Living in the Twilight Zone: Advising the Afghan National Army at the Corps Level
Abstract
Advisers working with the Afghan 205th Corps operate in a ‘twilight zone’ as they attempt to bridge the cultural and institutional gaps between the Afghans and their ISAF partners. Like the rest of the Afghan National Army, the Corps is grappling with numerous institutional development challenges while simultaneously fighting a difficult counterinsurgency war. Determining what might constitute ‘Afghan okay’, and how they can assist their Afghan colleagues to arrive at this state, demands considerable adaptability. This article discusses this advisory experience and considers its wider relevance, particularly as the campaign in Afghanistan enters a new phase.
‘Cling tight to your sense of humour. You will need it everyday.’
- Lawrence of Arabia, The 27 Articles1
Introduction
The Australian Army has a long history of providing advisers to foreign armies. Examples include the personnel who served with Dunsterforce in Persia in 1918, the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam and, more recently, the various Mentoring Task Forces (MTFs) in Uruzgan Province. Since 2010 Australia has also provided individual advisers to the 205th Afghan National Army (ANA) Atal (Hero) Corps. With the recent withdrawal of the Canadians from southern Afghanistan, and the refocus of British efforts on Helmand Province, Australia now provides half of the twenty-person 205th Corps Coalition Advisory Team (205 CAT). Like the MTF, who focus on developing the ANA’s 4th Brigade, 205 CAT is focused on the development of ANA capacity, but at the corps level (equivalent to a Western division). While there are undoubtedly many common ‘adviser’ experiences, operating at this level provides some different perspectives that are worth considering. This is particularly true as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) seeks to drawdown in Afghanistan and transition lead responsibility for security operations to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by 2014. The aim of this article is to discuss the experience of advising the 205th Corps, highlight the associated challenges and consider their relevance to the future.
Overview of 205 CAT
205 CAT’s organisation and employment was theoretically governed by the ISAF CONOPs for Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs).2 The reality was that this higher-level direction provided only a very basic foundation for the conduct of daily tasks on the ground. 205 CAT’s mission was to:
...provide advice, assistance, and training to Headquarters 205th Corps and promote close partnership with Headquarters Regional Command South (RC-S), in order to contribute to a self-sufficient, well led and competent ANA capable of independent operations by 2014.
205 CAT’s name and composition have varied significantly since its original formation, which is believed to have occurred in approximately 2006. By mid-2011 the team had transitioned from a multinational organisation, consisting of Dutch, British, Canadian and Australian personnel, to an Australian/US only organisation (and one lone Canadian lawyer). This twenty-person team, commanded by an Australian colonel, provided advisers to the majority of the key ANA staff on the Corps’ headquarters. In some cases, positions such as the Deputy Commander Civil Affairs and the Religious and Cultural Affairs Chief had to be covered by enthusiastic generalists. 205 CAT was based adjacent to Camp Hero, which houses the Corps’ headquarters and a number of related units and formations, and is located close to the ISAF Kandahar Airbase. OMLTs are assigned operational control to Commander ISAF and delegated tactical command to the regional commands. In theory, OMLTs operating below the corps/divisional level are supposed to report to their relevant regional commands through the Corps OMLT. In practice the 205th Corps’ brigade level OMLTs, manned by Australian, Canadian and US personnel, reported through the partner force (ISAF taskforce) chain of command. 205 CAT did not exercise any formal authority over any of the other OMLTs operating with 205th Corps units. Liaison with these other organisations was relatively frequent but informal.
It is worth noting that the terms ‘partnering’, ‘advising’ and ‘mentoring’ tend to be used interchangeably by many ISAF personnel, despite the fact that they really describe very different ways of interacting with the ANSF. In simple terms, ‘partnering’ occurs between like organisations, or equivalent personnel, and involves the conduct of combined activities. Thus Commander RC-S and Commander 205th Corps and their respective headquarters are partners. Advisers are embedded into ANSF units and support the development of these organisations. A critical part of their work is facilitating the partnership links. The term ‘mentor’ is often used as a synonym for ‘adviser’. Members of 205 CAT preferred to avoid describing themselves as mentors, which implies a relationship between someone with great insight and a less experienced learner. As many of the Headquarters 205th Corps’ officers had extensive military experience, and certainly knew more about Afghanistan and the ANA than members of 205 CAT, this seemed a sensible approach. ‘Mentoring’ is perhaps better considered as an activity that can be conducted by partners, advisers and their Afghan colleagues, where previous experiences place particular people in a position to impart their knowledge in a relevant way.
