An Opportunity Not To Be Wasted: What Army Should Require of the Australian Defence Force Academy

Abstract

This article argues that the Australian Defence Force Academy, by virtue of its original charter, access to resources and duration of its officer training course, offers a unique and unrealised suite of opportunities yet to be fully realised and harnessed toward ADF capability. The author offers practical suggestions for implementing a number of ready, command-led measures for directing the academy toward this end, thereby increasing graduates’ contributions to Defence capability across the complexity of contemporary operations, while attaining a world class reputation deserving of this maturing institution.

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The demands of the Primary Operational Environment (POE) and lines of operation detailed in Adaptive Campaigning require a broad range of personal abilities as a component of Army’s developing Foundation Warfighting preparation cycle.¹ These present a daunting prospect for Army learning due to their depth and breadth, as well as the duration required for development of individual abilities. The establishment of Headquarters Forces Command (HQ FORCOMD) has aligned most of Army’s resources toward this Foundation Warfighting imperative, yet the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) is largely shielded from the wider Army and even ADF priorities. Consequently, vast opportunities to develop around half the officer corps during their critical, formative first three years’ service are wasted. Moreover, the learning environment, time and ready access to a variety of resources available during these three years of training are beyond the scope of what Army can achieve in virtually any other phase of the training cycle (including at the Royal Military College (RMC) Duntroon). As such, this article details what Army (and, by extension, the ADF) should be demanding from this unique institution.

ADFA is not fully achieving its original intent and, despite the level of investment, is not contributing to ADF capability to the degree it could through simple measures. Despite the achievements of academic staff, and the continuance of the time-worn Academy Military Education and Training (AMET) and varying single service training programs, the essential ‘missing element’ pertaining to officer qualities and the formation of appropriate attitudes is virtually ignored on the path to graduation. There is little understanding of how investment in military activities such as drill, room inspections, the ADFA Production or voluntary sporting and extra-curricular activities links with (or detracts from) the generation of confident, competent, mentally robust, thinking officers for the ADF. Consequently, the result achieved by ADFA, in terms of individual graduate quality, is uneven, and for many midshipmen and officer cadets² the benefit of ADFA is little more than could be gained by attending the University of New South Wales (UNSW) in uniform. This need not be the case. Many capable junior staff already in command at ADFA—having themselves recently experienced the demands of the POE—are poised to appropriately develop the many high-quality cadets who join the ADF with the intellectual capacity, ability and motivation to be trained.³ Additionally, by not allowing such officers to execute senior command intent, the institution in turn is not fulfilling a range of lofty implicit and explicit promises made in recruiting.⁴ This disappoints cadet expectations, which consequently affects motivation and, in turn, achievement of learning outcomes. The simple remedy is for the ADF to promote a common understanding of the purpose and prospects for ADFA and for this to be executed in a collegiate manner by ADFA staff through command focus, prioritisation and alignment of resources.

ADFA is not fully achieving its original intent and, despite the level of investment, is not contributing to ADF capability ...

An Academy For What Purpose?

Simply put, ADFA exists to provide thinking junior officers toward ADF capability. Cadets are placed in the academy environment, undertake academic degrees, and complete various courses with the support of staff who shape and influence them toward this fundamentally attitudinal end. This ‘higher purpose’ is demonstrated in the initial conception of the academy.

ADFA was established in 1986 in partnership with UNSW, recognising efficiencies in delivery by centralising the degree programs of the three single service colleges. This was achieved through huge initial investment and ADFA continues to be maintained at considerable expense. Such expenditure demonstrates an enduring and implicit understanding at strategic levels of Defence toward the value of education of officers from an ab initio stage. The difference between education and training,⁵ and importance of education for officers is important to grasp—both militarily and academically—since it directly relates to future job performance.⁶

Inherent in ADFA’s original purpose was a desire to enhance Defence capability, by enhancing joint service networks, educating officers through an academic degree, and providing military training. It also placed officer qualities at its core;⁷ although it has been suggested that even at an early stage this original intent began to erode.⁸

