Entry by Air and Sea: The Littoral Challenges of Operation ASTUTE, 2006

Introduction

Since the Second World War, Australian naval, land and air forces have rarely had the opportunity to undertake amphibious operations on active deployments. On the evening of 24 May 2006, with firefights taking place around the Timorese capital of Dili and the government losing control of its own security services, the country’s political leaders requested assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal ‘in sending defence as well as security forces from their countries to Timor-Leste as a matter of urgency’.[1] Having monitored events for several weeks and as the nearest of the four nations, the Australian Government had already authorised a potential stabilisation force to be at high readiness and thus was able to respond quickly. After a deployment agreement was signed with the Timorese Government outlining the parameters of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) mission, the force, designated Joint Task Force (JTF) 631, began landing in Dili at dawn two days later on Friday 26 May under the auspices of Operation ASTUTE. Over the coming weeks, the multi-national military force sought to restore order to the streets of the capital while a political resolution to the crisis was found. As with its predecessor in 1999, the initial phases of Operation ASTUTE required a force lodgement and build-up in a littoral environment, drawing upon a range of air and sea assets. Therefore, it is a worthy case study for the modern ADF and the Australian Army, and warrants consideration in conjunction with the better-recorded events of 1999.

Policy Context for Operation ASTUTE

On 6 December 2000, barely a year after the first Australian troops landed in East Timor as part of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), the Australian Government released a Defence White Paper which Prime Minister John Howard referred to as ‘the most comprehensive reappraisal of Australian defence capability for decades’.[2] As with previous policy documents, the White Paper affirmed that the defence of Australian territory from direct military attack was the country’s most important long-term strategic objective.[3] Yet unlike the earlier 'Defence of Australia' policy, which had emphasised that expeditionary operations were largely unnecessary for Australia’s defence, the new White Paper acknowledged that the stability of Australia’s immediate neighbourhood could not be guaranteed and it was in the nation's strategic interest to foster security in the region.[4] As a consequence, the ADF required the capability to lodge a force into a foreign country, either from the sea, by the air or both, and then sustain it over the duration of its mission. While the document never used the word ‘expeditionary’, it nevertheless pointed towards such a role for the ADF in the future.

At that time, the recent INTERFET deployment had been a textbook example—in form if not necessarily in execution—of a regional expeditionary operation. It had, however, also demonstrated the ADF’s limitations in this area. Years of force development in line with the precepts of Defence of Australia, in conjunction with several efficiency reviews, had left the organisation hollow in key areas. The ADF had put together enough lift assets in September 1999 to execute the Operation WARDEN lodgement into East Timor, comprising RAAF C-130 Hercules transport aircraft from No. 86 Wing for airlift. Meanwhile, sealift was provided by the heavy landing ship HMAS Tobruk, the heavy landing craft (LCH) HMA Ships Balikpapan, Brunei and Labuan, and the leased wave-piercing catamaran HMAS Jervis Bay.[5] Yet planners recognised that if the ADF wished to deploy and sustain another expeditionary force on regional operations, it required increased amphibious lift capacity and capability. Accordingly the White Paper provided a detailed, costed plan—the Defence Capability Plan—to guide force development and capability acquisition over the following decade to enable the ADF to achieve its required tasks. 

The government planned to structure the Army to ensure it was able to sustain a brigade deployed on operations for extended periods and, at the same time, maintain at least a battalion group available for deployment elsewhere. This required an increase of the number of infantry battalions at high readiness from four to six. The 3rd Brigade, based in Townsville, would continue to provide light, air-mobile forces available for immediate deployment.[6] To deploy these forces, the government gave high priority to improving the ADF’s strategic lift and logistics capabilities. After several years of modernisation and conversion to Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA) configurations, the amphibious ships HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla had only recently joined the fleet, too late to support INTERFET. These capabilities would enable the retirement of Jervis Bay, which had proved a valuable platform in 1999 for high-speed runs to Dili but possessed only limited cargo capacity and no means to support helicopter operations. The government also planned to replace Tobruk at the end of its life, as well as the fleet of heavy and medium landing craft. Further, there were planned enhancements to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 12 C-130H aircraft (a replacement of the ageing DHC-4 Caribou cargo aircraft) and improvements to the Army’s logistics capabilities and capacity to support deployed forces.[7] Due to the lengthy development and acquisition process, however, these capabilities would not come into service for many years.

No sooner had the Defence White Paper been adopted, however, than strategic priorities shifted following the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. The government having declared that the defence of the continent and contributing to the security of Australia’s immediate region were the ADF’s first and second priority tasks, the ADF proceeded to spend the next two decades in the Middle East area of operations, predominantly undertaking what the White Paper designated the third-tier task of contributing to ‘international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond our immediate neighbourhood’.[8] In early 2003, Defence updated the 2000 White Paper, reflecting the strategic changes since 11 September 2001 and the looming US-led invasion of Iraq, which began in March 2003. Amid discussion of global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the update reiterated that Australia’s neighbourhood constituted ‘a troubled region’, faced with ‘major economic, political, governance and social challenges’.[9] 

The residual concern about stability in Australia’s nearer region was borne out in mid-2003, when the ADF was called upon to lead a security (military and police) intervention into Solomon Islands at the request of Prime Minister Kemakeza. On 24 July the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (2RAR) (the Army’s Ready Battalion Group) deployed to Honiara as the nucleus of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 635. Designated Operation ANODE, Australian forces arrived surreptitiously at dawn by C-130 aircraft and on a beach landing site borne by two Army-operated LCM8 mechanised landing craft and Sea King Mk 50 helicopters from Manoora. Ultimately CJTF 635 was to become a 1,800-strong peacekeeping organisation comprising army personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea, supported by navy and air force elements.[10] The requirement for the ADF to become proficient at regional expeditionary operations was seemingly confirmed.

A second defence update was released two years later and affirmed the strategic judgements of its predecessors with some modification. Specifically, Australia's National Security: a Defence Update 2005 included language concerning ‘the risks posed by failed or failing states’, which sat alongside trans-national terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as grave challenges to Australian security.[11] The document acknowledged that ‘Australia’s regional security interests require that we have the ability to respond comprehensively to contingencies that might arise with little warning’.[12] Yet aside from the Solomon Islands intervention, which was on a relatively small scale, the capacity for the ADF to respond to contingencies similar to those of 1999 had not been tested in the years since. By 2006, Defence was finalising the acquisition of C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft and seeking first-pass approval for the amphibious ships project to replace Manoora and Kanimbla. Yet, by and large, the ADF’s capability to respond to a regional crisis was largely the same as in 1999, with the welcome exception of two new LPAs and 12 new C-130J models. Furthermore, unlike in 1999, the ADF was heavily committed, on a genuinely global scale, and operating at a higher tempo than it had seen in decades. As a result, the second Australian military intervention in Timor would be undertaken in a vastly different operational context than the first.

