Contribute

The Reserve Response Force and Public Safety

Journal Edition
Volume 8, Number 3, Summer

Abstract

The 2nd Division’s Army Reserve Response Force (RRF) was established after a series of overseas terrorist incidents in 2001–02 and has carved out a niche role in the area of public safety. Since 2006 RRF trained soldiers deployed on no less than three domestic event support operations and three disaster response operations. This article focuses on experiences in NSW, and argues that the RRF Defence Aid to the Civilian Community (DACC) role in public safety for major events and disaster response is likely to continue in the future. It puts forward the reasons why RRF collective training needs to be more challenging and relevant to the DACC role in a multiagency environment with police and other emergency services so as to better prepare commanders, staff and liaison officers, and soldiers for future domestic support operations.

Prime Minister John Howard announced his intent to establish a Reserve Response Force (RRF) in December 2002. Senator Robert Hill gave more detail in May 2003. The RRF was to be:

...trained for short notice response to domestic security incidents including terrorist incidents as well as quick response to other civil emergencies. Reserve Response Forces will be employed primarily as formed units to cordon off an area, provide static protection of a site or to assist other ADF elements. They could also provide limited on site medical and transport support.

The RRF was formed within six brigades of the Australian Army Reserve’s 2nd Division.1 Government directed Defence to provide an RRF for Defence Aid to the Civilian Community (DACC), where there was no likelihood that force will be required, and Defence Force Aid to the Civilian Authority (DFACA), where force may be required to achieve the task and where soldiers may be armed.2 The RRF is tasked to provide a capability within Australian territory only and is at higher-level readiness than normal Active Reserve soldiers. In addition to their specialist trade training, RRF soldiers receive additional training including low risk search. A myriad of targets can be searched (buildings, open areas, vehicles, aircraft, roads, trains, tunnels, vessels and wharves), provided the risk to search operators is low.3 Subject to the availability of vehicles, the RRF deploys with its own command, control, communications, water, and rations. Unlike civilian emergency services, it does not require external logistical support when deployed. The RRF’s principal resource is a disciplined, fit and resilient labour force, with security and search skills. It can be complemented with, but does not include, specialist engineering, medical or other sophisticated technology or equipment. If such a capability were required it would need to be force assigned.

The RRF’s principal resource is a disciplined, fit and resilient labour force, with security and search skills.

The government’s motivations to establish the RRF were manifold. In the relatively benign period following the Vietnam War the Army moved elements of its full-time 1st Division from the more populous southern states to northern Australia.4 The Army’s Reserve 2nd Division became the largest operational capability located in the more populous southern states. Following its deployment to East Timor in 1999, Army experienced a heightened operational tempo.5 Army Reserve soldiers were successfully deployed for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, primarily performing search-related functions.6 It appears that government presentiment of attacks on home soil post 11 September 2001 and the first Bali bombing in 2002 served as principal catalysts to project the Army Reserve into a domestic security role.

Since 2001 Australia has remained free from domestic based terrorist attacks;7 however, RRF trained soldiers were employed, not in security incident response but in security incident prevention and disaster response. In three Domestic Event Support Operations (DESOs)8 the RRF searched for explosive devices, weapons and other prohibited and dangerous items. In three disaster response operations these same skills were used to search for the remains of deceased persons and provide logistical and other support when the RRF was deployed at short notice to the Victorian bushfires in 2009, and the Queensland and Victorian floods of 2011.9

Public Commentary on the RRF and DACC

Public commentary of the RRF is sparse; however, academics across disparate disciplines comment more generally on military involvement in disaster response. The RRF itself has attracted little publicity or debate within Defence publications or in the wider community.10 Large-scale ADF domestic operations involving the Army Reserve are relatively recent phenomena over the last ten years, concurrent with the rise of emergency management as a separate academic discipline. Several Australian Strategic Policy Institute strategic policy articles11 emphasise an emerging ADF trend of participation in domestic operations, along with Defence ambivalence towards their involvement. Authors point to views among some Defence members that DESO detracts from its core business of training and preparedness for warfighting. Indeed, that argument is a partial justification for tasking the Army Reserve for DESO. The Army Reserve can surge to meet short duration activities, avoiding disruption to regular units preparing for or deployed on overseas operations. These analysts also point to a lack of preparedness within the ADF for domestic support operations. There are no specific Defence budgets for DACC, nor are there permanent, designated units for DACC other than the RRF. Except for command positions, RRF positions are held by Reserve soldiers in addition to their normal Reserve postings.