The value of ADFA has been queried in numerous fora through its history.⁹ There are many reasons for ADFA’s continued existence: some are practical, such as the recruiting drawcard that a degree can offer;¹⁰ others are embedded, such as the academic degree or joint networking. However, ancillary or ‘automatic’ benefits should not distract the commandant and military staff from their main effort—contributing to the military capability of the ADF. Without achieving this, ADFA would never have been created.¹¹ Indeed, the institution’s survival has invariably stemmed from military benefits beyond those which could be gained by sponsorship of cadets at civilian universities. However, these benefits are poorly expressed in any available direction, and are extremely fragile, leaving them vulnerable to ‘railroading’ by other, seemingly more pressing concerns.

The developmental path of ADFA has been excessively hindered by ‘analysis paralysis’ and well-meaning higher direction. The most recent of which, the 2010 ADFA Review¹²—delivered at considerable expense—fell far short of being a blueprint to revitalise ADFA’s key role in Defence capability. Despite extensive staff advice, it failed to articulate a single central theme or a compelling vision for the academy into the future or to define the unique role of the academy, thereby championing its existence. The review delved into numerous points at a ‘tactical’ level, thereby perpetuating ‘churn’ at the academy rather than assisting the commandant to drive toward outcomes with a higher goal. Rather than establishing a framework for a fundamental and comprehensive rethink about how ADFA should deliver a niche capability to the ADF, it simply perpetuated ‘review fatigue’. Instead of squarely facing the ubiquitous spectre of the Grey Review,¹³ additional constraints are imposed, when in reality a complete reassessment of ADFA’s progress and purpose as an institution is required. Rectifying this shortfall could realise the academy’s aspiration to stand alongside the better known academies both here and abroad.

The developmental path of ADFA has been excessively hindered by ‘analysis paralysis’ and well-meaning higher direction.

ADFA is ultimately established to graduate cadets and is minimally staffed to do so. A small cadre of tri-service senior non-commissioned officers and military officers are appointed to command divisions of around forty-four cadets, with a secondary role as instructors.¹⁴ Their potential to influence junior officer attitudes and contribute to training is immense, but unrealised. In the course of the academic week, cadets spend two half-days undertaking AMET.¹⁵ In addition, each morning one further hour of military time is allocated before university study commences. Conceivably, if well utilised for the entire three-year period, this time could significantly contribute around 420 additional hours to military capability. Unfortunately, at present, around 3/5 of this time is allocated to drill and room inspections.¹⁶ Furthermore, there is little direction or understanding of what the other 2/5 of weekly time, typically allocated as ‘OC’s or DO’s [Divisional Officer] hours’, could or should be harnessed toward officer training. Additional windows of opportunity also arise randomly throughout the AMET program and during academic breaks which offer further, often lengthier, chances for military-oriented learning. How staff decide to utilise this time sends powerful messages to cadets about what is important for officers.

Graduation is dependent upon cadets passing key milestones, namely their academic studies, the AMET program,¹⁷ and satisfactory performance while training with their parent service.¹⁸ These three essential pillars ignore a fourth, less tangible, yet vital component: possessing the officer qualities appropriate to a junior officer having spent three years’ service in a joint officer training establishment. But how might ADFA contribute to the nurturing of such qualities?

A clue to explaining this ‘missing element’ is provided by the academy’s charter: to provide a ‘tertiary education in a military environment’.¹⁹ The ability of academic staff to deliver degree qualifications is unquestioned, but precisely what does this ‘military environment’ consist of? This has never been certain,²⁰ and no clear definition is provided,²¹ yet scope for misinterpretation is wide.²² At a more junior level, ADFA staff interpret differently the purpose of their employment, and have little guidance or training in appropriate methods to conduct their duties. This leads to highly varied approaches in which conflict can easily arise between priorities.²³ Cadets too—mostly fresh out of high school—can be easily confused by images proudly trumpeted by the academy.²⁴ The intense focus on sporting, inter-squadron competitive and extracurricular activities, military uniforms aside, can render ADFA virtually indistinguishable from a boarding school or sports institute. The obvious alternative is to recast the environment portrayed at ADFA as unmistakably that of a military academy dedicated to the development of joint junior officers in the profession of arms. With it would come pride, morale, motivation and a reduced need for a rules-based system.

