Land Command in the 21st Century
Howgate Publishing Ltd, Havant, Hampshire, 2022, ISBN 9781912440320. 236 pp
Author: Jim Storr
Reviewed By: Chris Roberts
The premise of Jim Storr’s Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century is that many army operational headquarters are no longer fit for purpose. According to him, this situation is not due to the mythical ‘additional complexity of modern conflict’. Instead, they stem from slow internal practices that tend to complicate planning and orders and that impede command systems from effectively and efficiently controlling operations. Based on the experience of British, American and other NATO armies, he provides strong grounds for making his claims, comparing the performance of more modern, larger headquarters with their smaller and more agile counterparts prior to the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, his work is based on his personal experience as a senior infantry and staff officer and (following his retirement) his extensive array of interviews with serving officers across several NATO nations. Moreover, his book has been endorsed by senior British generals.
While Storr states that many senior officers agree with him, nothing has been done to fix the problem. The excuse is that war has become complex. He rejects this. Armed conflict has always been complex. It is adversarial, lethal, and evolutionary. Overall, it is about winning. Thus there has always been a need to operate in a complex and dynamic environment, and for speed in planning and conducting operations - something smaller headquarters were cable of undertaking in the First and Second World Wars, but which many modern headquarters are unable to do in less dynamic environments.
Beyond simply identifying the problems, Storr goes on to offer solutions to fix them. He presents his case through the lens of six elements relating to the function of a headquarters: purpose, products, process, structure, systems and people, with a chapter devoted to each of them in that order. The last five elements provide the command system that enables achievement of the first. Discussing each of them in turn, Storr employs a combination of historical examples, theoretical discussions, research reports, behavioural studies, and the observations of serving officers to support his views. In doing so, he presents compelling reasons why modern headquarters fail to perform competently, and offers convincing solutions. This is followed by a fruitful discussion concerning mission command, in which he discusses the fundamentals required for practising the concept. A cogent summary of his arguments—Observations and Conclusions—draws his case together and presents the key actions to effect the necessary changes.
Command systems exist to support commanders in winning and achieving the desired military outcome in the most effective, efficient and economical way. Storr argues that, to achieve this, strategic goals must be translated into theatre level plans, and then tactical activity - what he calls the golden thread of purpose. However, this golden thread has rarely been evident in more recent conflicts. While many tactical actions succeeded in terms of their task, they did not fulfil any sensible strategic or theatre purpose. Part of the problem, he believes, is a lack of clarity and the confused use of terminology which simply complicate matters. He points to the use of verbose language that leads to a poor understanding of issues—the military virtue of simple, clear expression has long been forgotten. Storr challenges the too ready acceptance of recent intellectual thought that gives rise to new military terminology and ‘new’ forms of warfare that are often fads or fashions. In his view, factors that prevent the achievement of the desired military purpose include nebulous national policy, flawed strategic planning, inadequate efforts to identify the nature of a conflict, and nefarious purposes for employing certain types of units. In practice, modern command systems are simply ineffective and inefficient. Consequently, the golden thread of purpose is either not clear, or worse, the command system routinely breaks it as a matter of course.
Storr examines in some detail the reasons for headquarters failing to operate effectively, efficiently and economically by considering each of the remaining five elements that make up a command system. Each chapter covers a wide range of issues, addressing the factors that cause the problems, analysing why these problems occur, and offering solutions in each element. Essentially, he argues that modern headquarters have more than doubled in size compared to their 20th Century counterparts, staff functions increasingly have become ‘over ranked’. In this regard, he gives the example of roles previously undertaken by majors now performed by colonels. Planning has become mired in unnecessary process, while digitised information systems have not delivered what they promised. Only 20% of the information they produce is useful, thereby clogging the works and slowing decision making. The consequences of these deficiencies are fourfold. Headquarters lack the agility they once had and cannot move location as quickly as they once could. They are too slow in reacting, operations are over-planned and orders are too convoluted. Command and control has become centralised leaving subordinates little initiative. Further, orders often take too long to produce, they are far too long in detailing what is to occur and how it should be undertaken, and they arrive at subordinate headquarters too late to be properly executed. In making his case, Storr provides many historical examples comparing modern efforts with those of considerably smaller headquarters that react quickly to dynamic situations with brief orders (of one to three pages long) and maintain a high tempo of operations.
The obvious solution he offers is to reduce the size of headquarters (up to a quarter at least) with majors and captains reassuming the responsibilities they once had. He also proposes removing the senior ranks that have crept in over the past forty years, and who bring no added benefit. This reduction in senior officers would reduce top-heavy hierarchies, provide a more balanced officer structure and overcome the officer shortages currently being experienced. More radically, Storr advocates abolishing one senior rank altogether. Overt processes need to be reduced and information systems should be revised to ‘reduce the bulk’ and deliver less but better information. Moreover, commanders should become more involved in the planning process.
While offering solutions, Storr acknowledges that the necessary changes require more than simply form and substance. A constant theme running through the book is the importance of training and familiarity. Headquarters work best and faster when they are familiar with their work and the complexity of operations they encounter. This comes with thoroughly training junior staff officers and giving them more responsibility and experience early in their careers. The essence of familiarity is practice, practice, and more practice. Headquarters, both commanders and staffs, need to be regularly exercised, through a variety of activities Storr lists, and always under dynamic operational conditions in two sided, free play scenarios. We know that time spent in appropriate and demanding training is never wasted, but to what extent do we practice what we know?
While some will disagree with some of Storr’s views, what he writes is largely valid, backed by sound argument, examples, and the views of a good many officers. To effect the necessary changes, however, senior commanders will need the authority, the will, and the moral courage to cut the Gordian knot afflicting modern headquarters. Although this book is concerned with largely British and American experience, the Australian Army would do well to reflect on its own operational headquarters’ structures and practices against the solutions Storr advocates. They are worthy of serious consideration.
[Matt. Please link to pre-existing online bio]
