Engineering from the Sea: Establishing How Australian Army Engineers Fit Into Australia’s Amphibious Concept

Abstract

The high demand historically placed on engineers by an amphibious landing force after it has deployed ashore requires that the manner that Australian Army engineers fit into Australia’s Amphibious Concept be established in order for the ADF to successfully execute amphibious operations, prior to any future such commitment. The list of engineering tasks needed to support the full spectrum of operations in the current and future operating environments is quite extensive, thereby an ad hoc engineer group to support the landing force cannot simply be formed, nor is there a one-size-fits-all engineer solution. This article is based on a paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Military Studies from the Marine Corps University. A copy of the full paper can be obtained at the Alfred M Gray Marine Corps Research Center USMC Research Library website.

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The combat Marine engineer was described as the man who volunteered for nothing, but worked around the clock.

- Ralph W Donnelly¹

Introduction

The Australian government stated in its Defence White Paper 2009 that ‘Australia’s defence policy should continue to be founded on the principle of self-reliance in the direct defence of Australia’.² This White Paper dictated that Australia’s military strategy is principally a maritime one and assigned the Australian Defence Force (ADF) a primary operational environment covering approximately sixty-six million square kilometres—more than 12 per cent of the Earth’s surface.³ As a result, the Australian government decided that this expansive strategic geography requires the ADF to assume an expeditionary orientation⁴ at the operational level, underpinned by requisite force projection capabilities.⁵ Flowing from this requirement was the purchase of two amphibious Canberra class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships, due to enter service between early 2014 and mid-2015, and the early-2011 purchase of a former Royal Navy Bay class Landing Ship Dock (LSD). In order to provide the required expeditionary amphibious capability, the ADF produced Australia’s Amphibious Concept (AAC), which articulates the ADF’s aspirations for future amphibious warfare across the spectrum of amphibious operations.⁶

Engineers have always played, and will continue to play, a significant role in amphibious operations. The 13th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps (USMC), Major General John A Lejeune, wrote that ‘the Marine Corps for many years has carried on certain military activities of an engineering nature. Work which may properly so be designated is performed as a matter of necessity in almost every land campaign.’⁷ Engineers have also historically been an integral part of all major amphibious operations that Australia and its major allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, have conducted. Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) have thus played important roles in these amphibious operations, with Sapper Fred Reynolds of the 1st Field Company Engineers recorded as the first soldier to be killed on the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915.⁸ The most recent amphibious operations conducted by the ADF primarily involved engineer forces providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief following large-scale natural disasters in Indonesia in 2004–05 and 2009.

The most recent amphibious operations conducted by the ADF primarily involved engineer forces providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief ...

With respect to engineers, neither the AAC nor the more detailed Landing Force Concept of Employment⁹ provide more definition than to state that engineers will be part of the battle group, around which the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) will base its landing force. Despite this, due to the high demand historically placed on engineers by a landing force after it has deployed ashore, the nature of how Australian Army Engineers fit into the AAC must be established in order for the ADF to successfully execute amphibious operations. This nature can be established through an examination and analysis of the engineer tasks and organisations that have contributed to previous successful amphibious operations from the Second World War to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

Description of the Military Problem

Australia's Amphibious Concept

The AAC is the concept for the employment of the ADF’s amphibious capability to its full potential, linking higher-level guidance and operational concepts with ADF operational-level doctrine for amphibious operations.¹⁰ The strategic military priorities established in the Defence White Paper 2009 are reaffirmed in the AAC: deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia, contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor, contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world.¹¹

At the same time the ADF saw the need for the AAC, the USMC decided to get back to its amphibious roots after ten years of intense focus on ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹² While closely aligned with the USMC’s Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century and Marine Corps Operating Concept – Third Edition, as well as the UK’s Littoral Manoeuvre (Amphibious Task Group) Joint Capability Concept, the AAC is tailored to secure Australia’s strategic interests with a relatively small-sized force. The AAC directs that ADF forces be prepared to conduct three distinct types of amphibious missions: amphibious operations, military support operations, and sea lift. Amphibious operations are further divided into four types: demonstration, raid, assault, and withdrawal. Military support operations are also further divided: Defence aid to the civil community or Defence Force aid to civil authorities; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; non-combatant evacuation operations; peace operations; civil enforcement duties; and inter-agency, international organisation and nongovernment organisation liaison and support. Sea lift is the ‘administrative movement of personnel and/or equipment to and within the Joint Force Area of Operations’.¹³