Cadets too—mostly fresh out of high school—can be easily confused by images proudly trumpeted by the academy.

ADFA must get the ‘environmentals’ right for effective contextualised learning to occur. This is because all learning consists of knowledge, skills and attitudes.²⁵ Becoming an officer is not just about knowing ‘stuff’. It is more about having the right mental approach and bearing to command on operations.²⁶ This requires ‘soft skills’ (such as adaptability, ethical conduct and social intelligence) which cannot be delivered in discrete training lessons so much as developed within an appropriate environment,²⁷ since shaping and influence is required.²⁸ Moreover, the learning levels²⁹ to be attained by officer trainees, who may deploy shortly after commissioning, are of a high level. These cannot be achieved at the requisite level if the teaching method is not aligned. This is precisely why PowerPoint® falls short in officer training courses, and more ‘active’ teaching methods are required.³⁰ Finally, attitudes, once instilled, are far more durable and versatile than skills training and knowledge accumulation.³¹

By virtue of duration and its immersive environment, ADFA is uniquely placed to develop abilities and attain learning levels strongly required in the POE—abilities that are virtually unobtainable elsewhere. A recent training needs analysis into Adaptive Campaigning has indicated the need for some operational capabilities, such as cultural understanding, which take lengthy development times and attainment of learning levels that cannot be rapidly delivered in a brief course of training. Whether ADFA can deliver this requirement—effectively compensating for life experience foregone while ‘institutionalised’—is dependent upon how well ADFA achieves its higher-order military goals. The fact that such attitudinal goals are difficult to measure should not deter ADFA from the importance of this objective.

Why Hasn't This Happened Already?

Why such a focused military learning environment does not exist already is perplexing. A vision for the development of the ADF officer corps is pronounced at the highest levels,³² and its purpose has been directly enunciated at the academy.³³

Competencies for leaders within the POE are also explicitly stated in esteemed literature of foreign forces,³⁴ and ADFA itself accumulates benchmarks attained in recurrent, hugely expensive and largely ineffectual annual visits to overseas academies.

Some shortfalls in the current regimen are explicitly recognised by Commander Australian Defence College.³⁵ However, these shortfalls appear to have only emerged as a topic for discussion,³⁶ with scant evidence of any real action. Indeed, much of what is discussed in this article has been articulated before in great detail,³⁷ yet little progress has occurred. Perhaps a lack of precise guidance can explain the varied and frequently disruptive approaches taken by the various commandants of ADFA.³⁸ Similarly, such confusion, as discussed, can easily see staff at lower levels working at cross purposes—with some commanders above Divisional Officer (DO) level only measuring performance in terms of administrative prowess. With limited explicit direction as to their role, and brief staff induction focusing on skills training for drill and weapons lessons, DOs can mistake their role as being simple and indulge in the personal study opportunities available at ADFA, rather than maximising time shaping cadets. Cadets readily perceive the various deficiencies outlined above.

DOs can mistake their role as being simple and indulge in the personal study opportunities available at ADFA, rather than maximising time shaping cadets.

ADFA is at ‘arms length’ for all services, and the performance of graduates is difficult to attribute to acts and omissions at ADFA. This distance from the services can give the impression that ‘all is well’, when the presumed achievements of the academy occur haphazardly at best.³⁹ Very little external pressure is exerted upon ADFA to attain development goals at the cadet level. Army has no direct budgetary control over ADFA, nor does ADFA have a relationship with the integrated training delivery established with the formation of HQ FORCOMD. It follows that ADFA lacks ‘deliverables’. Consequently, developmental activities within DO’s hours, which could be highly relevant, instead become ‘study own room’ without detection—to say nothing for the contemporary relevance of the AMET program or ongoing effectiveness of activity series such as the Exercise Leadership Challenge.