It is worth noting that the terms ‘partnering’, ‘advising’ and ‘mentoring’ tend to be used interchangeably by many ISAF personnel ...
Overview of 205th CORPS
The 205th Corps’ area of operations extends across the southern provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan and Daykundi. The areas immediately surrounding Kandahar City are the primary focus of the ANA’s efforts.3 The Corps’ primary formations are its four rifle brigades, each comprising four rifle battalions (kandaks), a combat support kandak and a combat services support kandak. Increasingly a number of corps level independent units and sub-units are being added to provide enabling capabilities. ‘Divisional’ manoeuvre, as taught at Western staff colleges, was not a regular feature of the Corps headquarters’ work. A small tactical command post did deploy into the field in the latter half of 2010 in support of Operation HAMKARI.4 In essence, however, most of the staff’s attention was focused on force generation and institutional development activities. Operational planning was largely conducted at the brigade and kandak levels, which was appropriate given the small unit nature of the counterinsurgency operations being conducted in the south. There were certainly more than enough ‘raise, train and sustain’ challenges to keep the staff fully employed, but it should be noted that this focus was significantly different to that of the partner headquarters.
Operational planning was largely conducted at the brigade and kandak levels, which was appropriate given the small unit nature of the counterinsurgency ...
The staff of the 205th Corps’ headquarters had diverse backgrounds. They were drawn roughly from three distinct professional sources. Many of the senior officers had served in the military forces of the former Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Many struggled to survive during the Taliban era and were forced to either flee the country or adopt very low public profiles. Soviet influence on their training and exposure to the Red Army remains considerable and permeates many aspects of their institutional culture. Another group, albeit considerably smaller, consisted of ex-Mujahideen fighters. Many lacked formal staff training but this was, to an extent, compensated by their sometimes stronger local knowledge and connections. It was probably more typical to find ex-Mujahideen officers in lower level command and staff appointments. Understandably, the potential for friction between these two particular groups remains considerable. The last distinct group were those officers and senior non-commissioned officers (SNCOs) with no military experience prior to 2001. This group has been influenced greatly by its exposure to ISAF, particularly US, training. By necessity most within this group tend to be more junior in rank, although it should be noted that many of the Corps’ highest-ranking SNCOs originated from this source. Not all within this last cohort have earned their positions based solely on their military expertise—this is also true for all groups.
Despite the ANA’s desire to see itself as a truly national organisation there is no doubt that the ethnic origins and tribal affiliations of its personnel are a significant factor in its organisational politics. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) has formal policies mandating the required ethnic composition of its organisations to ensure they mirror wider Afghan society. This can, however, distort personnel management decisions in less than optimal ways. The accusation of ethnic and tribal favouritism was often one of the first responses employed by officers faced with undesired career management decisions. One wonders how well the Australian Army’s career management system would cope if all of its unpopular posting decisions were challenged on the basis of state bias. Given the raw ethnic and tribal undercurrents flowing through Afghan national life, this issue was particularly problematic. Different ethnic backgrounds also had an impact in other ways. The official language of the ANA is Dari, but not all Corps headquarters personnel spoke it to the same level of proficiency. Likewise, the regional language in the south is Pashtu, but not all ANA personnel are fluent in this language.
The accusation of ethnic and tribal favouritism was often one of the first responses employed by officers faced with undesired career management decisions.
The Corps’ activities were marked, ostensibly, by a highly centralised command and control system with distinct Soviet characteristics. Officially no action is undertaken without a formal written order (cipher) from the MoD. Likewise, subordinate formations will simply not act without written formal orders. The practical realities, in keeping with most aspects of life in Afghanistan, were not as simple. The MoD’s ciphers tended to be vague and open to wide interpretation. As such there were many opportunities for formations at all levels to ignore unwelcome guidance or delay its implementation. The absence of an appropriate cipher was also used to delay action where this was deemed to be advantageous. Likewise, the ‘Tashkiel’ (authorised manning table) was held to be sacrosanct and delays in official amendments were routinely used to explain why certain actions could or could not be taken. None of these things are completely foreign in Western armies but the way they affected the routine work of the headquarters was particularly marked. More importantly, the ability of the staff to randomly (or so it appeared) switch between seemingly slavish adherence to higher direction and ignoring it completely could be somewhat disconcerting.