Early Warning Signs

Following East Timor’s independence in 2002, the ADF’s operational commitment in the country now known as Timor-Leste concluded. On 30 June 2005, the last contingent of ADF personnel supporting the United Nations handed over Forward Operating Base Moleana to the Timorese Government and departed the country.[13] The residual ADF presence in Timor was then confined to the Defence staff at the Australian Embassy and a 24-person bilateral Defence Cooperation Program.[14] It was not long, however, before the country once again became a strategic focus for the Australian Government.

In early 2006, internal disputes began to escalate within the Timor-Leste military—the FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL). In mid-March, after raising complaints of unfair treatment in a letter to President Xanana Gusmao, the Chief of the Defence Force, Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak, dismissed 594 protesting soldiers.[15] On 28 April, a week-long demonstration by the former soldiers turned violent when the protest was hijacked by anti-government groups. In response, Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri authorised the military to assist the police in containing the unrest, resulting in five civilian deaths and 70 wounded or injured.[16] The government had stabilised the situation within several days, but not before thousands of frightened Dili residents had fled into the hills. There had also been several high-profile deserters from the F-FDTL in protest over the government’s action. Chief among these was the charismatic military police commander, Major Alfredo Reinado, who soon had a small group of armed former soldiers and police around him.

In Australia, the ADF had only just deployed the Ready Company Group back to Solomon Islands on 19 April to reinforce the international police and military in the wake of riots in Honiara.[17] Reports of fresh unrest in Dili, therefore, came at an unwanted time for Australian policymakers, officials and military commanders. Australian Defence Headquarters was alive to the possibility that Australia might be asked, either by the Timorese Government or by the UN Security Council, to send police or military forces to help the local authorities maintain or regain control should events deteriorate. Accordingly, strategic- and operational-level planners put together a basic concept of operations for a stabilisation operation, drawing heavily on the INTERFET experience. The intervention force, designated JTF 631, would deploy into Dili to assist the Timorese Government to regain security and restore order to the streets to enable a peaceful resolution of the unrest. It would also support a non-combatant evacuation operation of Australians and other approved foreign nationals in either permissive or uncertain conditions.[18] 

Given the dispersal of Australian forces across the globe and their existing domestic commitments, planners were only just able to pull together on paper the required stabilisation force. As in 1999, 3 Brigade was the natural choice around which a potential force could be built. The Townsville-based light infantry formation could provide a force headquarters; combat support elements, namely the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment (3CER), the 3rd Combat Signal Regiment (3CSR) and M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers from B Squadron, 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment (3/4CAV); and a combat service support unit, the 3rd Combat Service Support Battalion (3CSSB). The brigade could also be augmented from elsewhere within Army by other capabilities, in particular S70-A Black Hawk helicopters from B Squadron, 5th Aviation Regiment (5AVN). The challenge came with the combat element. At that time, 3 Brigade’s rifle companies were spread far and wide. From what remained, planners formed a new Ready Battalion Group, led by the Commanding Officer of 3RAR, Lieutenant Colonel Mick Mumford, and comprising the 3RAR battalion headquarters, A Company, 1RAR, B Company, 3RAR, and C Company, 2RAR, in addition to support and administration companies from 3RAR.[19] This would create a complete, if diverse, battalion and importantly would leave several companies in Australia to address other contingencies. 

For strategic lift, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) had the Amphibious Task Group—Tobruk, Manoora and Kanimbla—and several LCHs. The full task group was theoretically capable of transporting the equivalent of an Army battalion group, together with its equipment and ready-use stocks of fuel, stores and ammunition.[20] For a more expedient, if numerically limited, deployment of troops, the RAAF could draw from its fleet of 24 C-130s (both H-model and the newer J-model), although they were in high demand due to operational commitments in the Middle East and the requirements of training and routine maintenance. 

Operation ASTUTE - Concept of Operations

On Thursday 11 May 2006 the commander of 3 Brigade, Brigadier Mick Slater, was formally warned out for a possible deployment to Timor-Leste. Slater was an experienced infantry officer who had spent much of his military career in 3 Brigade, including as the Commanding Officer of 2RAR when, in September 1999, he led the battalion into Timor. He was, therefore, well positioned for the emerging crisis. At one level, the warning order came at an inconvenient time for the brigade, as many elements had only recently returned from Operation LARRY ASSIST, providing support to recovery efforts around Innisfail after Cyclone Larry, and, external to the brigade, several Black Hawk helicopters from 5AVN were still in northern Queensland. On the other hand, the brigade was preparing for its annual combined arms training activity (CATA) at High Range Training Area, scheduled to start on 16 May.[21] This meant that many of the elements required for a 3 Brigade-led stabilisation force, should it be ordered, were already planning to force concentrate in Townsville.

From 11 to 18 May, brigade headquarters worked alongside the maritime component (the Amphibious Task Group commanded by Captain Peter Murray), and an air component (commanded by the Officer Commanding No. 86 Wing, Group Captain John McGarry). Based in Darwin, the headquarters developed a concept of operations for both a non-combatant evacuation and stabilisation operations.[22] At that time, the situation in Dili remained fragile. There had been some further violence on 8 May, but nothing of a scale that would precipitate widespread unrest or, worse, civil war.[23] Regardless, thousands of Dili residents had fled to the hills around the capital, groups of armed former soldiers continued to pose a threat to stability, and Timorese leaders began blaming each other for the situation and positioning themselves to capitalise on future events.[24] 

Back in Australia, 3 Brigade continued planning. Many members of the brigade had participated in the 1999 operation, where they had gained a good appreciation of the environment and terrain. Timor-Leste has a hot tropical climate, usually around 25–35°C in the coastal area and cooler in the mountainous interior. By May it would be coming into the dry season, which would last until November. Thus far, Dili had been the epicentre of activity as the crisis had slowly grown, so it would remain central to military planning and execution. Situated on the country’s northern coastline, it was a former Portuguese colonial city, occupied by the Indonesians and set ablaze by militias in 1999. It was only starting to rebuild itself after those harrowing events, and still bore many of the scars of occupation. Many dwellings were rudimentary and the streets and alleys could be labyrinthine. It had one main airfield, the Presidente Nicolau Lobato International Airport (known more simply as Comoro airfield) situated to the west of the city.[25] Its runway ran broadly east-west, and represented the main point of access for those seeking to enter the city from afar. Within Dili itself, a former airfield constructed by the Japanese during their occupation of the island in the Second World War was used as a heliport during INTERFET and the subsequent UN missions. For those seeking to arrive by sea, the Dili wharf was located centrally. The port itself was relatively small; the main wharf was 280 metres long and had a maximum capacity of three commercial vessels, augmented with two roll-on/roll-off ramps. 

