Review Essay - The Last Knight: A biography of General Sir Phillip Bennett AC, KBE, DSO by Robert Lowry

The Last Knight: A biography of General Sir Phillip Bennett AC, KBE, DSO,  Written by: Robert Lowry,  Big Sky Publishing, Sydney, 2011,  ISBN 9780980814040, 416 pp

Reviewed by: Nick Jans

Every decade since Federation has thrown up a distinctive challenge for the Australian military institution. The main challenges in the first half of the twentieth century concerned the mobilisation of the services for conventional warfare operations overseas, and in the last decade or so the ADF again finds itself engaged in significant deployment commitments far from our shores. But the chief challenge for the Australian military institution for most of its history has been to maintain its integrity in the face of limited resources and a nebulous threat.

One of the most instructive case studies of this professional juggling act was played out during the long trough between exit from Vietnam in the early 1970s and intervention in East Timor in 1999. The remarkable thing about that East Timor operation was just how well the Australian force and its leaders performed after nigh on a quarter of a century without serious ‘match practice’. Shrewd observers must have wondered how it was the institution had managed to preserve its skill, spirit and professionalism in those flat years.

Bob Lowry’s biography of General Sir Phillip Bennett sheds some light on the mechanics of how it was done. Bennett was Commander of the 1st Division in the late 1970s, then Assistant CDF and Chief of the General Staff and, finally, from 1984 to 1987, Chief of the Defence Force. In these capacities, he and his senior colleagues oversaw the conduct of collective training, the organisation of the Army and the ADF, the development of doctrine, and a strategic shift of significant proportions, and laid the foundation for the maintenance of professionalism and performance that so impressed the nation in 1999.

The book’s title ostensibly refers to the fact that Bennett was the last Australian military officer to be knighted before the imperial honours system was dismantled in the mid-1980s. But there is a more subtle connotation. Bennett’s career began in what we can now see as the close of an era, during which military leadership was a simpler process and the causes for which Australians went to war were less equivocal. As his career progressed, he and his contemporaries were required to adapt the institution for a more complex and murkier professional and strategic world, a world that did not fit so comfortably with the straightforward professional identity of ‘warrior-knight’ to which they would have aspired on commissioning.

Lowry’s account takes us through Bennett’s early career years, conventional enough as they were in the context of that era (participation in the occupation forces in Japan, combat service in Korea and battalion command in Vietnam). We get a clear picture of what he did in each appointment that enhanced his opportunity for advancement to each new level; and this is useful enough, at least for the layman. But the book’s chief value is its account of Bennett as bureaucratic warrior at the strategic levels of the military institution, valuable because it details activities and issues—demanding political manoeuvring as opposed to force manoeuvring—that are not the usual stuff of military history books.

The most important area of activity for a senior military leadership team is to initiate and direct the reshaping of strategy. But performance in this respect probably carries the least weight and for how a chief will be judged. It is usually years before a valid evaluation of any high-level strategic decision is possible, and by then a host of other potential explanations will be available to account for its consequences (actual or supposed). In the meantime, most people will already have judged that chief by the decisions he made on a multitude of more visible but less weighty issues, especially in terms of how he advanced the interests of his ‘tribe’.

What makes such an evaluation even more difficult is that getting things done at the senior levels requires determination and skill in both ‘big-P’ and ‘small-p’ politics. In particular (according to former CDF Admiral Chris Barrie), a senior officer who takes an other-than-cautious approach to strategy formulation is near-certain to confront opposition. Because bold thinking often runs counter to the short-term interests of one or more of the services (even his own) or of the public service, a chief needs to be tough enough to ignore any risks in terms of his reputation, and skilled enough to manoeuvre politically in the face of such opposition. Clearly, Bennett was not found wanting in either respect.

Bennett took over in an era when the ADF was in the middle of the long hiatus between Nui Dat and Dili, during which Australia’s offshore military commitments were very minor indeed. With the impending end of the Cold War (for those who could read the tea leaves), the rationale for large conventionally-equipped and conventionally-trained military forces was increasingly being questioned. This was complicated by the difficult economic times, as Australia, like most Western nations, struggled with the low economic growth and high inflation woes of the post-Keynesian era, with a future that would be defined by the unpredictable interaction of technological, social and political factors. Budgets were tight and, in the face of the inconvenient question as to ‘threat’, it was often difficult to mount a compelling case even for the maintenance of existing military expenditure, let alone the acquisition of increasingly complex and expensive capability. Governments and senior civil servants tended to look sceptically at traditional military arguments for the acquisition of such items; and, in the cases where they yielded (if reluctantly), they expected a quid pro quo in the form of reduced expenditure somewhere else.

