The Battle of Pinios Gorge: A Study of a Broken Anzac Brigade

Abstract

The Battle of Pinios Gorge was a key ‘rearguard’ action fought by Australian and New Zealand troops against a German enemy from 17–18 April 1941 during the ill-fated Greek campaign. The purpose of this investigation of events at Pinios is threefold. First, it provides a detailed forensic account of an important yet little known ‘Anzac’ battle. Second, it seeks to counter a number of mistaken interpretations, which have grown from the scant body of non-operationally oriented literature that has thus far concerned itself with the engagement. Last, for professional military practitioners it is an important historical case study of a brigade under pressure, and defeated. More lessons are often learnt from analysing failure than studying success.

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The Pinios Gorge, otherwise known as the historic ‘Vale of Tempe’, lies on the eastern coast of Greece. It was the site of an important action fought by Australian and New Zealand troops against a German enemy from 17–18 April 1941. This battle was one of the most operationally significant and intensive ‘rearguard’ engagements fought by the Anzac Corps throughout the ill-fated Greek campaign. This corps, as part of W Force, the larger British and Dominion commitment to Greece in early 1941, was progressively deployed in the first week of March that year for the purpose of assisting the Greeks against an increasingly obvious and imminent German invasion, eventually launched on 6 April. The ensuing campaign in Greece lasted just over three weeks and ended with a complete German victory during which W Force retreated some 430 kilometres in ten days. By 20 April, when it was clear that it could do no more than slow the German advance, the Greek government agreed that this expeditionary force should be evacuated. The withdrawal began on the beaches of Attica and the Peloponnese four days later. Over the next five nights around 50,000 Allied troops departed the Greek mainland. The fact that such an unexpectedly large proportion of W Force managed to evacuate, given that senior British officers had earlier predicted that a third of the force would be lucky to escape, was in no small part a consequence of events at Pinios Gorge.

The purpose of this investigation of events at Pinios is threefold. First, it provides a detailed account and forensic analysis of an important yet little known ‘Anzac’ battle in the early stages of the Second World War. Second, in seeks to counter a number of mistaken explanations or interpretations that have grown from the scant body of non-operationally oriented literature that has thus far concerned itself with the battle. Last but not least, for a professional military audience it is an important historical case study of a composite Australian/New Zealand brigade under pressure, and defeated. More lessons are often learnt from analysing failure than studying success.

In terms of operational context, the first six days of the German invasion of Greece did not actually involve any substantial fighting on the part W Force. Rather, the initial German thrust from bases in Bulgaria (in conjunction with simultaneous advances into Yugoslavia) was directed against the Greek defenders of the Metaxas Line—a 155-kilometre long chain of fortifications constructed along the line of the Greco-Bulgarian border and named after the former Greek dictator. The first time Imperial troops actually came to grips with the Germans was in a sharp battle fought at Kleidi Pass between 12–13 April. This engagement was a consequence of early and serious Yugoslavian collapse which exposed northern Greece to invasion on the axis of the ‘Monastir Gap’—a valley running from Monastir in the north to the Greek city of Florina, 13 kilometres south of the Yugoslavian border. German troops streaming down this passage threatened to flank the W Force line to the east, and as a consequence the 19th Australian Brigade, along with flanking Greek formations, was rushed northwards to plug the gap at Kleidi. The subsequent engagement did not go well for the Allies. By the evening of 13 April the forward elements of Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Regiment, followed by vanguard elements of the 9th Panzer Division, had broken the Australian line and were headed south. The defenders managed to escape, bruised and bloodied, in what was best described as less than an orderly withdrawal.¹

... the first six days of the German invasion of Greece did not actually involve any substantial fighting ...

After the W Force ‘delaying action’ at Kleidi Pass, what followed was a nervous period of consolidation for W Force as it attempted to hold German probing attacks against a series of defended passes along the Aliakmon Line, while plans were developed to withdraw much further south to a new line at Thermopylae. Pinios Gorge was the easternmost of these ‘passes’, and a crucial one. The chances of W Force successfully withdrawing to the Thermopylae Line were in many ways predicated on holding the western exit of the gorge until the morning of 19 April, after which time threat to the bottleneck at Larissa, a town to its immediate south, would have passed and a critical situation would have been saved. At the same time, the potential of cracking the defenders in this location, and this cutting-off a large proportion of W Force from moving south through Larissa, represented a significant opportunity for the Germans.

In terms of geography the ‘gorge’ in question is formed where the Pinios River, on its way to the sea, cuts through the coastal mountain range, to the south-east of Mount Olympus. The village of Tempe stands at its western end. The Ancient Greeks thought the area, covered in April with hyacinths and cyclamens, inhabited by gods. The gorge was a traditional and historical avenue for an invader moving south along this part of the Greek coast. The ruins of old fortresses thus abounded. In 1941, both a railway and a road used the gorge to cross inland from the coast and connect with Larissa. In order to protect Larissa long enough for W Force to withdraw through the choke point it represented, the 16th Australian Brigade under Brigadier ‘Tubby’ Allen, minus the 2/1st Battalion but with the 21st New Zealand Battalion under its command, was rushed into position to block German movement through the gorge.

The gorge was a traditional and historical avenue for an invader moving south along this part of the Greek coast.

Under generally overcast skies and rain, bearing down on Pinios Gorge were leading elements from both the 2nd Panzer Division (following up along the coast from Plantamon) and the vanguard battalion of the 6th Mountain Division, moving southwards over the Olympus foothills towards the village of Gonnos, near the western exit of the gorge. Both German groups received orders during 17 April to get to Larissa before W Force could pass through it.² This task, however, was not at all straightforward. The easternmost of the 2nd Panzer Division’s battle groups at once began, with considerable earthworks and blasting, the difficult task of transporting vehicles across the mountain spurs and improved cart tracks towards the eastern entrance of the gorge. The leading German tank company had a very difficult descent at this point. Time after time tracks came off along narrow mule paths and the company did not reach the bottom of the ridge to the north of the gorge until midday. There it carried on along the railway track paralleling the coast. From here the country all the way up to the eastern entrance to Pinios Gorge was reported clear, and early in the afternoon the leading tanks were at the eastern mouth of the gorge. As all the bridges across the Pinios River in this location had been destroyed, the German armoured troops (led by the 1st Battalion, 3rd Armoured Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel K von Decker) proceeded west along railway tracks on the north side of the river. At about halfway along the length of the gorge, von Decker’s leading tanks found their way blocked on the railway line by two blown tunnels. The tank column was momentarily halted. Wheeled vehicles could not yet be brought up and the tank crews, soon accompanied by infantry patrols, were ‘entirely without supplies’.³ This problem was only partially solved by airdrops and use of small boats off the coast east of Olympus to ferry stores forward.⁴

At about halfway along the length of the gorge, von Decker’s leading tanks found their way blocked on the railway line by two blown tunnels.