Emergency management studies rarely touch on Defence in response efforts despite embracing a whole of government ethos to disaster response efforts.12 Emergency Management Australia supports an all agency approach to disaster response, reinforcing the desirability of Defence involvement in training in order to provide niche specialist capabilities in response. Emergency management concepts stress the importance of joint or combined training exercises. Emergency Management Australia13, the NSW Police Force14 and Defence internal training publications stress the value of joint training as a means to enhance training outcomes. Emergency management emphasises rapport and trust building between emergency service agencies as an ingredient for effective coordinated response, underpinned by developing long-term relationships and the mutual awareness of roles. Trust can be developed with regular meetings and exercises to practice working together, so that coordination and possible friction can be resolved more readily during the stressed periods of initial response. Conversely a lack of understanding between agencies may compound emergency response efforts.

Emergency management studies rarely touch on Defence in response efforts despite embracing a whole of government ethos to disaster response efforts.

Analysis of military responses to major disasters proves insightful; common functions emerge across diverse conditions. In the aftermath to extreme weather conditions—ice storms in Canada,15 hailstorms in Sydney16 and bushfires in Victoria17—military participation was invaluable. Reconnaissance, intelligence gathering in hazardous environments (rapid impact assessments in emergency management terminology), analysis and reporting, improvised search, community liaison and planning are some of the examples of military skills used in emergency response. Major, mega or super events embrace many facets of emergency management. Just as for disaster response, preparatory joint training for major events enhances operational performance.18

Civilian libertarians and lawyers focus on the sensitive constitutional and political precedence of military deployments on the home front.19 They highlight the dangers of blurring police and military functions within Western democracies that might occur when the military supports the police. These authors suggest that the Australian public is uncomfortable with armed soldiers on the streets. The last occasion in which the ADF deployed armed soldiers on the streets within Australia was in response to the bombing outside the Sydney Hilton Hotel, site of a Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting in 1978. The ADF has exercised force within Australia only rarely in very specific instances since then.20 Personnel deployed on DACC operations have no more powers than do civilians, except on Defence land where they have powers to stop, search and arrest trespassers.21 Unlike members of the NSW Police Force or State Emergency Service, ADF members do not have authority to direct traffic or pedestrians. At a vehicle check point (not on Defence land) RRF soldiers have no powers to stop vehicles, searching them only in the presence and with the authority of civilian police.22

Civil libertarians pose the question: what events could precipitate armed deployment of ADF personnel within Australia? One might be a series of terrorist events causing a much higher domestic threat level. This possibility may have served to motivate establishing the RRF, given the specific mention of the cordon role in the Defence Minister’s 2003 press release. Over the last decade circumstances have not warranted the RRF deploying armed personnel or using force. Experience to date of course does not definitively predict future scenarios.

One of the reasons posed for deploying armed soldiers in the disaster response phase overseas is to prevent looting. Emergency management theory purports that media exaggerates the incidence of looting; in fact communities pull together to overcome adversity. Looting may be more likely in very low socio-economic areas, as was experienced after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, Louisiana, in 2005. The hurricane caused a high loss of life, widespread damage, broken levies and sustained residential flooding. Looting occurred in hardest hit poor communities with high crime rates and drug dependency.23 One might speculate on the circumstances that may arise after a disaster hit one of Australia’s remote or urban socio-economically poor communities and (for whatever reason) emergency response proved ineffectual in delivering aid. In the Australian context, and as an alternative to seeking DFACA, police are able to draw additional personnel from interstate as special constables, as occurred after the Victorian bushfires and the Queensland floods.

One of the reasons posed for deploying armed soldiers in the disaster response phase overseas is to prevent looting.

RRF Capabilites

With the knowledge of RRF deployments, and in the light of overseas experience, potential RRF capabilities could be:

Search – low risk, for explosive devices, weapons, contraband, missing persons.

  • Manpower for transport, setting up tents, catering labour and other logistical support, augmented by other Defence elements with the RRF providing manpower where appropriate.
  • Rapid impact assessment – in the response phase to a disaster, the RRF can survey the impact of a disaster and prepare intelligence reports in a timely manner using Army off-road vehicles (armoured vehicles if necessary) and radios. This capability is especially useful for rural and remote areas employing off-road and hazardous driving skills. Moreover there is a tendency in disaster response to focus on the impact to urban centres and towns overlooking farming properties and small rural settlements that could be accessed by military vehicles in the first hours of response. Army training lends itself to this task, but it is not covered within RRF courses.
  • Community engagement – as occurred in the 2009 Victorian bushfires, the RRF can establish and maintain small outposts ‘24-7’ in affected disaster areas to engage with the local community, gather information and provide a reassuring presence to locals among the destruction.
  • Evacuation assistance – early warning via door knocks, accessing remote localities.
  • Planning assistance – Army’s Military Appreciation Process discipline and training gives key personnel the ability to assist emergency services in planning complex short notice tasks.

Where to Now?