The main challenge for services leaders in that era was to reshape and consolidate an institution that was geared for the ‘modern’ era of conventional warfare into what has been called the ‘post-modern’ military: a military force that could be called upon to deploy anytime, anywhere, in any strength, and on any task, while simultaneously maintaining itself by training and exercises, with continual attention to economies large and petty. This main challenge was complicated by some comparatively minor but nonetheless significant other challenges in the form of often-strained relationships with public service counterparts, public indifference and often hostility, and patchy performance on the part of ministers.

Bennett determined that tribal stovepipes needed to be broken down so that the ADF could become a force capable of joint operations in a range of circumstances and a viable and vibrant institution even in circumstances of perpetual frugality and budgetary uncertainty. As might be imagined, his views were not readily welcomed in the three services and in the wider department, so much of his time was spent in political manoeuvring with his uniformed and public service counterparts. Lowry gives the reader just the right amount of detail to show how this was done—enough to see and to learn from the lessons, but not too much as to cause our eyes to glaze over. For example, one of the most significant organisational changes that Bennett initiated was the transfer of battlefield helicopter capability from the RAAF to the Army. Lowry begins by giving us a potted history of the issue, including the complicated political machinations that accompanied a series of studies that directly or indirectly related to the issue. Then he tells us about the way that Bennett successfully organised a series of reviews and senior committee meetings in order to get the outcome he wanted. (The issue of whether this was the right outcome in the long term is essentially irrelevant; the instructive aspect of the story is how it was done.)

Bennett comes across as a competent bureaucratic warrior, tough enough to shrug off parochial criticism of his decisions and skilled enough to steer through complex or controversial policy. Among the many qualities that he brought to his strategic posts were doggedness, attention to detail, a very strong work ethic and broad professional experience (at least in terms of conventional military activities). And he continued to project a strong persona as a ‘warrior chief’, an image that was important in dealings with the rank and file, allies, government and the public.

Lowry reveals that, while service officers often found Bennett to be a cool, no-nonsense and not always approachable character, he was readily able to establish rapport with sailors, soldiers and airmen/women on the many visits that he made to units throughout the Army and the ADF during his watch. From the perspective of a mid-level regimental officer, I first encountered Bennett as a somewhat aloof divisional commander; but later in my life, when both of us had retired from full-time service, I knew him as a charming and affable golfing companion. Lowry doesn’t tell us very much about Bennett’s personality, but in essence he doesn’t need to. Bennett’s character is important only in terms of how it affected his professional behaviour; and being aloof to upstart young majors was probably the kind of person he needed to be at that time.

Lowry’s account shows that Bennett had most of the attributes needed for the job but, like all of his uniformed counterparts, he had to learn bureaucratic politics on the run. And if his performance in this respect was sometimes clumsy, he was in good company. These were skills that did not sit well with the foundation development experiences of the military profession of that era. Bennett came from the old school, so his acquisition of such skills was all the more commendable.

Bennett’s natural leadership style is illustrated in an anecdote told to me by a former colleague (it’s not in Lowry’s book) about Bennett’s direction to his staff at the 1st Division. ‘Gentlemen,’ he told them, ‘you have all been well prepared professionally for this job. And the same is true of the COs of the units in the division. They will all be trying to do the best they can. To help you support them, you have my authority to say “yes” to any request for support, without further reference to me. But you do not have my authority to say “no”.’ One can imagine how much the staff were inspired by such an approach.

Bennett and his senior colleagues brought about substantial change to the organisation and approach of the ADF to joint warfare, with equal attention to ensuring that officer development kept pace with these organisational and doctrinal changes. And if all this was not absorbing enough, the senior leadership team was also required to ensure that that appropriate relationships were forged with important allies. The main targets here were the United States, which needed reassurance of Australia’s military reliability, and Indonesia, where the political relationship was somewhat tenuous following military hostilities and strained relationships over the previous three decades.

The senior teams of the 1980s did not have unequivocal success in tackling their huge reform agenda. For example, the three services were slow to shake off their conservative and somewhat parochial approach to professional military education and career structures; and relationships between the military and the public service had to wait for another decade before they were effectively addressed. However, a strategic leadership team can only do so much during its watch. It must address what it sees as the priorities, and risk neglecting less pressing matters. It is a judgementcall, but overall, the skill and effort of Bennett and his peers in steering the institution into a new era is clearly one of the major reasons for the strong performance record of the contemporary Australian military institution.

From that perspective, this book deserves close consideration from any officer who wants to contribute effectively beyond mid-career or understand what goes on within the Defence bureaucracy. It will no doubt be closely read by those attending the courses at Weston Creek.

In that sense alone, Bob Lowry has done his former profession a considerable service.

About the Author

Nick Jans is a visiting fellow at the Centre for Defence Leadership & Ethics at the Australian Defence College. His 2003 study, ‘Once Were Warriors’, deals with senior leadership culture in the Australian Defence Organisation. (This was the source of the quote from ex-CDF Chris Barrie.) He is currently working on a study that examines the leadership issues and processes at the highest levels of the ADF.