Land Power Library - The Ottoman Army in the First World War

Routledge, 2021, 466 pp.

Hardcover ISBN 9780367471774
Paperback ISBN 9780367675349

AUTHOR: Mesut Uyar

REVIEWED BY: Jordan Beavis

Many myths, stereotypes, fallacies, and misunderstandings of the Ottoman Army in the First World War abound in military circles, academia, and among the general public. In Australia, much of this is the result of our own myth making. The depiction of the Ottoman soldiers by Official Historian Charles Bean was by no means kind, alleging that the ‘Turk is a brave soldier, but a very dull one—boorish, uneducated, stupid, and infinitely less capable of … cleverness than his opponents’.^[1] Even when well trained, they were nonetheless ‘slow of thought and movement and generally very ignorant’, with the Arabs among them generally having little loyalty (they were ‘changeable’) while ‘the Turk, when convinced, clings stubbornly to his conviction.’^[2] Such generalisations, based as they were on widespread contemporary European racial stereotypes of ‘Orientals’, are very distant from reality.^[3]

In The Ottoman Army in the First World War, historian Mesut Uyar delves deeply into the history, capabilities, experiences, and context of that military force from 1914-1918. Uyar is uniquely qualified for this task – a former Colonel in the Turkish Army, at the time of the book’s publication he was also a Professor of International Relations at the Antalya Bilim University, and able to decipher the unique Ottoman Turkish script contained within original Ottoman sources. With access to a wide array of contemporary and secondary sources, many of which have been inaccessible or not consulted by western historians, Uyar’s myth and stereotype-busting modern analysis is long overdue.

Over the course of seven chapters, themed chronologically, Uyar systematically explores the political, social, geographic, and military context of the Ottoman Army before and during the conflict. Chapter One initiates the study by presenting an outline of the difficult political and military situation facing the Ottoman Empire prior to the First World War. Amidst internal political instability, which ultimately saw the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress to government, the empire commenced a series of significant military reforms to modernise its army and navy out of its obsolescence. This process had barely began before the empire suffered the repeated blows of internal revolt (Yemen, 1911) and wars against the Italians in Libya (the Italo-Turkish War, 1911-1912) and a coterie of states in the Balkans (1912-1913), the latter of which saw the empire lose significant territory, resources, and caused population displacement. Understanding their weakness, after the conclusion of the Balkan Wars the Ottoman leaders looked for the support of a great power to support the country’s military recovery and modernisation, and following negotiations Germany agreed to despatch a military mission. This duly arrived, headed by Otto Liman von Sanders, and unlike in previous missions German officers were appointed to the direct command of units (including a division and five brigades) and military schools, and into a plethora of staff positions in various headquarters. In 1914, as part of this period of reform, over 1000 Ottoman officers were purged from the rolls and the army commenced a wide-reaching restructure.

Despite the arrival of the Sanders mission, and the undermining of sovereignty it represented, Uyar commences the book’s second chapter by reminding us that it was by no means a forgone conclusion that the Ottomans would join the Central Powers’ side as the world slid into war. Throughout this chapter, Uyar accounts for the issues that dominated Ottoman decision making in the lead up to their entry into the conflict in October 1914. Ottoman leaders understood that the empire could not remain neutral in the conflict – to do so would see it dismantled by the winning coalition – and it actively negotiated with France, Russia, and Germany for the best deal it could get. By ‘fall’ 1914, Ottoman leaders had concluded that a partnership with Germany was best, but that they needed two years to reform and rebuild the Ottoman Army prior to joining the conflict.^[4] They would get only three months. If a modern military needs a model of how not to prepare for a conflict, there is none better than that of the pre-First World War Ottomans. Not only was the Army in the midst of a post-Balkan Wars reorganisation and refurbishment, but it faced several other severe limitations too. The population was both geographically dispersed and ethnically diverse, inhibiting mobilisation planning. There were difficulties in moving and supplying troops due to universally poor (or non-existent) infrastructure. There was also a lack of specialised equipment of all types to support their maintenance in the field. In a spectacular undermining of Ottoman sovereignty, mobilisation and force concentration planning was overseen by the Ottoman Chief of the General Staff, which was headed by a German appointee, with the actual planning undertaken by two German staff officers, who ensured the preparations and plans were kept away from Ottoman officers and civil leaders.^[5]

Chapter three commences the narrative of the Ottoman Army’s experience of the First World War, with each of the following four chapters covering approximately one calendar year of the conflict, and the campaigns waged in that period. These campaigns, however, often do not fit neatly within such temporal boundaries, and in his narrative Uyar inevitably crosses between calendar years to find adequate stopping points for each campaign (see Table 1).

