Remaining Timely and Relevant: Two Key Challenges for Army's Intelligence Capability Post-Afghanistan

Abstract

Since 1999, reinvigorated understanding and investment has seen an increase in the effective use of intelligence and its associated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection capabilities during recent operations in the Middle East and South Asia. During this period Army’s intelligence capability has demonstrated agility in tailoring its organisation to meet evolving expeditionary force requirements—this has been no more evident than during deployments to Afghanistan. This article examines two key challenges for Army’s intelligence capability post-Afghanistan. Initially, it will examine the challenge of introducing the provision of professional intelligence support to commanders at Army’s highest levels in order to improve synchronisation of effort regarding intelligence activities across the Service. Secondly, it will review the provision of intelligence support to amphibious operations and the challenge of preparing personnel for employment within a new capability, while being constrained by time and a lack of current knowledge, skill and experience.

And in all honesty, while some view the next few years as the post-Iraq and after 2014 the post-Afghanistan period, the reality is the next few years are likely to be the ‘pre-war’ years for a contingency, crisis or conflict beyond prediction today.¹

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Introduction

For over a decade, the Australian Intelligence Corps has deployed in support of operations across the globe. Intelligence Corps personnel have been required to display a high degree of agility and adaptation as they have gone about their task of conducting and coordinating intelligence support to military and civilian decision-makers, policy-makers and planners. The nature of recent operations in which the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been involved, namely distributed counterinsurgency operations, irregular warfare, and joint and coalition cooperation, has resulted in a number of improvised and ad-hoc arrangements, practices, technological innovations and tactical support structures. During this period Army’s intelligence capability has demonstrated marked agility in tailoring its organisation to meet these evolving expeditionary force requirements—no more evident than on operations in Afghanistan.

As these threats constantly change and adapt, so too will the environment and tools which they exploit.

However, the messy, hybrid, irregular conflicts of the post-Cold War era are unlikely to suddenly end with Afghanistan, and nor should the Army’s ongoing systematic capability development and adaptation to confront such conflicts.² Such adaptation, both procedurally and organisationally, must continue in a constantly fluctuating geostrategic operational landscape. Intelligence personnel must capitalise on a decade’s worth of valuable experience and continue to remain prepared to provide first- class support in a world where global stability is increasingly threatened by such issues as nuclear proliferation, shifting power dynamics in strategically vital regions, an increase in non-state actors and threat groups, cyber warfare and transnational crime. Indeed an array of these threats will most likely co-exist in potential future operating environments.³ As these threats constantly change and adapt, so too will the environment and tools which they exploit. Globalisation, sophisticated satellite technology, the universal reach of the Internet, and hand-held smart phone devices enabled by clever social networking software all contribute to a highly complex and ever-changing threat environment.⁴

Like many of the capabilities within Army, intelligence faces many challenges in the post-Afghanistan environment. The purpose of this article is to highlight two key challenges for Army’s intelligence capability. It will posit that senior commanders within Army do not receive adequate professional intelligence support. Despite the increased understanding and recognition of intelligence there remain many challenges, some of which are longstanding. Army’s most senior commanders require dedicated, professional, intelligence support in order to provide effective synchronisation of effort to intelligence activities and capabilities across the Service. It will also review the specific challenge of providing intelligence support to amphibious operations. Intelligence forms a critical component in the planning and conduct of any amphibious operation. Along with the other staff functions, and in concert with its maritime intelligence partners, the Intelligence Corps faces the challenge of preparing personnel for employment within a new capability while being constrained by time and a lack of current knowledge, skill and experience.

Professional Intelligence Support to Army's Senior Leadership

Creating effective intelligence is an inherent and essential responsibility of command. Intelligence failures are failures of command—just as operations failures are command failures.⁵

While it is widely understood in Western military doctrine that the commander directs the intelligence effort, it is the principal intelligence officer, regardless of level, who manages this effort. This responsibility includes acting as the commander’s principal advisor for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)⁶ and implementing activities that carry out the commander’s intelligence responsibilities. As important, the principal intelligence officer is a full participant in the commander’s decision-making process, ensuring that intelligence is effectively used during all phases of mission planning and execution.⁷ Australian Intelligence Corps personnel are the only personnel within Army that are trained and qualified as principal intelligence officers.