The level of staff motivation, like all big headquarters, was uneven. Many of the more senior staff (lieutenant colonel and above) had served in some sort of military organisation, and on operations, for up to three decades. It was not uncommon to find officers who had served in 205th Corps, or southern Afghanistan more generally, for several consecutive years. Most served in the south unaccompanied by their families, reflecting the general security situation, the scarcity of married quarters and their family origins. There is a marked feeling that service in Kabul, particularly in the MoD, is both more comfortable and better for career advancement. Finally, many officers served below the rank they held during the Communist era. None of these factors make for a highly dynamic or motivated organisation, but of course there are always exceptions. Overall a posting to southern Afghanistan for an ANA officer seems to be about as attractive as a posting to the Eastern Front for a German officer during the Second World War.
It is all too easy to be critical of the ANA’s general performance, and this was no different for Headquarters 205th Corps. However, as a number of senior ISAF officers have noted, building a new army at the same time as fighting an utterly ruthless insurgency is no easy matter. Understanding the challenges that impede better progress is critical if relevant capacity building is to be supported. The high rate of illiteracy within the ANA was a background, but very significant, difficulty. Like most armies, the two areas that challenged the Corps headquarters most were personnel management and logistics. The potential morale issues noted above were also broadly applicable to the average frontline askars (Pashtu for soldiers). Unlike the staff at the Corps headquarters, however, their service in the south brought with it a much higher likelihood of being killed or wounded when compared to those in the north or west. ANA personnel were not well administered and basic problems such as unreliable pay and leave systems reflected this challenge. Combined with generally poor living conditions these fed the largest personnel difficulty: very high rates of absence without leave (AWOL). National recruiting and training efforts were being undermined by the constant leakage of personnel who deserted. The widespread availability of hashish was an additional problem.
Understanding the challenges that impede better progress is critical if relevant capacity building is to be supported.
Equally challenging for the Corps staff was overseeing a logistical system that nearly everyone, from the askar in the most remote outpost to the Corps Commander, completely mistrusted. The US designed ‘MOD 14’ system (supply request procedure) was not well understood by many, lacked transparency as requests proceeded up the chain of command and produced, at best, very inconsistent results. For example, even a simple request for the provision of furniture and computers for the Corps’ Tactical Operations Centre produced nothing for in excess of six months. Poor basic staff procedures, complacency, incompetence and corruption all served to make logistics harder than normal. This situation also inevitably affected the maintenance of equipment and vehicles—a constant source of complaints from the brigades. The poor quality of some of the foreign equipment being supplied to the ANA and the lack of indigenous tradesmen and specialists were also significant contributors. A source of many logistical problems was the ANA’s reliance on contractor support for an array of supply and maintenance services. Contract management is a weakness in most armies, and this is particularly true in Afghanistan. The majority of contracts were developed under ISAF auspices and even when these were turned over to the Corps to supervise, the associated details remained unclear. The difficulties encountered during the transition of vehicle maintenance contract arrangements during the first half of 2011 provided an excellent example. At times it was evident that ISAF contract negotiations were conducted in complete ignorance of the real requirements on the ground. This was also evident in the arrangements made for the development of longer-term infrastructure and facilities. The frustrations expressed by members of the Corps’ staff when faced with these issues were entirely reasonable.
At times it was evident that ISAF contract negotiations were conducted in complete ignorance of the real requirements on the ground.