For the operation, Slater’s intent centred around the early establishment of situational awareness, rapid build-up of forces, the establishment of a highly visible and robust security presence in Dili and the denial of adversary freedom of action. Once this was achieved, he aimed to transition security responsibility back to the Timorese security forces at the earliest opportunity, consistent with their capacity and the stabilisation of the security situation. The corresponding concept of operations evolved as additional details were added over the following days. It comprised six phases, in addition to a preliminary non-combatant evacuation phase. An evacuation, either permissive or non-permissive, in the days immediately before D-Day, could be conducted with just the air component or with the Ready Company Group supported by limited protected mobility. The preliminary operation was designed in such a way that, if launched, it would flow directly into Phase 1, securing a point of entry.[26] Once Comoro airfield had been secured, forces would build up on D+2 and D+3 (Phase 2), after which the land force would break out and begin security key locations in Dili (Phase 3) until D+13. Stabilisation operations (Phase 4) would take place not before D+14, after which there would be an unspecified transition phase (Phase 5) and a redeployment phase (Phase 6).[27]

Figure 1. Concept of Operations

Slater could be reasonably confident that, unless the situation deteriorated into genuine civil war, once ashore and established in Dili, his land force could stabilise the situation there. The force at his disposal was well equipped, well trained and armed more heavily than the adversaries they might reasonably expect to encounter in the streets of Dili. Rather, the hardest tactical task would be creating the initial foothold in Dili to act as an airhead to facilitate the deployment, build-up and sustainment of the Ready Battalion Group, as well as to facilitate the non-combatant evacuation. While the whole concept of operations owed much to the brigade’s previous Timor experience on Operation WARDEN, the tactical plan for Phase 1 was particularly influenced by the 1999 INTERFET landings. On that occasion, Commander INTERFET,  Major General Cosgrove,  had wanted to insert the maximum combat forces in the minimum time, and thus focused on securing the airfield and the Dili wharf before focusing on restoring security in Dili.[28] 

If ordered to return to Timor in 2006, Slater also wanted to maximise boots on the ground in a minimum amount of time. His reasoning was simple: should the situation in Dili deteriorate to the point where a stabilisation force was required, violence needed to be stamped out quickly and authority asserted in the streets. This was best done by having the largest and most capable land force possible in Dili in short order. Therefore, Slater’s tactical plan for the lodgement replicated much of the INTERFET approach, even down to the inclusion of two M113s in the initial wave. Yet there would be important differences between Operations ASTUTE and WARDEN. One was that the quantity of assets available to Cosgrove and his force was much greater than that Slater could call upon. Although Slater had access to every major amphibious platform the Navy possessed, the quantity of C-130s was much reduced. For instance, for the initial insertion in 1999, the air component commander had 13 RAAF C-130H aircraft at his disposal, augmented by two C-130Hs from No. 40 Squadron, Royal New Zealand Air Force.[29] This was nine more than was available for Operation ASTUTE on 25 May 2006, due to the lack of assets provided by coalition partners and competing demands on Australian C-130s.

It was also the case that Slater could not guarantee his entry force would land at Comoro airfield uncontested. He subsequently wrote: 

It needs to be remembered that we essentially conducted a permissive entry in 1999, and while there was a degree of uncertainty, the vital cooperation of the Indonesian military (TNI) ensured that we were able to achieve a rapid build-up of forces without serious incident.[30] 

By contrast, in 2006 there was every possibility that there would be no cohesive security force on the ground to guarantee security while the Australians attempted to get a firm foothold. ‘In other words’, Slater continued, ‘we had to assume that our lodgement could be contested and our plan reflected that’.[31]

Given this risk, 3 Brigade staff developed two entry options: a tactical air landing operation (TALO) largely replicating the INTERFET lodgement, and an amphibious landing option followed by a TALO.[32] The second option came about due to Slater’s intention to use as many different means of entry as possible to reduce the operational risk associated with deploying his force through a single and familiar method. It also arose from having the availability of three major amphibious ships from the Amphibious Task Group, rather than just Tobruk and Jervis Bay. This situation offered Slater increased flexibility to consider a genuine amphibious entry option. Both LPAs were larger than Tobruk, capable of carrying up to 450 troops, and had extensive command and control facilities that allowed them to operate as mobile joint force headquarters. They had a hangar for four Army Black Hawk helicopters or three Navy Sea King helicopters and could carry multiple vehicles and extensive stores and equipment.[33]

Of the two, Manoora would directly support JTF 631. While the Ready Battalion Group would still deploy into Dili by air, Manoora would transport the JTF 631 reserve (A Company, 1RAR, mounted in APCs from B Squadron, 3/4CAV), the Force Engineer Group and the brigade headquarters (main). Under the amphibious entry option, A Company would secure a beach landing site at Comoro airfield by ‘amphibious assault’. The landing was described this way in the operational orders in view of the uncertain situation and the need to be prepared for opposition or an otherwise unstable situation on the beach. The company headquarters, three platoons and the amphibious beach ream tactical party would deploy ashore on Black Hawk helicopters when Manoora was 20 nautical miles from Dili, landing at L-Hour. The beach team would then move to the landing site, designated Blue Beach, and reconnoitre the location. LCM8 landing craft would deploy two M113s carrying two sections from A Company, 1RAR. The rest of the amphibious beach team would follow and prepare the beach for the wheeled vehicles. The remaining M113s would then land, followed by a general offload from Manoora.[34] Elsewhere, the Ready Company Group (B Company, 3RAR) would conduct its TALO and secure the perimeter of the airfield in advance of the rest of the Ready Battalion Group, which would build up its strength over three days (Phase 2).

If the lodgement plans for Phase 1 paralleled the previous successful landings under Operation WARDEN in 1999, logistics planning took a different approach. Logistics had been a signature weakness of INTERFET, and Slater held ‘strong views’ on how JTF 631 would be supported. The force size was smaller than INTERFET, numbering 1,800 personnel (a land component of 1,500 personnel, land-based air elements of 50 personnel and special forces of 230 personnel) and some 300 vehicles.[35] While the limited numbers of combat troops would make the task of restoring law and order to the streets of Dili more challenging, the smaller force size enabled Slater to exercise greater control over how his brigade’s logistics were handled. Shortly after 3 Brigade began planning Operation ASTUTE, Slater established a specific logistics component within JTF 631, sitting alongside the standard maritime, land and air components under the Commanding Officer of 3CSSB, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Bottrell. Unlike in 1999, when neither Cosgrove nor his tactical land force commander, Brigadier Mark Evans, had control over logistic priorities and the means of deployment and resupply, Slater wanted to ensure a single commander within his organisation had the authority to prioritise logistic requirements and demands and to coordinate the available strategic life assets to achieve the most effective inflow of supplies to theatre.[36]