Army’s expeditionary tactical-level ISR collection capabilities consist of disparate stakeholders including the signals, artillery and intelligence communities. Due to operational necessity, over the past decade the Army has invested considerable resources into improving these previously neglected capabilities. This includes expanding its tactical human intelligence capability, establishing its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities, improving the tactical signals intelligence capability, increasing dedicated tactical intelligence staff support, and providing increased tactical ISR collection capabilities at battle group level. Some of these improvements were further reinforced in March 2010, with the reorganisation of these expeditionary tactical ISR collection capabilities into a single formation—6th Brigade—albeit alongside eight other unrelated units.⁸

The UK Director of Naval Intelligence in the Second World War, Rear Admiral Edmund Rushbrooke observed that ‘Intelligence is the Cinderella service. War is the Fairy Godmother who changes Cinderella into a Princess.’⁹ If the last decade is any indication, this metaphor remains true for Army. Yet despite the increased intelligence capabilities and growing recognition of its importance on the battlefield, there remains a lack of qualified and dedicated professional intelligence support to Army’s most senior commanders. Currently, the professional principal intelligence advice to commanders within Army peaks at Headquarters 1st Division and Headquarters Special Operations Command. This section will examine how professional intelligence officers at Army’s highest headquarters could ensure the improved management of intelligence continues unabated and that the Army’s intelligence capability is ready for the next fight.

there remains a lack of qualified and dedicated professional intelligence support to Army’s most senior commanders.

Headquarters Force Command

Established in mid-2009, Forces Command replaced both Land Command and Training Command as the single organisation responsible for individual and collective training.¹⁰ With the notable exception of intelligence, each staff function is represented in the current structure at Headquarters Forces Command. Personnel, operations, logistics, plans, signals, training, health and chaplains are each led by a colonel. Furthermore, Headquarters 6th Brigade also has colonels to represent artillery and engineers. Bereft of intelligence staff, Commander Forces Command and his key staff are deprived of critical intelligence support including qualified advice, coordination and management of a number of intelligence and broader ISR-related issues.¹¹ Commander Forces Command can draw upon Commander 6th Brigade and his limited ISR staff for expertise regarding highly-specialised, deployable, tactical-level ISR collection capabilities. However, there remains no trained and dedicated professional intelligence staff that can provide the necessary support for the management and coordination of intelligence personnel, capability and policy-related issues across the command.

Due to the mission of Forces Command, the principal intelligence officer’s role of the provision of all-source intelligence would likely be of less focus. However, a principal intelligence officer can ensure Commander Forces Command and staff have the appropriate qualified specialist advice on intelligence and ISR-related issues (tactical through national) including policy, manning and structure, capability development, emerging doctrine, personnel management, and individual and collective training. For example, intelligence staff can ensure that intelligence and associated tactical ISR and national collection capabilities are effectively integrated into the individual and collective training continuum. In the past decade, this shortfall has largely been overcome by a cohort of tactical commanders and staff who have deployed and experienced what a complete intelligence staff function and supporting ISR collection capabilities provide.

On the present All-Corps Officer Training Continuum such as Staff Officer Grade Courses and Command and Staff College, as well as the Combined Arms Officers Course, officers are exposed to little more than the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace staff process. In order to improve the status quo in preparation for future operations, commanders and planners will require a broad understanding of how Army, ADF and allied ISR capabilities can support forthcoming operational deployments. This involves the complete structure of a deployed intelligence staff including its all-source capability and the various products it can produce, the capabilities and limitations of Army’s tactical ISR collection capabilities, and the role and functions of the national collection agencies.

Consistent and well-developed individual and collective training exposing Army officers to the roles and capabilities of Army intelligence and ISR capabilities will ensure these future commanders and staff understand what can be brought to the fight. Post-Afghanistan, the education received during individual training must be reinforced by exposure to these capabilities during collective training, including battle groups undertaking collective training for independent deployment. These battle groups should be supported by formation-level ISR including the complete intelligence staff function and national agency integration. Where appropriate, the intelligence staff at Headquarters Forces Command would provide the capability to coordinate allied ISR representation and integration into individual and collective training as required.

Post-Afghanistan, the education received during individual training must be reinforced ...

Additionally, intelligence staff at Headquarters Forces Command would supervise, coordinate and provide valuable input into emerging doctrinal and capability developments, thus ensuring a rigorous, informed and balanced debate on evolving issues. Examples include the ongoing or future responsibility for the size and role of Army’s deployable counter-intelligence and protective security capability. Currently it seems there is no informed representative at any level within Army who understands the issue beyond the force element. This could have serious effects on the battlefield, particularly as green-on-blue incidents (also known as the ‘insider threats or attacks’) in Afghanistan become increasingly prevalent.¹²

The ADF is less than two years away from receiving the Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD) capability, yet there is little discussion regarding intelligence in any amphibious concept documents beyond some talk of tactical ISR collection assets. This all-important concept of employment should drive the development of intelligence-related individual and collective training, doctrine, equipment and standard operating procedures, not to mention how intelligence staff structure will support the commanders. Due to the lack of adequate intelligence advice or representation at the right levels, these issues are in danger of being left unattended. Worse still, decisions risk being made based on well-meaning but ill-informed advice from staff who lack the experience and detailed understanding of the challenges at hand.