Will the RRF continue to be deployed at the current rate and in what kinds of roles? Recent history and emerging emergency management trends provide some clues. Causal factors can be explained under the following headings:

Domestic Event Support

Across the globe nations aggressively compete to win the right to host major and mega events to boost tourism and economies. The NSW government24 clearly aims to attract events to the ‘Premier State’ while other Australian states and cities compete to attract major events. During the period 1956–2000, the ADF supported four DESO at the rate of one per eleven years.25 Since 2001, the ADF has supported no less than six events or one every 18 months.26 Sporting, religious and political events offer both risks and rewards to host nations.27 A successful event showcases a city as a place to attract tourists and conventions with flow-on benefits such as additional revenue and employment. Conversely, a poorly managed event has an unfavourable impact on reputation, tourism and the economy. Mega-events can precipitate contingencies, generating consequence and response management roles, some of which the RRF may be called upon to perform, particularly if they are already in situ and at heightened readiness levels. Mega-events may attract a range of threats:

  • Threats to VIPs, both physical attack and harming the dignitary’s dignity through embarrassment and unfavourable media
  • Threats against event attendees and members of the public
  • Threats to the successful conduct of the event by way of disruption
  • Demonstrations and public order incidents
  • Crowd crush
  • Public transport disruption
  • Disruption to the non event attending public
  • Damage to the reputation or embarrassment of those personnel in uniform, whether they are police or Defence28
  • A range of potential contingencies, identified and unidentified

Mega-events present both specified and implied tasks for the supporting military force. Specified tasks are normally identified in the initial request agreement for the establishment of a joint task force, and documented in a Memorandum of Understanding. For the RRF search tasks have predominated, fitting within the DACC ambit, requiring no additional legal powers or use of force, and freeing up stretched police resources. Mega-events are deliberate and well planned with military personnel on location on a high degree of readiness. An implicit expectation exists for the ADF to assist, if during the event, a contingency occurred. A prudent commander would plan ahead in order to identify those possible contingencies, possible new RRF short notice tasks, and conduct relevant preparatory training accordingly. The Military Appreciation Process (MAP), including risk management techniques, helps to identify ‘worst case’ scenarios and possible new tasks. Given that deployed RRF soldiers are physically located close to the event at high readiness levels and with situational awareness, political leaders and the public may well expect a prompt and professional military response to a range of contingencies. New tasks might be categorised as either more of the same or new, ‘be prepared to’ tasks. More of the same might be additional police search tasks. New search tasks might involve preparatory site specific occupational health and safety risk mitigation, for example the search of underground rail tunnels or to conduct magnometer and bag searches of individual event attendees. In a heightened threat environment, event volunteers may stop attending and the RRF may be called upon to perform some key roles.29

Mega-events can precipitate contingencies, generating consequence and response management roles, some of which the RRF may be called upon to perform ...

Natural Disaster Response

Natural disasters appear to be increasing in their frequency and impact, as does ADF involvement in their response phase. Climate change is forecast to increase the incidence of extreme weather events over time. Flow-on effects may be water shortages, greater health problems including disease contagion, flooding, coastal erosion and storm surge.30 Extreme weather events such as hailstorms,31 floods and cyclones may occur in places where they have not previously occurred. Population growth and housing sprawl into bushfire and flood prone areas and fragile coastal developments increases the level of exposure to such events.

The RRF may be required to assist in a major natural disaster response, tasked at short notice to complement civilian combat agencies, particularly in states with a limited full-time Army presence. The degree of warning and preparation time for natural disaster response varies depending on the nature of the emergency. Weather reports forecast approaching cyclones and heavy rain precursors flooding, whereas earthquakes and tsunamis occur without presentiment. Nonetheless the RRF is not the Army’s SES’. State governments compliment full time (police, fire and ambulance) emergency combat agencies with large and well-equipped volunteer organisations. For example, in NSW the Rural Fire Service has 70,000 members across 2100 brigades, while the State Emergency Service has 10,000 volunteers across 226 units. Under DACC local ADF commanders may provide assistance for up to 24 hours without seeking approval from higher authority. Local ADF base commanders in regional areas may consider it necessary to commit personnel and equipment to assist the local community in times of crisis in order to protect Defence’s reputation in the local community. In 2010, Army personnel from Puckapunyal were deployed to assist in flood preparations, subsequently to be replaced by members of Victoria’s 4th Brigade RRF personnel. RRF may be called to backfill Regular personnel in regional areas. One might question the RRF’s ability to significantly contribute capability to the efforts of civilian emergency service combat agencies, given their broad extant capabilities. For example, sand bagging is an unskilled task that RRF soldiers can perform, and for which Defence can receive due recognition for assistance from the local community. However sand bagging could be equally performed using purpose built equipment or by able-bodied members of the local community, whereas the RRF has other, more unique skills to offer in an emergency environment.

The RRF may be required to assist in a major natural disaster response, tasked at short notice to complement civilian combat agencies ...