Bottrell’s component was effectively 3CSSB, augmented by specialist third- and fourth-line logistic attachments from across Army and supported by a robust communications and logistic information node from 3CSR. Given the strategic importance of this regional stabilisation mission, the Australian Government did not impose an artificial manpower cap on JTF 631. Instead Slater had significant freedom to establish a logistics element with sufficient capability to properly achieve its mission.[37] For the purposes of Operation ASTUTE, the unit was retitled the 3rd Combat Service Support Group (3CSSG), which more accurately reflected its enlarged nature and responsibilities.[38]

Despite the operation’s access to No. 86 Wing C-130s plus Tobruk, Manoora and potentially several LCHs, early operational planning strongly indicated that these were insufficient to deploy the combat elements and each unit’s first-line logistics support and still meet Slater’s intent to rapidly start and maintain security operations. To address this problem, Bottrell and his staff developed an unconventional plan. Specifically, 3CSSG would provide both first- and second-line support to the entire deployed force for the first 10 to 14 days of the deployment, until such time as individual unit first-line support deployed. A small combat service support team (CSST) would deploy on Tobruk and operate in theatre until the full 3CSSG arrived.[39] It would comprise 150 personnel: 80 personnel from 3CSSB, 34 from 3CSR and 36 from the 10th Force Support Battalion (10FSB).[40] The arrangement was intended to make best use of strategic assets and allow for a rapid establishment of capabilities that could support the entire force, not just individual units. However, it also created a situation whereby Tobruk’s arrival and the establishment of the CSST ashore were critical precursors to the start of robust security operations in Dili. It also demanded much of the small CSST during the first days of the operation.[41]

As these plans were being developed, the various elements of JTF 631 were surreptitiously consolidating in Townsville and Darwin. The timing of the 3 Brigade CATA had helped expedite and, to an extent, mask the force concentration of land elements in Townsville, and while individual and low-level collective training took place, soldiers were not formally advised of the potential Timor mission.[42] At the same time, the separate special forces element, JTF 629, had formed and pre-positioned in Darwin to provide a special recovery operations capability if required. This task force included an SAS troop, the Commando Company Group from the 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando), several Black Hawk helicopters from the 171st Aviation Squadron, Kanimbla and the LCH HMAS Labuan.[43] The air component also begun to concentrate in Darwin in preparation for a possible non-combatant evacuation operations and support to a JTF deployment.[44] 

Given their size and presence, maintaining operational security around the move of the amphibious ships was more challenging to achieve. On 11 May 2006, Maritime Headquarters ordered Kanimbla, which was sailing into Sydney Harbour, and Manoora, alongside at Fleet Base East, to proceed north with all despatch.[45] Their departure did not go unnoticed, and the following day the Prime Minister was asked about their potential destination. ‘They’ve got to head somewhere’, he replied, ‘they can’t just sort of remain becalmed like the “Ancient Mariner”’.[46] Asked if there was any urgency regarding their move, Howard pre-empted a question about Timor, stating that Australia had received no requests for military assistance from the Timorese Government but what the ADF was doing was positioning its assets ‘in such a way that if we were to receive a request we’d be able to respond’.[47]

On Saturday 13 May, Maritime Headquarters force assigned the LCHs Tarakan and Balikpapan, as well as Tobruk, to support Operation ASTUTE. Over the following week, the three main amphibious ships were loaded with stores and personnel. On Sunday morning, Tobruk, which had just returned from conducting exercises off Noumea, came alongside Townsville Harbour, where it began pre-deployment preparations including loading aviation stores and equipment.[48] Once 3 Brigade’s operations and logistic planning was complete, the CSST personnel and 980 tonnes of vehicles and stores were embarked aboard Tobruk.[49] By then, Manoora had arrived in Townsville and it too began embarking the JTF 631 reserve (A Company, 1RAR, and M113s from 3/4CAV), the Force Engineer Group from 3CER, support personnel from 3CSR, 3CSSB, a contingent from 5AVN and Amphibious Task Group staff—320 personnel in total.[50] In Darwin, Kanimbla, still assigned to JTF 629, nevertheless loaded stores on behalf of 3 Brigade. In addition, 21 medical personnel arrived and stood up the primary casualty reception facility (PCRF) to a Level 3 surgical capability.[51] By 18 May, with ships loaded, the ADF was in a position to launch a sizeable stabilisation force to Timor-Leste by air and sea.[52] 

Despite having three fully laden ships that could, if required, loiter over the horizon from Dili, the operation did not put Manoora, Kanimbla and Tobruk to sea. As Slater would subsequently report:

[D]ue to strategic concerns about the effect of the forward deployment of major fleet units on the security situation in Timor-Leste, the JTF remained in Townsville and Darwin for a further seven days.[53] 

This proved to be a decision that, while not fatal to Operation ASTUTE, undermined much of the tactical planning. The concept of operations allowed for several days of pre-positioning before Phase 1 was launched, yet commanders recognised that should the operation be executed, the Australian Government—and the Australian public—would be unlikely to accept a delay of several days while relatively slow-moving ships made their way to Dili. Instead, they would want ‘boots on the ground’ as soon as possible. D Company, 1RAR, the previous Ready Company Group, had very recently deployed from Townsville to Honiara with barely 12 hours’ notice. The difference was that in Solomon Islands they expected to support an unopposed evacuation operation with the possibility of having to assist police to quell civil unrest. They did not expect to face a potentially contested entry against armed adversaries, as was the situation now in Timor-Leste.[54] 

The decision not to forward deploy the amphibious ships thus increased the risk to ADF personnel if the TALO needed to be executed at short notice. Without forces on the ground to secure the airfield, a TALO was vulnerable to modest resistance at Comoro airfield or by a simple delaying action, such as the closure of the airfield’s runway with a single burnt-out vehicle sitting in the middle preventing any arrivals. Rather than hope the Ready Company Group would face an uncontested situation, the amphibious option could have placed a rifle company with integral rotary-wing support off Dili with the means to assault and secure Comoro airfield if required.

Crisis Point

When the crisis eventually escalated to the point where international military intervention was required, the speed at which events took place in Dili caught the ADF by surprise. The flashpoint expected to ignite unrest was the Fretilin party national congress, held for three days from Wednesday 17 May. The Weekend Australian had reported ‘diplomatic sources’ who suggested that Alkatiri would be challenged as Fretilin’s leader. This would take place ‘while hundreds of armed soldiers and police beyond the control of the government are watching with considerable interest, less than an hour’s drive away from Dili’.[55] 

Throughout the Fretilin national congress, 3 Brigade continued to prepare for both the CATA and, discreetly and with due regard for operational security, a potential stabilisation operation in Timor. On Friday afternoon, Slater addressed the brigade, briefing them on the situation in Dili as best he could and suggesting that there was only a 35 per cent chance that the force would be ordered to deploy to Timor.[56] The following day, he issued orders for a potential non-combatant evacuation operation. The plan provided for both a permissive and non-permissive evacuation and, in the case of the latter, would see JTF 629 subsumed into JTF 631 as the special forces component on activation.[57]