The final example of how dedicated intelligence staff can be used effectively occurred in July 2011 when the Chief of Staff of Headquarters Forces Command directed the Deputy Commander of 6th Brigade to undertake a review of Army’s intelligence personnel, stating that Army cannot manage the range of responsibilities currently assigned to it without better management of the asset.¹³ Why a brigade headquarters—of which one of its many responsibilities is Army’s expeditionary tactical ISR collection capabilities—was tasked with a review of Army’s intelligence personnel indicates a management deficiency that clearly highlights the need for intelligence staff at Headquarters Forces Command. Although the review was well intentioned and long overdue, this further begs the question why this task was not initiated or undertaken by the appropriate intelligence staff at Army Headquarters.¹⁴

Army Headquarters

The responsibility for intelligence plans and capability development at Army Headquarters resides under three key appointments: Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning, Director General Developments and Plans, and Director Network Enabled Warfare, where there are two intelligence officers—Staff Officer Grade 1 and Grade 2—for intelligence. These officers are the only qualified and dedicated intelligence professionals within Army Headquarters. Additionally, there is another Staff Officer Grade 1 responsible for ISR. Due to the growth and importance of intelligence in the past decade, the staff effort dedicated to Army’s intelligence plans and capability development is insufficient.

Due to the growth and importance of intelligence in the past decade, the staff effort dedicated to Army’s intelligence plans and capability development is insufficient.

Given the growing importance and size of ‘ISR enablers’ and Army’s revitalised commitment to its ISR capability, Army Headquarters requires additional personnel with the requisite knowledge and expertise to advise the Chief of Army, through his senior staff, on intelligence plans and capability development. This includes liaising with the other services to ensure the ADF has a cohesive development strategy, and is not wasting valuable resources competing for or duplicating the same or similar capabilities. Although an ‘Intelligence Career Pathway’ exists from lieutenant colonel onwards, there are no intelligence appointments for colonels or above within Army. The experience, knowledge and expertise these officers can apply is significant, yet this resource remains untapped.

A possible solution is the establishment of a ‘Director of Army Intelligence’ at the O6-level who would provide a holistic approach to the coordination and management of intelligence related development across the entire service, an approach which is currently lacking. The Director of Army Intelligence and qualified specialist supporting staff would provide dedicated management to Army’s ISR capabilities and related intelligence disciplines such as geospatial, human, signals, technical, open-source, measurement and signature, and counterintelligence.¹⁵ The Director of Army Intelligence staff need not all be intelligence professionals, rather a balance of personnel with the requisite subject matter expertise in the various collection capabilities and/or intelligence disciplines. This would provide the Director General Development and Plans with a highly skilled team to advise him and his plans, organisation and establishment staff. The Director of Army Intelligence’s staff would apply significant knowledge, experience and consistency into the ongoing personnel challenges and ISR Force Modernisation Review that commenced in 2008 and remain unfinished.¹⁶ On behalf of Army the Director of Army Intelligence would also manage and coordinate the relationship between the Services including joint and single service ISR projects, allied partners and organisations within the Australian Intelligence Community.

The Director of Army Intelligence should have the capacity to supervise Army’s external intelligence representation to ensure Army’s interests are represented effectively, especially when supporting land-centric operations. Further, the Director of Army Intelligence would provide the Chief of Army with a suitably qualified and experienced officer who would provide intelligence security, policy and personnel advice, including a coherent strategy for intelligence-related postings to the non-Army Group and into allied organisations overseas.¹⁷ Finally, the appointment of a Director of Army Intelligence would complete the staff relationship and centralised control intelligence and of ISR capabilities within Army that commences at Army Headquarters, through Headquarters Forces Command and finally into Headquarters 1st Division integrated intelligence staff function and Headquarters 6th Brigade with its resident deployable tactical ISR units. Although the Director General Developments and Plans recognised this gap during an establishment review in early 2011, the inability to identify a suitable offset postponed the issue until the next Army Headquarters establishment review scheduled for 2013.¹⁸ In the meantime it is disappointing that Army’s professional intelligence support remains under-represented at its highest headquarters.

Army’s professional intelligence support remains under-represented at its highest headquarters.

Australian Defence Force Headquarters

The Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) is the Department of Defence’s strategic all-source intelligence assessment agency.¹⁹ The Director DIO is responsible for commanding the organisation, and is also the Chief of Defence Force’s (CDF) principal intelligence officer, known as the ‘Strategic J2’.²⁰ The 2004 Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies by Mr Philip Flood recommended that the selection of Director DIO be made ‘on merit with a preference for a suitably qualified high- quality military officer if such an officer is available’.²¹ Director DIO is considered the most senior uniformed intelligence appointment in the ADF, yet no long-serving professional intelligence officer has held the position.