Urban Expansion

Since the Second World War Australia’s steady population growth has expanded into bush land and farming areas exposing residents to new threats. Some newly urbanised areas are more vulnerable to natural disaster; for example, the communities north-east of Melbourne surrounded by bush and destroyed by the Victorian bushfires of 2009, or the new suburbs west of Brisbane affected by the 2011 floods.

Infrastructure Failure

In recent decades our increasing embrace of technology accelerated demands for supporting infrastructure. Computers, communications devices, air conditioners and a growing number of household and office appliances generate heat and consume energy. Information systems and utilities are vulnerable to human or natural disruption and failure. State governments, particularly in the more eastern populous states, were criticised for investing inadequate funds on infrastructure development and maintenance, especially road and rail. Interdependence of systems means a collapse by one can precipitate multiple systems failures.32 Climate change, growing dependence on technology, government neglect of infrastructure funding, and the interdependence on these human systems raises the potential incidence of major disasters.

Terrorist Action

Threat of terrorist attack on Australian soil remains extant. A recent example is the 2010 conviction of ‘home grown’ terrorists intending to attack Sydney’s Holsworthy Barracks. RRF personnel deployed on Defence land have additional legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 to stop, search, seize and detain. If an attack were to occur then the RRF may be tasked to search or provide a preventive presence on Defence land and civilian infrastructure or iconic structures, and may be armed under DFACA arrangements.

RRF personnel deployed on Defence land have additional legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 to stop, search, seize and detain.

Public Expectations

Australian society’s expectations about emergency support service levels are increasing. If a major disaster were to occur the public presumes a comprehensive government response. The public expects emergency services to respond quickly when needed without much consideration of the cost or degree of difficulty in doing so. Media will expose any perceived failings with consequent damage to the Service’s public reputation.33 Australians perceive Defence as a professional organisation; regardless of the scenarios faced, Australians expect Defence to act professionally and get the job done. However, the public has little understanding of the legal relationships between the states and the Commonwealth.

Government Willingness to Deploy the ADF

Concurrent with a perceived rise in the domestic terrorist threat post 11 September 2001 was an increasing incidence of ADF involvement in natural disaster response, both domestically34 and overseas.35 Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 and its aftermath reinforced political leaders’ desire to be recognised acting decisively and expeditiously after a natural disaster. President George W Bush was heavily criticised for the federal government’s poor response to Katrina and his own actions. Initially he flew over flooded New Orleans in his Air Force One aircraft, rather than landing to inspect personally. He praised Michael Brown, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and a Bush appointee with very limited emergency management experience, only to accept his resignation two weeks later. Post Hurricane Katrina, Australian political leaders demonstrated little hesitation to commit Defence assets in disaster response in recent years.36 Witness Prime Minister John Howard’s visit to north Queensland after cyclone Larry in 2006 and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s visit to the victims on the Sunday following the Victorian bushfires of Black Saturday in 2009.

Risk Mitigation

Over the last ten years Australia’s workplace occupational health and safety legislation was standardised in federal law. The ADF along with other government agencies and private enterprise ramped up their occupational health and safety processes. Training in risk management to identify risks, worst case scenarios, and means to mitigate risks are now commonplace. One consequence of such planning is a greater recognition of dangerous scenarios for event organisers. Identifying new dangers generates more work to militate against them, engendering more potential RRF tasks. The RRF was tasked to assist the Victoria Police in a search for deceased persons in the devastated bush fire areas in 2009, several weeks after the event, in order to ensure that all human remains were recovered. Media presence at disasters and mega events can be pervasive; any transgression by personnel in uniform may appear on the Internet and newspapers. Media propensity to publicise any peccadillo, no matter how trivial, with consequent potential reputation damage, influences commanders to adopt a cautionary approach to operational planning.

Training in risk management to identify risks, worst case scenarios, and means to mitigate risks are now commonplace.

Sound Track Record

Police and other emergency services perceived that the ADF performed to a high standard on domestic operations in recent years, as evidenced by their repeated invitations by government at several levels. ADF DACC attracts favourable public, government and media support, enhancing Defence’s reputations.

The above analysis supports the existence of an ongoing demand for the RRF in the future, particularly in the DACC space.

Multiagency RRF Training

What types of training should the RRF conduct to be best prepared for future operations? RRF training includes both individual and collective training. After an initial qualification course each brigade RRF exercises annually. This article focuses on a particularly important skill for the RRF, namely the ability to coordinate effectively in a multiagency environment. DACC and DFACA training, like stabilisation operations, involve coordination with the emergency services, other government and non-government agencies. Specialist niche capabilities need to be deployed effectively in a harmonious and timely manner with other specialist emergency services. Conventional military training focuses on command, control and planning, with less regard for coordination with third parties. A potential for friction exists between army and civilian emergency service commanders; military commanders are trained to take charge, whereas coordination is primarily emphasised among emergency response agencies. For the ADF (including the RRF) to work effectively, emergency services incident commanders and RRF commanders need to be aware of each others’ standing operational procedures and modes of operations. This all takes practice and is best learned in an exercise environment rather than the pressure cooker atmosphere of an emergency response.