The entire program at ADFA barely progresses cadets toward being members of an Adaptive Army—even though ADFA is uniquely placed to mentally prepare them for precisely that. Ready examples can be seen; for instance, how does an immersion in near-daily drill and inspections shape thinking, adaptive officers? Do the range of activities which occur outside academic classes support and reinforce adaptive thought processes—albeit in a military setting—or worse, undermine them? Is the program itself adapting toward the vast developmental needs of ‘a war’,⁴⁰ or is it simply a re-run of last year?

Of course, the proposed remediation of such issues from a strategic level could be, and is, currently rendered irrelevant by the internal culture of the academy—particularly amongst the staff. These cultural elements include role confusion (reinforced by staff structures) that fixates upon ‘crisis management’ (rather than preventative measures); rigorous attention to personnel administration and reporting but comparatively little on training delivery; overemphasising maximal cadet academic study time; resistance toward any activity perceived to be ‘too Army’; and unproductive bickering between tri-service staff (at all levels) over their role—largely reversing the synergies a joint environment could achieve.⁴¹ A particular threat for Army officer cadets is the common belief that ‘RMC will sort it out’, which, taken to its full extent, wastes three of four years of officer training and with it the unique ‘value add’ that ADFA could offer. Overall, there is a mistaken belief that cadets are ‘too junior’ to understand concepts relating to the POE; have an overreliance on ‘osmosis’ to attain officer qualities;⁴² and that there is complacency with ‘automatic’ features of the academy such as making ‘joint mates’.⁴³ Far more can be deliberately done to progress important objectives, such as ‘maturity’ or ‘jointness’ that are highly regarded for operational success.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, many junior staff are pleading to do more and cadets are burning to get more from their ADFA experience.⁴⁵

... many junior staff are pleading to do more and cadets are burning to get more from their ADFA experience.

The reality outlined above amounts to a pressing need for practical ADF level direction to ADFA that cuts down recurrent hindrances and excuses. Higher direction must translate into foundational attributes for all ADF officers so that staff can consistently shape at the point of influence with cadets.

What Should Be Done?

Given the situation described above, what should be done to reinvigorate ADFA as a military academy? The key step is to clearly define the graduate attributes required. These must be firmly postured toward the POE, should include knowledge, skills and attitudes, and specify foundational competencies, even where practicalities and constraints preclude widespread ‘practice’ in areas such as leadership.⁴⁶ These attributes must be tri-service relevant, although a cogent argument could be made that the basic qualities for officers rest on the same foundation across the services. Such foundational qualities must then be imbued in future graduates, primarily through an appropriate military environment and a range of synchronised activities. These activities must be supported by the bulk of available resources at the academy—even at a risk of downscaling some ‘traditional’ cadet activities of questionable developmental utility.⁴⁷ Finally, these activities must be prioritised for delivery by junior commanders and not be overridden by other programming issues simply because they are ‘measurable’.

In designing such ‘training interventions’ it may well be found they include current activities such as drill and inspections, but these should not be included solely because of preconceptions, habits, simplicity or ease of resourcing. As a corollary, if other, higher-resource activities are required, then the basis for justifying such expenditure (as a small addition to the enormous existing cost) will have been strongly formed already. Matching activities to priorities will have a strong signalling effect in itself. Cadets readily respond to actions staff take far more than what they say. Demonstrating a commitment to command-led development as a member of the profession of arms—rather than the present slavish devotion to the AMET program augmented by time-fillers during the morning—would vividly illustrate what is important as an officer and what is less so. A current example of this mismatch is the practice of ‘locking down’ the academy for successive drill practice weeks, but sending cadets on additional days or weeks of leave immediately after exams and during university breaks when quality training could be planned and delivered. Is rifle drill really more important than preparing for the POE?