Despite this litany of problems, the Corps was able to support the conduct of simple counterinsurgency operations by its subordinate formations. In the operational arena the headquarters proved adept at managing short-notice and short-term crises. The sense of urgency and commitment to action displayed in these situations were markedly different from the general headquarters’ approach to less urgent, but equally challenging issues. The Corps’ general success in reacting to a variety of short notice contingencies in Kandahar City, for example, was largely driven by the direct involvement of its key commanders and senior staff. While this was positive it also revealed a systemic weakness in the capability of the general staff system, which had little redundancy below the principal staff. Here inexperience, limited training and a military culture that does not generally encourage initiative and mission command, were severe limitations. It remains to be seen whether ISAF’s training influence will alter this situation, but it will probably take generational change to overcome long entrenched habits.
While the Corps was relatively good at ‘crash actions’, its operational and planning capabilities were particularly poor at addressing longer-term campaign and institutional development challenges. This again was shaped by limited staff depth and the more pressing problem of dealing with the ‘wolves closest to the sled’. One example was the Corps’ inability to consider the requirements involved in developing a force generation cycle which would enable and sustain its long-term development. The MoD had actually issued clear directions concerning the introduction of a red-yellow-green cycle (equating roughly to leave/administration, individual and collective training, and commitment to operations) but the conditions in southern Afghanistan were not conducive to its development.
In simple terms, the Corps is fully committed to operations but has insufficient redundancy to free formations, or even kandaks, to rotate through programmed leave and training periods. Furthermore, the management of such a system requires a relatively sophisticated staff capacity. However, some sort of force generation cycle will be critical to the Corps’ institutional health, particularly in the post 2014 period. The current AWOL problems and inability to complete training much beyond the individual level are symptoms of an underlying ailment that cannot be ignored forever.
ISAF’s drawdown over the next few years will only increase the difficulty of implementing such a system. This is one of those dreaded staff college ‘wicked problems’ that are challenging for even the most sophisticated and well-resourced armies.
The Challenges of Advising at the CORPS Level
There is little doubt that the general situation described above makes for a challenging environment for the adviser at the corps level. Maintaining one’s sense of humour is critical. Added to this is the requirement for large doses of tact, patience, humility and persistence. While it was possible for advisers within 205 CAT to work their way into a multitude of different roles, probably the most important was acting as the intermediary between 205th Corps and RC-S. In essence this critical role was all about facilitating the partnership between the two organisations. ISAF’s rather ad hoc development over the last decade has produced a military organisation of considerable complexity, which is difficult even for an officer trained in NATO standards to understand, let alone explain to his Afghan colleague. The conventional counterinsurgency paradigm is that the different strengths of the ANSF and ISAF are complementary.5 The ANA has better local situational and cultural awareness, better access to human intelligence sources and a better approach to information operations. On the other hand ISAF is able to provide sophisticated enablers, such as joint fires, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance platforms, medical evacuation assets, and, perhaps more importantly, access to material resources. ISAF officers and soldiers are also able to provide their Afghan partners with an example of contemporary command, staff, leadership and management procedures. This model was broadly valid but its underpinning assumptions needed to be constantly reviewed. For example, ANA personnel recruited from northern provinces could not necessarily speak the local language in the south, let alone empathise with villagers from different ethnic backgrounds.
Assisting in the maintenance of relations between Headquarters 205th Corps and Headquarters RC-S required careful management of their competing agendas and demands. Of these, the very different time horizons that drove the two headquarters were the most significant. Put simply, ISAF elements are generally deployed for 6–12 month operational tours and, even with the most enlightened leadership, inevitably focus on a fairly short timeframe. This is driven by their inevitable desire to produce tangible results during their tours. Conversely, the members of the Corps staff realised that their ISAF partners and advisers came and went with, what seemed to them, regular monotony. The constant influx of new enthusiastic colleagues with ‘good ideas’ could be a source of considerable frustration, particularly when the Afghans knew that they would be left to deal with the repercussions long after their partners had redeployed home. It is little wonder that many of the Afghan officers on the Corps staff were not always motivated to approach issues with the same sense of urgency as their ISAF counterparts. Ironically, it was the realm of long term planning for institutional development, the Corps’ real Achilles heel, which received the least attention from their partners.
The constant influx of new enthusiastic colleagues with ‘good ideas’ could be a source of considerable frustration ...