Exemplifying the value of practicing coordination among agencies are the regularly held Special Forces exercises with state and territory police. The Munich Olympic Games terrorist incident in 1972 and the 1978 Sydney Hilton Hotel bombing served as a catalyst for the federal government to establish a domestic military counter-terrorist response capability. Special Forces rehearse and refine arrangements for the deployment of personnel in a hostage siege or other counter-terrorist action regularly with civilian police forces in each jurisdiction. Well-practiced training regimes exist with civilian police to practice and build learning around the most effective counterterrorist response.

Special Forces rehearse and refine arrangements for the deployment of personnel in a hostage siege or other counter-terrorist action ...

When RRF trained soldiers were deployed on three DESO, extensive mission specific training was conducted prior to each event in order to prepare them for the activity. DESO usually offer a lengthy degree of military planning (6–12 months) during which training and preparations can occur. In preparation for planned operations (Commonwealth Games, APEC, World Youth Day) mission specific training and a mission rehearsal exercise took place. Other than in preparing for these DESO, RRF training largely occurs in isolation. Commanders rarely practiced coordination with other agencies, which may not participate and are represented by Army role-players.

The lead agency for emergency management doctrine in Australia, Emergency Management Australia, reinforces the desirability of joint training. It embraces four concepts of emergency management:

  • The all hazards approach
  • The comprehensive approach
  • The all agencies approach
  • The prepared community37

The first three of these tenets support the conduct of joint RRF/emergency service training. The all hazards approach proposes that emergency services should train for a variety of scenarios, not just for one type; for example, a terrorist response. Moreover, hazards include both physical hazards, as discussed earlier, and also technological hazards. In an increasingly technologically complex and interdependent society an extended power failure can threaten life and a volcano spewing ash can disrupt airline flights globally. As the name ‘Reserve Response Force’ indicates, the RRF was intended to be employed in response to an emergency or terrorist incident. If it is to be ready for the response phase it should train in the preparation phase. The all agencies approach involves an active partnership between all levels of government. Under Australia’s federal constitution the states hold primacy for the protection and preservation of lives and property, while the Commonwealth provides guidance and physical assistance to a requesting state or territory when an emergency requires assistance beyond its response capabilities. The all agencies approach emphasises the multidisciplinary and multiagency nature of response management. An oil spill in Sydney Harbour may involve twenty or more agencies working in a coordinated effort. To operate effectively the RRF needs to exercise in a multiagency environment.

RRF and Police Joint Training in NSW

Joint training encompasses a broad spectrum of activities from desktop exercises through to field exercises. By way of example, two joint training activities at each end of this range were conducted in NSW in 2009 and 2010. Based on relationships built on Operations DELUGE and TESTAMENT, members of the NSW Police Force developed an understanding of the RRF’s capabilities and a willingness to build joint understanding. The two activities were:

  • A desktop activity involving NSW Police Force and the 8th Brigade RRF in December 2009
  • Exercise STEEL GUARD, a field exercise involving NSW Police Force, 5th Brigade RRF and civilian stakeholders in October 2010

Joint training encompasses a broad spectrum of activities from desktop exercises through to field exercises.

Desktop Exercise

Within the NSW Police Force the Major Events and Incidents Group is responsible for the conduct of planning for scheduled large events and response to short notice major incidents. During recent major events (APEC and World Youth Day) the NSW Police Force was exposed to the RRF through its low risk search capability. The NSW Police Force is also relevant to emergency response through its responsibilities under the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act, 1989. A range of exercise options was considered, as presented in the handbook of the NSW State Emergency Management Committee.38 It was agreed that a one-day workshop would be conducted to improve the combined understanding of the response capabilities of the RRF and civilian emergency services during operations. The principal challenge identified for developing interoperability between the NSW Police Force and RRF lay not with the soldiers or junior leaders but with RFF commanders. This view was based on the experience during the conduct of support to the NSW Police Force for APEC and World Youth Day. After consultation with a number of parties to achieve a shared understanding of capability, it was agreed to conduct a number of presentations followed by three discussion exercises.