In order to be interoperable with allies, the ADF’s amphibious concept aspires to develop Australian amphibious thinking based on an Australian analysis and conceptual models from US and UK doctrine. As a result, the four core concepts to underpin the Australian approach to amphibious operations reflect US and UK thinking: littoral manoeuvre, ship-to-objective manoeuvre, distributed manoeuvre, and sea basing. Like the US and UK, the core concepts require further development in order for the models to be fully implemented.¹⁴

For a country with relatively limited military assets, the Australian ATF must be flexible and adaptive to conduct sequential and/or simultaneous different missions. The AAC states that the ‘ATF must be a scalable organisation’, ‘be a balanced, mobile force ... with sufficient endurance to accomplish the mission, and deploy ‘without the reliance on host-nation infrastructure’.¹⁵ To achieve the large mission set, the AAC bases the future ATF around the deployment and sustainment requirements of the following two organisations:

• Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The ARG will be capable of the full suite of amphibious tasks. Its manoeuvre component will be a medium-weight battle group, of similar size to a USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), of approximately 2200 personnel, with armoured vehicles, helicopters, associated stores and equipment. The engineer element will be squadron-sized.
• Amphibious Ready Element (ARE). The ARE is a sub-element of the ARG and is primarily focused on the conduct of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or non-combatant evacuation operations missions at very short notice. The manoeuvre component will be an infantry company based Ready Combat Team (RCT) and will include a troop-sized engineer element.¹⁶

For a country with relatively limited military assets, the Australian ATF must be flexible and adaptive to conduct sequential and/or simultaneous different missions.

Neither the AAC nor the derived Landing Force Concept for Employment defines tasks or an organisation for the engineer elements. The documents do, however, imply that substantial engineering effort will be required to ensure success. The Landing Force Concept for Employment states that the ‘ADF is to be prepared to conduct amphibious assault[s] ... into uncertain ... environments’¹⁷ and repeatedly highlights that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations will be a core skill set of the landing force. As the list of engineering tasks required to support these operations is quite extensive, an ad hoc engineer group to support the landing force cannot simply be put together without a detailed analysis of what it will likely do, what personnel and equipment it will require, and what training it will need.

Historical Examples Of The Employment Of Engineers In Amphibious Operations

A brief study of amphibious operational history highlights the utility of engineers and the fact that they were crucial for the manoeuvre elements in combat. The study of operational campaigns since 1943 provides examples of likely combat operations in the ADF’s primary operating environment: the USMC and RAE in New Guinea and the Central Pacific in the Second World War; the Royal Marines as they landed and advanced to their objective in the Falkland Islands (1982); the USMC entry operations into Somalia, with a focus on a low-mid intensity security environment (1992–93); and finally, the 2001 operations of the 15th and 26th MEUs for a planned non-combatant evacuation operation and the executed operations that seized two airfields inside Afghanistan in the early stages of OEF. All tasks noted were conducted within the first thirty days (many within the first seven days) of a landing force deploying ashore, which is well inside the mission duration that has been set for the ARG.¹⁸

Second World War

The strongest theme that emerged from analysing the official records of operations in New Guinea, including Gape Gloucester, on Saipan and in Borneo can be simply stated: terrain was very restrictive to the movement of the landing forces.¹⁹ The lack of key infrastructure in the region, such as roads and bridges, resulted in engineers providing the required mobility through the expedient construction and maintenance of beach exits, tracks, corduroy roads and bridges. (A lack of infrastructure in the ADF’s primary operating environment is still the case today.) These tasks were made all the more difficult during the extensive monsoon season, with its influence on both rain and surf. The weather was not the only challenge, as engineer tasks frequently had to be completed under enemy fire, often without protection.²⁰ Other common tasks included obstacle reduction, minefield clearance, booby trap clearance and the destruction of enemy strong points to enhance mobility. General engineering tasks also had to be completed, including water supply, rapid airfield repair and improvement, and camp construction.²¹ In addition, the vast majority of amphibious engineers in the Second World War were required to execute infantry tasks; that is, engage in combat, the engineer’s ubiquitous secondary role.

