Book Review - The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice

The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice,  Written by: Colin S Gray,  Oxford University Press, 2010,  ISBN 9780199579662, 308 pp

Reviewed by: Antulio J Echevarria II, US Army War College

The purpose of this book, as its author states, is to propose a general theory of strategy. Scholars and military professionals may well ask why another book on strategic theory is necessary or even desirable, given the already vast number and range of works on strategy, both as theory and as practice. The bookshelves of most educators and researchers already contain several essential works on strategy, among which are: The Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton 1986), which covers the principal thinkers who have contributed to modern strategic thought; Grand Strategies in War and Peace (Yale 1991), which offers a number of important historical case studies; The Makers of Nuclear Strategy (New York 1991), which does for nuclear strategy what Makers of Modern Strategy does for general military strategy; The Making of Modern Strategy (Cambridge 1994), which covers the processes by which strategy is developed as opposed to treating those who thought about it; Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London 1992, 1996, and 2001), which provides a comparative analysis of the main ideas of history’s classical strategists; and Modern Strategy (Oxford 1999), which lays out the basic concepts that modern strategic thinking employs. Added to these are the many timeless works written by luminaries such as Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, Thomas Schelling and Bernard Brodie, among others, as well as a host of competent textbooks on the topic. So why does the field need yet another book on strategy?

This is an especially pertinent question, because, as the author acknowledges, ‘There is but a single theory of strategy’ (p. 15). If that is true, and many scholars would agree that it is, then one would expect that, cumulatively, the above sources ought to have addressed the theory adequately by now. In fact, they have. Colin Gray has also already laid out the theory quite well in his earlier work, Modern Strategy (1999). The theory has not changed in essence, though there are always new details or nuances to consider.

The answer as to why this book is necessary (and desirable) is, simply, because so much has been written on strategy. In any field as broad as the study of strategy it is occasionally necessary to reassess how what is known stacks up against what is thought to be known (which may well be scattered throughout a vast sea of literature), or what needs to be known. Strategy Bridge does this. In fact, it is in many ways a capstone document in military doctrine; it is a work that synthesises a diverse range of contributions to the study of strategy, and in the process situates them within the larger framework of the discipline. Strategy Bridge not only lays out the general theory of strategy—as the bridge between ‘politics and action’ (p. 15)—it also examines the parts and features of strategy, both individually and as elements in a coherent whole. It does not propose a revolution in the way strategy is understood, so it is not Copernican in nature. However, it does put a number of propositions and scholarly contributions under the microscope, so to speak, so it is far more than a textbook, though it certainly can and should be used for instructional purposes. In terms of its rigor, Strategy Bridge is every bit as scientific as Clausewitz’s On War, but much more accessible.

Readers will find the book soundly organised in three parts: (I) Theory, (II) Practice and (III) Context and Purpose. The chapters in Part I discuss the definition of the theory, the role of theory, and how the particulars of strategic theory may change over time, but its core remains the same. The chapters in Part II deal with the problems usually encountered with putting strategy into practice, and how it is crucial to remember that the chief effect to be sought with strategy is the modification of an adversary’s behaviour. The chapter in the final part addresses how the general theory of strategy has been, in a phrase, present at its own creation throughout history. The particulars are as important as the core, even if they have not altered it. Nor is it likely that will future circumstances will do so either. Last but certainly not least, Strategy Bridge also offers four appendices, each of which offers ample grist for seminar discussions.

Its synthetic nature and analytical rigor make Colin Gray’s Strategy Bridge a necessary, and welcome, addition to any educator’s already vast library of works on strategy.