A related aspect of this different time appreciation was the incompatible staff cycles that could be generated and maintained by the respective headquarters. Not only was Headquarters RC-S compelled to operate at a higher tempo by both the ISAF chain of command and its own basic nature, its large, well trained and technology enabled staff branches enabled it to do so. The respective staff branches within 205th Corps simply could not keep up the same tempo. For example, the Corps’ planning capability consisted of a G5 branch manned by a lieutenant colonel and a very small number of majors. RC-S maintained large CJ5 and CJ35 branches, which meant that simultaneous ‘partnered’ planning was impractical. The inevitable time frictions involved with collaborative activities, of which the simple act of translating specialist military language was only one difficulty, also made practical partnering between staff branches frustratingly slow. On occasions this led RC-S staff to engage in fairly superficial consultation and subsequently to attempt to camouflage this with various acts of tokenism. This situation was not aided by the practical difficulties of sharing any sort of information between the two organisations caused by security restrictions, incompatible information systems and, most importantly, the lack of suitable translators.
There were numerous other pitfalls that could hinder 205 CAT’s members in ‘building the bridge’ between the Corps and RC-S. It should be noted that RC-S also had partner responsibilities with numerous other ANSF organisations—primarily the Afghan National Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police and the National Directorate of Security. Practically there was only so much time and energy that could be provided to each. This was particularly true given higher-level strategic direction to change the main effort for partnering to the Afghan National Police. Sometimes the strength of the partnerships at brigade and below actually hampered smooth relations between their superior headquarters. On a number of occasions it became apparent that subordinate ANA headquarters were involved in planning partnered operations without informing the Corps staff. A favourite brigade tactic when this inevitably came to light was to confuse the situation by denying they knew anything about ISAF’s intentions, which led to recriminations and friction at the higher levels. The Afghans can be particularly good at ‘staff obscuration’ when it is required. Close partnership at brigade and below, when not coordinated using the Afghan chain of command, could reinforce the tendency of some ISAF personnel to view elements of 205th Corps as extensions of their own task forces. This was evident in a number of attempts to pressure the Corps Commander to allocate forces in line with the preferences of certain ISAF officers. Managing the ‘dependencies’ fostered by close partnerships at the lower unit level was also challenging. ANA units proved particularly adept at tapping into their partners’ logistical capabilities, something that the ISAF chain of command recognised was not particularly desirable. However, the abrupt termination of local arrangements, particularly when ISAF units rotated, had the potential to cause major disruptions for the Corps’ staff. As the daily ‘face of ISAF’, 205 CAT’s advisers quickly became acquainted with the ensuing angst.
Sometimes the strength of the partnerships at brigade and below actually hampered smooth relations between their superior headquarters.
Perhaps the biggest challenge as an adviser at the corps level was attempting to adhere to Lawrence’s famous saying that ‘it is better to let them do it themselves imperfectly than do it yourself perfectly. It is their country, their way, and our time is short’.6 In a perfect world this guidance is completely valid, but in practice it is very difficult to honour. Advisers are no more immune than other ISAF personnel from the desire to produce tangible results during their short tours. At times it was difficult to know how to inject one’s own experiences and knowledge in way that actually aided the Corps’ staff, as opposed to progressing personal agendas. This proved difficult but the default rule for the advisers was to ensure that they did not foster staff practices that would be unlikely to survive ISAF’s eventual withdrawal. A further complicating issue was the culture of learned dependency evident in certain Corps staff sections. It was difficult to foster close working relations with officers when they insisted that their advisers ‘fix’ problems that they should have been addressing through their own systems. This was particularly the case when time was short and the need pressing. There is a fine balance between winning influence and trust, and pandering to the addicted. In this respect it is interesting to ponder if Lawrence would have been as influential with his Arabs if he was not the means by which liberal quantities of stores and equipment were provided to them.