Meanwhile, slightly to the west, at around midday, 17 April, the vanguard company of the leading battalion of the 6th Mountain Division (the 3rd Battalion, 143rd Regiment) began arriving at Gonnos, after having moved across the southern slopes of Olympus using mountain trails. The Greek inhabitants immediately informed them of British patrols on south bank of Pinios. The German divisional commander, Brigadier Ferdinand Schörner, ordered the rest of the 3rd Battalion to rush at best speed to Gonnos to open the gorge from the west. After a short rest, at 3.00pm the remainder of the 143rd Regiment resumed its exhaustive climb. Behind it, the 141st Regiment began its move into the hills well to the north. Schorner himself arrived at Gonnos at 4.00pm and later described the trek to this village as the most difficult task his men had yet faced. Again, food and supplies were scarce and were either dropped by air to the mountaineers or acquired on the march.⁵

As the leading elements of the 2nd Panzer and the 6th Mountain Divisions closed in on the gorge, during the morning of 17 April, with Brigadier Allen still en route, Lieutenant Colonel F O Chilton (2/2nd Battalion) and N L Macky (21st New Zealand Battalion) prepared their planned blocking position. According to Pliny, when the ancient Greeks had occupied the same position in an attempt to halt Xerxes’ march on Athens they decided to abandon Pinios Gorge before battle in favour of making a stand at Thermopylae. Their central reasoning was any blocking position in this area, while effective in the gorge itself, was vulnerable to flanking by an advance from the southern ridges of Mt Olympus. The ancients saw it was possible for an invader to approach Tempe, or begin an encirclement of the western flank, by movement from the coast through various mountain villages to Gonnos—just as the 6th Mountain Division was now doing. For Chilton and Macky, however, withdrawal was not an option. Both men thus began the day with a combined reconnaissance as far west as a roadblock placed by the New Zealanders within the gorge. Macky suggested that pending Brigadier Allen’s arrival the entire force go under his command. Chilton refused. The two men did agree, however, that Macky’s battalion should deploy east of Tempe village on high ground on sharp ridges on the south bank of the gorge (culminating in Mt Ossa) and with a company within the gorge itself, in order to prevent the Germans from driving through it from the north-east. For its part the 2/2nd Battalion would take a position in depth on the western slopes of the same heights at the western exit of the gorge, with the added responsibility of protecting the left flank of the position from any infantry attack across the Pinios River south of Gonnos. Four anti-tank guns were sighted with the New Zealanders, with one covering a position in depth near Tempe village. At this stage a battery of 25-pounders was tasked with establishing observation posts to allow for observed shooting on the roadblock, within the 21st (NZ) Battalion position, and along the Pinios River. Weapon pits were dug and good use made of low stone walls in the area. There was no wire, however, nor any anti-tank mines. Sappers placed naval depth charges at the culverts on the pass, to be blown in case of a hurried withdrawal.⁶

...  battery of 25-pounders was tasked with establishing observation posts to allow for observed shooting on the roadblock ...

At 1.00pm, 17 April, Allen arrived and assumed command, immediately informing Chilton that the 2/3rd Battalion (minus some trucks which had lost contact with the unit and mistakenly drove on to Larissa), and eleven carriers from the 2/5th and 2/11th Battalions, were already rushing to reinforce the Pinios position. Allen spent the rest of the afternoon trying to hastily arrange his defences, which were shaped entirely by terrain. The gorge itself was narrow, steep-sided and around 10 kilometres long. The fast flowing river within it was 30–40 metres wide. A railway (currently being followed by von Decker’s tanks) travelled along the north side of the river and a road along the south. At the western edge of the gorge both the railway, after crossing the river, and the road swung south to Larissa. Expecting the Germans to appear at any stage, and disturbed about the small number of troops he had available to defend such a large, extended front, Allen accepted the deployments he found rather than attempting to change them in any significant way. He ordered a platoon of the arriving 2/3rd Battalion to ‘thicken up’ the centre of the 2/2nd Battalion, and sent a company of the same unit (detailed under Chilton’s command) to the 2/2nd Battalion’s left flank.⁷ Nonetheless, a gap of some 2700 metres still existed on this flank that could be covered only by patrols. Two field guns were rushed forward and placed in an anti-tank role. The rest of the 2/3rd Battalion was used to defend astride the road to Larissa some kilometres south of Tempe, to patrol nearby roads lest the Germans attempt a flanking move on Larissa from the north-east, and to form a small reserve.⁸ On confirmation of his task Allen replied to his divisional commander, Major General Iven Mackay, that, ‘I can do no more than my best.’⁹

Despite the weaknesses of Allen’s force, Pinios Gorge was naturally a strong defensive position. Any attack, even from west of the barrier of the gorge itself, still needed to cross a significant river. The constricted terrain also offered opportunities for the defenders to delay an advance to their position. Such demolitions had, after all, already halted von Decker’s tanks at the blocked railway tunnel on the north side of the gorge. A proportion of the Germans’ tankmen then tried to cross to the road on the south bank of the gorge but could not easily ford the river. In the afternoon a successful attempt was made to swim a Panzer Mk II across, cheered on by German spectators. Four more tanks crossed in this way, but two others were lost in the river. A separate party of tanks attempted to bypass the tunnel demolitions by moving on the north side of the gorge but they were held up by swampy ground.¹⁰

Despite the weaknesses of Allen’s force, Pinios Gorge was naturally a strong defensive position.

Frustrated at the lack of progress, at 4.00pm von Decker ordered the cycle squadron of 112th Reconnaissance Unit (which, with the cavalry squadron of the same unit, had been detached from the 6th Mountain Division’s advance guard and re-attached to the 1st Battalion, 3rd Panzer Regiment), forward of the blocked tunnel. At 5.00pm, just past the tunnel, the squadron was engaged by machine gun fire from the New Zealand roadblock. The German cyclists immediately deployed to attack. With almost no cover, however, and badly exposed, they were forced back to the tunnel. At that point one of the German tanks, which had managed to cross to the south side of the river, arrived and engaged the roadblock, forcing the New Zealanders manning it to retire. A little later Chilton sent one of his platoons to patrol the lower eastern portion of gorge as far as the roadblock position. As it arrived on the scene it was pinned by fire from the roadblock from a small party of soldiers of the German 8/800th Special Unit, which had now joined the troop of German tanks on the south bank of the river. The Australian platoon was unable to break away until nightfall and lost a number killed and wounded. Chilton’s pleas to Macky to assist them elicited no response from his headquarters, or from the New Zealand platoon which had originally been manning the roadblock. Allied artillery, however, prevented any German attempts to infiltrate much past the blocked tunnel on the north side of the river for the rest of the afternoon. At one point the German cycle company managed to crawl around 800 metres forward, but was called back by von Decker to the railway tunnel as night fell. A German tank column several kilometres long patiently lined up behind the tunnel in the darkness.¹¹

Meanwhile, at Allen’s headquarters attention was focused northwards as reports had been arriving all afternoon on 17 April of Germans in the heights above Gonnos. It was therefore decided to despatch a fighting patrol in a small boat found by the left hand company of the 2/2nd Battalion across the river to see if there were indeed any Germans in Gonnos and in the foothills between this village and Tempe, north of the river. This patrol returned 2.00am, after eight hours of investigations, to report that Germans were not only in Gonnos, but also in the nearby villages of Rapsani and Ambelakia, and the ground in between. More enemy troops were moving towards Elea, further to the west. Three Australians left to guard the punt had in fact been attacked but had fought off a German patrol. During the night the centre and left hand companies of Chilton’s battalion patrolled the south bank of the river to their fronts and exchanged fire with Germans on the other side thought to be conducting reconnaissance. Harassing Allied artillery fire was laid to the north-east of the New Zealanders and on German parties showing lights in the vicinity of Gonnos. This fire was surprisingly effective. In one bombardment von Decker’s tank battalion and patrols from the 8/800th Regiment lost more than twenty killed and wounded. The rest of Allen’s men spent the night trying to improve their defences, building sangers and digging slit trenches.¹²

In one bombardment von Decker’s tank battalion and patrols from the 8/800th Regiment lost more than twenty killed and wounded.