There is merit in appointing non-intelligence professionals, especially former commanders, in leadership roles within a nation’s peak intelligence organisations. As previously mentioned, commanders direct the intelligence effort at all levels. Throughout their careers these former commanders have been consumers of intelligence and understand the role it plays in both decision and policy-making. Importantly, the appointment of a non-intelligence professional can sometimes bring fresh insight into the way intelligence is produced and disseminated, leveraging off years of experience as commanders at various levels during their careers. Further, commanders possess experience leading large organisations, or supervising staff responsible for large, budget-heavy projects. Both the United Kingdom and Canada appoint a ‘Chief of Defence Intelligence’ at the two- and three-star level, many of whom are former commanders.²² However, while the UK and Canadian intelligence chiefs lead large intelligence organisations, they are not employed as principal intelligence advisors. The United States, whose intelligence budget and capability eclipses the combined worth of its Commonwealth allies, overwhelming appoints intelligence professionals to lead their peak national intelligence agencies and as principal intelligence advisors.²³

The appointment of a professional intelligence officer to lead strategic intelligence organisations and provide advice to national decision-makers offers significant benefits. In Australia’s context, considerations include:

• Representation at this rank level assists in the aspiration of delivering intelligence-led decisions, policy and operations and provides centralised control. As a member of the Strategic Command Group, Director DIO provides all-source strategic defence intelligence to senior defence and civilian decision- and policymakers. As the ADF’s senior principal intelligence officer (the ‘Strategic J2’), Director DIO is a full participant in the CDF’s decision-making process. The role of the ‘Strategic J2’ is more than simply providing intelligence assessment. Like a principal intelligence officer at any level, in his capacity as the ‘Strategic J2’ Director DIO must ensure the ADF’s intelligence capabilities are employed as a strategic asset and are effectively considered throughout all phases of strategic planning and policymaking. A senior intelligence professional will intuitively understand this based on their training and depth of experience. They will possess instinctive knowledge of what to ask for and from whom. Of note Director DIO has no staff to assist him in his ‘Strategic J2’ role except for the Director General – Intelligence who is also employed as the J2 for Headquarters Joint Operations Command. Finally, the appointment of an intelligence professional as the ‘Strategic J2’ will, via the proposed Director of Army Intelligence and Principal Intelligence Officer Headquarters Forces Command, ensure intelligence is controlled and coordinated centrally, thereby adhering to a key principle of intelligence.²⁴
   
• The size, importance and complexity of intelligence has grown exponentially since 1999. The Army has recognised the importance and benefits of appointing suitably trained and qualified intelligence professionals as unit-level intelligence officers throughout Army’s three regular brigades; they are no longer extra- regimental appointments. This was due to the evolution in the level of complexity and importance of the role intelligence now undertakes at the tactical-level during operations. Arguably, this complexity increases exponentially at the strategic- level. Here, large, well-resourced, national intelligence agencies manage highly sensitive collection and assessment capabilities, and the policies and relationships that underpin them.²⁵ Ultimately, these assessments inform decisions and policymaking at the national level. However, despite the growth in size and complexity of intelligence at the strategic levels, the recognition of intelligence professionals is yet to translate into the higher echelons of Army and Defence intelligence.
   
• Draw upon a career of professional intelligence networking both domestically and internationally. Intelligence in the Australian context relies on a network of allies not least of which is the United States. Throughout their career, intelligence professionals working within the intelligence community have increased opportunities to build strong professional networks and can draw on such relationships to good advantage. The same network of professional relationships applies domestically both in the Defence Intelligence Community and wider Australian Intelligence Community. An intelligence professional is less likely to require an in-depth introductory period learning about DIO, the Australian Intelligence Community, and the allied intelligence agencies and organisations for the first portion of their posting. Furthermore, this introductory process probably inhibits any momentum generated by the previous executive administration.
   
• Strategic messaging. The message to Australia’s allies is an important one. Australia leverages heavily on the United States for intelligence support. Each service in the United States possesses an intelligence specialisation where officers can reach a two-star ranking as a Service, Combatant Command or Joint Staff J2, and three-star ranking in command of the Defense Intelligence Agency—DIO’s sister agency in the United States. These officers are overwhelmingly career intelligence professionals who have been employed as principal intelligence advisors or commanding intelligence collection capabilities at unit or formation level throughout their careers.
   
• The symbolism associated with the appointment of a professional intelligence officer aids the retention of capable, ambitious intelligence talent. ADF intelligence professionals from the three services look to Director DIO and his position as the CDF’s principal intelligence advisor as the culmination of a career within their service and wider defence intelligence community. These are officers who have spent their careers providing intelligence advice to commanders at almost every level domestically and during operational deployment. The experience, knowledge and expertise that these officers can apply is significant, yet this resource remains unexploited. The ADF and Army have senior specialist officers at the O6-level and above employed in the logistics, special forces and communications communities to name a few, yet fails to capitalise on levering the experience of its intelligence professionals both within Army and DIO.

