the Work of Relief Agencies

Under the conditions outlined above, the support of the Sudanese Government is obviously essential to the work of relief organisations if they are to act in time to save thousands of lives. To assess the needs of IDPs in Darfur effectively, UN agencies and NGOs require unhindered and sustained access to the region. However, until recently these agencies have not had such access, and while access to Darfur has improved, humanitarian agencies must also rely on the cooperation of the rebel forces—something that cannot be guaranteed. In theory, freedom of movement for humanitarian workers was improved when the Government’s Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) issued identity travel cards that enable aid workers to travel whenever and wherever they wish. In reality, the facilitation of movements of food and other aid supplies is still poor. Trucks required to deliver aid are impounded by Customs officials for several weeks at a time. By August, seasonal rains had exacerbated an already-complex operating environment since the roads deteriorate in the bad weather. Heavy trucks and four-wheel drive vehicles have become essential for the delivery of aid to IDPs in camps and villages. However, the continuing violence in the region makes travel a dangerous undertaking for both locally employed and international aid agency staff.

In mid-August a local staff member of the US–NGO CARE was murdered in Kalma Camp, which is just ten minutes drive away from Nyala township. The response of the Sudanese local authorities, HAC and the police was to limit access to the camp by relief agencies. This constraint interrupted the provision of basic services—drinking water, food and hygiene facilities—for several days while the police carried out investigations in the camp. The relief agencies operating in Kalma Camp were thus put in the difficult position of having to work under tight restrictions imposed by the local authorities. Under the prevailing security situation, aid workers do not have sufficiently strong grounds to push for the unrestricted access to the camp that they require for continuation of their work on a full-time and regular basis. The continuing poor security environment is thus not only disrupting the provision of humanitarian services, but is also creating significant safety concerns for both the IDPs and aid agency staff. The government’s campaign to return and relocate IDPs is exploiting this problem. The campaign is also making it virtually impossible for humanitarian agencies and other organisations to verify the extent to which IDPs have been properly informed of the security situation and whether they have consented to participating in the return and relocation program.

International aid workers have also been the target of attacks and harassment. In June 2004, a female aid worker travelling in a car stopped in the market area of Nyala. When she opened her car window, a man approached and hit her in the face. This attack occurred at 10 a.m. when the market was crowded with people. A few weeks later, another female international aid worker was walking along the street from her office to her guesthouse. Although it was evening, she was using a busy street. According to her account, three young Sudanese men approached her, pushed her into a corner, sexually assaulted her and then said, ‘This is Sudan, Americans leave!’ In other instances of harassment, both expatriate and local aid agency staff have frequently been arrested and held in police custody. The justifications given for these arrests and investigations include allegations that aid workers were taking photos of ‘sensitive’ buildings or simply that they were present in a location where a crime had recently been committed.

Sudanese security forces in civilian clothing are a constant presence. These men are easily recognisable by their sunglasses, fancy shirts and new motorcycles. Many local staff employed by international relief agencies are also working for Sudanese military intelligence. Ironically, in July 2004, Nyala’s Chief of Police stated that ‘NGOs are all spies for their governments’. Aid workers are used to operating in sensitive and dynamic situations. However, in Darfur they are also working in an environment where they are regarded as the vanguard of a prospective military intervention (UN resolution due on 31 August). Even without the presence of foreign troops, aid workers are being treated as if they are not in Darfur for humanitarian reasons. This attitude puts them at real risk.

Editor's Note

On 30 July 2004, the UN Security Council gave the Sudanese Government a thirty-day deadline to ‘disarm the Janjaweed and bring them to justice’ (UN Resolution 1556). When the deadline expired on 29 August, the Secretary-General reported on the state of the conflict. According to his report, the situation ‘has resulted in some improvements on the ground but remains limited overall’. In particular, he notes that the Janjaweed militias remain armed and continue to attack civilians (contrary to Resolution 1556). He also noted that the Sudanese Government’s commitments regarding their own armed forces have been only partially implemented, and IDPs continue to report attacks involving government forces. On 9 September 2004, the United States put forward a draft UN Security Council resolution threatening Sudan with sanctions to its oil industry. This resolution was adopted, in a modified form, on 18 September 2004 as Resolution 1564. These resolutions and peace accords signed in November 2004 have had little effect on the situation in Darfur.