In reality, Alkatiri was easily re-elected. While this situation did little to assuage the concerns of the government’s opponents within Timor Leste,[58] the lack of armed response to Alkatiri’s victory eased concerns in Australia about the possibility of further civil unrest. By Monday 22 May, 3 Brigade elements in Townsville previously earmarked for JTF 631 were directed to High Range Training Area on the assumption that their services would not be required in Dili. Mumford eased his battalion into the fact that Operation ASTUTE was ‘just about dead’, while refocusing his staff on the CATA.[59] 

Then, on the morning of Tuesday 23 May, a firefight broke out in the hills above Dili between Major Reinado’s group and a joint F-FDTL/police patrol. The skirmish lasted through an increasingly wet afternoon and into nightfall, before the arrival of police and army reinforcements forced Reinado’s men to withdraw. The incident reinvigorated ADF preparations for Operation ASTUTE. In Townsville, Mumford recorded that ‘all hell [has] broken loose in [Timor-Leste]. Just when it appeared to be over’.[60] Captain Murray was ordered to dispatch all maritime elements of JTF 631 to northern Australia ‘with the distinct possibility that units would be transiting direct to Dili’.[61] Tobruk departed that evening, with Manoora embarking 3 Brigade headquarters (main) and some other late additions before following the next morning. Passing Cairns around midday, she embarked four Black Hawk helicopters from 5AVN, still supporting domestic flood recovery operations until that point. With the four Black Hawks and a Navy Sea King aboard, the hangers and flight deck were at capacity. At the time, the captain believed this was the maximum number of aircraft embarked in a Navy warship since the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne in 1982.[62]

On Wednesday 24 May 2006, amid an atmosphere of increased tension in Dili, fighting broke out to the city’s west. The catalyst was an encounter between a clearing patrol from the F-FDTL Headquarters in Taci Tolu and an armed group of civilians, police and former soldiers, led by former resistance soldier Vicente da Conceição (more commonly known by his nom de guerre ‘Rai Los’). Fighting stopped when Rai Los’s group withdrew in the afternoon after a Timorese naval vessel was sent into the nearby Tibar Bay to provide offensive fire support.[63] In Dili itself, an armed group of police attacked the residence of the Chief of Defence Force. Although he was elsewhere, the house was defended by an army protection unit and a gun-battle ensued for much of the day.[64] By that time, it had become clear to Timorese leadership that the situation was spiralling out of their control. Around midday on 24 May, as fighting continued in Dili, the Timorese Government agreed that international military assistance was required. The Timorese foreign minister, José Ramos-Horta, informed Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer. Later that same afternoon, diplomatic representatives in Dili were summoned to the president’s office at the Palacio das Cinzas, where President Gusmao and Prime Minister Alkatiri formally requested security assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia.[65]

In Australia, frantic efforts were now underway to prepare JTF 631 for deployment. In Darwin, Balikpapan and Tarakan helped finish loading Kanimbla. Meanwhile, JTF 629 was dissolved and all its elements were formally assigned to JTF 631. Very early on Thursday morning, Kanimbla weighed anchor and headed for Dili, eventually followed by both LCHs.[66] The distance between Townsville and Dili is 1,758 nautical miles. At a moderate speed of 15 knots, it would take just under five days to reach the Timorese capital. To position a naval presence closer to the city, the guided-missile frigate HMAS Adelaide was reassigned from the border protection task under Operation RELEX II to JTF 631 and directed to a station north of Timor, while the replenishment oiler HMAS Success, transiting through the Molucca Sea within the Indonesian archipelago, was ordered to rendezvous with Adelaide.[67] In Townsville, Slater, his headquarters and the land force undertook their last-minute preparations and certifications. By now, the Ready Battalion Group, designated Battlegroup Faithful, included Support Company, 2RAR, in a rifle company role, and G Company, 4th Field Regiment, formed from the 108th and A Field Batteries to create a fifth rifle company.[68]

Throughout the day, Mumford waited for Slater’s orders to be issued, but the timings were continually pushed back and formal direction would not be given until the following day.[69] With Manoora days away from conducting an amphibious landing, the Battlegroup Faithful-led TALO was now the only viable entry option. Unfortunately, from the perspective of Mumford and his headquarters, planning for the insertion phase had been disjointed and poorly coordinated. Much of the brigade planning process had been restricted to those at brigade level, a decision Mumford, as the commander of the land component’s manoeuvre unit, found difficult to understand.[70] It was especially frustrating as 3RAR was a parachute battalion with a dedicated air operations cell and deep experience in airborne planning and working with the RAAF. Battalion staff had argued with their brigade counterparts to be allowed to plan the force composition and aircraft load plan for the insertion and the security of Comoro airfield. However, no reverse planning was conducted for the TALO, contrary to doctrine and good planning practice. Further, personnel and equipment not immediately required for the entry were being allocated to aircraft at the expense of combat power. ‘For a future similar mission’, Mumford later wrote, ‘the combat elements must be allowed to plan their part first and have the air planners meet their requirements, not the other way around’.[71]

Back in Dili, the situation was steadily deteriorating. On the morning of Thursday 25 May, nervous Timorese police officers fired a warning shot at a suspicious truck heading towards their headquarters building. Nearby, Timorese soldiers occupying the former UN headquarters interpreted this as an attack against them and fired grenades at the police building, beginning an intense exchange of fire. Eventually, UN military staff were able to arrange a ceasefire. However, as unarmed police were being escorted from the headquarters to the safety of the UN compound, Timorese army soldiers fired upon them for two or three minutes causing the death of eight police, with 27 others suffering gunshot wounds.[72]

As the bloodiest episode of the crisis was unfolding, back in Townsville Slater issued orders for stabilisation operations.[73] Mumford, who was to use the Ready Company Group to secure Comoro airfield, was aware of reports of violence and disorder in Dili and, in particular, at the airfield. ‘Looks like it could be a very warm reception for us’, he recorded. ‘Much pressure to leave immediately.’[74] That afternoon, Adelaide and Success rendezvoused in the Wetar Strait, holding station until Adelaide was directed to make for Dili at full power.[75] Amid gloomy tropical rain, Adelaide appeared in Dili Harbour and began patrolling up and down the shoreline as a show of force, much to the relief of at least one Australian civilian in Dili, who described it as ‘a sight for sore eyes’.[76] There were also reports that, upon sighting Adelaide from a summit outside the city, truckloads of armed men coming in from the east to join the fighting turned and headed back.[77] As a demonstration of Australia’s readiness to deploy combat power to the situation, Adelaide was seemingly a success.[78]

With Operation ASTUTE authorised, JTF 631 was required to execute the concept of operations as developed by 3 Brigade headquarters. The following sections unpack the initial phases of the operation, the lodgement and the force build-up, the two phases of the mission conducted in a littoral environment. 