The lack of key infrastructure in the region, such as roads and bridges, resulted in engineers providing the required mobility ...

The Falkland Islands, 1982

The Royal Engineers (RE) reinforced 59 Independent Commando Squadron (Five-Nine), which included a reconnaissance troop and a troop from 9 Parachute Squadron RE,²² provided the mobility and survivability support to 3 Commando Brigade (3 CDO BDE RM) when it secured a beachhead at San Carlos in East Falkland. The squadron then supported the advance east to the final objective, Stanley. While relatively light, with regards to engineering vehicles and specialist equipment, the amphibious engineers played a significant role in the operations to recapture the Falkland Islands. In addition to fighting as infantry, the significant engineer tasks Five-Nine undertook included: improving beach exits and roads; constructing hardstands; reconnoitring, breaching and clearing minefields and obstacles; rendering safe explosive ordnance and booby traps; constructing fighting positions and strong points; and water supply operations. Once the beachhead was secure, additional RE units were brought ashore to undertake the numerous general engineering tasks required to support the larger task force.²³ The Commander of 3 CDO BDE RM wrote in his account of the war: ‘In war there are never enough Sappers and the support given to the Commando Brigade by its engineer squadron, which included a troop from 9 Squadron, was superb.’²⁴

Somalia, 1992-93

As part of Operation RESTORE HOPE, the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (1 CEB) supported the initial insertion of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) into Somalia with a reinforced combat engineer company. The bulk of effort provided by the company from 1 CEB at the start of the operation was on mobility tasks, including route reconnaissance, route maintenance, route clearance, mine clearance and work to open the port facilities. Survivability was another high priority, including strong point construction and facility hardening, as well as the provision of water and general security tasks. After the initial insertion of the SPMAGTF, additional engineers were flowed into theatre from 1 CEB, as well as from the US Navy Seabees, the Marine Wing Support Squadron and the 7th Engineer Support Battalion. At the eighteen-day mark, approximately 1300 engineers worked for the Marine Forces.²⁵ An official and important lesson that emerged from Operation RESTORE HOPE: UN ‘chapter VI and VII operations [that is, Security and Stability Operations] in third world countries place high demands on engineer support’.²⁶

Afghanistan, 2001

The seizure in late 2001 of forward operating base Rhino and Kandahar Airport by Task Force 58 (TF 58), consisting of the 15th MEU and the 26th MEU, is the most recent amphibious combat operation studied. Engineer support to this operation was crucial to the rapid build up of forces in Afghanistan and was almost exclusively flown in, initially by helicopter, then by KC-130 aircraft, and finally by C-17 transporters. Each MEU was supported by a reinforced combat engineer platoon, a reinforced support engineer platoon, a Marine Wing Support Squadron detachment, and an enlarged explosive detection dog section. TF 58 was also reinforced with a chemical biological inspection site team and a Seabee detachment of thirty engineers. The key tasks conducted by TF 58 engineers were: the rapid repair and expansion of the two airfields and helicopter landing zones; the conduct of high risk search tasks; the clearance of mines, booby traps, and explosive ordnance; the construction of fighting positions, strong points, and berms; the construction of hygiene-related camp facilities and the building of detainee compounds. Of particular note is the fact that both the 15th MEU and the 26th MEU were afloat when the events of 11 September 2001 occurred. Thus, neither MEU was task organised for this specific mission but they were prepared for it.²⁷

... neither MEU was task organised for this specific mission but they were prepared for it.

Indonesia, 2004-05 and 2009

Since late 2004, the 1st Combat Engineer Regiment (1 CER) has twice provided short notice amphibious engineer forces for large-scale humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in Indonesia. In response to the devastating 2004 Boxing Day Indian Ocean Tsunami, 1 CER provided the main ADF contingent as part of the Australian government’s response in Banda Aceh. Here, it focused on water supply and debris clearance in order to reduce environmental health threats. In response to the 2009 magnitude 7.5 earthquake off Western Sumatra, 1 CER again provided the main ADF contingent to the Australian government’s response in Padang. On this occasion, it focused on water supply, structural building assessments, rendering safe important buildings, minor repairs to key lines of communication, and construction of semi-permanent medical centres. While both responses were very similar in nature, before deployment no contingency plans existed. This resulted in planning from first principles; that is, with a limited knowledge base for such an operation. 1 CER was very successful in both operations, largely due to the individuals who were available at the time to rapidly plan the tasks and then execute a quickly developed plan, providing modifications to it as required.²⁸

