This article seeks to review the relationship between suppression and manoeuvre in infantry platoon tactics. It is argued that current Australian Army doctrine has not paid sufficient attention to the advent of precision munitions, the development of all-arms combat teams, and the introduction of information technologies such as intra-section communications. Nor has Australian military doctrine fully appreciated how these new developments have ‘force multiplied’ the combat power of an infantry platoon. In a recent article on the future structure of the Australian infantry battalion, Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen suggested that, in the relationship between firepower and movement, the achievement of fire dominance and the use of a ‘reserve of fire’ required greater emphasis rather than reliance solely on a manoeuvre reserve.1
The notion of compromising manoeuvre assets in favour of an increase in suppression capabilities sits uncomfortably with many Australian infantry officers. The tried-and-tested section tactics of ‘two up, one back’ or ‘one up, one in depth, and one in fire support’ has been fundamental to all courses of instruction in platoon tactics for all ranks since the 1960s. However, this focus underestimates the possibility that new technologies may require a change in tactical focus.
The Infantry and the Challenge of Hardening and Networking the Army
In his Hardening and Networking of the Army (HNA) initiative, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, has explained the challenge facing the land force in the following terms:
Our Army must move from a light infantry force to a light armoured force with increased protection, firepower and mobility. The alternative is for us to steadily lose capability over time as existing systems age and are overwhelmed by the emerging threat environment.2
One of the tenets of the HNA initiative involves the ‘upskilling’ of Australian infantrymen in order to complement the acquisition of new equipment. The dual mechanism of multiskilling and new equipment may provide a paradigm shift in the dynamics between manoeuvre and suppression. The introduction into the Australian Army of both the Javelin anti-armour weapons system and the Mark 19 automatic grenade launcher have significantly enhanced a rifle platoon’s ability to concentrate lethal force at a precise moment within the battlespace at a definite time. No longer does the platoon commander necessarily have to fight a battle in complete isolation. Moreover, the notion of the ‘strategic corporal’—that is, the potential strategic effect of individual soldiers deployed in a tactical operation to call in long-range fires on the enemy—now requires absolute precision with regard to the employment of lethal force.
The current challenge for the infantry is to consider how best to exploit its growing ability within the battlespace to apply force and to coordinate external suppression assets with small-unit operations. The use of professional targeters as forward observers or forward air-controllers as well as such targeting devices as groundbased laser target designators (GBLTD) increases the suppression effect that small numbers of infantry may be capable of generating in proportion to their physical size. As has been recently noted in the pages of the AAJ, in operations conducted in complex terrain, combat may increasingly involve the application of highly accurate firepower delivered from relatively static fires. Thus, in the battle for Basra during the warfighting stage of the 2003 Iraq War, British sections often possessed no riflemen, but nearly every soldier carried a fire support weapon.3
In terms of combat capability, the intellectual challenge for Australian infantry is the need to determine the correct balance within the platoon between training and equipping for manoeuvre and suppression tasks. Given the increased mobility, protection and firepower proposed under the HNA scheme, it will be possible to execute both manoeuvre and suppression through the combination of improved weapons in armoured fighting vehicles and better equipped individual soldiers. It is likely that an increase in the suppression capability of a future HNA infantry platoon may also require additional anti-armour weapons, anti-materiel sniper weapons and heavy machine guns.
Regardless of eventual platoon tactical composition, one of the key strengths of HNA infantry units is certain to be enhanced organic firepower. The fundamental difference between an HNA attack and the standard infantry attack is therefore likely to be the factor of suppression. In the future, it is probable that an HNA infantry attack would seek to place a relatively small dismounted assault element against a vulnerable penetration point supported by the overwhelming firepower of an organic vehiclemounted suppression element. There may also be an ability to coordinate support from tactical and operational suppression assets. In theory the tactical effect would be complete—an enemy would be suppressed with fires supporting the friendly forces assault element manoeuvring to close on the objective.
Balancing Capability within the Infantry Platoon
If the Army sacrifices traditional small-unit manoeuvre in favour of an increased suppression capability, what are the consequences? It is important to understand that modern manoeuvre is not about size but rather effect. In a paper discussing the future of Australian infantry, Alan Ryan, formerly of the Land Warfare Studies Centre, observed:
[Australia needs] first-class infantry of the information age—highly mobile, and able to operate in small units and orchestrate effects across the full spectrum of operations. Mass infantry are obsolete, and as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated, will invariably be defeated by more intellectually adept and technologically superior forces. Information-age infantry will inherit the flexibility, the ability to discriminate and the lethality of their forebears; however, properly led, trained and organised, they will not be the cannon fodder that their less fortunate colleagues are.4
In the future, it is likely that the Army will require a more modular form of tactical organisation to meet sub-battalion needs. The HNA initiative presents the infantry with a powerful opportunity to ‘value add’ both to the Army and to itself through the restructuring of infantry units and the enhancement of organic suppression capabilities. Armoured mobility, helicopter mobility and amphibious capability will enable a rapid manoeuvre effect, whether in platoon or larger force element. For example, under a combat team system of manoeuvre, an infantry element operating in a built-up area could be supported by tanks as well as by organic light armour. Highly mobile suppression assets such as armoured fighting vehicles could move with infantry manoeuvre elements and remain in support throughout an engagement.