For their part the German mountaineers closing up to the north of the river also spent the night preparing for the new day. During its move to Gonnos the 143rd Mountain Regiment was given warning order at 7.50pm for an attack over the Pinios River early the next morning. This was clarified further at 9.30pm when the German 18th Corps headquarters ordered cooperation between the 6th Mountain and the 2nd Panzer Divisions in clearing the Pinios Gorge as fast as possible in order to make an early push on Larissa. At 10.30pm Schorner issued his own orders. His division’s part in the coming attack would be mounted by two battalions of the 143rd Mountain Regiment. It was to begin with feint attack (by fire only) supported by artillery mounted against the defending troops in the Tempe area by the 1st Battalion at 7.00am from an assemble area south-east of Gonnos. Then, at 7.30am, the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment would make a genuine attack through the western flank of the 2/2nd Battalion, before exploiting along the road to Larissa. After the 3rd Battalion had gained its objective, the 1st Battalion was to cross river and push to Larissa east of the main road. The combined two-battalion objective was the destruction of defending forces on south bank of the Pinios thereby opening up the gorge and the Larissa Road. Meanwhile, the 2nd Company (1st Battalion), the division’s original advance guard, with engineers attached, was placed under Schörner direct command and directed to cross the Pinios further to the west. Covered by the 3rd Battalion’s attack, this company was to proceed with a special task of advancing over the western slopes of the Erimin mountains towards the Larissa Road with the purpose of getting behind the defender’s lines and blocking the road short of Larissa against withdrawal by Allen’s force. The coming attack by the mountaineers would be the first time they faced ‘English’ troops, rather than Greeks. For its part, von Decker’s tank battalion, along with the two squadrons of the 112th Reconnaissance Unit and the detachment of 8/800th Special Unit in the vicinity of the tunnel were ordered to push on westwards through the gorge at first light.¹³

The new day dawned at Pinios clear and fine. The attacking units of the 6th Mountain Division, the 1st and 3rd Battalions (143rd Mountain Regiment), had only arrived complete in the Gonnos area during the night. Most German soldiers thus had only a few hours rest before moving up to their assembly areas at first light. Company and platoon orders were given at daybreak and the infantrymen moved to their assembly areas. At 6.30am Allied artillery began to fall on Gonnos and within the German 1st Battalion’s assembly area. At 7.00am the forward posts of Chilton’s 2/2nd Battalion spotted German infantrymen of this battalion, moving down the slopes from Gonnos towards the Pinios River. The volume of Allied shelling increased, and as the German troops approached the river they received heavy fire from D Company, 2/2nd Battalion, in the hills slightly to the east, and from the composite carrier platoon (of 2/5th and 2/11st Battalion carriers) operating from the southern bank of the river. After a prolonged machine gun duel, by 10.00am the German feint attack had moved forward to around 500 metres north of the river but had halted. Reconnaissance found the river to their front impassable to the German infantrymen, most of whom could not swim, and there was no immediate means to make a crossing. Unaware this attack was only a feint, Chilton later claimed ‘success’ at preventing the river crossing at this point.¹⁴ The aim of distracting the Australians from the advance of the 3rd Battalion to their west had, however, already largely been achieved.¹⁵

Reconnaissance found the river to their front impassable to the German infantrymen, most of whom could not swim ...

Meanwhile, the main (3rd Battalion) German attack from Gonnos had begun. The battalion was two kilometres north-west of the Chilton’s position by 6.50am. Patrols were despatched. One went to the village Parapotamos, to the forward-left flank of the 2/2 Battalion, after crossing the river in a boat they had found. Soon after, an Australian patrol sent to investigate the village came under sharp fire. A carrier patrol sent into the same area made contact with the German detachment in this village, and after taking casualties from mortar fire, established itself (dismounted) on this flank. Meanwhile, the bulk of the German 3rd Battalion assembled for its river crossing and attack. The Germans began to trickle across the Pinios from 7.45am with the aid of a captured boat and from midday by a ferry of two boats. By 10.30am the Australian defenders in the vicinity of Parapotamos village were broken and retreated to high ground towards the south. At 11.00am Schörner personally ordered the artillery in support of the 3rd Battalion to take on a direct-fire assault gun role against the nearest Australian company positions (D Company, 2/2nd Battalion and C Company, 2/3rd Battalion) holding positions south of Parapotamos. Under such fire, Chilton’s left-hand positions were gradually becoming encircled from the west. By 11.30am the Australians on this flank were all but surrounded on three sides. The 2/2nd Battalion’s own carrier platoon sent forward to clear the river immediately to front of D Company, engaged the left flank of the German battalion at the river but could not stop it. Just before midday D Company, 2/2nd Battalion sent another patrol to Parapotamos and found it still strongly held by the by Germans.¹⁶

By midday the feint attack by the German 1st Battalion was ordered to transform itself into a full-blown assault. The unit was ordered to cross the river by all available means to the south-west of Tempe to open a direct path out of the gorge for the 2nd Panzer Division group. German infantry companies advanced line abreast, by platoon, with short intervals in between. By 1.00pm this crossing was well underway and despite considerable defensive shell, mortar and withering machine gun fire on the river and its northern bank, and 30 metres of fast flowing river, the first company was across and formed a beachhead. Over the next 90 minutes the remainder of the battalion crossed, savaged by Australian mortars and by A and C Companies, 2/2nd Battalion, on the high ground south of the river. The obstacle had been crossed, but at significant cost, with German bodies and broken rafts drifting downstream. Nonetheless, the 1st Battalion, now on the southern bank, quickly reorganised and prepared to attack. By this time the rest of the 143rd Regiment (less the 1st Battalion) had been ordered to follow the 3rd Battalion across the Pinios at Parapotamos and continue its attack along towards Larissa.¹⁷

By midday the feint attack by the German 1st Battalion was ordered to transform itself into a full-blown assault.