Three scenarios tested a number of scenarios:

  • Major planned event – Sydney hosts a G20 heads of government meeting
  • Disaster response – earthquake in a NSW town, no warning
  • Pandemic outbreak – while responding to the earthquake, a highly contagious, non-lethal pandemic breaks out.39

Exercise Steel Guard

RRF commanders need skills in liaison and coordination with emergency services, and public and private agencies. Rather than Army recreate or role play other stakeholders, a plan emerged to ‘bolt on’ an RRF exercise to an existing police security operation and a major civilian event, namely the 2010 Breakfast on the Bridge event, held on 10 October 2010. Billed as a tourist promotion for Sydney, it involved closing the Sydney Harbour Bridge and laying down real grass for 6000 people to have breakfast on the bridge deck. The NSW Police Force, the Roads and Traffic Authority and the NSW government invited Army’s 5th Brigade RRF to perform a low risk search of the bridge the evening prior. The bridge is an iconic landmark, vital road and rail link, and on the day a potential mass causality target. Subject matter experts from each agency jointly developed components of the plan together, for example search, media, risk/occupational health and safety, logistics and traffic. Working at heights with high perceived risk challenged the RRF operators in what is an inherently repetitive task of searching. While the RRF was deployed on the bridge the NSW Police Force established a command post at the Sydney Police Operations Centre. The NSW Police Force and RRF personnel conducted a desktop exercise at the Police Operations Centre, discussing how the RRF and the NSW Police Force would react to a range of ‘what if’ scenarios. Harbour Bridge staff also benefited from the chance to interoperate with the RRF.

RRF commanders need skills in liaison and coordination with emergency services, and public and private agencies.

Lessons Learnt

Key findings from both activities were:

  • Up until that time RRF training in NSW was generally conducted in isolation to the emergency services. Opportunities should be considered to train as part of a joint exercise or public event, thereby engendering a greater degree of realism for participants, particularly facilitating interaction with external agencies.
  • The RRF can be used as a capability enhancement for the NSW Police Force. By tasking the RRF to conduct low risk search, a task requiring no additional legal powers, police resources are freed to conduct other tasks. In NSW the Public Order and Riot Squad has primary responsibility for low risk search. Riot squad personnel who would be otherwise conducting search can be employed in high visibility policing, crowd control and other duties during major events or disaster response.
  • Jargon can be a barrier; presenters need to be cognisant of acronyms and terminology that are not understood by all involved, Army being the principal offender. Ideally a common language and nomenclature would enhance interoperability.
  • Simply meeting each other in the workshops was helpful in building trust and enhancing working relationships. As the adage says ‘...when you need a friend it’s too late to make one’.
  • Cost savings may be achieved through joint training; for example, reducing the number of role-players and sharing expenses in the preparation of exercises.
  • Joint training widens the scope for suitable venues, both Defence and NSW Police Force facilities and areas. Contacts of both organisations can also be exploited and shared.
  • RRF commanders practice coordination among the RRF and emergency service agencies while conducting command and control internally.
  • Risk management outcomes are enhanced by involving organisation subject matter experts, rather than developing plans in isolation.40 Without joint training the potential exists for mission failure and/or embarrassment to members in uniform and consequent damage to the reputation of respective organisations.
  • Emergency services’ understanding of the RRF within the DACC arrangement in NSW is limited. Through a failure to explain the RRF, Army’s motives can be unwittingly misconstrued. Emergency services may think that Army seeks to take over, threatening civilian emergency service roles and jobs. The 1999 Sydney hailstorm response exhibited that friction may arise among emergency combat agencies and with Defence.41 A deduction is that the ADF needs to make clear its intentions for the RRF’s role in DACC in the future, and joint training is one means.
  • The RRF is not embedded within the NSW Disaster Response Plan. Its presence during emergencies is problematic, depending on circumstances. Unlike other emergency agencies, standing operational procedures for the RRF to support civilian combat agencies are not in place. Joint exercises are one way to explain the RRF’s capability to emergency services.
  • When deployed supporting a major event, emergency services and the public may have a higher expectation for RRF response to an incident, given their proximity on hand and high readiness state. Appropriate planning needs to occur to prepare for possible worst case scenarios and subsequent possible RRF tasks.
  • RRF road transport, including the choice of vehicle raised several issues. While Army all-wheel vehicles excel in hazardous off-road rural conditions, in urban areas limitations arise: poor turning circles, seat belts only in the driver’s cabin, and no roll over protection for personnel in the rear of the vehicles. Emergency service vehicles are fitted with emergency lights and sirens, RRF vehicles are not. While some RRF soldiers will have local knowledge, many will not. Drivers and navigators of military vehicles can struggle to move in convoys in busy city traffic, with motorways, tunnels and unforgiving on/off ramps. Mega-event special event road closures and clearways are not depicted on GPS systems, if available to Army drivers. If RRF personnel were required to move quickly in heavy traffic in an emergency they would require a police escort. Media is usually well represented at major events and disaster sites. Clearly identifiable as Army vehicles, if they are involved in a vehicle accident or take a wrong turn they become targets for unfavourable media coverage, possibly harming the ADF’s reputation.42 These factors convinced commanders to compliment the Army ‘green fleet’ vehicles with civilian style mini-buses in which to transport personnel during the last two DESO in Sydney.
  • The ‘nightmare’ desktop scenario was a pandemic outbreak on the site of a country town with stretched emergency services responding to an earthquake. Discussion revolved around use of the RRF to man checkpoints and provide early warning of vehicle and personnel movement in that scenario. The RRF could man roadblocks in a DACC environment providing a police officer was present to provide legal powers and deal with non-compliant civilians. Additional legal powers under DFACA are required to stop, search or detain members of the public without police presence outside Defence land.

