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Enhancing Australia’s Integrated Deterrence

Land Power’s Contribution

Australia stands at a pivotal moment in its military strategic policy with the National Defence Strategy 2024 (NDS) adopting deterrence by denial and calling for the evolution of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) into a truly integrated force. The aim is to maximise the ADF’s deterrence, denial, and response options in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the NDS lacks specificity on crucial aspects, such as the who, where, when, why, and how the ADF will harness military power for deterrence objectives. Australia’s evolving deterrence strategy requires clarity and cohesion to effectively achieve national interests. In our forthcoming Australian Army Journal (AAJ) article, ‘Australian Deterrence: Land Power’s Contribution to the Integrated Force’ we examine how the ADF should approach deterrence and examines land power’s contribution to integrated force effects to enhance Australia’s capacity and capability to deliver deterrence objectives.

Back to Deterrence Basics

To understand how the ADF and the Australian Army contribute to the strategic and operational demands of the integrated force, it is essential to baseline the basic principles of deterrence. Deterrence is broadly defined as the process of discouraging adversaries from unwanted actions. It relies on three pillars: capability, credibility, and communication. The ADF’s success in deterring potential aggressors hinges on the effective integration of these elements. Capability involves influencing behaviour through military power; credibility stems from an adversary’s perception of the deterrer’s will and reputation; and communication ensures a clear and unambiguous transmission of resolve. Deterrence operates across two time periods—immediate and general. Immediate deterrence aims to prevent imminent actions, requiring targeted messaging to signal capability and resolve. General deterrence, on the other hand, is a long-term effort of shaping the international security environment through capabilities and reputation. Understanding how they both operate is vital for Australia’s deterrence strategy. Shaping the environment is integral to achieving integrated deterrence across services and domains.

Towards a Deterrence by Denial Campaign Framework

We propose expanding the concept of campaign planning to connect general deterrence activities to immediate deterrence postures. We do this by developing a deterrence by denial campaign framework that could assist ADF leadership think through how to achieve and continuously improve Australia’s independent and collective deterrence options and activities. Enhancing deterrence campaign planning in this way would enable purposeful shaping activities across the competition continuum. Such a revised approach to campaigning could help clarify deterrence objectives and missions, force design, and posture decisions. This could, in turn, strengthen conventional deterrence by denial in the Indo-Pacific region. This approach ensures a more purposeful integration of individual services, including the Army, in achieving deterrence goals. The framework also encourages ongoing assessment, refinement through wargaming, and a deeper dialogue with allies, particularly the United States. 

Land Power’s Contribution to Deterrence

We identify three key critical contributions from Army that can help with the achievement of Australia’ deterrence objectives at home and abroad. Firstly, Army being persistently present in the region (including through ongoing international engagement and training activities) to help shape perceptions around Australian intent and military capability. Importantly, these activities generate a context within which partner states can align themselves with Australia’s deterrence objectives. Second, Army delivering credible capabilities that reinforce the integrated force in the region. Lastly, Army producing a combat credible force capable of deterring aggression, and should deterrence fail, one that is demonstrably capable of defeating an adversary in combat. 

In the dynamic landscape of the Indo-Pacific over the last decade, the Australian Army has not just maintained, but has solidified its influence. Army has established a persistent presence and sought to gain preferred partner status with numerous nations in the region. The Army’s commitment to conduct regular military exercises, as well as train, advise, assist missions, serves as a linchpin in enhancing deterrence because it enables Australia to exercise influence, and thereby helps to strategically deny potential adversaries access to critical resources. The Australian Army’s unique advantage in the Indo-Pacific lies in the relative prominence of armies in leadership roles within regional militaries, including in positions that help shape joint strategies and operational concepts. Leveraging person-to-person links with senior regional armies, the Australian Army is already a credible voice, and is therefore well placed to directly communicate deterrence objectives and to help coordinate partner and joint forces during potential conflicts.

