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Michael Evans is the General Sir Francis Hassett Chair of Military Studies at the Australian Defence College and a Professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University in Victoria. He is a former Head of the Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. He has held fellowships at King’s College London and at the universities of York, Cape Town and New South Wales and is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the New Zealand Defence Force Command and …

This paper argues that, despite being the world’s largest island, the greatest paradox of Australia’s existence is that the country lacks a maritime consciousness to guide defence policy. National development has been marked by several historical characteristics which have created an ingrained culture of sea-blindness. These include a long tradition of maritime dependence on great powers; the growth of a martial cult centred on Anzac; a schism between continental and expeditionary approaches in strategic …
This paper argues that, despite being the world’s largest island, the greatest paradox of Australia’s existence is that the country lacks a maritime consciousness to guide defence policy. National development has been marked by several historical characteristics which have created an ingrained culture of sea-blindness. This paper argues that, despite being the world’s largest island, the greatest paradox of Australia’s existence is that the country lacks a maritime consciousness to guide defence policy. …
This paper examines the development of Australian Army doctrine from the end of the Vietnam War in 1972 to the publication of Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare in March 1999. It analyses the rise of Army doctrine for continental defence operations in the 1970s and dissects the trend towards low-level conflict in the 1980s. The paper looks closely at the logic behind the Army in the 21st Century (A21) Review and the Restructuring of the Army (RTA) initiative in the 1990s. The …
This paper uses a historical case study of the Ambon disaster of 1942 to try to determine lessons for the development of Australia's maritime concept of strategy in the early 21st century. The paper examines how, in 1941–42, Australia embarked on the strategy of a forward observation-line, using troops to secure bases for air forces in the northern archipelagos. The failure of this strategy is viewed through the lens of the Ambon disaster of February 1942. The study examines how, with respect to defending …
This monograph analyses modern land power through examining the continental school of strategy that emerged in early 19th-century Europe at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The continental school of strategy is important because it has provided the essential knowledge for the theory and practice of land power over the past two centuries. Many of the continental school's principles continue to remain fundamental to an understanding of the use of ground forces in the early 21st century. The argument advanced …
This monograph examines Australia's strategic culture and way of war over the course of a century. It seeks to analyse the relationship between ideas and practice and between geography and history in the evolution of Australian strategic behaviour. The study argues that, since Federation in 1901, there has been, and continues to be, a ‘tyranny of dissonance' between Australian strategic theory and its warfighting practice. While peacetime Australian strategic theory has frequently upheld the defence of …
This paper examines the role of the Australian Army in a maritime concept of strategy. It does so against the background of new trends in post-Cold War international security and, in light of the publication in 1997 of Australia's Strategic Policy (ASP 97) and Restructuring the Australian Army (RTA). It argues that ASP 97 and the 1997 RTA plan are not optimising the Army's capabilities, force structure and doctrine for tasks which a close reading of the strategic guidance contained in ASP 97 might …
This paper analyses the relevance of deterrence theory based on conventional forces to Australian military strategy. It argues that a majority of Australian strategists did not favour conventional deterrence as an explicit strategic posture during the Cold War since it was seen as an outcome, rather than a starting point, of successful defence planning. In the post-Cold War era, conventional deterrence has become a disputed subject amongst Western defence analysts. In a multipolar world prone to regional …