Figure 2. Australian Army troops disembark from HMAS Balikpapan during a beach landing in the Comoro district of Timor-Leste.(Source: Defence image gallery)

Phase 1 - Lodgement

In response to the Timorese request for assistance, on the evening of 24 May 2006, Acting Prime Minister Peter Costello announced that the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie, would lead a senior delegation to Dili the following day to negotiate with Timorese leaders the details of the size and roles of JTF 631.[79] Phase 1 of Operation ASTUTE thus began on 25 May, with D-Day set for the following day. With JTF 629 now the JTF 631 special forces component, an SAS element would deploy from Darwin in Black Hawks to secure Comoro airfield before the arrival of the RAAF C-130 aircraft carrying Lieutenant General Gillespie, his delegation and 150 members of the Commando Company Group.[80] On the afternoon of 25 May, once the SAS troop was given the authorisation to proceed, it deployed on four Black Hawk helicopters, each full of special forces personnel in full kit. Unfortunately, dense cloud cover over Timor’s central mountain range made the passage to Dili impossible. With fuel running low, they put down at an airfield near the southern town of Suai, where, in the words of a patrol commander, ‘we camped in literally a pile of pig manure’.[81] 

As a consequence, the C-130 carrying the senior officials landed at an unsecure Comoro airfield in the late afternoon. The aircraft was reportedly subject to minor gunfire from the surrounding hills, but once on the ground received cheers from locals gathered at the boundary fence.[82] After the commandos secured the perimeter of the airfield, Gillespie met with President Gusmao, Prime Minister Alkatiri, foreign minister Ramos-Horta and Speaker of Parliament ‘Lu’Olo’ Guterres, all of whom agreed to the details of the Australian intervention. The delegation then returned to the airport to await the arrival of Brigadier Slater.[83] Late that evening, once Timorese approval had been confirmed, Slater, Mumford and their tactical headquarters’, along with the Ready Company Group and two M113s deployed from Townsville in RAAF C-130s, flying overnight directly to Dili. By now, both Tobruk and Manoora were heading directly for Dili, with Adelaide acting as the advance force in Dili Harbour for the Amphibious Task Group, later joined by Success.[84] Meanwhile, Kanimbla had been diverted from her course directly to Dili in order to refuel the stranded 171 Squadron Black Hawks. Arriving in the area that afternoon, the four helicopters ventured out, one by one, to undertake a complex refuel in adverse weather conditions. Once this was completed, Kanimbla resumed passage for Dili and the Black Hawks eventually arrived at Comoro airfield just before first light.[85] As one patrol commander reflected, ‘It was a bit embarrassing, and an inauspicious start to the mission’.[86]

At dawn on Friday 26 May the first C-130s arrived from Townsville.[87] Before their final approach, the aircrew in Mumford’s C-130 were reluctant to land due to security concerns, requiring Mumford to dissuade the flight commander from turning around and taking the aircraft back to Darwin.[88] Upon landing, the Ready Company Group immediately relieved the Commando Company Group and spread out around the airfield.[89] Not expecting the commandos to have already secured the airfield, Mumford found it a ‘bizarre situation’ where the carefully crafted plan did not even survive arrival.[90] The flights continued throughout the morning and into the afternoon, bringing in additional combat elements from Battlegroup Faithful: C Company, 2RAR, and G Company, 4th Field Regiment.[91] These sub-units had flown from Townsville to Darwin, where the C-130s had collected them for their deployment into Dili. Given the uncertainty of the conditions on the ground, they had been ordered to fly in combat-ready loading configuration, which made the flight ‘extremely uncomfortable’. Unable to sit properly on the C-130’s cargo net seats, they could barely lift their arms upon arrival at Comoro airfield, and thus the precaution perversely undermined their ability to be ready to fight upon landing.[92]

Meanwhile, in Dili itself, the situation remained tense and unstable.[93] Fighting continued between rival groups, and members of one faction even invited an Australian journalist to accompany them in a raid on a government building.[94] At the airfield, Battlegroup Faithful secured a beach landing site in preparation for the Amphibious Task Group’s arrival, while Slater established his tactical headquarters in cramped conditions in the terminal building’s VIP lounge.[95] By the end of the day, Lieutenant Colonel Bottrell and a small command, medical and supply element from the logistics component had arrived by air and set up operations. Limited material-handling equipment and additional medical elements arrived by air over the following 24 hours.[96] In Dili Harbour, Adelaide and Success were joined in the late afternoon by Kanimbla and then Balikpapan.[97] 

Once Slater was on the ground in Dili, he recognised that the threat situation was more permissible than originally feared and that low-level violence was going largely unchecked throughout the city. Therefore, he decided to abandon the three-day build-up and instead push his available manoeuvre forces into the Dili suburbs on 27 May to secure the Dili port and key government infrastructure.[98] Meanwhile, the amphibious portion of the lodgement plan was still underway. As dawn broke on the morning of Saturday 27 May, those aboard Manoora caught their first glimpse of Timor-Leste. L-Hour was set for 1515 hours that day, and as this approached, Manoora closed up at flying stations and prepared the flight deck for multi-aircraft launches. At 1430, the first Black Hawk departed with a platoon from A Company, 1RAR, with the remainder launching in sequence through until 1516.[99] 

The helicopters also deployed several members of the amphibious beach team, including the beach master, who would make a final survey of the primary landing beach to ensure it was accessible and could support the amphibious assault. Designated Blue Beach, it was situated at the western end of Comoro airfield. When Manoora rounded Fatocama Point later in the afternoon, plumes of smoke were seen rising from the city. With Captain Murray assuming tactical control of all maritime units to support the amphibious lodgement, Manoora anchored some 1,200 metres off Blue Beach that evening. Wasting no time, Manoora began the amphibious landing, deploying both LCM8s and a geospatial survey team deployed via Zodiac inflatable boat to survey the approaches to Blue Beach and Red Beach (the alternative landing site). After some initial setbacks with the airport perimeter fence, Blue Beach was officially opened at 2045 on 27 May. With the beach open and both LCM8s launched and fuelled, the landing began at 2100. Supported by Balikpapan, amphibious operations continued through the night until 5.35 am, when the final vehicles and stores were offloaded. The beach was then closed, pending Tobruk’s arrival.[100]

Phase 2 - Force Build-Up

Slater’s decision to break out and begin securing Dili (Phase 3) was unquestionably correct, given the state of lawlessness in the city, the capability of the forces at his disposal as compared to those causing trouble in the streets and the apparent lack of will of any of the rogue groups or the Timorese police and army to contest the Australians’ arrival.[101] It would, however, disrupt the logistics plan, which was predicated on the force remaining localised at the airfield for three days, where the CSST’s limited number of vehicles could keep the rest of the force supplied. Dispersing Battlegroup Faithful and other elements into Dili would test ability of the 3CSSG’s transport elements to undertake their own second-line tasks while also effectively acting as individual unit first-line support and echelon elements.[102] 