As the geopolitical landscape evolves, the Army’s networks of regional senior leadership emerge as pivotal assets. These networks, especially in Australia’s northern approaches, can be instrumental in furthering Australian and coalition objectives, allowing for dispersed asymmetric effects. While collaborative efforts among all three ADF services are crucial, Army’s strong relationships within the region uniquely position it to contribute significantly to common deterrence goals.

Australia’s northern approaches are not Australian territory. Therefore, there is considerable merit in Defence ensuring its international engagement objectives move towards explicit deterrence and denial goals. In doing so, the ADF can help assure itself access to the sovereign territory of immediate neighbours during critical times. In this effort, Army must be forward in the region to enable power projection and to help it prepare for conflict with greater speed, precision, and lethality. Such a proactive stance sends a strong message to the region of Australia’s commitment to deterring hostility and reinforces the overall effectiveness of deterrence efforts.

While Army is already positioned to acquire long-range capabilities that can contribute to deterrence objectives, challenges still remain. Our article explores the acquisition of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launcher and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) will contribute significantly towards the deterrence objectives of the integrated force. However, challenges in range, mass, and mobility must be addressed if Army is to make a truly meaningful contribution to deterrence objectives. The article explores Army’s roles in the integrated force e in massing effect from dispersed forces and providing survivable capabilities. These roles underscore the importance of Army having the capacity to coordinate C4ISR for the integrated force, and provide base defences and logistics. Army’s ability to conduct long-range reconnaissance missions will also be key to enhancing the ADF’s credibility and serves as a strong message of deterrence.

Amid the focus on deterrence, it is also essential to recognise what happens when deterrence fails. Our article explores the ongoing need for land forces to maintain resilient and survival combat-credible military forces. As conflicts increasingly involve close combat, land forces play a unique role in seizing strategic points, conducting rapid manoeuvre, and working with local partners to pose operational dilemmas on opponents.

Conclusion

As Australia embraces a denial strategy, the ADF faces the simultaneous challenge of deterring direct attack on its territory while contributing to the deterrence of great power territorial ambitions. The proposed campaigning framework outlined in our AAJ article offers a pathway to optimise deterrence efforts, emphasising the unique contributions of land power and fostering collective deterrence with allies. Land power has a significant role in Australia’s deterrence strategy. Through international engagement, the Australian Army can shape the region, align partner states with deterrence objectives, and gain critical access in times of crisis. Additionally, the Army’s combat-credible force enhances the capabilities of the integrated force and serves as a last line of defence if deterrence fails. With a focus on communication, capability and credibility, Australia can navigate the evolving landscape of integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

NOTE: The views expressed in this Land Power Forum Post are the authors’ and do not represent the Australian government or OCRT Consulting.

About the Authors

Dr Gregory MacCallion is a Senior Managing Consultant for OCRT. He has a career that spans Australian academia and public service in the Department of Defence. Gregory has contributed to Defence’s first deterrence polices, the 2020 Force Structure Plan, and 2022 ADF Theatre Operating Concept. In 2019, he published his book, National versus Human Security: Australian and Canadian Military Interventions. Gregory has contributed to numerous book chapters, journal articles, and presented at international conferences on security theory, strategy, and foreign policy. He holds a PhD in International Relations from The Australian National University, and a MA in International Relations from the University of Queensland. 

Ms Courtney Stewart is a Senior Managing Consultant at OCRT with over 20 years of national security experience in government, industry, and think tanks. She previously served as the US Department of Defense (DoD) Policy Exchange Officer to Australian DoD. In the Pentagon she worked in the offices of Nuclear and Missile Defense, East Asia, Nuclear Matters and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. In 2013, Courtney was the lead author and negotiator of the US-ROK Tailored Deterrence Strategy. In 2015, she earned a US Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service. She holds a MA in Science and Security from King’s College London, and BAs in Political Science and History from University of California, Los Angeles.

The views expressed in this article and subsequent comments are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Australian Army, the Department of Defence or the Australian Government.

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