Today sees the release of a new Occasional Paper, Littoral Operations for the Australian Army—Theory and Principles. The paper presents a comprehensive conceptual re‑evaluation of how the Australian Army can operate in the littoral: an environment where land, sea, air, space and cyber domains intertwine. It argues that Australia’s strategic circumstances and the accelerating evolution of long‑range, high‑precision weapons necessitates a fundamental shift in thinking. The Army must no longer view itself as a land‑focused force that is occasionally projected by sea, but rather as an indispensable contributor to sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection.
The Australian Army must be reconceptualised as a littoral force capable of shaping maritime outcomes, not simply fighting on land after arriving from the sea. Littoral operations are not merely a new tactical approach, but an operational construct to enable the ADF’s strategic transformation aligned with Australia’s national defence strategy.
The idea that geography and distance shields Australia is historically and strategically untenable. The nation’s dependence on maritime trade and the vulnerability of its sea lines of communication mean that threats arise far from its shores. As such, the ligature between Australian national security and the maritime domain is permanent, not episodic. Any credible defence posture requires projecting influence forward into the archipelagos to Australia’s north and east, rather than relying on a defensive buffer across empty oceans – the notorious ‘sea-air gap’.
This strategy must be grounded in sea power theory, which has always relied on joint capabilities, including land forces able to influence the maritime domain. History illustrates that land forces have long been able to shape maritime outcomes to some degree, but today’s technology dramatically expands their radius of influence. Long‑range precision fires, integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), and advanced ISR systems turn dispersed land detachments into potentially significant players in sea control and denial campaigns.
A key discussion point in this paper is the difference between amphibious and littoral operations. Amphibious operations can be defined by a linear ship‑to‑shore flow of forces. Littoral operations, however, involve manoeuvre across an entire archipelagic battlespace: projecting effects from sea to land, land to sea, and land to land – as well as the airspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Australia’s geography demands an Army comfortable with operating across multiple islands, choke points, and maritime approaches. This is not to say that littoral has superseded amphibious doctrine. Amphibious skills remain necessary as a baseline for many littoral operations. Rather, the central challenge is campaigning in an environment where the land cannot be isolated from the sea, and where joint effects must be produced rapidly, including in dispersed and low‑signature ways.
In line with the categorisation of amphibious operations in doctrine, this paper proposes a three‑part classification of littoral mission sets:
- Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting (ISRT)
- Offensive Operations / Strike
- Occupation and Manoeuvre
This is intended as a framework to understand the land force contribution in littoral environments/campaigns. Notably, these missions are not sequential, but often concurrent. A force may simultaneously hold key terrain (occupation), generate targeting information (ISRT), and conduct or support long‑range fires (offensive operations). This concurrency reflects the reality of contested littoral zones where time, signature, and mobility are at a premium.
The paper also highlights that the Army’s ability to directly influence maritime outcomes relies heavily on long‑range fires. Land‑based missile units, enabled by dispersed sensors and supported through robust logistics, can deliver effects once achievable only by ships or aircraft. This is not an easy task, and striking mobile naval targets is difficult, requiring fused, precise targeting and a significant salvo size. It further underscores the need for Army’s contributions to be integrated, not independent.
The maritime environment has great potential as a manoeuvre space for land forces. Future forces must possess organic mobility across both the sea and the land domains, reflecting the lessons of past campaigns where manoeuvre by water enabled operational advantage. This point carries major implications: littoral land forces will need organic landing craft, uncrewed vessels, and small boats, not as Navy enablers, but as essential Army manoeuvre assets.
Finally, there are a whole host of considerations that require particular focus in a littoral context. While important in every military operation, command and control, logistics, fires, mobility, deception, and technology will require new approaches for modern littoral operations. Particularly important will be designing and implementing novel approaches to deliver medical support, establish and maintain communications, and sustain deployed forces, which will be far more challenging than in recent land campaigns. High‑signature movements invite lethal retaliation in a weapons‑engagement zone crowded with sensors and fires. Success therefore demands disciplined emission control, dispersion, and sophisticated deception. These observations have been amongst the clearest to emerge from Ukraine, but will require adaptation to a geographically and climatically distinct Indo‑Pacific environment.
A littoral enabled land forces will be critical to future deterrence and denial strategies. In an Indo‑Pacific defined by archipelagos and contested sea space, an Army that can seize, defend, and exploit key terrain while projecting multi‑domain effects is indispensable. The paper seek to provides a conceptual blueprint for how the Australian Army must evolve into a littoral-enabled force. This paper does not solve ‘littoral’; it is not proscriptive or doctrinaire. It is intended to serve as a robust foundation to the conversation on how the Australian Army can contribute to the integrated ADF’s role of defending Australia in the 21st century.