Of the eight directors of DIO since 1990, only one possessed an intelligence background. By inference this could imply that Army has no suitably qualified, high quality, professional military intelligence officers capable of assuming the appointment of Director DIO. However, an examination of available personnel indicates this is not the case. Acknowledging that ‘suitably qualified’ covers a range of competencies, demonstrated competence within the field of intelligence should rate highly.²⁶

Currently, the Army has five brigadiers each with more than twenty years experience within the intelligence community. Three of these brigadiers have served as the assistant principal intelligence officer (Deputy CJ2) to the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, while another is currently serving in the position. The Deputy CJ2 ISAF position is the highest non-US intelligence appointment in theatre and is the second most senior intelligence representative behind CJ2 ISAF—a US Army major general who is a career military intelligence officer. The Deputy CJ2 ISAF is responsible for assisting CJ2 ISAF in the supervision and management of the intelligence architecture in Afghanistan, which ranges from tactical through to strategic intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, thousands of personnel and hundreds of millions of dollars of specialised equipment. During his year-long tenure, the Deputy CJ2 ISAF is often called upon to act as the CJ2 ISAF in his absence.

For the first time since the Vietnam War, Army now possesses a significant depth and quality of senior professional military intelligence expertise ready to provide advice to senior commanders and lead or hold senior appointments within intelligence or collection organisations. While the appointment of former operational commanders to lead intelligence organisations can be seen to offer fresh insight, career intelligence professionals not only possess the requisite skills, knowledge and experience, but also inherently understand the nuances, relationships and culture having developed and grown as a professional within the intelligence community. Although there are arguably some benefits from appointing non-intelligence professionals, given the current depth of talent and expertise of senior intelligence professionals currently available in Army, the time is ready for the balance to shift.

Army's Intelligence Support to Amphibious Operations

Major Earl ‘Pete’ Ellis wrote the seminal conceptual treatise on amphibious operations, ‘Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia’, in 1921. At that time the Navy and Marine Corps did not possess a single amphibious ship, landing craft, or amphibious vehicle.²⁷

In 2014/15 the ADF will introduce into service two Canberra class Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD).²⁸ The Canberra class LHD will be the largest warship ever operated by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and will represent a sea change in force projection capability. At the launch of the first LHD hull in February 2011, the

then Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Crane, stated that ‘with a new generation in technology would come a new way of thinking in terms of how Navy would operate and crew this new capability. I am confident we will have the people and the know-how by the time the first LHD comes on line.’²⁹ His statement is not only relevant to the Navy, but applies equally to the Army as the projection of land forces provides the raison d’être for the purchase of these naval platforms. Providing intelligence support to amphibious operations enabled by these platforms represents a challenge to the Intelligence Corps: how does the corps position itself to provide suitably trained and experienced personnel that have the requisite know-how to operate effectively as part of the (new) amphibious capability? While this section addresses intelligence support to amphibious capability, it should be noted that this cannot be considered in isolation; changes brought about by the need to support the amphibious capability must be synchronised with other developments in order to maintain a holistic approach to both the ADF’s and Army’s intelligence capability.

Providing intelligence support to amphibious operations enabled by these platforms represents a challenge to the Intelligence Corps

The ability for government to project military power throughout Australia’s region and beyond, by deployment and sustainment from the sea, places land force maritime manoeuvre in the littoral environment as a key component of future ADF capability.³⁰ The ADF’s future Amphibious Task Force (ATF) may be directed to undertake amphibious operations³¹ in the near region or beyond, in a range of environments³² and the Amphibious Force enabled by the new naval platforms provides joint commanders with scalable, expeditionary combined arms response options.³³ The primary component of Army’s contribution to the ATF will be the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).

The Operational Concept Document for the Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment System (JP2048) defines the ARG as ‘a Battle Group based organisation with enablers such as armour, artillery, aviation, engineers and logistics’.³⁴ The LHDs will be able to embark all of the necessary Combat Support, Combat Service Support and ISR capabilities necessary for a battle group to operate independently and, when desired, to fully integrate the battle group into a joint, interagency and/or coalition operation.³⁵ Jon Hawkins and Albert Palazzo have examined how the Army and the ADF would undertake and sustain a dedicated standing ARG, including the challenges of certification and effective collective training. Both Hawkins and Palazzo consider the United States Marine Corps (USMC) to be the world’s best practitioners of amphibious operations but also acknowledge the UK, Netherlands, France and Italy as having useful models.³⁶

Regardless of the future environment or operation in which the ARG will be employed, intelligence will be required to provide support throughout all operational and tactical phases.³⁷ The Intelligence Corps will be required to support amphibious operations by providing analytical support from the strategic through tactical levels. Intelligence support to strategic decision-making will be required at Australian Defence Headquarters, into operational and contingency planning at Headquarters Joint Operations Command, and into tactical planning at Headquarters 1st Division and 3rd Brigade. When afloat, the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force will be supported by his own maritime intelligence staff, while the Commander Land Forces and the Commanding Officer of the ARG will require support from an integral intelligence staff and broader intelligence architecture. Additionally, such a staff will need to be capable of integrating the specialist intelligence staff required to support a Special Operations Task Group, Rotary Wing Task Group or a Logistics Support Element. The Australian Intelligence Corps is approximately 500-strong; directly or indirectly supporting the deployment of the ATF will likely require a considerable number of these personnel.³⁸