It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this review to catalogue Uyar’s treatment of the Ottoman Army’s campaigns in this war. His coverage is both deep and incisive. For the audience of this review, however, certain key incidents and arguments that remain relevant to the contemporary Australian Army. The first (for an Army which is being optimised for littoral manoeuvre) is the importance of sea control in moving troops by sea. On 7 November 1914, scarcely days into the conflict, three Ottoman steamers carrying reinforcements and equipment to the Caucasus Front were sunk by the Russian navy, with the loss of some 3,000 Ottoman soldiers as well as essential (and rare) stores and equipment.^[6] Such a loss in incomprehensible to us today, but is an important reminder of the need to ensure adequate force protection for any significant seaborne movement of the Australian Army.

A further item of interest is Uyar’s revisionist argument in favour of the Ottoman’s abortive Suez Campaign of 1914-1915. An operation largely undertaken as a result of German pressure and with widespread unwillingness by the Ottomans, the advance on the Suez Canal was mounted by a small force (two divisions committed, two in reserve) and in the face of severe logistical issues. Although pushed back by the British Empire forces in Egypt, Uyar nonetheless maintains that this campaign was a long term strategic success for the Central Powers. In exchange for 1,700 casualties, the Ottoman threat to the vital Suez link forced the British to maintain a significant garrison in Egypt to protect the canal. The British also had to secure internal control and combat Ottoman-led incursions from Libyan tribesman, with this totalling some 400,000 troops by 1916, many of which could have been of used in other theatres of war.^[7] The German/Ottoman exploitation of British sensitivity regarding the protection of Egypt and the Suez Canal is a clear example of how a relatively small force can provoke an asymmetrical strategic outcome.

Australian readers will also find Uyar’s analysis of the Ottoman side of the Gallipoli and Palestine campaigns to be of interest, given the space both campaigns still occupy within Army’s culture. In his coverage of Gallipoli, Uyar bursts many of the campaign’s greatest myths, including that of the evacuation deception. Uyar asserts that the Ottoman forces were ‘clearly’ aware of allied preparations to evacuate Gallipoli, and they were not fooled by devices such as the ‘drip rifle’. Despite the Ottoman commanders’ keenness to exploit the Allied evacuation and maximise their casualties, their soldiers refused – they had ‘suffered a lot and were more than happy to let the enemy go without further bloodshed’.^[8] With regards to the Palestine Campaign, Uyar’s assessment of the overwhelming superiority of the Allied expeditionary force there does tarnish some of the lustre associated with the Australian Light Horsemen’s actions there. Although gallant and courageous in many respects, they should be grounded in the context of the complete overmatch of the Ottoman forces in firepower, logistics, manpower, and political will. While admittedly an important campaign, Uyar also asserts that the Allied victories and advances in Palestine, Syria and the Levant were not solely responsible for the Ottoman decision to surrender. Instead, it was the collapse of Bulgaria which ‘effectively spelt the end of the Ottoman Empire’s First World War campaign’ and led to the signing of the armistice of 30 October 1918.^[9]

Extensively researched, The Ottoman Army and the First World War is now the authoritative text on this topic, and a necessary resource for any individual seeking to analyse campaigns against or involving the Ottoman Army. The book would, however, have benefited from one further round of editing prior to publication as it does still contain some unfortunately garbled sentences that detract from its clarity.^[10] Nonetheless, the book is to be commended for its coverage of a worthwhile topic. Military professionals will find within its pages a litany of lesser-known campaigns for their personal study, and will be astounded by the resilience of the Ottoman Army as a fighting force. 

Endnotes

^[1] Charles Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume I – The Story of Anzac: The First Phase, 11^th ed. (Angus and Robertson, 1941), 470.

^[2] Charles Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume II – The Story of Anzac, 11^th ed. (Angus and Robertson, 1941), 152-53.

^[3] For a discussion of such racial views, see Kyle J. Anderson, The Egyptian Labor Corps (University of Texas Press, 2021), 21-28.

^[4] Mesut Uyar, The Ottoman Army and the First World War (Routledge, 2021), 47.

^[5] Uyar, The Ottoman Army, 55-65.

^[6] Uyar, The Ottoman Army, 84.

^[7] Uyar, The Ottoman Army, 126.

^[8] Uyar, The Ottoman Army, 194.

^[9] Uyar, The Ottoman Army, 416-417.

^[10] See, for example, the first paragraph on pg. 166.