Strategic Cooperation as Army Littoral Strategy
The 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and Defence Strategic Review (DSR) describe an Indo-Pacific region increasingly seeing the effects of US-China great power competition in a landscape where modern warfare is rapidly changing. Traditional kinetic warfare is increasingly being replaced by or complemented with hybrid tactics, including the use of cyberattack, foreign interference, influence on public opinion, and cognitive warfare. Climate change and rapidly advancing technologies such as AI and quantum represent further compounding factors to Australia’s security climate.
Within this complex and multi-faceted security environment, the NDS tasks the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with defending Australia and its northern approaches, a region made up of archipelagic and littoral environments to our nation’s near north. The DSR directed the Australian Army (Army) to build capability within the littoral warfighting domain. Perhaps paradoxically, I would argue that one key way Army can adapt and contribute to littoral warfare is not necessarily through direct preparation for kinetic conflict in the littoral battlespace, but through partnership and cooperation. This strategy can be implemented with partners to our near north, and in particular with a nation that has been described as Australia’s ‘northern shield’: Papua New Guinea (PNG).
Historic Ties
PNG is a country that has become intimately linked with Australian military and Army history, with the 1942 Kokoda campaign being crucial in halting the advance of Japanese forces in WWII through the Pacific and northern approaches. This campaign involved Australian soldiers fighting in difficult conditions through significant adversity, with the Battle of Milne Bay seeing Allied and Australian forces deliver the first defeat of Japanese forces on land. The New Guinea offensives of 1943-44 were the single largest series of interconnected military operations in Australian history, and the 9th Division’s September 1943 landing at Lae represented the first major amphibious landing by Australian soldiers since Gallipoli. When defence strategy refers to littoral warfare in our northern approach, it is referring to this region.
In modern times Australia and PNG have drawn closer as regional neighbours. Australia supported the nation through COVID-19 and development assistance, as well as through the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) to support regional stability, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. This relationship has been bolstered through a 2023 bilateral security agreement and more recently the Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese walked the Kokoda Track and celebrated Anzac Day with the PNG Prime Minister in 2024. This occurred closely on the back of another nation signing a significant mining agreement with the nation: China, with commentators speculating that PNG, and Bougainville in particular, may be the next Pacific battleground for US-China great power competition and influence. For Australia, there are further opportunities for building strategic relationships with PNG that will work towards Australia’s strategic aims of deterrence of adversaries and the shaping of its regional environment, aims which also support PNG’s own security.
A Littoral Rifle Company Butterworth?
One avenue of Australia-PNG cooperation in littoral warfare could be through the establishment of an Army company in the nation, along the lines of Rifle Company Butterworth. This infantry company is based in Malaysia and has allowed Australian soldiers, as well as reservists, to complete jungle and urban combat training in Malaysia and Singapore, as well as support regional contingency operations and relationship building with military partners. A PNG-version of this endeavour could further specialise in littoral warfare training for Australian and PNG soldiers, advance the two nations’ interoperability, and build joint capability in the littoral space.
Precedent for this joint infrastructure exists in the ADF’s supporting of construction at Igam Barracks at Lae in 2022, as well as the ongoing redevelopment of Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island. Both bases could be supported to take on Army littoral training and capability to complement their existing roles in maritime and regional security. These bases may further allow for entry pathways and the recruitment of PNG personnel into Army, potentially through a ‘Pacific Battalion’, aligning with ADF workforce changes to allow for non-citizen enlistment.
While Rifle Company Butterworth has hosted Army infantry, a similar program in PNG could host Australian soldiers from varying corps to specialise in littoral training alongside local military. In particular, this expansion could include the artillery corps and further capacity building in new technologies such as drones, a key capability of the Army Robotics and Autonomous Systems Strategy.
The future of littoral warfare will likely utilise new and emerging technologies, and thus training in the field will be beneficial for Australian soldiers as well as potentially support local security, such as in combatting illegal fishing in the seas or instability in the highland region via aerial surveillance. Just as at Butterworth, reserves could rotate through and undertake this training, considering civilian drone operators are now being utilised by military contractors in the Middle East and Army reserves in Perth already undertake amphibious training. These are examples of capability building not only for Australian soldiers in the littoral warfare domain, but also for our local partners in addressing regional security issues.
Australia-PNG Littoral Exercises
One further opportunity for Australia-PNG partnership that will further Army’s role in littoral warfare could be through a new joint exercise focused on littoral operations and scenarios involving Australia, it’s near north partners such as PNG, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste, as well as potentially other partners such as the US, Japan, and South Korea. PNG soldiers participated in their first Talisman Sabre exercise in 2023, and opportunities for further training for the nation alongside Australia and other partners in the littoral domain will not only assist in joint capability and interoperability, but also allow for deeper ties and relationships between Australia-PNG armies and others. Such an activity could take place at Shoalwater Bay, with the potential for activities in the littoral and jungle space of PNG, as well as the archipelagic environment around Indonesia and Timor-Leste.
These forms of activities could allow for greater Australian presence in its northern approaches, through basing initiatives in PNG, and represent an opportunity to shape the strategic environment through deeper relationships with partners based on reciprocal benefit and the development of military capability. This will allow Army to better respond to any potential military threat, particularly in the domain of littoral warfare. Cooperation further has the potential to adapt to new threats and technologies into the future such as through the cyber domain. Improving cyber capability with Pacific partners was specifically outlined as a key action in the 2023 Cyber Security Strategy, and PNG has been the victim of cyberattacks on government infrastructure in the past.
Defence Cooperation Program
The potential endeavours discussed could be further supported by and complemented through the DCP, whereby the most recent 2023-24 Defence Portfolio Budget Statement (PBS) outlined that the program with PNG is Australia’s largest of any partner nation, with the DCP supporting the conduct of bilateral exercises, mobile training teams, logistics support, governance, and information sharing with the country.
Australian Strategic Policy Institute figures show that DCP funding to PNG slowly rose in the decade beginning 2011-12 from nearly $AUD11.5 million to a peak of $AUD74.05 million in 2021-22. While this funding declined to $AUD49.6 million in 2022-23 for PNG specifically, the funding for the Pacific region within the latest 2023-24 Defence PBS, into which PNG was grouped, rose from a combined Pacific region total of $175.4 million in 2022-23 to a most recent $AUD248.2 million in 2023-24.
This shift in funding likely not only signifies the current defence focus on cooperation in the littoral environment to Australia’s near north, but also takes into account the requirement to build relationships and mutual capability with these partners in an increasingly contested strategic environment. The future of Australia’s security relationship with PNG and other partners in our northern approach will likely also need to factor in the ongoing impacts of climate change and rising sea levels.
This article has outlined potential ways Army can adapt in order to contribute to littoral warfare, in particular through deeper cooperation and partnership with a nation to our near north. The establishment of an Army littoral company in PNG, Australia-PNG littoral-focused bilateral or multilateral exercises, and ongoing investment through the DCP will allow for this contribution by Army. These endeavours can not only be implemented with our partner in PNG, but also serve as a guide for cooperation with other nations in our northern approaches such as Indonesia and Timor-Leste, as well as beyond in the security gateway of Southeast Asia. It is in this way that cooperation and partnership will ensure Army capability and Australian national security into the future.
The views expressed in this article and subsequent comments are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Australian Army, the Department of Defence or the Australian Government.
Using the Contribute page you can either submit an article in response to this or register/login to make comments.