The key link between future graduates and the institution are the DOs. Their crucial yet nuanced role (without providing an exhaustive list) involves a wide variety of priorities and emphases which must be supported by every facet of the academy. Primarily, good staff employ a mentoring approach.⁴⁸ This bolsters morale and reinforces cadet motivation, and in so doing, gains them rapport and influence, which has utility both in terms of welfare and character shaping.⁴⁹ DOs understand that cadets are young and inexperienced members of the ADF and find the means to make tangible their future role and expectations as a junior officer. Good DOs demonstrate leadership in order to teach it, and shape attitudes toward sanctioned ADF behaviours that persist beyond ‘work hours’, although, under current manning and with a single duty officer, this is difficult to achieve directly. To shape behaviour, they promote an appropriate military environment, maintaining an ‘atmosphere’ within their command. They also plan activities using innovative, yet necessarily austere, training approaches that grant them an insight to cadet development and permit accurate assessment. Simultaneously, insightful DOs promote the start of, as the Chief of Army would have them do,⁵⁰ a lifetime of learning and the beginnings of professional mastery, reinforcing learning and the thought processes borne of academic study.⁵¹ For an insightful DO, the mantra is ‘first do no harm’, recognising the fragile path toward achieving the true purposes of education.⁵²

The key link between future graduates and the institution are the DOs.

Good DOs are today striving toward these goals, often in the absence of higher direction and support, with little specialised training and resourcing which is ad hoc at best. Indeed, DOs are far from unencumbered in what should be considered their main effort.⁵³ Where their attempts at achieving higher commanders’ intent end in disappointment, a dual loss occurs in terms of staff morale and cadet learning outcomes.

Cadet university costs are paid for by Defence, for which individuals incur a return of service obligation. Additionally, a first year cadet takes home $917.76 per fortnight (which now includes an additional, generous ‘trainee allowance’). This lavish salary is paid for them to learn in designated military timeslots and develop as military officers at all times within a military environment—not just to attend academic classes. Staff are there to shape them within this environment toward a military goal—not to ‘baby sit’. The confluence of these issues amounts to a need for better military training aligned toward military objectives.

What Opportunities Are Out There?

The range of foundational qualities might, upon analysis, establish a range of aspirational goals which will form graduates with unique abilities that need not correspond with those of the single service college graduates. Indeed, ADFA’s value prospect as an institution must stem from what it can uniquely deliver. The foundational qualities determined will form a vision or ‘endstate’ for an ADFA graduate, one that includes more than a university degree and ‘passes’ in a range of skills and knowledge based assessments. These foundational qualities should not be the product of individual opinion but be determined through analysis at the most senior levels of Defence. The development goals handed to ADFA should be far more ambitious than those recurring annually at ADFA at present and should require genuine evidence of ‘target effect’ at the cadet level during delivery.

... ADFA’s value prospect as an institution must stem from what it can uniquely deliver.

Without pre-empting the results of such an analysis, it would seem logical that a re-assessed list of qualities would include fundamentals such as better understanding of joint operations and joint service-appropriate leadership competencies.⁵⁴ It would also be prudent to expect that after three years’ training, an ADFA graduate would have a greater sophistication in their understanding of modern war.⁵⁵ They should begin their preparation for complex, austere and demanding environments⁵⁶ while working alongside allies in overseas operations.⁵⁷ All such objectives play to ADFA’s strengths. From this point there are various schools of thought regarding the approach to take. Stevenson argues that developing a ‘profession of arms’ framework founded on character gives the best long-term result. In this vein, ‘future proofing’ can best be achieved by developing mental capacity through awareness of strategic issues.⁵⁸ Finally, if ADFA has any ‘hidden objectives’ like developing cadet maturity,⁵⁹ then the academy should be explicit about these goals so that contributions to life experience can be made with the attendant resources granted to do so, rather than simply leaving this aspect to chance.⁶⁰