US Joint Doctrine states that amphibious operations have been characterised as one of the most complex and difficult military operations.³⁹ Palazzo observes that among the most pressing requirements facing Army is to learn the complexities of amphibious operations and to work with Navy with a degree of intimacy and cooperation that has rarely existed before.⁴⁰ Palazzo argues that the baseline for amphibious skills greatly exceeds that of traditional land warfare; personnel in the landing force must become masters of both land and maritime environments, particularly the dangerous transition from ship to shore (and back again).⁴¹ Intelligence is no exception.

Although the fundamental nature of intelligence support remains extant, there are areas where the support requirement differs from a purely land based operation. Amphibious operations involve extensive planning in all functional areas to ensure that personnel, ships, aircraft, landing craft, and supporting fires are synchronised to take advantage of an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities and expedite combat power build-up and sustainment ashore. Intelligence challenges cited in United States Joint Doctrine include a heavy initial reliance on national and theatre collection assets, the lack of amphibious force ISR assets in the operational area during the planning phase, the transition ashore, and the requirement to provide analysis to compensate for relatively longer periods of uncertainty.⁴² Despite some of these challenges not being unique to amphibious operations, the complexity of the littoral environment underpinned by unfamiliarity of operating afloat alongside a nascent maritime intelligence capability will most certainly present a significant initial test for Army intelligence personnel.

The RAN also recognises the importance of the joint intelligence function. The RAN’s maritime joint warfighting capability document, Future Maritime Operating Concept 2025, identifies the importance of the fusion of multi-source intelligence data to produce a coherent picture for the joint force.⁴³ While encouraging, there is more to the provision of intelligence support than picture compilation and this reinforces the need for all services to broaden and deepen their understanding of the intelligence support requirements to amphibious operations.

The importance of intelligence during the conduct of amphibious operations is highlighted by the personnel and space allocated within a United States Navy (USN) Wasp class LHD.⁴⁴ The Joint Intelligence Centre on a Wasp class LHD has approximately sixty secure compartmented intelligence spaces for up to 120 USMC and USN intelligence personnel, divided evenly across both services and split between two shifts. While recognising that the RAN’s Canberra class LHD is around 10,000 tonnes smaller than a Wasp class LHD, the dedicated secure compartmented intelligence space is for eight personnel. This does not include spaces allocated to intelligence personnel within the Main Planning Room or Joint Operations Room, which may fluctuate depending on mission requirements. This physical limitation will define the operating parameters for both land and maritime intelligence staff while afloat. These parameters provide impetus for more effective and efficient intelligence-related systems and procedures—pending the amount of dedicated bandwidth—in order to compensate for the lack of allocated space.⁴⁵ As highlighted previously, although the Australian Amphibious Concept was published in 2010, there remains no concept for the employment of intelligence support to amphibious operations which outlines proposed intelligence architecture, structure, capabilities, roles and responsibilities.

Despite this lack of concept, both land and maritime intelligence organisations have the right foundation to confront these challenges—their personnel already undertake individual training in a joint, interagency environment at the Defence Intelligence Training Centre.⁴⁶ This training is reinforced by postings, deployments and experience in this environment from an early stage. The challenge for Army’s intelligence personnel is how to obtain the required experience and knowledge in the available time and current operational tempo, and invest this back into the individual training system while simultaneously being ready to provide support to amphibious operations. Specific subjects to address during individual training may include understanding amphibious command and control, planning considerations for amphibious operations including the Mission Appreciation Process/Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield-specific differences, additional allied and maritime ISR capabilities, and the constraints and limitations of the provision of intelligence support while afloat.⁴⁷

The Army’s Intelligence Corps will need to rapidly introduce intelligence support to amphibious operations to its individual training continuum. However, before it can be introduced into training, instructional staff must acquire the requisite expertise in order to effectively train others. The simplest and most effective option is to gain the knowledge from one of Australia’s closest allies—the United States—and their naval expeditionary force in readiness for the USMC.⁴⁸ Although Palazzo warns that the Army should carefully consider aspiring to the competency of the USMC, tapping into existing intelligence expertise offers a low risk, high pay-off opportunity given the USMC’s reputation as leaders in the field and underpinned by the likelihood of undertaking coalition operations in the future.⁴⁹ This opportunity is further enhanced by the announcement of the deployment of US Marines to Darwin where they will conduct exercises and training on a rotational basis.⁵⁰