Meanwhile, with Tobruk’s arrival off Dili on the morning of Sunday 28 May, the CSST could deploy ashore and begin its work, a relief to those soldiers who had been operating for two days with little more than what they had brought with them. As Manoora had done, Tobruk began a logistics-over-the-shore operation, offloading the CSST at Blue Beach using Balikpapan and two LCM8 landing craft. Difficult sea conditions hampered the operation and the offload was eventually postponed due to risk to persons and equipment. The heavy swell, the freshening sea breeze and the lack of other suitable anchorages within close proximity to the beach meant that Tobruk was faced with the likelihood of not being able to restart the offload safely for a prolonged period. Yet by 1800, Tobruk was informed that the fenced Dili port precinct had been secured by the Commando Company Group and it could proceed independently alongside to conduct the offload using the port’s infrastructure. Work progressed with great efficiency and concluded past midnight on 29 May; the ship’s company appreciated being at the centre of the operation, providing much-needed resources to the land force.[103]

Figure 3. Army stores and vehicles sit on the Vehicle Deck onboard HMAS Tobruk as they wait to be unloaded ashore off the coast of Dili, Timor-Leste, as plumes of smoke can be seen rising into the air from the direction of the city during Operation Astute, 28 May 2006. (Source: Defence image gallery)

Once the CSST was ashore at Comoro airfield it established a bulk fuel installation and a transit area, the latter invaluable in rapidly clearing the airhead and establishing control over stores and equipment as they arrived in theatre. More generally, the logisticians provided the deployed force with rudimentary yet immediate first- and second-line logistics and critical combat supplies, namely water, rations, petrol, oil and lubricants, so that each unit would receive a basic level of logistic support. The CSST also provided transport support to Battlegroup Faithful and, by 30 May, had established a logistics node which allowed units to immediately place demands for supplies. The decision to deploy second-line transport and infrastructure elements before much of the first-line support and echelon elements of Battlegroup Faithful was one that Bottrell believed should be sustained. ‘This approach’, he argued, ‘provided the same level of service to all units and ensured that the available strategic lift was utilised to its fullest potential’.[104] 

The benefits of this approach were not readily apparent to Mumford, who experienced ‘a considerable time lag’ between the deployment of his fighting echelon and the arrival of sufficient 3RAR Admin Company assets to support his unit. The gap was intended to be filled by 3CSSG providing first-line support, but it ‘did not occur at any stage’. In particular, the battlegroup was without its full number of integral B Vehicles, which was exacerbated by the fact that the battlegroup comprised five rifle companies rather than three. Some 26 ageing Land Cruiser troop carriers were acquired from the in-country Defence Cooperation Program to compensate but, while invaluable, these vehicles presented a maintenance liability and did not reinforce the image of a professional military force. In light of such problems, Mumford argued that if the battlegroup had been required to undertake genuine combat operations then the mission would have been at considerable risk. In general, he declared the expedient to be ‘unsatisfactory’, and argued that in the future, the complete self-sustaining battlegroup package should be deployed before the deployment of second- and third-line logistic and other units.[105]

Meanwhile, Kanimbla’s main offload was undertaken via Blue Beach and with Balikpapan’s assistance on 29 May, a task made difficult at times due to strengthening winds and unfavourable sea conditions.[106] That same day, the contingent from B Squadron, 5AVN deployed from Manoora and established a staging and support base at Comoro airfield, while 3 Brigade headquarters staff also disembarked at Blue Beach to help establish Slater’s headquarters at the Dili port. Manoora was due to return to Australia to collect further personnel, stores and vehicles, and thus transferred her two LCM8s, their support crews, and the deployed geospatial survey team to Kanimbla. With the offload complete and all embarked personnel ashore, Captain Murray detached Manoora in the early evening and ordered her to Darwin for a second upload of combat support elements.[107] Tobruk had also departed that afternoon to collect one tranche of the 3CSSG main body in Townsville, while Balikpapan returned to Darwin for the next resupply.[108] Concurrently, as the requirement to complete non-combatant evacuation reduced, the air component focus shifted to the build-up of sustainment stocks.[109]

By the morning of Tuesday 30 May, Kanimbla was the only Amphibious Task Group ship remaining in Dili Harbour. Proceeding alongside Dili wharf, she offloaded humanitarian aid stores and provided bulk fuel ashore. As Slater was having communications difficulties at that time, Kanimbla’s operations room was prepared as a potential temporary headquarters. Slater ultimately decided that he would simply wait until his new headquarters was established at the port complex in order to reduce the number of times he and his staff were required to move. Kanimbla did, however, begin providing hotel services to land forces, which ‘very quickly became extremely popular’, with up to 200 Army personnel taking advantage of a hot shower, a hot meal, and a comfortable bunk for a few hours or overnight. The ship’s company also baked bread and delivered it to soldiers in the field (an initiative colloquially known as ‘Cakes Ahoy’). While alongside, Kanimbla became responsible for force protection at the port complex. Initially this was conducted in union with land forces, but once the capability of a ship’s force protection team became apparent to Slater, he handed over full responsibility to the sailors.[110] When Kanimbla briefly returned to Darwin in June, Tobruk provided health and comfort services to JTF 631 personnel. During the four days she filled this role, 150 personnel were received on board, making use of mess, shower, laundry and recreational facilities.[111] 

Tobruk, Manoora, Kanimbla and Balikpapan all undertook further transits between Australia and Timor, with the LCH also being of use around Dili Harbour. Under the concept of operations, the Agreed Point (the location where supplies were handed off from Joint Logistics Group to deployed forces) was in Darwin for the initial period, and control of air and maritime assets was devolved to Lieutenant Colonel Bottrell. This arrangement allowed Bottrell to more effectively manage and prioritise the inflow of stores and equipment. He later argued that this approach avoided the situation where other components could utilise the available assets to satisfy their own priorities, which may not have been in accordance with JTF 631 priorities.[112] For his part, Slater pointed to the establishment of the Agreed Point in Darwin as ‘a significant contributing factor to the success of the logistic support during the first 30 days’, and Bottrell was subsequently recognised with a Bar to his Conspicuous Service Cross.[113] In general, Slater praised the effective delivery of logistic support, arguing that Army was ‘a more robust and agile organisation as a result of the enhancements that the various iterations of the Defence Capability Plan have provided since the 2000 Defence White Paper’.[114]

On 1 June, the first tranches of the 3CSSG main body arrived in Dili by air, providing some respite to the hard-working CSST. The following day, Tarakan arrived and offloaded seven M113s from 3/4CAV and three portaloos.[115] By 8 June, Tobruk had arrived with the remainder of 3CSSG, which included heavy transport, bulk liquid assets and additional material-handling equipment.[116] Each amphibious ship was incrementally discharged from Operation ASTUTE, with Kanimbla the last to be released, on 18 July.[117] Slater subsequently paid tribute to the ship for its ‘indispensable support’, assisting with fresh meals and hotel services but also providing security elements for foot patrols at the Dili port. He also noted: ‘having a major fleet unit alongside creates a significant effect in its own right. It is a very potent symbol of national resolve’.[118] The LCM8 detachment, which had provided dependable support in the littoral environment since their arrival, returned to Australia with Kanimbla.[119] With their departure, it remained for the Army elements to conduct what was now almost exclusively a land-centric mission.