When deployed supporting a major event, emergency services and the public may have a higher expectation for RRF response ...

Recommendations

Identify tasks suited to the RRF, based on agreed threats, likely scenarios and capabilities.

  • Conduct joint training in order to build understanding, practice coordination skills and better understand each others’ capabilities and standard operating procedures.
  • Develop training wherever possible to be conducted as part of real events in order to maximise realism, challenge participants and provide opportunities for agency interaction.
  • Develop joint training programs, consulting with key stakeholders, recognising the long lead times necessary to suit Army Reserve training schedules.
  • Design training that conforms to the best practices for emergency management as prescribed by Emergency Management Australia.
  • Build on small steps through an agreed strategy progressing forward.
  • Exploit the strengths of each organisation, not their weaknesses.
  • Review the RRF operator and commander course in light of the above findings.
  • Compliment RRF training with selected Emergency Management Australia courses.
  • Appoint a liaison officer from each brigade to their relevant state emergency services.
  • Provide liaison officer training.

Conclusion

Established but never deployed as the Army Reserve component in an ADF response to domestic terrorist threat, the RRF found an operational niche providing public safety capabilities at major events and disaster response. A variety of casual factors point to a continuing demand for DACC with the RRF well-suited to provide that support to the states. Multiagency training with emergency services enhances RRF’s skills, and engenders understanding of its niche role. Ongoing joint training, liaison and relationship building should occur so that, when called upon in the cauldron of emergency response, the RRF can coordinate effectively with other agencies, and bring credit to the ADF.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Woodward is an Army Reserve officer in the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. Prior to his current posting as Commanding Officer, 2/17 RNSWR he was J7 (Training) and Liaison Officer to the New South Wales Police Force for Joint Task Force Operations DELUGE and TESTAMENT.

Endnotes

1     Originally the Army Reserve’s 1st Commando Regiment was included in the RRF construct but was later removed, leaving 2nd Division’s six brigades to each raise/train/sustain an RRF company group.

2     Sections 51A, 51B and 51C of the Defence Act, 1903, allow for the use of the ADF to provide aid to the civilian authorities under certain circumstances.

3     High risk search tasks are undertaken by Royal Australian Engineers. Underwater search and render safe can be performed by Navy Clearance Divers.

4     The Army’s full time 1st Division has three brigades: 1st Brigade – Darwin, 3rd Brigade – Townsville, and 7th Brigade – Brisbane.

5     Afghanistan, Gulf War II, Iraq, East Timor and the Solomon Islands.

6     Operation GOLD, (the ADF support to the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games).

7     Australians were attacked overseas on several occasions during this period, namely the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, the 2004 Jakarta Australian Embassy bombing and the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings.

8     2006 Operation ACOLYTE, (Commonwealth Games, Melbourne, VIC); 2007 Operation DELUGE, (APEC, Sydney, NSW); and 2008 Operation TESTAMENT (World Youth Day and the visit of Pope Benedict XVI, Sydney, NSW).

9     Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST, February 2009; Operation QLD FLOOD ASSIST; Operation VIC FLOOD ASSIST.

10    A short article on the RRF is J Baker, ‘Involving the Army Reserve in Terrorist Incident Response’, Australian Infantry Magazine, 2003, pp. 25–27.

11    A Bergin, A safer Australia: Meeting the challenges of homeland security, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Special Report, 2009; A Smith and A Bergin, Australian domestic security: the role of Defence, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2006; and A Yates. and A Bergin, Strengthening the Defence role in Australian disaster management, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010.

12    A journal article covering the topic is W N Carter, ‘Military Forces in the Counter-disaster role’ in Disaster management; a disaster manager’s handbook, ADB, Manilla, 1991.

13    Australian Emergency Management Manuals Series, Part 1: The Fundamentals., Department of Defence, Canberra, 2001.

14    Exercise Management Course Workbook, NSW State Emergency Management Committee, Sydney, 2002.

15    J Scanlon, ‘The problem - finding the problem: Canada’s ice disaster lessons for Y2K’, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1999, pp. 20–24.

16    C Keys, ‘The response to the “mother of all storms”: a combat agency view’, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1999–2000, pp. 10–15.

17    2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission-Interim Report, Commonwealth Response, 2009, pp. 278–88.