As the German 1st Battalion began pushing across the Pinios, to Chilton’s surprise troops from the 21st (NZ) Battalion began flowing through his headquarters location in unformed groups, some without equipment—clearly things had not been going well for Mackey in the gorge to the east. Efforts to convince the fleeing New Zealanders to stay, even by Lieutenant Colonel G B Parkinson in command of the 4th (NZ) Field Regiment, generally failed. Only one New Zealand platoon managed to regroup and report to Chilton for further tasking. It was despatched to reinforce the centre of the battalion’s position. As they passed through the 2/2nd Battalion Macky’s soldiers reported that German tanks and infantry had driven them off their positions and that they had received orders to withdraw ‘independently’. To this point Macky had not informed Chilton or Allen he had even been under attack, let alone that he intended to retire. Contact had abruptly ceased just before midday with no explanation or permission for closing his radio down. Macky’s last words were: ‘Tanks are through the village [Tempe] and we are withdrawing to the hills.’¹⁸ Chilton’s C Company on his right flank immediately south-east of Tempe village soon confirmed the New Zealander’s flight. Chilton warned the company to alert the anti-tank gun covering the southern exit of the gorge at Tempe but it had already departed without firing a shot.¹⁹

The pressure on the 21st (NZ) Battalion had in fact begun, as it had on the 2/2nd Battalion to its west, at dawn. In this case, however, it was not from Schörner’s mountaineers but the leading elements of the 2nd Panzer Division group continuing their push through the Pinios Gorge from the east. At first light the cycle squadron of 112th Reconnaissance Unit renewed its attack westward along the northern bank of the gorge. At first the cyclists met less resistance than the day before and they made significant progress before being halted by heavy enfilade fire from New Zealand machine guns, mortars and artillery from hills on the south bank of Pinios. German mortars and guns answered with a light bombardment, although the former were interrupted by Allied artillery fire. Although this German squadron, duelling with the main 21st (NZ) Battalion from across the gorge, posed little immediate threat to Macky’s battalion, throughout the morning he worried hard about the sounds of battle in the vicinity of the 2/2nd Battalion to his left flank. Macky was soon convinced that a serious German attack was threatening his left rear. He called a morning conference and told his subordinates that, if overwhelmed, they were to disperse. This order was contrary to earlier instructions given to the unit to stay in place for as long as possible and to fall back and form a second line if required. With perilous communications Macky’s orders left individual company commanders to decide exactly when to retreat.²⁰

With perilous communications Macky’s orders left individual company commanders to decide exactly when to retreat.

The most dangerous effect of the advance of the 112th Reconnaissance Unit’s cycle squadron was not its fire, but the fact that during the morning it occupied the full attention of the 21st (NZ) Battalion and its artillery. The New Zealanders were fixated on the German cyclists across the gorge and were not, therefore, looking east in the area of their original platoon roadblock. The problem was that after those manning the roadblock had been forced to retire the previous day, high ridges meant that Macky had no way of knowing what was happening in this area. No patrols were sent to observe it. No observation positions were deployed to cover it. As a consequence the Germans were able to send further detachments of infantry from the 8/800th Special Unit, and small groups from the 7th Battalion, 304th Regiment, across the river to the south bank to clear the roadblock unobserved. This task was complete by midday, freeing up the advance of the detachment of six German tanks that had managed to ford the river the previous day. The tanks rolled at 12.15pm on the south bank of the gorge and were soon engaging the right flank of 21st (NZ) Battalion. A desperate engagement followed. German tanks duelled with the anti-tank guns within the New Zealand position. German armour and infantry behind it then engaged Macky’s exposed positions on the forward slopes of the southern bank of the gorge. The easternmost NZ companies were soon pushed back, isolating the anti-tank gun positions that subsequently fell. As the three surviving German tanks moved slowly along the road below the battalion, indirect artillery fire halted their further progress for around two hours. However, with German tanks just below them and German infantry still firing from the other side of the gorge, the New Zealanders began to fall back. Coordination was lost with the many gullies and ravines making it difficult to collect the scattered fragments of the battalion. Though some positions continued to hold on higher up the ridge, the unit lost its cohesion. These were the parties withdrawing through the 2/2nd Battalion, declaring German armour was moving up the gorge behind them. Most of the New Zealand battalion, however, was withdrawing in packets south and south-east up the slopes of Mount Ossa to their rear.²¹

In the meantime, with New Zealand defensive fire slackening, the leading elements of 2nd Panzer Division continued pushing through the gorge. More of von Decker’s tanks were emerging and about to break out into open ground west of Tempe. At this point the Germans were cautious, however, and took time clearing the gorge. Tanks and infantry moving along the south bank did not occupy Tempe until 3.00pm. The cyclists of the 112th Reconnaissance Unit, still scrambling along the north bank and engaging the retiring New Zealanders where possible, did not ford the river and reach the village until 3.30pm. Nonetheless, with the New Zealanders now effectively out of the fight, the 2/2nd Battalion faced not only frontal attack from German mountain troops but now German armour approaching from its right flank.²²

... with the New Zealanders now effectively out of the fight, the 2/2nd Battalion faced not only frontal attack from German mountain troops but now German armour ...

Just after 3.00pm, with Tempe secured, preparations for a concerted German attack were begun against Chilton’s battalion. A little further to the south, Allen’s headquarters was bombed for 30 minutes by around thirty-five German aircraft. Next, German tanks from Tempe drove towards Chilton’s eastern (C Company) position, while their supporting infantry spread over the ridges previously occupied by the New Zealanders.²³ What followed for the 2/2nd Battalion was a chaotic and desperate sort of struggle by companies and platoons. Chilton lost communications with his left forward company (D Company) after ordering it to mount a counterattack against German troops seeking to flank his position to the west. At around 4.00pm a badly worded order from Headquarters 2/3rd Battalion to its company (C Company), situated close to Chilton’s left forward company, led to a premature withdrawal of both. When firing ceased on that flank Chilton incorrectly assumed both companies had been overrun. With the premature withdrawal of these companies Chilton’s left flank was now wide open. The forward anti-tank guns supporting his battalion now began receiving small arms fire, as did Chilton’s headquarters.²⁴

By 5.00pm the situation for the 2/2nd Battalion had deteriorated even further. Allen managed to contact Chilton with instructions to hold his position until 3.00am, but hoped to be able move this time forward. Freyberg also spoke briefly to Chilton from Allen’s headquarters wanting to know the whereabouts of the New Zealand battalion and if he could speak to Macky. Chilton reported this as impossible. The line went dead soon after this and no more communications were made between Allen’s headquarters and the 2/2nd Battalion. At 5.30pm a liaison officer was despatched by Allen to Chilton with new orders to thin out and break contact as soon as it was dark. The liaison officer returned to Allen at 7.00pm, however, with the news that he could not get through to Chilton’s headquarters.²⁵

Meanwhile, the Germans of the 1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment, began advancing from their newly won bridgehead and began attacking the hills to the south-east. In the face of stubborn resistance the unit made slow progress. It was not until 6.30pm that the attackers broke into the remaining 2/2nd Battalion positions after intensive hand-to-hand fighting. The small village of Evangelismos fell, and the attackers were now reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the same regiment that had been rushed across the river. Still further west the 3rd Battalion pushed further around Chilton’s exposed left flank. Schörner, thinking of exploitation, ordered whole of his division forward across Pinios during the evening to continue the pursuit.²⁶

... the Germans of the 1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment, began advancing from their newly won bridgehead and began attacking the hills ...