The old adage of ‘teach a man to fish to feed him for a lifetime’ was certainly appropriate guidance for 205 CAT’s personnel. When commenting on this issue, in relation to logistics, a recent US publication actually stated:
Advisers must make obtaining coalition logistical support as painful as possible for the ANA leadership in order for the ANA leadership to develop a reliance and confidence on the ANA logistics system over their dependence on NATO’s logistics system.7
The problem with this particular stance is that the ANA’s logistical system is largely based on Western procedures. ‘Teaching a man to fish’ is all very well when you are sure that knowing how to fish is actually what is required, and that your fishing style is applicable to the local conditions. The US produced ANA Mentor Guide correctly notes that ‘it is not the purpose of advisers to make the ANA look like a Western Army’.8 Despite being obvious, this approach was not always apparent in some of the schemes developed by higher level ISAF organisations, or even Afghanistan’s MOD. It is easy to forget how alluring some features of Western military organisations are to the unwary. One small example was the apparent fascination (bordering on fixation) of the Corps staff with PowerPoint. At a higher level, the push by both ISAF and Afghan personnel to introduce sophisticated capabilities and equipment also reflected a degree of ‘mirror imaging’ and ignorance of what was both possible, and appropriate, at the local level. In trying to properly fulfil their role, the Corps’ advisers had to attempt to navigate the fine line between supporting the ANA’s development through the wholesale adoption of ISAF procedures, their adaptation to local conditions or their rejection in favour of completely home-grown approaches. This was not made easier by the fact that the Afghans were by no means unanimous in their approaches to this issue. In keeping with tradition, today’s adviser practitioners have distilled much collective wisdom into one simple phrase: ‘Afghan okay’. But knowing what constitutes ‘Afghan okay’, or what might constitute it in the future, is certainly not easy.
... today’s adviser practitioners have distilled much collective wisdom into one simple phrase: ‘Afghan okay’.
An additional challenge for ISAF advisers and partners was the possibility of the ANA being infiltrated by the insurgents. Sowing mistrust between the two organisations is a particularly effective and economical means for the insurgents to disrupt friendly operations. Most of the deliberate ‘green on blue’ incidents in recent months seem to be more based on Afghans motivated by personal grievances and acting during moments of apparent insanity. The ready availability of drugs and weapons, years of living under trying conditions and generally high levels of psychological stress all tend to produce a fertile environment for random acts of violence against ISAF personnel. However, the deliberate infiltration of the ANA’s ranks remains an enduring threat and not one that is easy to counter. It should be noted, in this respect, that the Corps’ officers were very protective of their assigned advisers and aware of the threats posed by either discontented soldiers or infiltrators. A related friction point was the different force protection regimes maintained by the ANA and ISAF. The Afghans accept considerably more personal risk, particularly when moving around the battlefield, than is tolerated by the force protection regulations mandated by most ISAF nations. It is difficult for advisers to serve ‘shona ba shona’ (shoulder-by-shoulder) with their Afghan colleagues when prohibited from travelling with them by national policies.
The Future
The Inteqal (Dari for ‘Transition’) process, developed and endorsed throughout 2010, seeks to progressively shift the responsibility for security in Afghanistan from ISAF to the ANSF by the end of 2014.9 It is obvious that this is a key component of ISAF’s drawdown plan. Equally obvious is that one of the keys to this process is that the ‘ANSF must be capable of handling additional security responsibilities with less assistance’.10 As the US Secretary of Defence stated in 2007, ‘Arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves.’11 A key feature of the recent US-led ‘surge’ in Afghanistan has been the ANSF’s rapid expansion. Since November 2009 its size has increased by about 44 per cent (85,000 personnel).12 By March 2011 the ANA alone had reached 160,000 and there are plans for continued growth to bring this figure closer to 200,000. It is arguable, however, if the quality of these new troops has matched this rapid increase in quantity.
‘ANSF must be capable of handling additional security responsibilities with less assistance’.
A number of observations can be made about these trends. As ISAF reduces the size of its forces it will ‘progressively shift from partnering to a mentoring relationship that supports continued ANSF professionalisation’.13 The key will be for ISAF to concentrate on assisting the ANA to manage its future posture, as opposed to supporting the Afghans as they deal with shorter-term issues. Advisers will become more important as the assets available to support partnered relationships decrease and ready access to remaining ISAF enabling assets becomes increasingly important. The development of coherent command and control arrangements for linking advisory teams at all levels would be useful. Helping the ANA to negotiate ISAF’s metamorphosis during the transition will be a critical adviser task. As ISAF focuses on improving the quality of the personnel put through the ANA training pipeline there will also be a requirement to not only maintain operational adviser support, but reinforce this with additional training adviser support. In terms of maintaining a valued contribution to ISAF’s efforts in Afghanistan both of these areas provide attractive options for the Australian Army. There is certainly scope to increase the current commitment to 205 CAT and to investigate the provision of advisers to some of the specialist units that will be fielded within 205th Corps over the next two years. Australia’s mentoring efforts at the tactical level in Uruzgan have been very successful, but advising at the corps level may potentially have broader and longer-term effects.
