Release of Occasional Paper No. 34, Surf and Turf Operations

Australian Army Occasional Paper No. 34, Surf and Turf Operations, by Joshua Higgins

The 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) directs the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to optimise for littoral manoeuvre within Australia’s primary area of military interest (PAMI), in response to great power competition and reduced warning times. This strategic environment demands innovative approaches that offset Australia’s vulnerabilities in mass and technology through asymmetry—leveraging strengths against adversary weaknesses.

Purpose and Context

This paper examines how Army’s cavalry can deliver asymmetric effects in the Indo-Pacific littoral domain. It argues that cavalry is uniquely positioned to bridge the gap between special operations forces (SOF) and conventional brigade formations, offering flexibility, adaptability, and economy of force. Drawing lessons from the 2/2nd Independent Company’s operations in Timor (1941–43), the paper demonstrates how historical asymmetric approaches remain relevant today.

The Indo-Pacific operating environment is characterised by complex littoral terrain, dispersed archipelagic states, and advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) systems. These factors constrain large-scale manoeuvre and increase reliance on versatile, survivable forces capable of operating forward without committing strategic assets.

Key Themes

Asymmetry Defined

Rod Thornton’s definition frames asymmetric warfare as actions by “have-nots” to exploit relative advantages against stronger opponents. Three critical factors underpin asymmetry:

1. Lack of organisational conservatism – structural and functional flexibility.
2. Disproportionality – achieving outsized effects relative to resource investment.
3. Relative advantage against a stronger opponent – leveraging surprise, deception, and adaptability.

Historical Case Study: Timor 1941–43

The 2/2nd Independent Company exemplified asymmetric success through:

• Flexible organisation and initiative.
• Integration with local forces and adaptation to guerrilla tactics.
• Sustained operations despite isolation and resource scarcity.

Although ultimately withdrawn, the campaign demonstrated how small, agile forces can impose strategic dilemmas on stronger adversaries—principles that resonate in today’s context of limited Australian mass and contested littoral terrain.

Modern Cavalry’s Asymmetric Value

Cavalry embodies the attributes required for contemporary asymmetric operations:

Flexible Organisational Structure

• Modular design enables rapid regrouping from patrol to battlegroup level.
• High officer/NCO ratio supports independent action and combined arms integration.

Rapid Technology Adoption

• Cavalry leads innovation in unmanned systems, counter-UAS, and optionally crewed platforms.
• Demonstrated adaptability in trials with robotics, drones, and advanced communications.

Multi-Echelon Competence

• Proven ability to operate across tactical, operational, and strategic levels simultaneously.
• Supports dispersed littoral ISR, interdiction, and rapid transition between roles.

Tempo and Mission Command

• Cavalry excels in rapid decision-making, task transition, and decentralised execution.
• Enables commanders to maintain initiative and exploit fleeting opportunities.

Combined Arms and SOF Interoperability

• Cavalry integrates seamlessly with infantry, engineers, fires, and SOF.
• Offers redundancy and reinforcement options for special operations in complex terrain.

Surprise and Deception

• Cavalry’s mobility and communications enable operational security and deception measures.
• Creates uncertainty for adversaries, compelling resource expenditure on ISR.

Challenges

• Outdated Doctrine: Current cavalry doctrine underrepresents its joint and littoral utility.
• Digital Connectivity Gaps: Lack of networked C3 systems limits optimisation in dispersed operations.
• Personnel Shortages: Insufficient dismounted scouts constrain reconnaissance depth.
• Perception Issues: Misconceptions about cavalry as “platform-centric” hinder advocacy.

Opportunities and Recommendations

• Doctrine Update: Integrate cavalry’s joint and littoral roles into ADF doctrine.
• Capability Development: Pursue swimmable platforms, modular UGV/UAS integration, and simplified supply chains.
• Training and PME: Emphasise creativity, deception operations, and regional cultural acumen.
• Partnerships: Strengthen ties with SOF, RFSG, and allied forces for interoperability.
• Advocacy: Promote cavalry as a force of choice for economy-of-force missions and strategic ambiguity.

Conclusion

Cavalry offers the ADF a versatile, adaptive, and asymmetric capability essential for operating in contested littoral environments. Its ability to deliver disproportional effects, preserve decision space, and integrate emerging technologies positions it as a critical enabler of Australia’s strategy of denial. To realise this potential, cavalry must overcome doctrinal, technological, and structural challenges through targeted investment, education, and advocacy.