An HNA infantry platoon of the future might comprise the following assets: two manoeuvre elements, each of twelve soldiers (possibly mounted in two vehicles); a suppression element of twelve soldiers (also mounted in two vehicles); and a command group, perhaps composed of six personnel (including a forward air observer, medic and communicator) mounted in a command vehicle. It is possible that the command group might ‘re-role’ into a situational reserve if required. The dedicated reserve could come from either the manoeuvre element or the suppression element, depending on the tactical situation. The configuration of the platoon would be all-arms, and the unit would be capable of both suppression and manoeuvre Improved information-age weapons provide for a discriminate application of lethal force. In this context, Australian infantry have already benefited from such information-age equipment as the introduction of night aiming devices (NADs) under Project Ninnox. In addition, the recently introduced Javelin anti-armour weapons system, optical sights, thermal imagery and GBLTD demonstrate the potential for improved operational effect. The introduction of these and other devices at the platoon level increases suppressive capability and facilitates effective support for a manoeuvre group that may need to be ‘stealthy’ in its movements.
One of the key recommendations from US combat teams’ experiences in the war in Iraq has been the need for all-arms action, particularly in suppression, in close urban combat. The recent action in Fallujah in April 2004 saw tanks effectively employed by infantry commanders as support-by-fire and attack-by-fire platforms. Quick-reaction forces were used to mark a Forward Line Own Troops (FLOT) in order to facilitate close air support, conduct reconnaissance by fire and execute platoon-level feints.5 These lessons from the US Army are relevant to Australian infantry. Lieutenant General Peter Leahy has made the following observation in relation to the HNA project:
Close combat remains the Army’s core business; it is the acme of professional skill. Moreover, close combat is what the Government directs the Army to provide to the ADF’s joint capability ... [T]he Army seeks to take prudent steps to maintain its vital close-combat capability in order to achieve tactical decision. Close combat is dependent on effective combined-arms teams comprising balanced elements of infantry, armour, artillery, engineers, aviation and signals, supported by a range of ground- and air-based indirect fires and logistics support ... [D]eficiencies or mistakes in targeting become a weapon in insurgent information operations and are used to undermine Coalition attempts to bring stability.6
While configurations of the ideal tactical combat team in urban warfare remain a subject of considerable debate, one aspect is clear: operations on the urban fringe or within city areas are an all-arms business. The need for an all-arms effect in modern ground and joint combat means that there must be effective communications in the battlespace. In terms of infantry section communications, there are several significant capability gaps that HNA must address in the future.7 Currently radio compatibility problems exist in the ADF; these problems tend to limit an infantry formation’s ability to coordinate offensive fires, manoeuvre assets and supply supporting assets. There is also an inability to operate in a joint environment. For instance, Royal Australian Air Force and Royal Australian Navy assets operate predominantly in the high-frequency/ultra-high-frequency (HF/UHF) spectrum while Australian infantry operates in the very high frequency (VHF) band. Although there are communication modes available that span these different spectrums, significant training problems remain to be overcome, and a degree of communications incompatibility was demonstrated on the Crocodile exercise in 2003. If an infantry platoon is to be used to its full all-arms potential, then it must possess a first-rate communications capability in order to allow it to facilitate effective coordination of offensive fires in the joint domain.
Conclusion
Redefining the roles and capabilities of the Australian infantry is essential if infantry soldiers are to remain a potent and effective force in the battlespace. In Australian Army doctrine, suppression (through firepower) and manoeuvre are two of the three elements of combat power (the third is morale). As manoeuvre is more about efficiency and mobility rather than combat ratios, there should be a reassessment of its relationship to suppression. Historically, the weighting of suppression versus manoeuvre has been in favour of the latter. Today, with the advent of precision weapons, advanced battlespace communications, smaller and more powerful combat teams and the use of combined arms, a commander has the means to ensure that manoeuvre can be supported by effective and accurate suppression.
There is thus a requirement for the Australian infantry to reconsider its capability in a post-HNA environment, particularly in the area of organic suppression capabilities and in coordinating supporting fires in a joint environment. Paul Harris believes that change is necessary in order to ensure that foot soldiers do not become intoxicated by technology or blinded by science; it is all too easy for soldiers to lose touch with reality in warfare. After a couple of centuries of extremely rapid technological change the world’s most sophisticated and adaptable instrument of war is still the infantryman.8
Endnotes
1 Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, ‘Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat’, Australian Army Journal, vol. 1, no. 1, June 2003, pp. 29–40.
2 Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, AO, ‘Address to the United Service Institution of the ACT’, 11 June 2003, viewed 30 January 2005, <www.defence.gov.au/army>.
3 Kilcullen, ‘Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat’, p. 38.
4 Alan Ryan, Putting Your Young Men in the Mud: Change, Continuity and the Australian Infantry Battalion, Working Paper no. 124, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, November 2003, p. 7.
5 Commanding Officer, 1st Tank Battalion, United States Army, ‘Lessons learned: Tanks’ conduct of MOUT in Fallujah, Iraq’, April 2004. Unpublished paper in author’s possession.
6 Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, ‘Hardening and Networking the Army’, Australian Army Journal, vol. 1, no. 1, June 2003, pp. 31–4.
7 The Pintail team radio has provided effective communications internally to infantry platoons. However, the radio operates only in the VHF band; there is no UHF or HF capacity (unless issued by exception).
8 Paul Harris, ‘Radicalism in Military Thought’, in Brian Bond and Mungo Melvin (eds), Th e Nature of Future Confl ict: Implications for Force Structure, Occasional Paper No. 36, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Camberley, September 1998, p. 42