As the focus shifts to the ‘Army after Afghanistan’ it is also worth reflecting on how Australia’s most recent adviser experiences are relevant to the future. Building indigenous security force capacity is one of the tenets of Adaptive Campaigning and is likely to remain a role for the Army within Australia’s immediate region. For example, the Defence Cooperation Program in Timor Leste has been delivering a dedicated adviser effect for a number of years. As Australia’s contributions to Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands are examined, expanding this type of contribution is certainly worth considering. Structuring and preparing such contributions must be driven by local requirements but would benefit from considering past adviser commitments, including contemporary experience from Iraq and Afghanistan.
In conclusion, service as an adviser to the staff of the 205th Corps was both unique and challenging. The obstacles facing the Corps are numerous but progress is being made, largely because of the dedication of motivated and capable Afghans. An understanding of the challenges faced by the Corps, the difficulties of fostering effective partner relationships and avoiding a multitude of possible adviser pitfalls is important as the campaign in Afghanistan enters a new phase. Advising, at all levels and in both the operational and training realms, is only set to increase in importance. The unique perspectives that come with operating in the twilight zone between the ANA and the mainstream ISAF organisation make advisers well placed to help ensure the ANSF, and particularly the ANA, is well postured for the end of 2014. No article on advising should conclude without a parting shot from Lawrence: ‘It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.’14 It is a thought with universal applicability.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the many adviser ‘insights’ provided by fellow Australian 205 CAT personnel, particularly Colonel John Simeoni, Lieutenant Colonel David McKerral and Lieutenant Colonel Guy Moten.
About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel Gavin Keating is an Infantry Officer in the Australian Regular Army. He is a graduate of the Australian Defence Force Academy and the Royal Military College, and has served in the Second and Third Battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment. His previous operational service includes deployments to Timor Leste, Bouganville, South Lebanon and Padang, Indonesia. He served as the G3 Adviser in the 205th Corps Coalition Advisory Team during the first half of 2011, following two years as the G3, Headquarters 1st Division. He has completed a Bachelor of Arts (Hons) and Masters of Strategic Affairs.
Endnotes
1 T E Lawrence, The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence, 20 August 1917, article 12, <http://www.usma.edu/dmi/IWmsgs/The27ArticlesofT.E.Lawrence.pdf> accessed 20 July 2011.
2 Document revised in early 2011.
3 The regions of Arghandab, Dand, Panjwai, Zharay and Maiwand were all critical to the maintenance of Kandahar City’s security and the focus of both ANA and ISAF security efforts.
4 For a full study of this operation see Carl Fosberg, Counterinsurgency in Kandahar: Evaluating the 2010 Hamkari Campaign, Institute for the Study of War, Washington, 2010.
5 Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team, ‘Partnering: A Counterinsurgency Imperative’, Small Wars Journal, 20 November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/caatspecialreportnov2010.pdf&…; accessed 10 April 2011.
6 Lawrence, The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence, article 15.
7 Afghan National Army Mentor Guide, Joint Centre for International Security Force Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, March 2011, p. 2-46, <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/JCISFA_Publications.aspx> accessed 14 April 2011.
8 Ibid., p.3-3
9 ‘Transition to Afghan Lead: Inteqal’, NATO Media Backgrounder, March 2011, <http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110309_110309-…; accessed 26 July 2011.
10 ‘Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and the United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces’, US Department of Defence, Washington, April 2011, p. 49 <http://www.defense.gov/news/1231rpt.pdf> accessed 25 April 2011.
11 Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team, ‘Partnering: A Counterinsurgency Imperative’, p. 2.
12 ‘Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan’, p. 13.
13 Ibid., p. 49.
14 Lawrence, The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence, article 1.