As the mountaineers attacked the Australians in the late afternoon they were joined by the first of von Decker’s light tanks, which had by now passed through Tempe. As they had proceeded west through the Pinios Gorge, each German tank had dragged a trailer carrying a section of infantrymen (mostly from the 7th Battalion, 304th Infantry Regiment), while more infantry followed on behind. Chilton’s C Company on the right soon reported tanks had broken into its position and that it was taking fire from infantry on the high ground in the old New Zealand position. The German tanks in this area drew up stationary for around 30 minutes firing machine guns and cannon. The C Company infantry pits replied with small arms, but without effect. The company was forced to withdraw shortly after 5.30pm. The departure of C Company now meant A Company, in the centre, which had been engaging Germans crossing river since 3.00pm, was now faced attack from its right rear. At 5.55pm two tanks began to press its right flank. Soon after another ten pressed forward against it, supported by infantry. This company, by now out of contact with Chilton, was also forced to withdraw. Thus at around 6.00pm, after further delay imposed predominantly by Allied artillery fire, the 2nd Panzer Division tank/infantry force at last broke free of the mouth of the gorge and moved into open ground to the west. Around twenty-six German tanks in total subsequently deployed south of the river astride the road to Larissa. By 6.30pm this force, in conjunction with the mountaineers, had broken the remaining 2/2nd Battalion company positions and forced the survivors to withdraw. Chilton’s headquarters was by now receiving fire from its front, from the direction of Tempe, and from the old left flank D Company positions now occupied by the Germans (which included an assault gun). The 2/2nd Battalion was by now all but finished.²⁷

Around twenty-six German tanks in total subsequently deployed south of the river astride the road to Larissa.

The Germans moving from the east out of the gorge were, however, still cautious of their losses and moved forward slowly, delayed at every point by Allied artillery batteries that were leapfrogging to the rear firing, often over open sights as they went. By 6.45pm their creeping advance converged with the mountaineers south of Evangelismos, where Chilton’s headquarters and its last remaining company position (B Company) stood. The only remaining anti-tank gun in this area, sited 60 metres from Chilton’s headquarters, had departed once again without orders. Tanks were approaching from the north and infantry from the north-west. Germans were also seen to the left-rear in foothills across the flat. B Company was finally ordered to withdraw. Five minutes later, with his headquarters group of around seventy men engaged by German infantry and tanks from 40–200 metres away, Chilton gave the final order to extract all his remaining troops. From this point until darkness fell, small parties of Australians clambered into the nearby hills east and west of the road to Larissa chased by streams of bullets and mortar bombs from the German tanks and infantrymen below. Many parties reformed in nearby hills that night, and by the end of the next day the main group of survivors consisted of twelve officers and 140 ranks from the 2/2nd Battalion as well as seven officers and 120 ranks from the 21st (NZ) Battalion. Chilton was not with them. Eventually this group reached the coast 6 kilometres south of Koritza and waited two days for a Royal Navy pick-up that never came. From this point the large group split into small parties owing to the difficulty of obtaining food, and the idea that small groups had a better chance of escape. Most went south and sought boats. By 25 April the largest party had reached Skiathos Island and from there sailed to Chios Island. The single largest single group of 122 men from Pinios eventually reached Crete on 5 May.²⁸

The single largest single group of 122 men from Pinios eventually reached Crete on 5 May.

As German tanks broke out of the Pinios Gorge, Allen was ready to implement a hasty plan to delay further German advances. His orders were still to deny Larissa to the Germans until 3.00am, 19 April as the roads through the town were reserved until 1.00am for the withdrawal of the 6th (NZ) Brigade. With few alternatives Allen now planned to accomplish this mission as a fighting withdrawal. He had lost the 21st (NZ) Battalion, and most of the 2/2nd Battalion had been cut off and dispersed. In response he first redeployed his headquarters and what guns could be gathered to a road-rail junction south of Makrikhori, mindful that there were several points along the route back to Larissa where further blocking forces could be placed. Allen was at this point still confident that the Germans could be held until nightfall, when the job would be much easier. He had already ordered Lieutenant Colonel D J Lamb, commanding the 2/3rd Battalion, to prepare a rearguard line around 10 kilometres south-west of Tempe at a set of crossroads. In addition to preparing his own companies, Lamb was to ‘forcibly hold all guns particularly anti-tank guns—that tried to get through from the forward lines, and also to grab all other troops he saw and make use of them’.²⁹ This included the two companies that had mistakenly withdrawn from the left flank of the 2/2nd Battalion and any straggling New Zealanders. By 6.00pm a force of around three infantry companies, the surviving carriers, and a recently arrived squadron of NZ cavalrymen were set on Lamb’s first fallback line. Allen’s artillery, including detachments that had pulled out of the forward positions without orders, was re-deployed by Lamb behind this screen. Closing on this blocking force was the leading tank company of von Decker’s 1st Battalion, 3rd Panzer Regiment, now supported by elements of the 2nd Battalion, 304th Infantry Regiment. Slightly to the west but on the same axis, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 141st Regiment, had taken over from the units of the 143rd Regiment as the vanguard of the 6th Mountain Division.³⁰

At around 6.30am Allen’s hastily deployed rearguard position was attacked by five German tanks moving astride the road. A hail of ineffective small arms greeted them from his infantry force before two New Zealand 25-pounders were moved up into the line to engage the tanks over open sights. In the ensuing duel two tanks and one gun were lost before the artillerymen, without ammunition, withdrew with their wounded. The remaining German tanks formed up and continued forward. At that moment a squadron of German aircraft appeared and strafed Allen’s infantrymen and carriers who fired back with their small arms and Bren guns. The tanks pressed forward in the half-light of dusk and broke into the defending infantry positions. At one point 15–20 Australians reputedly surrounded a German tank and rather ineffectively persisted in pouring small arms fire into it. Two Australian soldiers were crushed in their pits by German tank tracks. Nor did the Boys rifles of the New Zealand cavalrymen slow the Germans before they too were forced to retire. With heavy German mortar fire now falling, at 9.00pm the helpless and disheartened infantrymen began to stagger backwards, or into the hills on each side of the road, and the line was broken. An officer Australian attached to Allen’s headquarters described how ‘suddenly, everybody seemed to become panic stricken and the one object appeared to be to get away’.³¹ Both D Company (2/2nd Battalion) and C Company (2/3rd Battalion) had thus withdrawn for the second time without orders. The carriers and artillery followed them. Only B Company, 2/3rd Battalion, held in position until ordered to move. At this point Lieutenant Colonel Lamb took control and reformed the withdrawing parties of infantrymen 1200 metres further south, again astride the road to Larissa in the darkness. They were soon joined by Allen’s headquarters, artillery detachments and the remaining carriers. The men lay once again in the darkness, close enough to touch each other. What was left of Allen’s transport was placed only a few hundred yards to the rear.³²

In the ensuing duel two tanks and one gun were lost before the artillerymen, without ammunition, withdrew with their wounded.