Whether in the ADF’s primary operating environment or further afield, the range of engineer tasks required for an amphibious operation are vast, although common throughout, and cover the majority of tasks for which RAE sappers train. The review of historical operations showed that combat, support and specialist engineers were required, both individually and collectively, to complete the work and, on occasion, required supplementation. The historical employment of engineers on amphibious operations can help predict how engineers will be used on future expeditionary operations.

How Other Amphibious Forces Employ Their Engineers

United States Marine Corps

USMC engineer roles, tasks, organisation, and principles of employment differ significantly from that of the RAE. Thus, the USMC template cannot simply be transferred to the Australian ARG, even though the manoeuvre element is similar in structure to a USMC MEU. For example, petroleum operators and engineer vehicle mechanics are USMC engineer specialities but not RAE trades; conversely, electricians and explosive ordnance disposal technicians are RAE trades but not USMC engineer specialities. In addition, USMC combat engineer units have neither organic transport/drivers nor protected mobility vehicles to support a mechanised/motorised combat team. Overall, USMC engineers independently support the four elements of a Marine Air Ground Task Force: command element, ground combat element, air combat element, and the logistics combat element. As these four elements will exist in an Australian ARG, while named and organised differently, the task and breakdown of forces provide a good reference point. In addition, in order to expand on capabilities that do not exist in the USMC (but exist within RAE CERs and 6 ESR), a scalable and tailored naval construction force will often be attached. Typical engineer support to a MEU is shown in Figure 1. The engineer elements total approximately 103 to 120 personnel, without including the naval construction force.²⁹³

... the USMC template cannot simply be transferred to the Australian ARG, even though the manoeuvre element is similar in structure ...

The USMC 2024 Baseline MEB and MEU provides the future force structure of USMC manoeuvre formations, including their engineer elements.³⁰ This baseline, used for future force concept modelling, includes very few changes to the engineer organisations organic to a MEU. The ground combat element is still supported by a reinforced combat engineer platoon and a reinforced engineer platoon is included in the combat logistics battalion. It can thus be deduced that the method by which the USMC employs its engineers will only substantially differ when the concepts of operation for USMC manoeuvre formations change significantly.

Royal Marines, Great Britain

The support provided by 24 Commando Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers (24 Cdo Engr Regt, RE) to 3 CDO BDE RM is relatively light. This reflects the fact that 3 CDO BDE RM is a light-medium expeditionary force that does not include significant armoured elements, such as tanks, in its order of battle. Having previously supported the entire 3 CDO BDE RM with one regular independent commando squadron (Five-Nine), the RE are now upsizing to support the brigade with an engineer regiment.³¹ This is in accordance with the Australian model and highlights the fact that amphibious operations require considerable engineer support in order to attain success. The RE provide support to a battalion-size Royal Marine commando battle group with a squadron-size element, totalling approximately 126 to 173 personnel. The typical organisation is shown below in Figure 2.³²

Australian Army

In accordance with Australian doctrine, the appropriate level of engineer support to an Australian battle group is usually provided by a combat engineer squadron, with a combat engineer troop supporting an independent company-sized combat team.³³ This is not always strictly followed, with the size and composition often adjusted to cater for specific missions and operational environments. Currently in Afghanistan, a combat engineer squadron, reinforced with additional combat engineers and support engineers, provides the increased support required by the combined arms battle group. This level of support is predicated on the level of threat, type of weapons being used by the opposing forces and the counterinsurgency mission of the battle group. As Australia does not currently possess a dedicated amphibious capability, the engineer support to an amphibious operation is usually ad hoc. Another real world complicating factor exists: force structure is generally based on limits set by a manning cap rather than on an analysis of historically based likely tasks.

As Australia does not currently possess a dedicated amphibious capability, the engineer support to an amphibious operation is usually ad hoc.