To a great extent, what should be achieved at the academy is simply an expansion of what is already being accomplished, albeit in limited ways. Good DOs strongly mentor their divisions, and arrange guest speakers and other activities, harnessing the opportunities before them with the very limited resources at their disposal. They enhance the bland PowerPoint® lessons they are required to present and teach leadership by actually practicing it within their respective divisions. Through force of leadership, the DOs create an environment in which cadets form officer qualities applicable to all services.⁶¹ They also encourage cadets to expand their horizons through selfmotivated activities such as professional reading. Additionally, cadets select relevant subjects and involve themselves in largely self-funded personal development activities such as adventure training and battlefield studies tours to exotic locations. In so doing, cadets are effectively taking responsibility for their own wider education and professional development in ways that the academy should require and redirect funding toward, noting the strong link between such activities and performance on operations.⁶²

If such activities were more widespread, DOs would have both a realistic opportunity to shape cadets and to assess individual character development. Of course, to simply repeat past successes, organisational learning needs to be appreciably improved. All cadets should benefit from successful activities and good individual initiatives must not disappear with the posting cycle. The DO-level efforts as described would be significantly more widespread and effective if they were received as higher direction and benefited from stronger higher level support. For example, ADFA could produce graduates with true joint understanding, rather than simply ‘joint mates’. Reinstating joint base tours and introductory joint warfare courses are examples where such direction and support would have immediate effect.

ADFA could produce graduates with true joint understanding, rather than simply ‘joint mates’.

In terms of preparing for the POE, Canberra is well placed at the centre of most other government agencies, all foreign embassies, military and intelligence organisations and other sources of expertise, such as academia. Learning levels can be deliberately addressed through use of ready resources such as the Australian War Memorial in place of dry military slideshows. Expert lecturers are on campus or nearby, a plethora of languages are available for study locally, and UNSW courses in politics and other social science disciplines can be selected by cadets to support knowledge required for operating amongst the ‘human terrain’ described in Adaptive Campaigning. Slightly further afield in Sydney, Defence resources could effortlessly support visits to ethnic communities, religious sites, museums, think tanks and major Defence bases. However, such opportunities within close grasp must be encouraged, endorsed and supported—this is presently not the case. The need for such perspectives is reflected in the Army’s comparatively miniscule history in domestic operations, and opportunities in this arena are vast.

So, what is the alternative to this? The status quo is what exists today. Often, cadets who fully participate in voluntary activities, or are the perceived ‘top’ cadets who are ‘rewarded’ with foreign academy visits, are those who are least in need. Moreover, it is quite possible for cadets to achieve minimum standards across their respective military and academic endeavour, confine themselves within their rooms before a PlayStation®, play no sport, read no military literature, avoid social interaction with their peers and the wider community, never visit the base of another service or visit places like Sydney, let alone exit their comfort zone in international destinations which will likely be the scene of their future careers.⁶³ The fact that such cadets have ‘passed the course’ carries with it no assurance that they possess the officer qualities to command Australian servicemen and women on operations.⁶⁴

A range of impediments have had and may continue to have a preventative effect on the achievement of outcomes advocated above. Paltry and misdirected annual funding of only $120 per cadet is allocated for divisional level activities (frequently spent on ‘paintballing’). Contractual support is limited. Staffing is adequate for the working day but not after hours when cadets ostensibly require increased influence—as if ‘learning to lead’ is an eight hour per day job! Staffing for lesson development, planning and change management is extremely limited. Increasing synergies with academic departments, as an example, consumes the limited discretionary time available to staff. However, the greatest impediment is the notion that even thinking about such issues is ‘too difficult’ when a great deal can be done with the correct mindset and directed effort. If mandated by command, this can be addressed immediately, with results soon becoming evident after implementation.

Staffing is adequate for the working day but not after hours when cadets ostensibly require increased influence ...

What is certain is that an appropriate environment and deliberate, consistent staff action is essential in shaping the values and attitudes of officers in training. Many opportunities exist, junior staff are poised to act and cadets, by and large, are keen to learn. Army should provide the impetus to prompt clear guidance, command emphasis and real developmental benefits to cadets currently at the academy.