Within minutes of Lamb’s hastily arranged second rearguard line, the leading German tanks arrived. The Australians again opened fire. The leading German tank commander, standing waist-high in the turret, was riddled with bullets. This tank and others to its rear, by now confounded by the darkness, fired tracer and shells randomly. This fire was met by an equally ineffective hail of small arms, but nonetheless the German armoured column stopped. In the darkness the risk of supporting units firing on each other, a dangerous lack of fuel, and exhausted ammunition supplies encouraged the German tankmen to halt in what Allen later called ‘a scene of colourful confusion’, a ‘world of Very lights, tracer bullets and blazing vehicles’.³³ There were sufficient burning Australian trucks to read a road map without aid. German tank crews once again resupplied themselves on food and water left in abandoned Allied vehicles. Inexplicably, however, German infantrymen did not follow up the truncated armoured push with immediate patrols or pressure Allen’s thin line in any other way. Flares subsequently rose to the flanks as German infantry explored the hills but no more attacks developed. Allen subsequently ordered Lamb to withdraw the force further back to a point where the road crossed a swampy area, considered to be difficult terrain for tanks, immediately north of Larissa. The New Zealand armoured cars covered this withdrawal. Allen’s headquarters pulled out at 9.30pm with ‘night and rumour...spreading disorder’.³⁴ It was fortunate for Allen’s men that the Germans had halted. The ford through this swamp was, in fact, found to be blocked by a bogged New Zealand 25-pounder and crammed with transport waiting to withdraw Allen’s remaining infantrymen. Allen noted the ‘confusion of vehicles was such that the further withdrawal of the force was almost impossible’.³⁵ The final movement from this ford area was sorted out and cleared by 4.00am.³⁶

Despite the fact that the German pursuit had ended for the night, the withdrawal of Allen’s force from its second rearguard line through the ford area to a position just north of Larissa did not precede according to plan. Unknown to Allen, the German 2nd Company (1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment) had followed its orders and moved around his left flank during the day and set up an ambush to cut his withdrawal route at a road-rail level crossing around five kilometres north of Larissa. It had been an epic day’s march for this company, which had begun with a swim across the Pinios that morning, unnoticed by the Australians. At around 8.00pm the company had made it to its objective at the main road north of Larissa and set up its ambush. All telephone lines in use at crossroads were cut, and a roadblock made with two captured trucks. The company went into all round defence in a natural redoubt. To this point, from the morning of 17 April, this particular company had marched close to 150 kilometres across mountains and difficult terrain with a total of two and a half hour’s sleep.³⁷

It had been an epic day’s march for this company, which had begun with a swim across the Pinios that morning ...

Almost immediately after its ambush had been set, a ten-vehicle Allied ammunition convoy appeared and was captured by the German company. Then, at 10.30pm, the leading vehicles of Allen’s long column from Pinios Gorge approached. The Germans again initiated their ambush, riddling the leading lorry with bullets and calling for surrender. A carrier travelling with the convoy tried to force the German roadblock at high speed. It was engaged with machine guns and anti-tank rifle, and was destroyed. Allen’s convoy now stopped in confusion, the road thoroughly choked. A number of Allied troops took cover off to the side of the road and opened fire on the German company position. At 11.30pm two more carriers came forward, weapons blazing, and again tried to crash through the block. They were met with a wall of German fire, but nonetheless pushed to close range with dismounted troops following. By around 1.00am, however, this attack had petered out. Around thirty Australians surrendered and the rest dispersed to the south-east. Others escaped towards Larissa by skirting the roadblock on foot. Meanwhile, Lamb, noting the fire to this front and therefore assuming Larissa to have fallen to the Germans, decided to divert the bulk of Allen’s column east along what he mistakenly thought was a road to the port of Volos. This was, however, a dead end road to a village by the coast south of Mt Ossa. Allen’s force was by now breaking up in the darkness; a large part of it was lost.³⁸ Two days later, as most of W Force was settling into its new defensive line at Thermopylae, small parties of survivors from Allen’s force had begun to appear with news as to the fate of their units. By nightfall, 20 April, 250 men from the 2/2nd Battalion and 500 from the 2/3rd Australian Battalion had reformed at Thermopylae under Allen’s command once more.

It was noteworthy that, apart from the physical challenge of reaching its ambush position, the German company ambush had attained some significant results. It had, in effect, managed to block Allen’s withdrawal through Larissa. Its success led to later legend that Larissa had been in German hands during the night of 18 April. This was never the case. Units of the 6th (NZ) Brigade were in fact passing through the town until 4.00am the next morning. Other rumours were that the confusion was a consequence of German agents in Larissa misdirecting traffic, or Greek fifth column activity. There is no evidence for such conclusions. Allied disorder was a consequence of a very successful German company-level ambush. This was achieved at a cost of two Germans killed, and two others wounded.³⁹

Allied disorder was a consequence of a very successful German company-level ambush.

Field Marshal Wilhelm List, in command of the German 12th Army and in overall charge of the German invasion on Greece, was later quite vocal in praise for the troops of the 6th Mountain division and 2nd Panzer Division that fought at Pinios Gorge. He remarked repeatedly about the ‘excellent cooperation’ between these formations, and the critical role they played in the ‘break out’ into the plains of Thessaly.⁴⁰ ‘The Pz troops’ swift advance’, he noted ‘was made possible only by the mountain troops splendid marching.’⁴¹ It was ‘the very model’ of combined action and an ‘unprecedented feature’ of the campaign.⁴² Certainly, the mountaineers that fought in this action had undertaken a monumental encircling march to the west, then climbed 1200 metres on the southern slopes of Olympus, before reaching the north bank of Pinios and attacking the 2/2nd Battalion, thus helping open the gorge for elements of the 2nd Panzer Division. It was quite a feat. Brigadier Allen may well have complained that his force’s ‘reserves, mentally and physically, were overdrawn’, but his men could not have been more tired than Schorner’s mountaineers.⁴³ It was also true, however, that List’s tribute’s masked the essential truth that Allen did hold on for sufficient time to protect Larissa—if only by the skin of his teeth.⁴⁴

What then can this narrative reveal about some of the traditional and enduing themes of Pinios? First, the idea that Allen’s men were pushed from their positions by vastly superior German numbers is a premise that underpins many English-language accounts of the engagement, especially those written in Australia. In this regard they echo the contemporary press, which claimed the defenders participated in distinctly ‘unequal combat’ in that they ‘held up two divisions, which outnumbered them by a least ten to one’.⁴⁵ This perception was also present in the minds of W Force soldiers not at Pinios and yet to meet a German attack. A soldier from the 2/6th Battalion, for example, noted with bitterness in his diary after the battle that ‘no doubt the Hun is well-equipped in everything as well as numbers’.⁴⁶ Such contentions are, of course, nonsense. Allen’s brigade group faced attack by elements of two German divisions, but it certainly did not fight them as divisions. In fact, the 21st (NZ) Battalion was assaulted, in the morning of 18 April, by 6–9 German tanks, around two companies of German troops from 112th Reconnaissance Unit firing from across the gorge, small detachments of infantrymen from 8/800th Special Unit, and small patrols from the 7th Battalion, 304th Regiment that had managed to cross to the south bank. This force increased as the afternoon approached, but by this stage the 21st (NZ) Battalion was in the process of leaving the field. When account is taken of the anti-tank support available to them, the force that routed Macky’s unit was roughly equivalent to it.⁴⁷

‘no doubt the Hun is well-equipped in everything as well as numbers’.