Figure 1. Current Generic Engineer Support to a USMC MEU

Figure 2. Royal Engineer Support to a Royal Marine Commando Battle Group

The Current and Future Operating Environments

Studies in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom³⁴ have predicted similar future global and regional security environments, which have proved accurate in recent years. Traditionally, inter-state wars involving conflict between armed forces purpose-built for engaging in conventional combat (symmetrical warfare) have been the main focus of defence planning by Australia and its allies. In recent years, intra-state conflict among different political, ethnic or religious groups has come more to the fore in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where conventional military forces have had to work alongside civilian agencies and nongovernment organisations. Moreover, threats from some non-state global actors, such as al-Qaeda, have meant that armed forces have had to be employed against new types of adaptive adversaries. All of this has resulted in what is termed ‘complex war’ or asymmetrical warfare. While globalisation has seen growing interdependence between states, the Australian government still considers it premature to rule out future conventional wars between states, including the major powers.³⁵

The ADF does not currently train for employment in a single environment; instead, it can be deployed from urban environments to jungles, from deserts to mountains. Global factors (including terrorism, pandemic disease, population growth, resource depletion and climate change security implications) as well as specific Asia-Pacific region factors (such as state fragility, poor governance, and economic underdevelopment and inequality) will affect Australia’s security interests, both directly and indirectly. Compounding these threats will be factors such as globalisation, urbanisation, the rise of new military powers, new technologies and other non-traditional challenges.³⁶ Traditional societal structures and the ability of states to provide essential services as well as law and order will continue to be stressed by population and urban growth, no more so than in Melanesia and Southeast Asia.³⁷ The principal physical characteristics of the ADF’s primary operating environment are its littoral nature, vast spaces between areas of human habitation and the presence of complex terrain. The broad range of topographical features tends to combine so that urban areas exist in close proximity to a mixture of agrarian land, coastal planes, mountains, tropical vegetation and coastal waterways.³⁸ Compounding these environmental challenges are the frequent natural disasters that occur in the Southeast Asian and Pacific regions, most notably the seismic activity along the fault lines of the ‘ring of fire’. History suggests that challenges that lack opponents are more likely than those with an adversary, that is, significant opposition greater than opportunistic criminals.

The global and regional security environment means that the ADF should be prepared to face opponents who use the following capabilities: readily available ‘low tech’ capabilities; increasingly secure and sophisticated networked command and control, and ISR systems; increasingly conventional platforms that enhance lethality, survivability, and deployability; and increasingly available advanced conventional weapons as well as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive devices.³⁹ States now no longer possess a monopoly on advanced weaponry, as non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and irregular forces, have acquired the means, knowledge and employment capability of increased lethality.⁴⁰ The conventional capabilities of many states will also improve, so both state and non-state adversaries will be able to acquire increased lethality. A significant trend, while not new, has been identified in recent conflicts where previous notions of distinct forms of war and conflict—conventional war, irregular challenges, terrorism and criminal activity—have become blurred into what is being described as hybrid challenges. These hybrid challenges can be created by state and non-state groups, and will result in opponents that can merge different approaches and integrate various weapons, tactics and technologies to deny access and freedom of action.⁴¹ A recent example is the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict.⁴²

The conventional capabilities of many states will also improve, so both state and non-state adversaries will be able to acquire increased lethality.

There are numerous implications for the conduct of engineer operations arising from the forecast of the security environment in which the ADF will operate in the next twenty to thirty years. Firstly, terrain in the littoral areas will provide significant mobility challenges that engineers will need to overcome. This harks back to operations in New Guinea and the Pacific during the Second World War, where engineers directly influenced and contributed to the speed at which operations were executed. Secondly, the ADF’s adversaries will use various combinations of conventional and improvised weapons systems to attack a landing force. These may combine conventional minefields and obstacles with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby traps in urban terrain, including at airfields and ports that may be used for the ingress of follow-on forces. Finally, the frequency with which natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions and cyclones have occurred in the past six years within Australia’s primary operating environment, will ensure that the ADF’s response to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations is engineer intensive.