Conclusion

Opportunities missed for officer development at ADFA are extensive. This wastage not only minimises potential Defence capability but undermines the fundamental purpose for which ADFA exists—producing quality joint junior officers. Without taking the final step toward ‘value adding’ to the entirety of the cadet body, the ongoing investment in ADFA is rightfully subject to continued questioning. The alternative to this prospect is clear and the path to remediation is simple—yet ADFA must be prompted to do so. Army should provide leadership in this respect and must demand from ADFA goals that are far more ambitious and comprehensive than those currently achieved. Such a command-led approach must address genuine need—not sponsor another cosmetic, ill-advised, yet highly disruptive re-organisation which chiefly delivers another blow to staff and cadet morale. Rather, it must flow from the foundational requirements for all officers in the POE—an environment that is now well understood across Defence. These requirements must be cast in terms that can be actioned at the DO level, being backed by unambiguous direction, support, training and resources to do so. It is also important that ADFA’s path must be set from the highest levels of Defence—engendering consistency—not devised by one person or subject to the whim of successive staff postings.

The idea forwarded in this article is not provided as an alternative to that which is articulated at present—there is currently no collegiate staff approach. If these ideas are rejected, then a coherent alternative still needs to be formulated. At present, the status quo is certainly not good enough.⁶⁵ In many ways, suggestions made here are the minimum—whereas far more can be done to achieve excellence both as an academy, and in producing officers for the POE.⁶⁶ However, if the base requirements cannot be achieved, ADFA cannot be considered to provide additional capability for the ADF and serious consideration should be given to its closure.

Many of the improvements required add little or nothing to the immense bill already paid to keep ADFA. They do, however, require some redirection of priorities, and with it, the mindset that some staff are imbued with upon arrival. Academy graduates are performing well on operations.⁶⁷ ADFA, as an institution, must ensure that this is more than simply a result of good recruiting of quality people. ADFA needs to ‘value add’ to the experience of the majority—not just the most ‘willing’ or ‘top’ cadets. At a time when Foundation Warfighting requirements present such pressing demands on our people and our training system, Army should be demanding more from this unique institution—as should the other services.

About the Author

Major Ross Cable is a Royal Australian Armoured Corps officer and academy graduate who holds an Honours degree in History and an MBA from the University of Queensland. Major Cable commanded a first year squadron at ADFA in 2009 and 2010. His personal reflections on the academy comprise part of the implementation planning for the 2010 ADFA Review. Major Cable wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Major Ann Noris in editing this article. He also wishes to acknowledge discussions with a wide range of parents, ADF officers, ADFA graduates, ADFA staff, officer cadets and midshipmen who aided in forming the views expressed in this article. Major Cable is currently posted as a plans officer in the G5 Branch of Headquarters Forces Command in Sydney.

56    Rear Admiral J Goldrick, quoted in Field, ‘Joint Education Comes of Age’.

57    Air Chief Marshall A Houston, quoted in ‘CDF’s Last Review’, Army: The Soldiers’ Newspaper, 17 March 2011.

58    Colonel M D Wyly, ‘Why Lieutenants Should Study Strategy’, Marine Corps Gazette, October 1988, pp. 42–43.

59    Kafer, response to Letter to the Editor.

60    Again, ADFA already conducts activities which contribute to these goals for niche groups amongst cadets. The value of travel in preparing officers to deal with uncertainty, risk and chaos is realised in related literature; see Mullaney, The Unforgiving Minute, p. 168.

61    Stevenson, ‘Educating the Community’s “Cream”’, p. 14.

62    Colonel G L Watkins and Dr R Cohen, Cross-Cultural Competence and USMA Cadets, Beetrix Consulting (for West Point), 7 December 2009.

63    Houston, ‘CDF’s Last Review’.

64    Adams, ‘Reflections on Officer Education’, p. 19.

65    Lieutenant General K Gillespie, CA Speech to ASPI, 27 August 2008, <http://www.army.gov.au/docs/Chief_Of_Army_Speech.pdf&gt; p. 8.

66    Anderson, ‘Foundations for Teaching’; Smith, ‘The Fundamentals of Junior Officer Training’.

67    Field, ‘Joint Education Comes of Age’; Houston, ‘CDF’s Last Review’.