Observations

When assessing the lessons of Operation ASTUTE as they relate to Army’s future littoral manoeuvre capability, the first point to note is that the lodgement and force build-up phases were ultimately successful. Within 48 hours of the Australian Government receiving a request for assistance from their Timorese counterparts, Australian land forces, deployed by sea and air assets, were on the ground in Timor-Leste. Within a further 24 hours, rifle companies were in Dili itself, securing key locations and beginning to bring order to the previously lawless streets. By 29 May there were some 1,300 ADF personnel in Timor-Leste, with an additional 700 in the wider area of operations supporting the deployment.[120] In the terminology of the time, the government had directed the ADF to provide an effect on the ground, and this effect had largely been achieved. 

That Brigadier Slater and his task force were able to execute a relatively complex insertion at short notice using a variety of joint capabilities demonstrated the value of early planning and force concentration. It also spoke to the high level of cooperation between the 3 Brigade headquarters and the air and maritime components. In planning, Slater outlined his intent, and the two components undertook their planning accordingly. Trust in joint elements to have professional mastery of their particular environmental domain was vital in facilitating such rapid planning and execution. Furthermore, despite the resource demands on the ADF at the time, the strategic importance of Operation ASTUTE gave Slater access to an array of joint assets, notably the Amphibious Task Group. The mission simply could not have been undertaken in such a short time frame without employing all three larger amphibious ships, the LCHs and the LCM8. The LCHs in particularly proved valuable, not only for supporting the offload in Dili but also as their own independent sea-lift platform. The fact that the RAN still does not have a replacement for the long-retired LCHs is a significant deficiency in its littoral capability.

Another important observation from Operation ASTUTE is the value of having a brigade that is trained and specialised in the conduct of regional evacuation and stabilisation operations. Over many years, the brigade was equipped, trained and prepared for situations such as arose in Timor in May 2006. As a result, when its skills and expertise were called for, it could move relatively quickly. Slater considered that his brigade was ‘very well prepared for this contingency’, adding that the success of the operation demonstrated its ability to adjust rapidly to the role of a JTF headquarters and highlighted the value of its high-readiness culture.[121] Undoubtedly the recent first-hand experience of undertaking a similar operation in 1999 also helped compensate for the uncertainty and the limited time to prepare.[122] This familiarity was demonstrated in the unorthodox logistics plan. Both Slater and Bottrell used their personal experience of INTERFET to develop a sustainment concept for Operation ASTUTE that went against doctrine but suited the particular requirements of the mission.

Operation ASTUTE also offers warnings for future littoral operations. If the ADF successfully achieved the lodgement phase of Operation ASTUTE, it did so inelegantly at times and with a considerable degree of good fortune. For example, a key risk was the decision by senior commanders, in accordance with the government’s intentions, not to put the Amphibious Task Group to sea once each ship was fully loaded. Valuable as they are in providing mobility in mass, amphibious ships need to be nearby if their embarked combat power is to be deployed effectively. The absence of an amphibious force just off Dili denied the ADF the flexibility and freedom to land combat troops in the city in a timely manner and in circumstances conducive to the ADF, leaving it with the more dangerous TALO option.  

Army must remember that, unlike operations in which it operates as a junior coalition partner in a geographically distant ‘war of choice’ where many aspects of the mission may be carefully calibrated, regional operations are often undertaken at short notice and with political imperatives that potentially undermine operational effectiveness. In 2006, with the situation in Dili breaking down and the Amphibious Task Group still days from Dili, only the TALO option allowed JTF 631 to achieve the government’s requirement to have Australian boots on the ground in Dili as soon as possible. Other than the presence of Adelaide in Dili Harbour, which might have deterred potential adversaries from attacking the RAAF aircraft as they landed at Comoro, JTF 631 had limited ability to shape the environment to ensure a permissive entry of forces. Had there been a genuine threat at the airfield, Australian decision-makers would have faced the choice between undertaking a TALO with a real risk of Australian casualties and waiting several days before Manoora arrived on station to execute an amphibious assault. Given the escalation of violence seen over 23–25 May, it is not unreasonable to assume that the absence of international security forces for several days might have led to even greater loss of life and property destruction in Dili. 

Figure 4. An Australian Army Unimog truck is transported on an Australian Army Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM8) prior to a beach landing in the Comoro district of Timor-Leste, 28 May 2006. (Source: Defence image gallery)

Another point to highlight is the importance of trusting subordinates with relevant expertise to contribute to mission planning. Whatever Slater’s rationale for leaving Lieutenant Colonel Mumford and 3RAR headquarters out of brigade planning, it limited the ability of the parachute battalion, specialists in air landing operations, from contributing their expertise to the tactical plan or even being aware of the full extent of their taskings should the mission be authorised. With the assumption that the lodgement would be amphibious led, the deployment of Mumford’s battlegroup was initially treated as little more than an air movement admin activity, on the basis that A Company, 1RAR, would have already secured the airfield.[123] The requirement to switch to a TALO-led entry allowed little time for the optimal development of manifests and load lists before the entry force was required to depart Townsville. Again, the lack of opposition upon landing obscured this weakness, which might have been exposed had the circumstances been different.

Conclusion

The modern ADF rarely conducts amphibious operations, and thus should pay close attention to previous operational examples for instruction and warning. While the 2006 intervention in Timor-Leste remains a far less storied operation for the ADF than its predecessor in 1999, this in no way diminishes its value as a case study for thinking through the challenges of littoral manoeuvre. The lessons of Operation ASTUTE, at least as far as the lodgement and force build-up are concerned, are thus generally twofold. On the one hand, professional expertise, coupled with a good mix of amphibious assets, enabled the planning and execution of a reasonably complicated lodgement onto a foreign shore in a short period of time. On the other hand, the absence of any serious opposition contesting the lodgement covered over several potentially costly problems in planning. The next time the Army is called upon to undertake an amphibious lodgement, it needs to be aware that the circumstances might not be as favourable as they were in 2006.

About the Author

William Westerman is a lecturer in history at UNSW Canberra, with research expertise in the First World War. A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, he is also the author of the Official History of Australian Operations in Iraq, 2003-2011 and co-author of the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping Operations in Timor-Leste, 2000-2012. Among his other work, he has written a history of the 1996 merger of the Fitzroy Lions in the Australian Football League.

Endnotes