In the short term, personnel identified for instructional postings or with tenure at the Defence Intelligence Training Centre would benefit from attendance at training conducted by the United States’ Expeditionary Warfare Training Group. Their programs focus on integrating intelligence with deliberate planning (operational and contingency) as well as rapid staff planning in support of crisis response. Courses for consideration include the Amphibious Warfare Indoctrination Course and Expeditionary Warfare Staff Planning Course. This individual training experience should be reinforced by experiential learning on annual collective training exercises such as the Battle Staff Training Program conducted by the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group and participation as integrated intelligence planning staff on USMC amphibious exercises such as Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR. Once trained, these personnel can return to instructional appointments to embed amphibious warfare knowledge, skill and experience into the Intelligence Corps individual training continuum. In order to create a sustainable instructor continuum, longer term options such as deployments or postings as intelligence planning staff in a marine expeditionary unit, the reactivation of an instructional exchange appointment at the Navy and Marine Intelligence Training Center, or the introduction of a liaison officer to the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – Enterprise (MCISR-E) should also be considered.⁵¹ While the Strategic Reform Program⁵² and Brady Review⁵³ are not particularly supportive of such arrangements, the magnitude of the capability and cost of capital assets indicates that this is a cost effective investment opportunity to ensure the Army can get the force at the right place, at the right time, in order to achieve the right effect.⁵⁴

As Palazzo observes, ‘there are few areas in Army that won’t be affected by the arrival of the LHDs’.⁵⁵ Intelligence forms a critical component in the planning and conduct of any amphibious operation. Along with the other staff functions and in concert with its maritime intelligence partners, the Intelligence Corps faces the challenge of preparing personnel for employment within a new capability while being constrained by time and a lack of current knowledge, expertise and experience. The Army’s Intelligence Corps must rapidly prepare to provide intelligence support to amphibious operations in order to meet the intent of government and ADF headquarters in relation to their amphibious warfare aspirations. Although the ADF does not yet possess the LHD capabilities or even a concept for intelligence support, like the USMC of the 1920s the Army’s intelligence personnel, in close coordination with its RAN maritime intelligence partners can examine, test and introduce training and doctrine in preparation to integrate effectively into the amphibious capability. For the relatively small short-term investment in training and postings, Army’s intelligence personnel would be well positioned to support amphibious operations upon the arrival of the LHD capabilities.

Conclusion

Meaningful change will not occur until commanders at all levels take responsibility for intelligence.⁵⁶

The reinvigorated understanding and investment has seen an increase in the effective use of intelligence and its associated ISR capabilities during operations in the Middle East and South Asia. Over the past decade the introduction and maturation of a new range of training organisations and capabilities underpinned by a depth of operational experience throughout all ranks provides a solid platform from which to continue development. However, like many of the capabilities within Army, intelligence faces many challenges post-Afghanistan.

The impending arrival of the RAN’s LHD capability heralds a new chapter in the ADF’s history. One which both land and maritime intelligence capabilities are currently unprepared for. Along with its maritime partners, rapid decision and solid investment need to be undertaken to ensure that Army’s intelligence capability is ready to contribute to this most complex and demanding of military operations. A concept for intelligence support is urgently required in order to guide individual and collective training, capability development and structure. In the meantime, Army’s intelligence personnel, in close coordination with RAN maritime counterparts, need look no further than one of their closest allies for expert advice on how to effectively prepare. While mindful of their size and inherent capabilities, tapping into existing intelligence expertise of the USMC offers a low risk, high pay-off opportunity given the USMC’s reputation as leaders in the field and underpinned by the likelihood of undertaking coalition operations together in the future.

The lack of intelligence input into, and preparation for, the introduction of the amphibious capability is one of the consequences stemming from the lack of professional intelligence support to Army’s senior commanders. Army currently does not have adequate professional intelligence support at the right levels in order to effectively provide synchronisation of effort regarding intelligence activities and capabilities across the Service. The unsustainable demand for intelligence personnel to support current operations, the introduction of game changing intelligence capabilities, the ongoing ISR Force Modernisation Review, and the ADF’s requirement to refocus following Afghanistan all indicate the requirement for commanders to receive the best possible professional intelligence support. Both of Army’s principal commanders, the Chief of the Army and Commander Forces Command, require additional integral, qualified, intelligence staff.

At this time, neither commander has immediate access to suitably qualified and experienced professional intelligence officers to support them on issues including training integration, policy advice, capability development and personnel management. This lack of support is especially detrimental to the coherent and consistent development of Army’s ISR capabilities. Although Army has recognised the importance of intelligence professionals at the tactical level, this is yet to transcend to its highest headquarters, or indeed the Australian Defence Force Headquarters. The CDF’s principal intelligence officer and director of the ADF’s peak analytical body is rarely an intelligence professional. With the completion of combat operations fast looming in Afghanistan, the maintenance of knowledge and understanding of intelligence represents a challenge; future generations of commanders, policymakers and planners need to be active participants in the intelligence process, and not just passive recipients. The investment in these qualified intelligence professionals means Army can optimise the overall management of one of its most critical enablers, and not risk being underprepared for the next fight. Without this informed and improved support, Army will once again risk stagnating development rather than preparing its intelligence capability for the next contingency, crisis or conflict beyond prediction today.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Gills trained at ADFA and RMC Duntroon between 1991 and 1994. His operational experience includes deployments to Bougainville, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. He is currently posted to the J2 Branch of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon.