Capabilities Required Of The Amphibious Engineer Force

What do the future operation environment and historical employment of amphibious engineers indicate? Individualised lethality of modern weapons and the disaggregated battlespace means that, in complex war, land forces will encounter more lethal enemies, with less warning, in close combat and in complex terrain. Therefore, all deployed land force elements, including engineers, will need to be given sufficient levels of protection, mobility and firepower to conduct sustained close combat within the complex battlespace. Importantly, the land force will need to survive first contact with the enemy and react accordingly. Additionally, Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept states ‘the land force will need the capacity to conduct rapid route clearance and gap crossing, maintain essential lines of communication and operate within a contaminated environment’.⁴³

... all deployed land force elements, including engineers, will need to be given sufficient levels of protection, mobility and firepower to conduct sustained close combat ...

Today and in the future, the combat and support engineers bring to the battlefield both constructive (e.g. building strong points and providing essential services) and destructive (e.g. obstacle breaching and demolitions) capabilities. This unique amalgamation of contrasting capabilities provides skills, knowledge and experience to commanders at the operational and tactical levels with which the commanders can reduce friction, facilitate manoeuvre and increase the morale of friendly forces, or create friction and disorder to break the cohesion of the enemy. The combat engineer earns his title most notably through assault breaching of enemy obstacles and fortifications, or by their contribution of firepower in the form of supplementary infantry support and self-protection. The capabilities provided can be decisive in maintaining momentum in the attack or responding quickly to an enemy’s counterattack.⁴⁴ These required engineer capabilities are common to all current and future operations, not just amphibious operations. Due to space constraints on the amphibious ships, which restricts the amount of engineer personnel, vehicles and equipment that can be carried, the number and type of tasks that can be undertaken by amphibious engineers is also restricted.

The challenge therefore becomes determining or prioritising the most likely tasks that will be required. Once done, an engineer force can be developed that is capable of covering the majority of these tasks while remaining within the space restrictions. The wide range of military and engineer tasks for which the ADF is required to prepare, across the full spectrum of operations in the current and future operating environments, means that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all engineer solution. Therefore, five likely scenarios are proposed, covering the spectrum of amphibious operations with their multitude of engineer options. The scenarios are as follows:

• Scenario 1. Support to an ARE conducting Phase Zero (shaping) operations, minor humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and non-combatant evacuation operations. Engineer tasks will include minor vertical and horizontal construction, including strong points, searches for simple IEDs and water supply.
• Scenario 2. An engineer task force conducting a major humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation as a result of a ‘large scale’ natural disaster, such as the Indian Ocean Boxing Day Tsunami. Engineer tasks will focus on water supply and debris clearance in order to reduce environmental health threats as well as essential infrastructure assessments, structural building assessments, rendering safe important buildings, minor repairs to key lines of communication and construction of semi-permanent community health buildings.
• Scenario 3. Support to an ARG conducting regional stability operations, such as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands in 2003 and East Timor in 2006. Engineer tasks will include clearing beach obstacles, countering unsophisticated IEDs, minimal preparation of beach landing sites and small-scale expedient construction tasks.
• Scenario 4. Support to an ARG conducting entry operations for a mediumintensity regional conflict, such as for the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999. Engineer tasks will include clearing beach obstacles, clearing basic IED/mine threat against air operations, countering IED threats on roads, the construction/enhancement of landing zones, preparation of beach landing sites and basic camp construction.
• Scenario 5. Support to an ARG conducting entry operations for a major regional conflict involving a Coalition Task Force, in the manners of 3 CDO BDE RM in the Falkland Islands in 1982 and 15th/26th MEU in seizing APODs in Afghanistan in 2001. Engineer tasks will include clearing beach obstacles, clearing sophisticated IED/mine threats targeting air operations, countering sophisticated IED threats on roads, breaching or clearing a mine threat, the construction of landing zones, preparation of beach landing sites, the construction and maintenance of routes, basic camp construction and the construction of defences.

The likely tasks for amphibious engineers can be distilled from analysing historical records from operations similar to those that the Australian ATF will undertake, described in the five scenarios, or from operations that have occurred in Australia’s primary operating environment. From these tasks a mixture of combat, support and specialist engineers is required for low-intensity missions such as Phase Zero operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and small-scale security operations. The majority of these engineers reside in a CER. The analysis also shows that for large-scale high-intensity operations, where the ATF conducts entry operations for a follow-on force, the variety and number of simultaneous engineer tasks that will be encountered will require a follow-on engineer force. Initially independent, it may then function as part of a coalition engineer capability to facilitate the flow of the ensuing forces. The majority of engineer tasks required to secure the points of entry, however, can be executed within the existing capabilities of a CER by a reinforced combat engineer squadron.