Similarly, on the western flank, Chilton’s 2/2nd Battalion was attacked on its left flank during the morning of 18 April by a single battalion (the 3rd Battalion 143rd Regiment), less a company despatched to perform the Larissa ambush. This attack was covered by a feint by the 1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment. Even conceding that in the afternoon Chilton’s men were under fire from some elements of the 2nd Panzer Division emerging from the gorge, and faced an attack by the 1st Battalion when it eventually moved against Evangelismos, the actual numbers of troops engaging each other on the ground on this flank did not give much of a numerical advantage to the Germans. In both instances, had the defenders held for longer, the Germans would have been free to concentrate an ever-increasing force against them—but it did not pan out that way. The Battle of Pinios Gorge, as it eventuated as opposed to how it might have developed, was fought between roughly equivalent ground forces. The story was the same in terms of artillery. The German attack was only effectively supported by the 1st Battalion, 118th Mountain Artillery Regiment, which was low on ammunition and could deliver only 400 rounds all day on 18 April. The 1st Battalion, 95th Mountain artillery Regiment only arrived on the scene at 3.00pm, too late to be effective as German forces were already advancing on the south side of the Pinios. Against this the full 4th (NZ) Field Regiment supported Allen’s men.⁴⁸

In terms of traditional perceptions regarding the critical impact of German armour at Pinios, it is true that the attackers had tanks to support their assaults within the gorge, but here the terrain, ‘which contradicted all principles and experience’, acted against their being decisive.⁴⁹ Due to demolitions, German tanks from 3rd Panzer Regiment had to be taken down to the deep and swift river one by one with the help of engineers. A number were lost in the torrent and others were bogged. The nine vehicles (at best) that pressed their morning attack on the 21st (NZ) Battalion faced five anti-tank guns sighted within the New Zealand position, as well as field guns prepared to fire in an anti-tank role if required. This was no German wave of steel. More tanks were deployed only after the 21st (NZ) Battalion had been removed from the east of Tempe. Nor does the scale of destruction often purported to have been wrought upon the attackers by Allen’s men in spite of the outcome of the battle hold up to analysis. The Germans lost in the vicinity of 140 casualties. The defenders lost many more, especially considering those taken prisoner or lost to their units, and not because they were overwhelmed by endless lines of German infantrymen and armour.⁵⁰

The Germans lost in the vicinity of 140 casualties. The defenders lost many more ...

Pinios revealed another important insight about the nature of the German advance down the Greek peninsula which had been foreshadowed at the earliest stages of the campaign and which was now becoming a significant operational concern. To begin, the fact that the Germans failed to clear the gorge in time to take Larissa and cut the W Force withdrawal was largely a consequence of an inability to move up supplies and troops in the Olympus sector. Simply put, the focus on speed left forward units dangerously extended from their logistics hubs. German vanguard units thus fought piecemeal, and at the time were perilously short of supplies. In the advance and attack at Pinios Gorge this logistics over-extension was only partially alleviated by airdrops and by shipping ammunition, fuel and food by small boats along Aegean coast. Some forward units still found themselves so far forward they were forced to consume emergency ‘iron rations’ and in many cases advance elements, out of touch with their supply lines and headquarters, relied on captured fuel and food from abandoned British and Greek dumps to keep advancing. It is not too much to suggest that in some cases such booty, and very low ammunition expenditures, was all that allowed German spearheads to continue forward. Thus far, such logistics gambles had paid off, and in a campaign as short as Greece (both in terms of time and space) the chances were that they would keep paying off. This type of logistics risk-taking, however, was an inherently dangerous practice. Many of the supply-related disasters that would befall the Germans in Russia were thus presaged in Greece.⁵¹

The question remains, however, that if it was not overwhelming German numbers or armour that decided the issue at Pinios, and if the Germans were to some degree at the end of their logistics tether, what went wrong for Allen’s brigade? The first part of an answer to this question must be centred on the issue of the 21st (NZ) Battalion’s premature withdrawal—an issue that has vexed Australian and New Zealand military historians, many of whom bore willingly or unwillingly the burden of nationalist agenda for many years. The Australian position is reasonably clear and consistent. Official Australian reports all basically agree that the New Zealanders fell back before they ought to have, thus ‘exposing the right flank of the 2/2nd Battalion’ and making Chilton’s position untenable in spite of his valiant efforts to hold on as long as possible.⁵² Major General Mackay did not pull his punches, claiming that Allen’s whole position was ‘compromised by the withdrawal of 21 NZ Bn and A Tk guns with them’.⁵³ Allen himself was later at pains to praise Chilton’s battalion in that it held on until late afternoon, ‘in spite of the complete withdrawal of the 21 N.Z. Bn’.⁵⁴ Captain R R Vial, of the 6th Australian Division’s intelligence section, concluded after questioning some 21st (NZ) Battalion soldiers, intercepted while withdrawing at Allen’s headquarters, that they had ‘broken before they were attacked by the enemy under the impression they were cut off’.⁵⁵ In summary, according to common Australian interpretation, the New Zealanders broke too early and without good cause, thus threatening the whole Allied position at Pinios.⁵⁶

... according to common Australian interpretation, the New Zealanders broke too early and without good cause, thus threatening the whole Allied position at Pinios.

Unsurprisingly, such conclusions have not been so readily accepted or palatable to many New Zealand historians. When drafting New Zealand’s official history of the war, its authors went to great pains to try to explain what happened at Pinios. After all, it was clear that there ought to have been sufficient Allied force in place to delay the Germans for longer than it did. German armour, in particular, was in a very difficult position in the gorge, yet it broke out and into flat ground west of Tempe, making continued defence impossible. The key aspect then was preventing German tanks leaving the gorge, which brings focus once more back to Macky’s battalion. His unit, and its attached anti-tank guns, should have posed a significant obstacle to the small leading German infantry and tank detachments on a restricted and narrow front in the gorge. Only these types of mobile forces could ever really have threatened the W Force evacuation timetable by getting to Larissa before it was clear of withdrawing troops. These authors, however, and those that have followed the tradition they set, generally conclude that it was Allen’s faulty dispositions that invited the German breakthrough rather than 21st (NZ) Battalion’s premature retreat. In particular, they argue, as it was deployed on hills on the south bank of Pinios, not in the gorge, Macky’s unit seemed sighted to meet a frontal attack from across the river. Sitting along high ridges the New Zealanders were thus useless once tanks were in Tempe. Furthermore, Allen placed too little importance on the key tunnel demolition and roadblock in the gorge. Of his seven anti-tank guns, not one covered this obstacle. Only two, in fact, covered the gorge entrance and the rest were positioned too far back to prevent tanks debauching from the gorge. Perhaps a full infantry company with anti-tank weapons might have been placed, covering this obstacle to great effect. Allen also prepared no force for counterattacks, while two full companies (of the 2/3rd Battalion) were held in reserve some seven kilometres distant. This did not seem, according to one New Zealand author, that ‘the best use was made of the troops available’.⁵⁷ While there is certainly something to such complaints about Allen’s dispositions at Pinios, such arguments must inevitably be seen as an attempt to shift focus from Macky’s failings, or else explain the poor performance of the 21st (NZ) Battalion in this action.