Endnotes

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1    Opening remarks by Lieutenant General R L Burgess, Director United States Defense Intelligence Agency, US Interagency Intelligence Partnerships Supporting Future Military Contingencies Conference, Bolling AFB, Washington DC, 1 December 2011.

2    Alan Dupont, Inflection Point: The Australian Defence Force after Afghanistan, Policy Brief, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, March 2012, p. 3.

3    Ibid., p. 4.

4    Christopher Paul et al, Alert and Ready: An Organizational Design Assessment of Marine Corps Intelligence, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica California, 2011, p. xiii.

5    Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2, Intelligence, Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 7 June 1997, p. 77.

6    The US, NATO and ABCA have no definition for ‘ISTAR’ or ‘ISTAREW’. The ADF definition of ISR is ‘a collection activity that synchronises and integrates the acquisition, processing and provision of information and single source intelligence by sources and agencies tasked to satisfy a collection requirement’ Source: ADDP 3.7 Collection Operations, Department of Defence, 2009.

7    Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 2-1, Intelligence Operations, Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 10 September 2003, p. 49.

8    6 BDE (ISR and Combat Support) comprises eleven units, three of which represent the Army’s dedicated expeditionary tactical-level ISR collection capabilities. These units are the 1st Intelligence Battalion, 20th Surveillance and Target Acquisition Regiment and the 7th Signals Regiment. Although Headquarters 6th Brigade is responsible for Army’s dedicated expeditionary tactical-level ISR collection capabilities, until January 2011 it did not have any Intelligence Corps staff at its headquarters. There is now an Intelligence Corps lieutenant colonel employed as the SO1 ISR.

9    Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, Overlook, 2003, p. 65.

10  The Hon Joel Fitzgibbon MP, Minister for Defence, A Defence Force for the 21st Century, Ministerial Support and Public Affairs, Department of Defence, Canberra, <http://www.defence.gov.au/media&gt;, 2 May 2009. ‘The generation of operationally- ready land forces will be enhanced by the formation of Forces Command, located in Sydney, which will be responsible for all individual and group training.’

11  As part of their training as principal intelligence officers, Intelligence Corps personnel are the only members within Army that are trained and qualified in collection management and coordination of the employment of Army, ADF and allied tactical- through-national ISR capabilities. While there are experts in specific ISR or collection capabilities in Army and the ADF, Intelligence Corps personnel are taught the strength and limitations of these varied collection capabilities and how best to employ them in order to answer a commander’s priority intelligence requirements.

51  The Army has recently activated a captain Operations position and a captain Logistics position in a USMC marine expeditionary unit. There is currently an Intelligence Corps captain posted to the headquarters of 3 (UK) CDO BDE as an intelligence planner. This position will provide useful insight into an alternate amphibious force of similar size and capability to the ADF’s. However, given the USMC’s reputation as leaders in the field and underpinned by the likelihood of undertaking coalition operations in the future, consideration should be given to transferring the position to a marine expeditionary unit. In 2012 Army activated a liaison officer position (lieutenant colonel) to the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. INSCOM is a global command with ten major brigade-size subordinate commands and a variety of smaller units with personnel dispersed over 180 locations worldwide. Given the similar size, culture, doctrine and training to Australian ISR capabilities, a liaison officer position to the MCISR-E offers considerably more advantages. Additionally, this position could also provide assistance in leveraging USMC knowledge and experience in providing intelligence support to amphibious operations. Following discussions in the 2012 A2MC ST, it was agreed that the AALNO to INSCOM should also be accredited to the MCISR-E.

52  ‘The Strategic Reform Program will comprehensively and fundamentally improve the supporting “backbone” of Defence, making the organisation more efficient and effective, and creating significant savings to reinvest in building a stronger Defence Force. These savings and reinvestments are essential to ensure the capability goals set out in the White Paper are delivered.’ The Strategic Reform Program: Delivering Force 2030, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 5.

53  ‘The Brady Review is a review of Intelligence Capability and is one of eight internal “Companion Reviews” commissioned to examine key parts of the Defence Organisation.’ The Strategic Reform Program: Delivering Force 2030, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 4.

54  Robert Moyse, ‘Manoeuvre in the Littoral Environment’ in Peter Kerr (ed), Peter Mitchell Essays, 2003, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Canberra, 2005, p. 77.

55  Palazzo, ‘Towards a Maritime Force’, Security Challenges, p. 41.

56  Major General Michael T Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, and Paul D Batchelor, DIA, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, Center for a New American Security, January 2010, p. 23.