This paper argues that, despite being the world’s largest island, the greatest paradox of Australia’s existence is that the country lacks a maritime consciousness to guide defence policy. National development has been marked by several historical characteristics which have created an ingrained culture of sea-blindness. This paper argues that, despite being the world’s largest island, the greatest paradox of Australia’s existence is that the country lacks a maritime consciousness to guide defence policy. …

This paper examines the development of Australian Army doctrine from the end of the Vietnam War in 1972 to the publication of Land Warfare Doctrine 1,  The Fundamentals of Land Warfare  in March 1999. It analyses the rise of Army doctrine for continental defence operations in the 1970s and dissects the trend towards low-level conflict in the 1980s. The paper looks closely at the logic behind the Army in the 21st Century (A21) Review and the Restructuring of the Army (RTA) initiative in the 1990s. The …

This paper uses a historical case study of the Ambon disaster of 1942 to try to determine lessons for the development of Australia's maritime concept of strategy in the early 21st century. The paper examines how, in 1941–42, Australia embarked on the strategy of a forward observation-line, using troops to secure bases for air forces in the northern archipelagos. The failure of this strategy is viewed through the lens of the Ambon disaster of February 1942. The study examines how, with respect to defending …

This monograph analyses modern land power through examining the continental school of strategy that emerged in early 19th-century Europe at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The continental school of strategy is important because it has provided the essential knowledge for the theory and practice of land power over the past two centuries. Many of the continental school's principles continue to remain fundamental to an understanding of the use of ground forces in the early 21st century. The argument advanced …

This monograph examines Australia's strategic culture and way of war over the course of a century. It seeks to analyse the relationship between ideas and practice and between geography and history in the evolution of Australian strategic behaviour. The study argues that, since Federation in 1901, there has been, and continues to be, a ‘tyranny of dissonance' between Australian strategic theory and its warfighting practice. While peacetime Australian strategic theory has frequently upheld the defence of …

This paper examines the role of the Australian Army in a maritime concept of strategy. It does so against the background of new trends in post-Cold War international security and, in light of the publication in 1997 of  Australia's Strategic Policy  (ASP 97) and  Restructuring the Australian Army  (RTA). It argues that ASP 97 and the 1997 RTA plan are not optimising the Army's capabilities, force structure and doctrine for tasks which a close reading of the strategic guidance contained in ASP 97 might …

This paper analyses the relevance of deterrence theory based on conventional forces to Australian military strategy. It argues that a majority of Australian strategists did not favour conventional deterrence as an explicit strategic posture during the Cold War since it was seen as an outcome, rather than a starting point, of successful defence planning. In the post-Cold War era, conventional deterrence has become a disputed subject amongst Western defence analysts. In a multipolar world prone to regional …

This study examines the relationship between the 1915 Gallipoli campaign and the military revolution of World War I. The paper seeks to focus on what can be learnt from the military expedition rather than concentrating on its legendary aspects. The study evaluates the strategic concept behind Gallipoli, provides a sketch of the events of the campaign, and then analyses the context and enduring significance of the Allied attempt to seize the Dardanelles. It suggests that Gallipoli remains a cautionary tale …

This paper examines the place of the Army in the making of Australian strategy in the 20th century. It argues that, over the past one hundred years, Australian peacetime strategic planning has been characterised by a schism between the requirements of local territorial defence and the needs of security defined on the basis of upholding vital international and overseas interests. The major consequence of this schism in Australian defence philosophy was that, for long periods during the past century, the …

This paper examines the way in which Australia has responded to the post–Cold War concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). It argues that, between 1994 and the present, Australian thinking about an information-age military revolution has gone through two distinct phases: a period of informal debate and a period of institutional theorising. The informal phase of Australian RMA thinking lasted from 1994 until 1997 and represented a period of intellectual speculation under the rubric of Defence of …