18    D Greenwell, ‘Managing security at major international events’, Intersec, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2005, pp. 117–20; and C Bellavitta, ‘Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Security’, Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2009, pp. 2–16.

19    For example, M Head, ‘Domestic violence and calling out the troops’ in Calling out the troops, Federation Press, Sydney, 2009; and J McCulloch, ‘Calling out the Troops’ in Blue Army, Melbourne University Press, 2001, pp. 53–67.

20    Special Forces were deployed to board and secure the North Korean cargo ship Pong Su off the coast of NSW in 2003. During Operation DELUGE in 2007 the RAAF deployed FA-18 fighter aircraft to intercept a small aircraft flying into an air exclusion zone. The aircraft failed to acknowledge radio messages and the FA-18 fired flares in order to attract the pilot’s attention, upon which the aircraft was directed to land at a local airport.

21    Defence Act, 1903.

22    Unlike the US National Guard which regularly deploys armed on domestic support operations and can be sworn in as state troopers when under direction of their state governor.

23    J Handmer, ‘American exceptionalism or universal lesson? The implications of Hurricane Katrina for Australia’, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2006, p. 32.

24    Events NSW is a NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet agency, with a three-year budget of $85 million to attract major events to NSW. ‘Iemma announces $85 million Major Events Corporation, John O’Neill appointed interim chair’ Press release, 25 June 2007, Events NSW website, <http://www.eentsnsw.com.au/home.aspx&gt;

25    Melbourne 1956 Olympic Games; Brisbane 1982 Commonwealth Games; Brisbane Expo 1988; Operation GOLD, Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Smith and Bergin, Australian domestic security: the role of Defence, p. 10.

26    Operation GUARDIAN, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Sunshine Coast QLD, 2002; Operation SCRUMMAGE, Rugby World Cup, 2003; Operation MIATA, visit by US President Bush and Chinese President Hu, 2003; Operation ACOLYTE, Commonwealth Games, 2006; Operation DELUGE, APEC Sydney 2007; and Operation TESTAMENT, World Youth Day, 2008.

27    Australia hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) meeting in Perth, WA in October 2011. The Australian government supported an unsuccessful national bid to win the hosting rights to the 2022 Football World Cup. Australia may seek to host a meeting of the G20.

28    In 2007 the ABC TV’s comedy program ‘The Chaser’ drew wide media attention when a mock motorcade penetrated an APEC roadblock, embarrassing the NSW Police Force and the state government.

29    By way of example, a series of terrorist incidents occurred leading up to the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, and on the opening night of the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, a bomb exploded in an Atlanta park killing one person and injuring 111 people.

30    W Steffen, Climate Change 2009: Faster Change and More Serious Risks, Department of Climate Change, Canberra, 2009; and A Yates and A Bergin, Strengthening the Defence role in Australian disaster management, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2010.

31    The 1999 Sydney hailstorm was Australia’s most expensive natural disaster at that time in terms of insurance claims, and Reserve personnel assisted in emergency roof repairs in Sydney. Keys, ‘The response to the “mother of all storms”: a combat agency view’.

32    Sydney’s rail system, exemplifies a complex system in which a collapse in one part may lead to widespread failure. A stoppage in the central underground will quickly disrupt the whole system, as most lines travel through it.

33    Witness the media’s criticism of perceived slow Navy response to rescue passengers of a vessel breaking apart at Christmas Island in December 2010.

34    For example, Operation LARRY ASSIST 2006, cyclone, Innisfail, QLD.

35    For example Operation BALI ASSIST 2002, Bali bombings; Operation SUMATRA ASSIST 2004-05, Boxing Day tsunami; Operation PAKISTAN ASSIST, earthquake; Dhanmi, Pakistan; and Operation PAPUA NEW GUINEA ASSIST 2007, floods, Oro, northern province, PNG.

36    For an Australian perspective on Hurricane Katrina see Handmer, American exceptionalism or universal lesson?’

37    Australian Emergency Management Manuals Series, Part 1, The Fundamentals.

38    NSW State Emergency Management Committee, p. 30.

39    A number of animal and human pandemics have attracted media coverage and government response in recent years, including Asian bird flu, horse flu and swine flu.

40    For example, while RRF personnel search the edges of piers and wharves, a water police vessel is deployed in case a soldier falls in to the harbour.

41    Interagency rivalry can occur, as evidenced by the Sydney hail storms response in 1999 when the NSW government replaced the SES with the NSW Fire Services Commissioner as the overall authority for the response effort, amidst radio talk back commentators calling for Army involvement to increase. Keys, ‘The response to the “mother of all storms”: a combat agency view’

42    During APEC in 2007, a RAAF truck damaged a historical park gate at North Head in Sydney. Owing to its camouflage appearance the tabloid media apportioned blame to Army.

Latest Land Power Forum