The likely tasks for amphibious engineers can be distilled from analysing historical records from operations similar to those that the Australian ATF will undertake ...

What is not captured in the task analysis, and is often overlooked, is the requirement for the provision of engineer advice and engineer planning. Due to the fact that there are so many different engineer tasks, the vast majority of which require technical knowledge to plan and execute, it is essential that engineers are represented from the outset in all operations planning processes.⁴⁵ Therefore, an engineer planner, or at least an engineer liaison officer, must always be included in ATF planning groups as well as in the landing force headquarters. While this function is sometimes filled by the headquarters of the engineer force, the need for the engineer headquarters to monitor and control engineer tasks results in this element often being physically distanced from the supported battle group headquarters. As such, it is recommended that an RAE Officer always be included in the landing force headquarters, either as a permanent liaison officer or as one of the operations cell staff.

Concept Of Employment

Assumptions And Restrictions

Several assumptions have been made for the provision of engineer capabilities to the scenarios. For the development of engineer options it has been assumed that the light vehicles, protected mobility vehicles and trucks will be replaced with similar vehicles as part of the current ADF land vehicle fleet replacement program. It is also assumed that medical support to the engineer element will either be provided by the supported battle group element or by the main combat service support element, except for Scenario Two where the medical element would be organic. Finally, it is assumed that the follow-on engineer element will be transported by either black-bottom vessels or coalition ships.

... it is assumed that the follow-on engineer element will be transported by either black-bottom vessels or coalition ships.

A feasible and suitable engineer solution to the outlined problem must be good, fast and cheap as well as be within the restrictions set by the ADF. The Landing Force Concept for Employment and modelling data used by the Joint Amphibious Capability Implementation Team gives the size of engineer force and its equipment for which there is space available on the amphibious ships. The publication Employment of Engineers provides the governing principles and guidelines for the employment of engineers by the Australian Army. Documents for the Modular Engineer Force, which is the RAE’s ongoing Force Modernisation Review, provide the guidance as to how engineers will meet future warfighting challenges and how they will be commanded and controlled. These documents provided the constraints for this analysis, as outlined in Table 1.

Scalable Options

Taking into account the constraints, the five scenarios covering the likely employment of engineers in amphibious operations necessitate five different and scalable organisation options, due to the size of the force being support, type of amphibious mission being supported and the variety of resulting tasks. An overview of each option is as follows:

• Scenario 1 – Support to an ARE conducting Phase Zero (Shaping) operations, minor humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and noncombatant evacuation operations. As the ARE is of company-size, it requires a reinforced troop-sized option. The likely security cooperation and minor HA/DR missions, which will dominate the ARE deployments, will most probably involve light construction. This would require four tradesmen and two plant operators. The military tradesmen would supervise construction works by the combat engineers as well as undertake specialist trade work. Two mechanised sections are included to provide self-protected engineer support to the combat team and can additionally serve as infantry sections for security operations. The light combat engineer section is air mobile, providing mobility capabilities, such as search, as well as the ability to conduct water supply tasks. The troop is reinforced with a two-man explosive ordnance disposal detachment and two explosive detection dog teams,⁴⁶ to increase the search and explosive ordnance capabilities of the troop. The troop has organic transport, a storeman and a mechanic. Planning with the ARE headquarters would be provided by an RAE captain, as either a liaison officer or operations staff member, as well as a geospatial technician.

41    Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025, Headquarters US Marine Corps, Washington DC, 18 June 2008, pp. 21–22.

42    For more information about Hybrid Wars and the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, see: Frank G Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, December 2007, <http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hyb…;; and Colonel Steven C Williamson, ‘From Fourth Generation Warfare to Hybrid War’, Master’s thesis, US Army War College, 2009, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA498391&Location=U2>.

43    Adaptive Campaigning, p. 66.

44    MCWP 3-17 – Engineering Operations, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Washington DC, 14 February 2000, p. 1-1.

45    Employment of Engineers, p. 10-5.

46    An explosive detection dog team consists of a handler and an explosive detection dog. 47 Defence White Paper 2009, p. 75.

48    Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment System, Landing Force Concept for Employment, p.,7.