While it is absolutely true that failing to adequately cover the roadblock was a mistake, it was as much Macky’s error as it was Allen’s. In fact, Macky himself later described this as his ‘major mistake at Pinios’.⁵⁸ Had an effective block been maintained, German tanks would have had much more difficulty ever emerging from the gorge. ‘This,’ admitted Macky, ‘we could and should have done...’⁵⁹ As it was it should not be forgotten that it was Macky who chose to man the roadblock with only a platoon, and Macky that chose not to replace that platoon when it was forced off the roadblock by the Germans. His battalion had been given clear responsibility by Allen to cover the roadblock and prevent German tanks moving out of the gorge. This he failed to accomplish. The fact the Germans were able to quickly clear the roadblock without harassment was decisive as it opened the way for more tanks to pour through the gorge. These were the vehicles that later swamped Chilton’s headquarters. Macky had also chosen, with his mission in mind, to deploy his companies on the ridges south of the gorge. He had not been directed there by Allen. Rather, with very little time available after he arrived and expecting the Germans at any minute, Allen accepted Macky’s choices. Allen recalled being ‘puzzled’, when he had arrived at Pinios in the afternoon of 17 April, at Macky not covering his platoon at the roadblock, but believed Macky was ‘rattled’ and considered it ‘safer’ to let the dispositions already agreed to stand. Allen was confident that Macky, with his anti-tank guns, could still perform its task of blocking the gorge and was, in fact, more concerned about his left than the right flank.⁶⁰

While it is absolutely true that failing to adequately cover the roadblock was a mistake, it was as much Macky’s error as it was Allen’s

The fact was, once Macky’s battalion vacated the roadblock and the gorge itself, it was too late for other forces to reoccupy them. Allen was rightly shocked when the 21st (NZ) Battalion withdrew at midday without being hard pressed and without permission. It might have been possible, if required, to fall this battalion back through Chilton’s position and reorganise it at Lamb’s fallback line, but Macky had ‘quitted the field’ and went up the ridges to the south instead. All of this, according to Chilton, was a consequence of the New Zealand commander’s mental state. He had, apparently, ‘given the game away before the fight started’.⁶¹ The small casualty figures for the 21st (NZ) Battalion compared to the 2/2nd Battalion bear out Chilton’s accusations. The New Zealanders lost a mere four men killed or wounded at Pinios, compared to sixty-two from Chilton’s battalion. In addition, contrary to the idea that the two reserve companies of the 2/3rd Australian Battalion were an unavoidable luxury, the actions of Macky’s battalion meant retaining these troops in a fallback position was vital and excluded them from use in a counterattack. Despite efforts to save its reputation, the fact remains that the 21st (NZ) Battalion performed poorly at Pinios and endangered not only this position, but the withdrawal of the rest of W Force as a result.⁶²

... once Macky’s battalion vacated the roadblock and the gorge itself, it was too late for other forces to reoccupy them.

Questions concerning the issue of the 21st (NZ) Battalion’s performance, however, have at the same time overshadowed another key reason for Allied difficulties at Pinios. Here, attention must turn to the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Parkinson’s 4th (NZ) Field Regiment. In many ways this regiment failed as badly as did Macky’s infantrymen. No observed fire was ever established, for example, on the roadblock and no artillery observation posts at all were ever set up on the western flank. This meant that the exposed advance of the German 3rd Battalion, 143rd Regiment, which represented a perfect artillery target, went without effective Allied bombardment. So too, throughout the morning the Germans provided tempting artillery targets in the flat ground below Gonnos and across the Pinios River, but poor communications prevented full use of Parkinson’s batteries. In addition, artillery fire intended to fall just forward of Tempe when called by Chilton, instead landed within his C Company perimeter, with Parkinson himself having to call for it to cease. In the early afternoon of 18 April, artillery forward observers that had eventually made it to the Chilton’s D Company position promptly withdrew despite specific orders from Parkinson to remain in place. In early afternoon some of his guns began moving out against Parkinson’s own orders. Thus, when the German 1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment’s feint turned into an attack against Evangelismos, effective artillery fire could not be brought down upon it. Parkinson ‘appeared very distressed’ at this stage, recalled Chilton, and told me he had sent back a senior officer to ‘give the gunners 10 minutes drill to pull them together’.⁶³ Allen informed Parkinson a little later that his guns were withdrawing without orders and that he was ‘expected to stand and fight’,⁶⁴ History, quite rightly, has tended to judge Macky harshly. Parkinson, thus far, has escaped the criticism his unit earned at Pinios Gorge.⁶⁵

While questions of who was to blame for Allied difficulties from 17–18 April at Pinios are important in a historical sense, they are not central to the significance of this battle. The engagement at Pinios in many ways represents the Greek campaign as a whole. It is important, yet traditionally under-analysed. When given close examination many of its existing ‘truths’ are exposed as attempts to explain (or explain away) more troubling questions and conclusions. Just because a battle, or a campaign for that matter, does not fit neatly within the celebratory and triumphal Anzac tradition of remembrance, however, does not mean it is unimportant or that it should not be understood on its own terms. There is much more to Australian military history than a litany of glorious victories. Defeat, just as much as victory, is part and parcel of this nation’s military heritage. Thankfully, the number of Australian military failures by no means outnumbers its successes—but this ought not mean such failures are ignored. They are, in fact, a rich source of insight for those of the profession of arms. Victory naturally enables congratulations while defeat engenders reflection and inquiry—and it is through critique, not self-assurances, that an army grows.

About the Author

Dr Craig Stockings is a Senior Lecturer in History at UNSW@ADFA. He holds a Graduate Diploma in Education, a Masters degree in Education, a Masters degree in International Relations and a PhD in History. His areas of academic interest concern Australian military history and operational analysis.

Endnotes

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1     ‘1st Armoured Brigade Group notes on operations in Greece, April, 1941’, 8 May 1941, The National Archives (UK) (TNA), Series WO 201, Item 2749.

2     ‘Report by 8 Pz Recce Unit’, Australian War Memorial (AWM) Series 54, Item 534/2/27; ‘Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign)’, AWM 54, 534/2/27; ‘Extracts from 9 Pz Div War Diary (Greek Campaign)’, AWM 54, 534/2/27; ‘Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign)’, AWM 54, 534/2/27; and G Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1962, p. 106.

3     ‘Appendices to 2 Pz Div Admin Diary (Greek Campaign)’, AWM 54, 534/2/27.

4     ‘A few war experiences’, reviewed and edited by Field Marshal S.W List and General H. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, AWM67, 624/7/2; ‘Relevant extracts from daily QMG reports from 12th Army to GHQ (Greece and Crete)’, AWM 67, 5/17; and ‘Extract of report by 3 Pz Regt (2 Pz Div)’, AWM 54, 534/2/27.

5     ‘Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete)’, AWM 54, 534/2/27; ‘Extracts from 18 Corps intelligence report’, AWM 54, 534/2/27; ‘Extracts from 6 Mtn Div War Diary (Greece and Crete)’, AWM 534/2/27; and W G McClymont, To Greece, War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand, 1959, pp. 322–23.

6     ‘Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust, Inf. Bde’, 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL4142, 2/9 [6-14].

7     Ibid.

8     Comments by W E Murphy, NZ War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, January 1950, AWM 67, 5/17; and ‘Report on operations in Greece 16 Aust’, Inf. Bde’, 29 July 1941, AWM 3DRL4142, 2/9 [6-14].