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Abstract This article analyses the current ADF psychological operations (PSYOPS) capability and whether it should be managed by the Australian Intelligence Corps or whether it requires a new capability manager. The essence of war is a violent clash between two hostile, independent and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other. 1 Introduction While political and technological developments change the character of warfare, its nature, as a violent clash of wills, remains unchanged. …
Abstract Since 1999, reinvigorated understanding and investment has seen an increase in the effective use of intelligence and its associated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection capabilities during recent operations in the Middle East and South Asia. During this period Army’s intelligence capability has demonstrated agility in tailoring its organisation to meet evolving expeditionary force requirements—this has been no more evident than during deployments to Afghanistan. This article …
Abstract The provision of national security is one of the essential responsibilities of government. As the Japanese advance neared Australia in early 1942 it became clear that Australia’s interwar political leadership had failed to provide adequately for the nation’s security. This article explains how in 1942 Australia found itself virtually bereft of military power as well as the steps to remedy the crisis. In doing so, the article questions whether the recent budgetary decisions by today’s political …
In the years since improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became symbols of asymmetric warfare and modern military conflict, very little has changed in the realm of counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) strategy. The military is always searching for better vehicles and equipment to defeat what is, at its core, a homemade device made for a fraction of the cost of our technological countermeasures. As a result, C-IED strategy has primarily focused on developing new ways to mitigate the effects of an IED …
Benjamin Kohlmann’s essay, “The Military Needs More Disruptive Thinkers,” 1 struck a chord like no other essay published recently in the Small Wars Journal. In brutal honesty, I have to say that the many sniping comments struck exposed flesh. While an ardent fan of Kohlmann’s essay, I have to agree that his argument was more akin to birdshot at maximum range than a mailed fist to the throat of the problem. Perhaps a better analogy is that his was a marking round lobbed in the general vicinity of the …
Army After Afghanistan Speech to the Sydney Institute by the Chief of the Australian Army Lieutenant General David Morrison, February 2012 It is an honour to address the Sydney Institute. Over more than two decades Gerard and Anne have cemented the reputation of the Sydney Institute as the premier forum in this city for the serious discussion of public policy as well as the arts and culture. Theirs is a considerable achievement, and I am grateful for the opportunity to deliver my first address to an …
Mobilisation Planning Requirements for the Land Domain Training System … Contemporary Plan 401 …
Lessons and Cautions for Army in the post-DSR World … The Concept of Mobilisation and Australian Defence Policy since Vietnam …
Australia awakened slowly. The outbreak of the war did not bring an immediate threat to the safety of the people living in Australia … clearly the first care of a nation on entering war was to make certain that home defence measures were adequate to meet any probable threat. But after the first fortnight of war, it was difficult for either the Government or its critics to find clear evidence that any immediate threat existed. [1] … The First Half …
Lessons from the National Service Scheme, 1965–1972 … 'The Army is Too Small' …